New ways to end old wars

Transcription

1 New ways to end old wars Report based on expert seminar, St Martin in the Fields, 15 May 2012 Summary A group of 50 practitioners, policymakers and academics gathered in London to explore what we are all learning of new and innovative ways of dealing with protracted armed conflicts and preventing violence. Convened by independent peacebuilding organisation Conciliation Resources, this is the first in what we hope will become a series of yearly expert seminars on this theme. We shared some of the new trends and phenomena that we are seeing in our work in East and Central Africa Fiji, Kashmir and the Philippines, among others. A consensus emerged during the seminar that the negotiation table should not be the only pillar, or even the main pillar of effective conflict resolution. Some went as far as arguing that a peace agreement is not always needed to transform a conflict, as illustrated by ETA s recent unilateral cease-fire in the Basque country. The heavy concentration on Track 1 activities tends to close opportunities for peacemaking and sometimes even complicate the achievement of more sustainable peace. As the example from the International Contact Group in the Mindanao conflict of the Philippines showed, there is a need for multilayered approaches that are able to react to opportunities. No single strategy is enough. Participants agreed that there was a need to overcome challenges to building greater civil society participation in peace processes. By looking at cases where the Track 1 was blocked, we heard examples of civil society actors taking matters into their own hands. For example, making incremental gains towards getting the Kashmiri voice heard in New Delhi and Islamabad through a Joint Chamber of Commerce across the Line of Control. Or at the forefront of engaging with the hardest to reach, such as the military leadership in Fiji or getting Lord s Resistance Army fighters out of the bush. Ensuring the inclusion of women was seen as central to the quality of a peace process. Without women s inclusion in the peace process, the conflict cannot be transformed. Concrete lessons for the international community emerged through the discussions. There is a need reduce reliance on the negotiating table and the prestige mediator. Instead the international community can do much more to engage and support local capacities and processes by looking at what is there and works, and building on it. International support to peace processes has to get better at using sanctions and incentives in a strategic way: the case of Cyprus accession to the European Union without conditionality on the unification of the island being a case in point. But also counter-terrorism policies such as the blacklisting of armed groups or International Criminal Court indictments, which sometimes prove counter-productive to peacemaking processes. 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web:

2 Background This expert seminar was organised by Conciliation Resources. It formed part of an afternoon of events designed to engage with our longstanding and new friends, and explain what our partners and we are doing on the ground and in policy arenas. The aim of the expert seminar was to explore what we are learning of new and innovative ways of dealing with protracted armed conflicts and preventing violence. The transition to a non-violent political campaign in the Basque country in October 2011, for example, after 43 years of an armed campaign for independence, prompts questions: what was behind the decision and what can it tell us about new ways to resolve long-standing and violent conflicts? In many countries where Conciliation Resources is working, conflicts seem intractable yet we are not seeing hopelessness. Our partners are defining new paths to peace. The expert seminar was an opportunity to gather practitioners, policymakers and academics to explore whether new trends and phenomena that Conciliation Resources is seeing in its work, amount to new forms of peace processes and new conflict resolution architecture. The seminar was divided into two sessions. The first focused on innovations in international mediation and international mediation support. The second session explored two challenges: alternative paths to peace when the negotiating table and Track 1 cannot make headway; and how to engage with the hardest to reach or unrecognised entities when there is no Track 1 and even limited activity at Track 2. Deliberations were held under the Chatham House Rule. Session 1 Innovations in international mediation and mediation support We started the discussions with a case study on the Philippines Mindanao conflict. Negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have continued over 13 years, but have become increasingly sophisticated in response to crises during that period. In 2009 the parties created an International Contact Group (ICG) comprising four states and four international NGOs, including Conciliation Resources. A civilian protection component involving three local NGOs and one international NGO was also added to the existing international monitoring team. The ICG exerts leverage and builds trust among the parties and provides assistance on request. To this end it attends and observes the negotiations, and talks to the parties before and after the negotiations. International NGOs also act as a bridge between the parties and civil society. Three hypotheses were put forward for discussion from this experience: 1. There is a trend towards hybrid forms of mediation support and ceasefire monitoring The Contact Group in Mindanao is perhaps the first time international NGOs are part of the formal mediation support structure together with diplomats. The Government of the Philippines welcomes this format, as it limits the number of embassies monitoring their internal affairs. Diplomats also appreciate it, as international NGOs have greater flexibility and expertise in peace, which in turn complements the diplomats greater political and diplomatic leverage. Is this replicable elsewhere? 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 2

