The development of party systems

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1 This article was downloaded by: On: 12 Nov 2018 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia Tun-jen Cheng, Yun-han Chu The development of party systems Publication details Olli Hellmann Published online on: 11 Sep 2017 How to cite :- Olli Hellmann. 11 Sep 2017, The development of party systems from: Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia Routledge Accessed on: 12 Nov PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

2 10 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEMS Olli Hellmann Political parties, as agencies of interest aggregation and interest articulation, play an important role in stabilizing democratic governance and helping democracy take root in society. However, the effectiveness of parties in fulfilling their democratic functions depends to a large extent on the interactions between them or put differently, the democracy-enhancing potential of parties hinges on the party system. In particular, scholars of political parties have identified three elements of party systems that are important in this regard: (1) How many parties are there? (2) How do political parties link themselves with the electorate? (3) How stable are patterns of interparty competition? As this chapter will show, party systems in the three democracies of East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) perform relatively well on these dimensions. Generally, it is accurate to describe them as stable two-party systems that have increasingly been mobilizing electoral support through programmatic rather than clientelistic linkages. If we take a closer look, however, we find a number of problems. For one, political parties in Japan and South Korea lack formally institutionalized grassroots organizations that would enable citizens participation in party internal decision-making processes. The Taiwanese party system, on the other hand, continues to be strongly structured around clientelistic linkages, with political parties targeting certain voter groups with particularistic benefits rather than public goods. This chapter will not only discuss the implications for democratic consolidation that stem from these problems, but it will also discuss factors that can help explain why East Asian party systems have so far not been able to overcome their deficiencies. In doing so, we will take advantage of the fact that democratic processes in East Asia have unfolded in very similar socioeconomic and institutional contexts. The conclusion that emerges out of this exercise is twofold: while differences in party organization are rooted in historical factors, the divergent development of linkage mechanisms has primarily been driven by voters evaluations of political parties ability to sustain economic growth. Party system size: how many parties are there? Beginning the analysis with the element of party system size, the first thing to note is that scholars are in disagreement over whether two-party systems or multiparty systems are better for democratic governance. Nonetheless, there appears to be a stronger inclination toward the two-party 175

3 Olli Hellmann type, which describes the situation where there are two major parties of roughly equal strength competing to form single-party majority governments. In particular, scholars make the following arguments in support of two-party systems: (1) because all main parties have a chance to govern, they make more inclusive appeals and avoid extreme claims; (2) due to the high frequency of single-party governments, responsibility for policy outcomes is clearly identifiable by the electorate; (3) voters influence directly the formation of government and can thus vote poorly performing parties out of office; and (4) governments tend to be more stable and less prone to collapse. Based on these arguments, the performance of party systems in East Asia can be viewed as positive, since electoral politics has generally tended towards a two-party race. This becomes immediately evident if we quantify the fragmentation of the party system using Laakso and Taagepera s (1979) frequently used measure of the effective number of political parties. Essentially, the measure captures the number of parties weighed by their size either parties vote share (effective number of electoral parties [Eff N v ]) or parliamentary seat share (effective number of parliamentary parties [Eff N s ]) through the following formula: Eff N = 1 n 2 pi i = 1 where n is the number of parties with at least one vote/seat and p i 2 is the square of each party s proportion of all votes/seats. Of the two measures, Eff N s is the more appropriate for assessing the performance of a party system. This is because Eff N s is directly relevant for determining whether governments will typically consist of a single party or a coalition of multiple parties, which as just explained lies at the root of the argument in favour of two-party systems. As can be seen from Figure 10.1, for the three East Asian democracies, the Eff N s score has for the past twenty Figure 10.1 Effective number of parliamentary parties Source: Author s own calculation 176

4 The development of party systems years been hovering around the 2.5 mark. In qualitative terms, this can be described as a twoparty system although, at times, the two main parties may require the support of smaller third parties to form parliamentary majorities. If we calculate the Eff N s score for historically more distant elections, it becomes clear that, for the case of Taiwan, the two-and-a-half party system constitutes a significant increase in the number of relevant parties. However, it needs to be remembered from earlier chapters of this volume that, up until the late 1980s, Taiwan was best described as a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime in which opposition parties were banned and the Kuomintang (KMT) routinely won overwhelming majorities. On the other hand, under the military-bureaucratic regime in South Korea which also relinquished power in the late 1980s elections were more competitive, with opposition parties regularly winning considerable numbers of parliamentary seats. The Japanese party system despite the implementation of a democratic form of government after WWII was, at least until the late 1960s, described as a one-and-a-half party system (Scalapino and Masumi 1962), pitting the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) against the half-as-large Japan Socialist Party (JSP). However, the LDP found its electoral support increasingly eroded as rapidly intensifying social problems caused by unchecked industrialization (such as pollution and social welfare) turned growing numbers of voters in particular in urban areas away from the party. This expanding pool of independent voters not only gave existing opposition parties, such as the JSP or the Japan Communist Party (JCP), an opportunity to increase their vote share, but it also opened up space for the emergence of new parties, such as the Komeito or the New Liberal Club (NLC). Nevertheless, the LDP managed to hold on to government, continuing to enjoy single-party majorities until For the most part, the LDP s persisting dominance was based on the party fostering support among rural voters through redistributive side payments (Pempel 1998: 60 61) and designing a system of electoral malapportionment that favoured rural over urban districts. This led, as Scheiner argues, to the emergence of two parallel party systems: an LDP-dominated rural party system and a more competitive urban one (2006: 48; emphasis in the original). In the end, the so-called 1955 system a term coined by scholars of Japanese politics with reference to the founding year of the LDP collapsed because of a split within the LDP s own ranks. In a context of growing voter discontent over economic mismanagement, a number of LDP defectors established their own political vehicles before the 1993 election to join opposition parties in their demands for a replacement of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system (see Chapter 9), which was widely perceived as fuelling corruption and money politics (Hellmann 2014a). With the LDP s voter base divided, a seven-party coalition assumed control of government albeit not for long, as, shortly after passing electoral reform, the coalition broke apart and the LDP (in a coalition with the JSP) retook power. Nonetheless, the 1993 elections mark a watershed moment in the political history of Japan, triggering a period of profound party system realignment (clearly evidenced by above-average Eff N s scores in the mid-1990s) that gave rise to what Hrebenar and Itoh call the second postwar party system (2015; emphasis added). This new party system is dominated by two main parties: the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was established by LDP and JSP splinter groups in In post-authoritarian Taiwan, the two-party system has consolidated around the former regime party, the KMT, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which emerged out of the pro-democratic dangwai movement. The two parties mainly compete on the question of national identity: while the KMT advocates closer ties with mainland China, the DPP appeals to Taiwanese-nationalist sentiment (Hsieh 2002). As can be seen from Figure 10.1, this two-party constellation did not emerge from a linear process, but the party system underwent a period of electoral fragmentation, which reached its peak around the 2001 parliamentary election. 177

5 Olli Hellmann Fragmentation increased as splinter parties broke away from both the KMT (the New Party in 1993 and the People First Party in 2000) and the DPP (the Taiwan Solidarity Union in 2001). The emergence of these parties was facilitated by the fact that the two main parties had gradually moved closer towards the centre of the national-identity spectrum, thus alienating significant voter groups at the extremes of the spectrum. In more recent elections, however, the Eff N s score has again dropped for mainly two reasons: first, both the KMT and the DPP have readjusted their position on the issue of Taiwan-China relations (Fell 2014); second, electoral reform replaced SNTV with a less proportional mixed-member system, which has made it more difficult for smaller parties to win parliamentary seats (see Chapter 9). In South Korea, the two-party system is anchored in regional identities although, as will be discussed in the next section, programmatic differences are becoming more important in structuring interparty competition (also see Hellmann 2014b). More specifically, the two main parties which change their names with such frequency that it makes little sense to introduce them here maintain respective strongholds in the regions of Yeongnam and Honam; closely contested electoral districts can only be found in Seoul and surrounding areas (Park 2002). To some extent, the roots of this regional cleavage can be traced back to the authoritarian regime: while Yeongam was the home region of dictator Park Chung-hee and received the lion s share of industrial investment, Honam became a hotbed of political opposition to authoritarian rule. Within this context of politicized regional identities, third parties have generally played merely a minor role. The only relevant minor party worth mentioning is the left-wing Unified Progressive Party (UPP), which was established as the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 2000 and has, since the electoral reform in 2004, won an average of three per cent of parliamentary seats. Party-voter linkages: programmatic or clientelistic? Broadly speaking, interparty competition can be structured around three different types of politician-voter linkage: clientelism and programmatic appeals. 1 Both of these strategies are based on parties promising to distribute material goods to voters they differ, however, as to whether citizens entitlements to these goods are codified in a formal document. We speak of programmatic linkages when politicians develop packages of policies that they commit to enact if elected to political office with sufficient support and these policy packages award benefits to citizens regardless of whom they voted for in the election (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 16). If, on the other hand, politicians are not guided by transparent principles of distribution and the delivery of material benefits comes with electoral strings attached that is, if benefits are only distributed to individuals or small groups who have already delivered or who promise to deliver their votes this would be classified as a clientelistic electoral strategy (Hicken 2011). Generally, programmatically structured party systems are considered to have a more positive impact on how democracy functions than party systems where clientelistic parties predominate. Most importantly, clientelism undermines voters ability to hold politicians accountable, strengthens incumbent control over elections, and compromises the secret ballot. Traditionally, party systems in East Asia have been heavily based on clientelism as a mechanism for electoral mobilization. Under Japan s 1955 system, politicians of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) relied on a mix of three primary strategies to cultivate clientelistic linkages with the electorate. First, individual candidates maintained their personal patron-client machines the famous koenkai at the local level, which were designed to elicit voters electoral support in exchange for material benefits, ranging from providing tax advice to fixing traffic tickets and job hunting on behalf of constituents, their relatives and friends (Fukui and Fukai 178