3 2. The need to demystify the negotiating table as a core pillar of the negotiating process. In the Philippines, 16 years after an agreement was reached through negotiations between the Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), there is still no peace settlement. The MILF splinter group is now in negotiations. Both parties are increasingly aware that, in order to win greater backing from their respective constituencies, negotiations need to be more inclusive. Negotiations tend to reward violence and play down the voices of those pursuing change through peaceful means, and in the longer-term reinforce a culture of violence. The negotiating table tends to be elitist: it brings together a small group who are predominantly male. Negotiations rarely meet people s expectations of what they will deliver. The question was put whether we should be aiming for a more inclusive negotiating table or, instead, constraining the negotiating table to focus essentially on addressing direct violence, and exploring options for more democratic decision-making on substantive social, economic and political issues? While negotiations are an important component of a peace process, a peace process includes actions and mobilises agents before, during and after negotiations. 3. Supporting women s empowerment is a bottom-up approach. It is possible and necessary to do more for women s empowerment not only for gender justice, but also to increase the quality of the peace process. The Philippines has the highest number of women in peace panels in the world. Most internationals supporting the peace process have national plans or guidelines on women, peace and security. Yet gender imbalance has increased with the participation of internationals: they are themselves not representative. It is important to listen and respond to the diversity of women in conflict affected areas; some will want a place at the table, others will not, which may mean that the latter prefer to exert influence behind the scenes. Conciliation Resources approach to the negotiations in the Philippines centres on women, peace and security; providing the only female members of the ICG, supporting civil society initiatives, partnering with the women s peace table and promoting an exchange programme between 10 women from the Philippines and 10 from Colombia with different backgrounds. Conciliation Resources is promoting an innovative International Action Plan on women, peace and security in the Philippines to bring together thinking between internationals on how to apply UNSCR There is also an effort to promote dialogue between policy, practice and theory, including through a tour of European capitals by women in the exchange programmes. Discussion Innovations One speaker pointed to innovations in broader peacebuilding practice as a potential source of ideas and inspiration to the peace mediation community, citing the example of the use of observatories in Latin America as an entry point to establish a common understanding of violence and its causes. The private sector also offers ideas, for example, alternative dispute resolution systems. An emerging practice looks at strengthening the resilience systems in which the company operates. Evidence from the architectures for peace approach, spearheaded by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the network for insider mediators supports the second hypothesis about the limits of the negotiating table. The focus under these approaches is on building up local capacity with which international assistance can connect. They also importantly build the space and capacity, which continue beyond the signing of a peace treaty and support its sustainability. These approaches offer insights for peace processes negotiations, such as those in the Philippines. 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 3

4 Who is driving the bus? Why is it that local actors aren t observing the talks? Inclusive peace processes who is driving the bus? It was noted that local actors in the Philippines have only indirect access to the negotiating table via international NGOs. What does this tell us about who is driving the peace process bus? This point was echoed in another comment about the value of giving local peacemakers the opportunity to speak for themselves, rather than speaking on their behalf and the importance of taking that message to other mediation fora. The difficulties in building greater civil society participation in a peace process were cited in the Cyprus case, including political resistance to alternative voices and options and the need for a new vision. UNDP s support to grassroots and civil society peacebuilding projects over a number of years, including confidence building and dialogue initiatives across the conflict divide, are now helping to generate alternative ideas for building peace. Another speaker added that peacemakers are players themselves, and can therefore expect to come under criticism and attack in this work. They therefore need strategies and joint thinking with others to contend with this. One speaker cautioned against idealising civil society. In many conflict contexts civil society is highly divided, reflecting the sides to the conflict itself. Particularly in ethnic conflict, civil society can be host to some of the most fervent supporters of war and opponents to concessions. A government may want to reach out to the other party, but be held back by its own civil society. That said, in many contexts there are natural constituencies for peace and in most cases we know who they are. The church, for example, often has political capital on both sides of the conflict, and it is important to explore what can be done to build the capacity of these constituencies. Beyond the negotiation table? To have peace do you need an agreement? One participant called for a re-conceptualisation of the negotiating table. The tendency to see local capacities and ideas feeding into the formal negotiations and to expect these in turn to be reflected back by the negotiators through implementation does not correspond to reality. In many countries poor governance means a disconnect between the population and its leadership. While top-table agreements by elites can be important to mark closure or to kick-start a process, it is their implementation which matters for peace. For this reason the political agreement should be demoted in order to concentrate more on implementation and to understand how the international community contributes to the exclusion of local actors and those affected by conflict. Building on this, another speaker noted that peace agreements have often been part of the problem. In many cases they have also been designed to lay the ground for democratic development. Yet, institutional power sharing arrangements, for example, can sometimes be meaningless when power still rests in the hand of a few strongmen. It is this power, which is distributed to the belligerents in a peace process. In serious armed conflict, focusing more on a ceasefire, and getting the peace process to subsequently focus on building up democratic institutions and culture can offer a way to counterbalance the dominance of belligerents. In West Africa peace agreements have served to silence the guns and given those at the negotiating table, inevitably the belligerents, their share of power. Peace agreements have not been used to look at how to address the causes of war. In Liberia, international organisations and civil society, rather than those who sat at the negotiating table, are the ones now addressing underlying conflict drivers. These points were endorsed by another speaker who felt that the international community had distorted the importance of peace negotiations and agreements by seeing the transition from war to peace as a rational process. Less emphasis and priority should be given to involvement in the peace negotiations by internationals and the conflict parties themselves, as it will not address the reasons why the conflict parties went to war, and it 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 4