6 The development of party systems 1999: 127). Second, candidates laid virtual pipelines of pork that delivered public funds to local politicians, who, in return, mobilized voters to support the respective candidate in national elections (Fukui and Fukai 1996). Third, through participation in the LDP s Policy Affairs and Research Council (PARC) which had the power to veto all emerging policy proposals before these were introduced to parliament politicians had the opportunity to press for policies and budget allocations that benefit[ed] their constituents (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1997: 32). Politicians used the complex divisional structure of the PARC to target public funding very narrowly for example, to agricultural cooperatives or construction companies. These organizations, to fulfil their part of the clientelistic deal, would then instruct their members or employees to vote for the politician on election day (Scheiner 2006: 72 73). While under Japan s 1955 system, individual candidates were thus largely responsible for nurturing their own clientelistic networks, in authoritarian Taiwan, the KMT opted for a centralized distribution of particularistic goods. To begin with, in the SNTV system s multimember constituencies, candidates were allocated so-called responsibility zones and were subjected to penalties if they campaigned outside their own zone (Liu 1999). Moreover, to assist candidates in their campaigns, the KMT maintained a party-controlled vote-buying system that connected the party headquarters to local vote brokers (called tiau-a-ka in Taiwanese), most of whom were recruited among local politicians, criminal gang leaders, heads of voluntary organizations, or business owners (Chin 2003: 136). Where possible, the KMT relied on local factions (difang paixi) large, interpersonal networks held together by informal social ties (such as kin, friendship, neighbourhood, school) which provided ready-made networks of vote brokers. In return for their electoral support, local factions were given economic privileges, such as special loans by provincial banks, contracts for public construction projects, and protection for illegal businesses (for example, brothels and gambling dens). In particular, farmers and fishermen s associations played an important role in distributing clientelistic resources to local factions (Rigger 1999: 77 80). Under the autocratic regime in Korea, clientelism was also organized in a more centralized fashion than in Japan. Although individual candidates maintained similar political machines compared to the koenkai referred to as sajojik in Korean these machines were not fuelled with resources by the candidate s individual effort. Rather, patron-client networks in authoritarian Korea depended heavily on the allocation of resources from the regime leadership. One important source of funding was money that regime leaders had collected through institutionalized corruption channels. In particular, it was large business conglomerates the so-called chaebol that paid significant bribes to senior politicians in exchange for privileged access to public resources, such as state loans (Kang 2002). Moreover, in rural areas, the regime relied on the Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA) with its power to affect almost all facets of everyday life in the countryside and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), which was farmers only source of credit, marketing, and fertilizer, to mobilize voters in elections (Lee 2011: ). More specifically, the regime instructed local officials to strategically funnel state resources into clientelistic machines, tying their career progression to how effectively they supported the ruling party s candidates in the current election (Chon 2000: 75). However, in recent years, the importance of clientelistic linkages as a mobilizational mechanism has for reasons that will be discussed later declined significantly in Japan and Korea. Evidence for this comes, first of all, from a cross-national expert survey on politician-voter linkages conducted by Herbert Kitschelt and his team at Duke University. As can be seen from Figure 10.2, the verdict among experts of Japanese and Korean politics is that parties and politicians nowadays only make a moderate effort at targeting voters with preferential benefits, which constitutes a notable cut-back compared to the late 1990s (see Figure 10.3). In contrast, 179

7 Figure 10.2 Linkage mechanisms Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project Notes: The left-hand axis refers to the mean score of responses to the following question: In general, how much effort do politicians and parties in this country make to induce voters with preferential benefits to cast their votes for them? (1) A negligible effort or none at all; (2) a minor effort; (3) a moderate effort; (4) a major effort. The right-hand axis represents the CoSalPo score, which is calculated by multiplying three indicators of programmatic structuration: the cohesion of parties appeals on an issue position, the salience of the issue position, and the degree of polarization of parties on issue positions. Figure 10.3 Clientelistic linkages (change between 1999 and 2009) Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project Notes: The chart reports mean scores of responses to two questions in the expert survey. Change in effort: Do politicians nowadays make the same, greater or lesser effort to provide preferential benefits to individuals and small groups of voters than they did about ten years ago? (1) A much lesser effort now; (2) a somewhat lesser effort now; (3) about the same effort now; (4) a somewhat greater effort now; (5) a much greater effort now. Change in monitoring capacity: Please assess how effective political parties are in their efforts to mobilize voters by targeted benefits. (1) Not at all; (2) to a small extent; (3) to a moderate extent; (4) to a great extent.

8 The development of party systems in Taiwan, despite the effectiveness of clientelistic monitoring mechanisms having dropped considerably in the recent past, politicians and parties continue to engage in particularistic efforts at a high level. Conversely, party systems in Japan and Korea are deemed to be structured much more closely around programmatic platforms than the party system in Taiwan. Moreover, evidence for this shift from clientelistically to programmatically structured competition is also provided by single-country studies. For examples, scholars of Japanese and Korean electoral politics have provided evidence that the success rate of newcomer candidates has improved considerably in recent elections (Reed et al. 2012), that particularistic spending on public infrastructure projects has dropped sharply (Noble 2010), that political parties increasingly invest in mass-media campaigns to appeal to voters through policy platforms (Koellner 2009), and that voters, to a growing extent, choose parties based on their personal ideological orientations (Hellmann 2014b). Studies of electoral politics in Taiwan, on the other hand, do not suggest a similarly notable transition toward programmatic interparty competition. Instead, scholars have observed that vote buying is still common in rural areas and remains an invaluable tool for some politicians (Fell 2012: 80). Similarly, it seems that local factions as the main vehicles for the organization of vote buying and the distribution of clientelistic benefits not only survived democratization, but even prospered in the new, more liberal climate (Göbel 2012: 88). This assessment aligns with Fields s (2002) discussion of how, after the introduction of free and fair elections, the KMT in addition to relying on public organizations (such as farmers and fishermen s associations) turned to party-owned enterprises as a source of clientelistic goods. In particular, party-owned enterprises provided three broad types of resources to reward local factions for their electoral support: (1) construction and other business contracts, (2) employment, and (3) local monopolies, such as natural gas provision. Party system institutionalization: how stable are patterns of interparty competition? An institutionalized party system, to put it in the words of Mainwaring and Torcal (2006: 206), is one in which actors develop expectations and behaviour based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behaviour will prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave. Such predictability and stability is generally regarded as being critical for democratic development in particular, scholars stress the following benefits of institutionalized party systems: (1) voters ability to hold politicians and parties accountable is greatly enhanced; (2) legislative parties tend to be more cohesive, thus increasing their ability to deliver on electoral promises; and (3) the entry barriers for populist anti-system politicians are relatively high. To capture differences in party system institutionalization, scholars usually build on the seminal framework developed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), which is based on a set of four attributes: (1) the stability in the nature of interparty competition, (2) political parties rootedness in society, (3) the degree of legitimacy attributed to parties and the electoral process, and (4) the extensiveness and systemness of political party organization. If we apply this framework to East Asia, it becomes clear that party systems are relatively well institutionalized. However, as the subsequent discussion will show, political parties in Japan and Korea suffer from significant weaknesses on the dimension of party organization. 181

9 Olli Hellmann The standard measure for the stability of interparty competition is that of electoral volatility. Essentially, electoral volatility expresses the change in aggregate party vote shares from one election to the next. Whereas low volatility means that there is a great deal of continuity in the distribution of votes among parties, high volatility can reflect either elite-driven changes in the party system (such as the emergence of new parties or party mergers) or changes in voters party preferences (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 158). The most widely used method to determine electoral volatility is the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979), which is calculated by taking the sum of the absolute changes in vote shares from one election to the other and then dividing this sum by two: Volatility n pit p i= it ( + ) = where n is the number of parties and p i stands for the percentage of votes obtained by that party at elections t and t+1. The index varies between the extremes of 100 (all votes have shifted to other parties) and 0 (the same parties received exactly the same share of votes). Existing studies that have applied the volatility index to the party systems of East Asia tend to come to the conclusion that, while interparty competition has generally been very stable in Japan and Taiwan, Korea s party system scores extraordinarily low on this particular dimension of party system institutionalization (e.g., Stockton 2001; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Croissant and Völkel 2012; Wong 2015). However, these studies make the mistake of including elite-driven modifications to the party system (e.g., party mergers, party splits, and parties changing names) in the calculation of electoral volatility. In doing so, they ignore the fact that behind all the elitedriven changes in the South Korean party system lies a profound continuity of personalities and intra-elite networks held together by school and regional ties (Hellmann 2014b: 60). Hence, it makes much more sense to exclude elite-driven changes to the party system from the calculation of electoral volatility. If we do this, it becomes obvious that interparty competition has indeed been incredibly stable in post-autocratic Korea, as indicated by an adjusted volatility score comparable to Japan and Taiwan (see Figure 10.4). Mainwaring and Scully s second attribute of party institutionalization is parties roots in society. For a party system to be considered institutionalized, parties must have somewhat stable roots in society; otherwise they do not structure political preferences over time and there is limited regularity in how people vote (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 5). Probably the most valid measure of social rootedness is the strength of partisan identity that is, the extent to which voters feel attached to particular parties. As can be seen from Figure 10.5, in East Asia, the share of voters expressing some party attachment ranges between thirty-eight (Korea) and fifty-five per cent (Japan). These may not seem particularly high scores, but as a matter of fact they lie within the range of established democracies in other parts of the world. On the third dimension of party system institutionalization, the East Asian party systems perform relatively more poorly. As Mainwaring and Scully make clear, in an institutionalized democratic party system, the major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties (1995: 5; emphasis added). East Asian party systems do not fully meet this requirement as there are sizable minorities of citizens who say that they have absolutely no trust in political parties (see Figure 10.6). However, it needs to be pointed out that these rates of distrust ranging from twenty-one (Korea) to thirty-one per cent of citizens (Japan) are by no means an indication of an inchoate party system. Most representative democracies around the world with perhaps the exception of democracies in Western Europe display similar, if not higher, levels of distrust. 182