5 will not decide what will happen in the next 5 to 10 years. A peace agreement is a marginal aspect of the broader peace process. Expanding the objectives of a peace negotiation to include peacebuilding would therefore help to facilitate women s inclusion. Women s empowerment is central to conflict transformation On the relationship between conflict transformation and inclusion, a respondent observed that one cannot happen without the other and that, while gender is not central to the conflict, it is central to its resolution. So without women s inclusion in the peace process, the conflict cannot be transformed. However, women find participation in peace negotiations extremely difficult; often talks are male dominated, and the predominant aim of stopping the violence excludes women because they do not tend to be war actors. Expanding the objectives of a peace negotiation to include peacebuilding would therefore help to facilitate women s inclusion. There was endorsement for Conciliation Resources efforts to put women, peace and security at the core of its work in the Philippines, acknowledging the current agency of women in the public as well as in the private space and developing a culturally-sensitive approach to women s empowerment when implementing UNSCR Building on this, one participant added that inclusion of women in the peace process, while vital, should not be an end in itself. More often than not, the exclusion of women in peace processes is a reflection of women s exclusion in society more broadly. For this reason, the peace process should be seen as an opportunity to catalyse inclusion in society itself, and the beginning of that process. Conclusions: beyond intractability The meetings was reminded that the longevity of old wars means that they have distorted political and economic systems and societies, and shaped psychological dimensions and individuals, hence their intractability. They also tend to bring certain types of people to leadership positions and into peace negotiations, and peacemakers need to contend with this. Another speaker noted that some old wars form part of an overarching and compelling international architecture, which is so overriding that it will frustrate any local peace efforts. The Georgian Abkhaz context and Western Sahara were cited as such cases. Yet, it was also noted that in some cases it is not only the conflicts which are intractable, but also conflict resolution efforts. The Juba peace process for the Lord s Resistance Army conflict was cited as an example. Following failure at Juba, despite major progress being made during the process itself, the conflict parties and internationals retreated to previously entrenched positions and styles of operation. Finally, it was thought the challenge is perhaps to develop structures which can bring together work at the three levels of hypothesis above, in an enduring way to influence the direction of peace process: hybrid forms of mediation; setting the negotiating table within its proper context; and women s participation. One approach is to encourage inclusive, creative thinking within conflict parties, before this even happens between conflict parties. This can address lack of inclusiveness within conflict groups themselves, which often underlie the conflict. A useful mechanism is supporting inclusive groups, which carry out strategic thinking on a sustained basis, and which in turn feed back into the process. Work at the three levels put forward can also help develop the appetite for negotiations, when these are not happening, and to fill the vacuum when negotiations break down. Session 2 Citizens path to peace Look at informal practices that take place to understand what actually works The second session explored alternative paths to peace when the negotiating table cannot make headway or even limited activity at Track 2, with case studies on Jammu and Kashmir, Fiji and the Lord s Resistance Army conflict in East and Central Africa. 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 5

6 Jammu and Kashmir The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan is one of the most intractable in the world and has remained unresolved for 65 years. The highly militarised Line of Control (LoC) divides the area between India and Pakistan. During this period there have been four episodes of direct war, and several rounds of dialogue and direct negotiations. Yet, local people have been excluded from talks, which has undermined dialogue attempts and meant that war has always remained palpable. A new round of official dialogue since 2004 has opened a window of opportunity for Conciliation Resources and others to try to change the dynamics of the conflict by fostering and enhancing informal dialogue between regions and helping communities build alliances and institutions across the divide. Official steps to launch travel and trade across the LoC have set the framework for incremental gains towards transforming the structure of the conflict from a war system to a peace system and from state- to people-centric. This exchange can potentially be a step towards easing tensions over Kashmir and putting people at the centre of its resolution. The contacts between a range of actors from civil society, members of divided families, business-people, and importantly Vice-Chancellors of universities in the region, have led to the creation of institutions that act as a space for long-term dialogue and models for regional cooperation. The Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry is the first institution created for cross-loc collaboration. It is based on a written agreement signed by all leading business organisations in the region. The Chamber is a democratic and inclusive body with members spread across the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir. It has already prompted a debate about putting Kashmiris in the driving seat of resolution efforts. India and Pakistan have made progress recently in establishing greater stability in their relations. Enhancing economic ties through a new trade and tariff regime was the entry point, but Kashmir had been the stumbling block to progress on this area. Intra-Kashmir trade over the last three years, with local backing, and the creation of the Joint Chamber of Commerce has given Indian and Pakistani governments confidence to move beyond and soften their positions. It has also increased local support in Kashmir for progress at the political level, as Kashmiris themselves feel part of the process. Given the political nature of the conflict, economic initiatives cannot replace a final solution, for which a political process is required, but they can make incremental gains. The evidence in the Kashmir case can be seen through the softening of rhetoric by some hardline voices, the fact that the LoC is increasingly seen as a potential channel for academic and cultural exchange, and in the fact that local suspicion towards Indian and Pakistani initiatives prevalent two years ago has reduced since local people have been included in confidence-building measures. Fiji Engagement was described as a continuum of contact between actors, in which they converge and diverge at different points. In Fiji this understanding is essential for peacebuilding efforts, given Fiji s history: four coups and three Constitutions in the past three decades. Peacebuilding needs to continue well beyond elections or the creation of a new government. The environment for civil society is highly restrictive. The military government, which took over in 2006, rules by decree and most decisions are designed to centralise power. About 60 per cent of senior government positions are occupied by security or military personnel. Media freedom is highly constrained. The international community s response continues to rely on standard, punitive measures: sanctions and aggressive diplomatic language. Civil society partners regularly appeal to international NGOs and actors to look at more creative ways to help the country back to democracy. In 2006 the Government set up the Charter Council, a group of individuals who should help determine the way forward. The decision whether or not to join the Council split civil society and caused antagonism. Those who did engage, including Conciliation Resources partners, were highly criticised by their peers, although the Council 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 6

7 posed an opportunity for engagement with the military leadership. However, this engagement was critical in nature, and there were opportunities for challenge: when, in 2009, a Court of Appeal decided that the military takeover of 2006 had been illegal, Conciliation Resources partner sided against the Government in support of the judgement. A group of NGOs took advantage of the circumstances to broker a series of dialogues at different levels of society, which allowed Conciliation Resources partners to develop relationships with the leadership and created space in which gradually more sensitive issues, such as the Constitution, could be discussed and more strategic engagement could follow. The tactic has been to engage with mid-level LRA commanders, as experience has shown that when one of them returns from the bush, they bring with them 10 to 12 other LRA fighters The Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) The LRA conflict emerged from a governance gap in northern Uganda but has now spread to the surrounding countries of South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). Perceptions of what the LRA is and who they represent vary across the region, but underlying the conflict is longstanding hostility between the governments of Uganda and Sudan, and Uganda and DRC. Over the last 20 years, the regional and international strategy has been to use military means to end the conflict. Civil society has responded by establishing a regional Civil Society Task Force, bringing together religious, cultural and civil society leaders from the four affected countries. The aim is to create a platform for sharing information and analysis, but also more importantly to develop channels of communication with the governments and with some individuals within the LRA. The tactic has been to engage with mid-level LRA commanders, as experience has shown that when one of them returns from the bush, they bring with them 10 to 12 other LRA fighters. The task force shows the role that civil society and local people can play in achieving a better understanding of the local dynamics and developing appropriate response strategies, including on issues such as return and reintegration of former combatants. Recognising that many within the ranks of the LRA are victims themselves, who were abducted and forced to commit crimes, communities see working with these individuals and reintegrating them back into society as the best way forward. Civil society has been supporting this for the last 15 years. No single strategy is enough to solve such an intractable conflict. The Ugandan experience shows that a combination of successful peacebuilding by civil society, backed by the Amnesty Law, and closer work between the military, communities and civil society were all important in bringing relative peace in northern Uganda. A strategy of engagement is important, especially where there is no Track 1, where there is no political will, or a complete denial of the conflict. But engagement poses challenges of legitimacy and who holds it, when different governments and local actors are speaking from different scripts and have different responses to the conflict. Discussion Peace constituencies There was discussion of the need for and challenges to engaging and including civil society in peace processes. It is difficult for national and international mediators, and large government bureaucracies, to know with whom to engage and who should be included. But it was also noted that sometimes donors accept too easily the goodness of civil society and who is speaking on behalf of civil society. A strong analysis of the composition of civil society is essential. Others agreed that civil society is not a panacea, but within it there are constituencies, which can play a critical role. It was noted that other constituencies, such as the military, should not be overlooked. The military can also be a powerful proponent of peace as they are more aware than many of the costs of conflict, as they are in the front line. 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 7