10 The development of party systems Figure 10.4 Electoral volatility Source: Author s own calculation Figure 10.5 Partisan identity Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey Notes: Percentage of respondents answering yes to the question: Are you close to any political party? On the other hand, on the fourth dimension of party system institutionalization that of party organization party systems in East Asia, in particular the Japanese and Korean systems, reveal serious weaknesses. According to Mainwaring and Scully, in an institutionalized party system, parties are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders; they acquire an independent status and value of their own (1995: 5). This condition, in turn, can only be satisfied if parties have firmly established structures; if they are territorially comprehensive; if they are well organized; if they have clearly defined internal structures and procedures; and if they have 183

11 Olli Hellmann Figure 10.6 Trust in political parties Source: World Value Survey Notes: Percentage of respondents in the top three boxes for the following question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in political parties: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? resources of their own (Mainwaring 1999: 28). In East Asia, only a small number of parties tick all of these boxes most notably, the two main Taiwanese parties (KMT, DPP), the JCP, and the UPP. 2 These parties maintain centrally managed networks of local branches where citizens can enrol as members, they are governed by formally institutionalized rules for career advancement and candidate nomination, and they generate their own income, for example through membership fees or party-owned enterprises. The main parties in Japan and Korea, in contrast, are not based on formal organizational structures. To begin with, they lack a formally constituted branch network. Japanese parties have been described as ghosts without feet (Foster 1982), inspired by the finding that local party organization largely consists of individual politicians koenkai. Likewise, in Korea, it still holds what Park (1988: 1051) observed in the 1980s: [t]he district party is based [...] on personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and followers, with party members if they can even be referred to as such primarily recruited from among friends and family. Second, party internal career paths are not formally institutionalized either. Most importantly, the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections takes place behind closed doors in a highly secretive and undemocratic process. Third, despite the fact that both Japan (in 1994) and Korea (in 1999) introduced a public subsidy system for political parties, parties as abstract organizations are not a major source of funding for individual candidates election campaigns. In Japan, politicians have exploited various regulatory loopholes to funnel public money earmarked for party-related activities into their own personal koenkai (Carlson 2012) and, in addition, continue to generate considerable income through institutionalized corruption (Woodall 2015). In Korea, political funding streams have traditionally mainly been targeted towards presidential candidates, who would then channel funds to legislators and parliamentary candidates within their own party (Park 2008). As in Japan, many of these streams have taken corrupt forms; however, unlike in Japan, corruption has been described not as a quid pro quo system, but as elite cartel corruption where politicians and heads of the chaebol are bound together in informal interpersonal networks 184

12 The development of party systems (Johnston 2008). Yet, while it appears as if stricter anti-corruption legislation has been able to disrupt the black money market (Ko and Cho 2015), political parties have not been able to fill the funding gap; instead, individual candidates need to rely on their own fund-raising abilities. 3 Explaining the deficiencies of East Asian party systems The discussion so far has revealed that party systems in East Asia do relatively well in performing the functions attributed to them by the pluralistic theory of democracy. However, the discussion also highlighted some weaknesses. First, while party systems in Japan and Korea have become more programmatically structured in recent years, the Taiwanese party system continues to be heavily based on clientelistic linkages. Second, although otherwise displaying comparatively high levels of institutionalization, party systems in Japan and Korea are held back by a poor record on the party-organization dimension. The question that will be discussed in this section is this: how can these deficiencies be explained? Party-voter linkages Before explaining the continuing importance of clientelistic linkages as a mobilizational instrument in the case of Taiwan, it is important to remind ourselves of two things. First, while many Taiwanese politicians continue to rely on the targeted delivery of particularistic goods as an electoral strategy, monitoring mechanisms designed to ensure that voters stick to their end of the clientelistic exchange agreement have significantly decreased in efficiency in recent years (see Figure 10.3). Second, as qualitative research on elections in Taiwan shows, clientelism is primarily a strategy employed by politicians competing in rural constituencies; in contrast, clientelism plays only an insignificant role in urban areas (e.g., Fell 2012: 80; Göbel 2012). These two trends are consistent with theoretical expectations regarding the effectiveness of clientelism as a mobilizational tool. Generally, it has been argued that economic development and urbanization are factors that contribute to the erosion of clientelism: not only does increased voter mobility both physical and occupational mobility make it more difficult for politicians to tie voters into patron-client networks, but rising living standards lead voters to reassess the utility of particularistic goods distributed through clientelistic channels. A similar rural-urban divide in the effectiveness of clientelism was for many years also observable in Japan and Korea. As explained earlier, under Japan s 1955 system, the LDP used its monopoly over central government funds to fuel various types of clientelistic linkages with the electorate. In rural areas, these clientelistic strategies worked very effectively and allowed the LDP to establish a dominant-party system, whereas in urban areas interparty competition was more competitive and more programmatically structured. To a large extent, this was because the average residents of rural areas displayed socioeconomic or demographic characteristics that made them more likely to support localistic and clientelistic politics than residents of more urban areas. Rural Japanese were older, less-educated [sic], more likely to be employed in clientelism-related professions, and work in a smaller workplace than urban Japanese. (Scheiner 2006: 87) Similarly, under the autocratic regime in Korea, elections produced a clear urban-rural split in voting behaviour, with more affluent urban voters supporting the pro-democracy opposition and less well-off rural voters throwing their weight behind the regime party. Again, these 185

13 Olli Hellmann patterns partly reflected the fact that urban middle-class voters did not depend on particularistic benefits to maintain their standard of living and were thus able to vote for programmatic alternatives. However, although clientelism continued to be an efficient electoral strategy in rural areas, Japanese and Korean politicians implemented a series of administrative reforms that have made it very difficult to misuse public resources for clientelistic ends. In Japan, the most important reforms in this regard were implemented under the government of Junichiro Koizumi ( ), including, for example, the privatization of the postal savings system, and institutional measures aimed at streamlining local government and strengthening the prime minister s control over governmental spending (Amyx et al. 2005; Noble 2010). 4 In Korea, where resources for the maintenance of patron-client networks were mainly generated by presidential candidates through their personal connections to business conglomerates, it was the strengthening of the political finance regime under the Kim Dae-jung ( ) and Roh Tae-woo ( ) governments that cut clientelistic machines off from the supply of financial resources, thus sealing their demise. In both Japan and Taiwan, these reforms were driven by economic crises, confirming Kitschelt s argument that, in affluent democracies, clientelism as a political mode of exchange faces demise when its institutional arrangements become fetters stifling the material possibilities of economic performance (2007: 299). In Japan, public opinion especially after the asset price bubble burst in the early 1990s increasingly blamed the LDP s clientelistic side payments for the emergence of a dual economy in which highly competitive export-oriented companies co-existed with uncompetitive sectors that enjoyed extensive protection and subsidization (Katz 1998; Pempel 1998). The ensuing debate over how to revitalize the economy revealed a deep rift in the LDP between pork and productivity factions, with the latter after much strategic manoeuvring by Prime Minister Koizumi eventually coming out on top to implement its reform programme (Pempel 2010). In Korea, the intensification of electoral competition after the end of autocratic rule had done nothing to undermine patron-clientelism. Quite the opposite: politicians scramble for money to fuel patron-client networks became more intense, thus fostering corruption and money politics (Kang 2002; Park 2008). Hence, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit Korea, the lax political funding regime was widely identified as a cause for the chaebols debt burden and manufacturing overcapacity. This, in turn, facilitated the implementation of campaign finance reforms under the Kim and Roh administrations. The Taiwanese economy, in contrast, has been able to avoid serious crises. Most importantly, Taiwan sailed through the 1997 storm relatively unscathed. As a result, unlike in Japan and Korea, there has never been, to put it in the words of Kitschelt (2007: 307), a receptive audience to challenge established modes of citizen-politician accountability. After winning the government from the KMT in 2000, the DPP set out to fight clientelism through administrative reform for example, by abolishing local-level elections or depriving farmers associations of the power to make loans. However, the DPP s reform plans met with strong social resistance, forcing the party to shelve most of them. It is important to point out, however, that subsequently a number of broader political reforms were passed that at least theoretically may have undermined the basis for clientelism. For one, in 2008, the SNTV electoral system was replaced with a mixed-member system, which meant that the element of co-partisan competition for district votes had been removed. Yet, despite changed incentive structures, a number of studies have found that local factions and their clientelistic networks continue to do well in elections (e.g., Wang and Huang 2010; Göbel 2012). 5 Moreover, through the Local Government Act implemented in 2009, a number of counties and cities were merged into larger so-called special municipalities a move that abolished a 186