8 It was noted that in intractable and blocked conflicts, it is crucial to be engaged in preparatory work at multiple levels in order to be ready for unexpected shifts in conflict dynamics. One of the vital roles that civic peace constituencies can play is to generate ideas that can be seized upon in those moments. Outside actors have a responsibility to understand how they support conflict systems. A recent Conciliation Resources Saferworld project People s Peacemaking Perspectives found ways to give voice to those in society who are undertaking such action. One participant described an increasing resistance to widening peace processes to civil society involvement. One of the obstacles to greater inclusion was the continued attachment to the prestige mediator. This can lead to the overemphasis on the peace agreement because of the mediator s need to show a peace agreement with their name on it. The European Union (EU) is uniquely placed to manage such hybrid mediation processes, but continues to emphasise the value of the power mediator figure. The international community also fails to promote women s inclusion in peace processes. All-male mediation teams can have damaging effects. In Kosovo the EU has always been represented by men at the highest levels, which has perpetuated gender stereotypes but has also fed into local dynamics. This further reinforces the need to include civil society, as there are more women in civil society than in international organisations. It was observed, based on the UK s experience in Afghanistan, that where there has been a better gender balance, this has resulted in a far richer insight into the conflict. Within the international community, there is a need for more joined-up effort on women, peace and security: in Afghanistan, for example, it was civil society itself which challenged the international community to be more coordinated. Space for building peace There was discussion around the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its impact on the course of the Juba peace process. While the need to fight impunity is clearly vital, the timings of the indictments in the Juba case appear to have played a pivotal role in the success or failure of the peace process. The indictments sent the strong impression to those indicted that if they laid down their arms, it would lead to a victor s justice. Yet, having missed its chance to sign the peace agreement in 2006, the Ugandan Government has less room to negotiate on complementary national justice mechanisms as international justice is now more prominent. Early ambition about what the ICC could achieve was exaggerated, and it is now time for a more balanced discussion about accountability. Finally, there was discussion around the challenges of choosing to engage with the hardest to reach. As one participant noted, no one side to a conflict has a monopoly on violence and where there is a dictatorship, people can be forced to resort to violence through the nature of the government. Engagement with armed groups does not necessarily encourage violence. However, Conciliation Resources is concerned by a shrinking of the space in which to engage with such groups, in part as a result of the international discourse on proscription of armed groups. UN Security Council resolutions and how they are interpreted and implemented, including by the United States, pose a real challenge to the peacebuilding community when considering how they can assert and maintain their right to engage. Another speaker endorsed this: the mediation community has failed to defend its own space over the last decade amid a judicialisation of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution has also been further marginalised to the statebuilding agenda, as the Afghan experience has shown. Yet, building institutions, such as the army and police, has not provided an adequate substitute for conflict resolution efforts. The failure of military, judicial and statebuilding approaches has proved that there is no alternative to negotiations between the belligerents, facilitated by others. 173 Upper Street London N1 1RG UK Tel: +44 (0) cr@c-r.org Web: 8