14 The development of party systems whole tier of elected administrative bodies in these counties and cities, which, in turn, may have weakened the power base of local factions. However, while we lack systematic studies to assess the effect of administrative reform on party-voter linkages, anecdotal evidence suggests that the targeting of particularistic benefits (e.g., through vote buying) remains a common electoral strategy in special municipality elections (e.g., Braig 2010). Party organization While clientelistic linkages thus continue to play a more important electoral role in Taiwan than in Japan or Korea, the Taiwanese party system displays a higher level of institutionalization than its Japanese and Korean counterparts in particular, on the dimension of party system organization. 6 Yet, before jumping into an analysis of the factors that can explain the weakness of formal party organization in Japan and Korea, the question that presents itself is this: to what extent do formally institutionalized parties pose the exception rather than the rule in contemporary democracies? As Randall and Svåsand conclude in their study of party politics in non-western settings, for perhaps the great majority of parties there are formidable obstacles in the way of institutionalization (2002: 25; emphasis added). In other words, is it reasonable to expect political parties to develop formally institutionalized rank-and-file organizations that are governed by clear rules for career advancement and control their own financial resources, or is this an idealized party model that is closely based on how the historical development of political parties unfolded in Western Europe? The history of political parties in Europe starts with the so-called cadre party, which emerged in the early to mid-nineteenth century when the suffrage was limited and voting restricted to a privileged few. Given that winning elections only required the mobilization of a small number of enfranchised voters, the cadre party did not develop an extra-parliamentary apparatus; instead, politicians relied on their own personal resources and networks to gather votes. However, these poorly institutionalized parties came under increasing pressure, as social groups that were excluded from political power most notably, the working class began to organize their own parties. Because these groups lacked the resources of the ruling elite, they established mass parties, characterized by a large base of members who supported the party through the payment of regular dues and the provision of voluntary labour during election campaigns. In return for their contributions, the mass party gave members participatory rights in internal decisionmaking processes, such as the election of leaders or the nomination of candidates. With progressing industrialization, which meant that more and more citizens were able to meet the suffrage requirements of the regime censitaire, mass parties grew in strength, forcing elitist cadre parties to seek voters beyond their traditional constituencies in the upper economic strata of society. This, in turn, made it necessary for cadre parties to emulate the mass party as an organizational type and institutionalize a more extensive grassroots foundation. In short, in Europe, formally institutionalized parties emerged as social classes excluded from the parliamentary arena sought to generate the resources necessary to challenge internally created parties. The latter s function was merely to coordinate legislative voting, which meant that they did not require an extra-parliamentary organization. Yet they saw themselves forced to intensify their organizational efforts as externally created mass parties boosted by rising number of industrial workers grew in strength. In other words, the electoral success of the leftist mass party created a contagion effect whereby parties of the right also built institutionalized party structures. The development of political parties in Japan followed a similar sequence. The first parties to emerge under the restricted-suffrage regime of the Meiji era in the nineteenth century 187

15 Olli Hellmann looked very much like the European cadre party in particular, they lacked formal structures and instead were held together entirely by personal loyalties. At the same time, repressive antisocialist laws effectively undermined any efforts of the growing working class to develop its own electoral vehicles. This changed after WWII, however, when the external imposition of democracy gave left-wing parties most notably, the JSP and the JCP full freedom to organize themselves along mass party lines. In turn, these activities continually stimulated a sense of disquiet among conservative politicians and businessmen (Calder 1988: 82), eventually prompting LDP leaders to institutionalize organizational structures that were modeled [...] after the British Conservative Party and other European parties that had strong central institutions and permanent national and local organizations (Richardson 1997: 50). However, it was the particular genesis of the LDP that prevented such a contagion effect from occurring: as Krauss and Pekkanen convincingly argue, the formation of the LDP through a merger of the two main conservative parties had created strong incentives for politicians to establish their own electoral machines as [f]ormer liberals and democrats squabbled about who would hold power in the local party branches (2011: 54). Once investments had been sunk, politicians refused to give up their koenkai and subordinate themselves to central party control. Leaders thus had no other choice but to leave the koenkai untouched and turn the LDP into a mass personalized-network party (Richardson 2001) rather than a formally institutionalized party. Unlike in Europe or Japan, industrialization in Korea took place under authoritarian rule, not under oligarchic democracy with a restricted franchise. Political activity by the working class was thus even more severely suppressed, which put a serious brake on the emergence of a formally institutionalized mass party that could have articulated workers grievances. Meanwhile, the regime party relied largely on state agencies and individual candidates sajojik to mobilize voters, and thus also remained poorly institutionalized. With democratization, restrictions on political organization were lifted; however, parties still did not develop formally institutionalized structures. The reason being that parties, as briefly discussed earlier, came to be fuelled mainly by money collected by presidential candidates through their personal networks. The analytical distinction between internally and externally created parties that can help explain the proliferation of strongly institutionalized parties in Europe is therefore difficult to apply to the Korean case simply because all major parties were able to generate electorally valuable resources without necessarily holding political office. The only notable example of an externally created party is the minor UPP, which, due to its ideological background, has never been a prime target for corporate contributions. In the case of Taiwan, on the other hand, both major parties were if we stretch the concept somewhat externally created. The KMT has its origins in the early twentieth-century nationalist revolutionary movement that aimed to unify China against the resistance of regional warlords. With the revolution losing momentum in the early 1920s, the KMT turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, with the goal of reorganizing itself into a disciplined Leninisttype mass party. After losing the Chinese Civil War to Mao s communists and being forced to retreat to Taiwan, the KMT then underwent another reorganization in the early 1950s. Sticking to Leninist principles of party organization, the KMT reinvigorated those aspects that had become dormant because this dormancy was believed to be a primary cause for its defeat on the mainland (Dickson 1993: 60). More specifically, this included the establishment of a dense network of party branches and cells, and the adoption of democratic centralism as the primary decision-making principle. Decades later, when, in the late 1980s, the KMT decided to liberalize the political system, a contagion effect induced the DPP to adopt similar institutional structures. As Cheng and Hsu explain, [a]s soon as the political thaw began in 1986, the democratic opposition lost no time in formalizing itself and, in doing so, borrowed from the ruling party all of its organizational components (2015: 128). 188

16 The development of party systems In short, this admittedly simplified comparison of the historical development of European and East Asian parties shows that the circumstances of party formation matter to explain the degree of formal party institutionalization: parties that were established externally that is, parties that came into being to challenge the political system from the outside developed formally institutionalized structures, whereas parties that were internally created did not. However, there was one significant difference in how organizational trajectories unfolded: while in Europe externally created parties subsequently had a strong contagion effect on internally created parties, such effects did not occur in East Asia either because internally created parties have been carrying significant organizational baggage (LDP) or because externally created parties have simply been too weak (UPP). Conclusion This chapter has outlined the development of party systems in East Asia over the last three decades. The conclusion we can draw is that, generally, party systems are quite effective at performing their democratic functions. However, party systems also display problematic features. First, party systems in Japan and Korea are characterized by a striking lack of formally institutionalized party organization. Second, Taiwan s party system at least in rural areas continues to be structured strongly around clientelistic linkages. It was argued in the discussion that these weaknesses can be traced back to different factors: while historical factors in particular, the context of party formation best explain the low degree of formal institutionalization of Japanese and Korean parties, the persistence of clientelism in Taiwan is mainly due to the fact that unlike in Japan and Korea public debate has not blamed clientelism for economic mismanagement and underperformance. The consequences of party systems structural weaknesses for democratic governance manifest themselves in several ways. For example, the absence of formal rank-and-file membership organizations in Japan has contributed to a growing number of hereditary parliamentarians (seshu-giin), whereby politicians inherit the jiban (constituency base) as well as the koenkai from their fathers, grandfathers, or other kin (Hrebenar and Itoh 2015: 14 16). Similarly, in Korea, the weakness of political parties as abstract organizations makes it very easy for ambitious politicians to capture parties for their own personal interests. A clear indication of such predatory behaviour can be seen before parliamentary elections, when party leaders purge the organization of legislators loyal to their predecessor and tilt the selection of candidates in favour of their own supporters (Hellmann 2014b: 67 68). In Taiwan, on the other hand, the prevalence of clientelistic linkages in rural areas means that the policy interests of certain social groups (for example, farmers) are not properly aggregated and articulated. Although specific predictions about the future development of East Asian party systems are difficult to make, it is at least possible to comment on possible broader trends. First, with respect to party systems in Japan and Korea, while internal decision-making processes and finance practices may become more formalized in the future, we are unlikely to see the implementation of formal rank-and-file structures. This is because party membership organizations are largely a thing of the past; technological developments in mass media and the advent of public funding mean that party members have become less important as organizational assets, which is partly reflected in declining party membership figures across contemporary democracies around the world. Second, regarding Taiwan s party system, it must again be emphasized that the effectiveness of clientelism as an electoral strategy has already declined significantly in recent years. This trend is likely to continue and may even accelerate in particular, if economic downturn shifts the public focus onto the inefficiencies inherent in clientelism or if programmatic political 189

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