Civil Society s Role in Palestinian Reconciliation: Taking Stock of Past Engagement and Its Potential for Future Initiatives

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1 Civil Society s Role in Palestinian Reconciliation: Taking Stock of Past Engagement and Its Potential for Future Initiatives January 2016 Palthink for Strategic Studies Birzeit University, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

2 Palthink for Strategic Studies PalThink for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit, non-political, nongovernmental and non-sectarian think and do tank that aims to stimulate and inspire rational public discussions and consensus for the well-being of the Palestinians and the Region. PalThink was established in March 2007 in Gaza-Palestine with a vision to be a leading think and do tank in Palestine and in the Middle East that contributes to the building of a free and modern Palestinian State and democratic society. Its mission statement is to promote peace, freedom and prosperity through debate on public issues, and produce policy recommendations to the decision makers in Palestine and the Middle East. Along its work, PalThink built a large network and relations with various local and international institutions and working with all segments walks of life. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies (IALIIS), Birzeit University The IALIIS s mission is to contribute to the establishment of a dynamic, democratic Palestinian State that entertains strong ties to the international system. Since its establishment, more than 200 students have obtained masters degrees in international studies, and have entered the Palestinian National Authority or the private sector where they have as a group excelled. Many of them have obtained Ph.D. in one of the disciplines related to the field of international Studies. The IALIIS seeks to develop Palestinian political and diplomatic skills through its teaching, training and research activities, the promotion of social awareness and local, Arab and international cooperation. In its work, the IALIIS emphasises experience as well as knowledge sharing. Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) swisspeace is a practice-oriented peace research institute based in Switzerland. It analyses the causes of violent conflicts and develops strategies for their peaceful transformation. swisspeace aims to contribute to the improvement of conflict prevention and conflict transformation by producing innovative research, shaping discourses on international peace policy, supporting and advising other peace actors, and by facilitating spaces for analysis, critical reflection and learning. swisspeace is an associated Institute of the University of Basel and member of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences. In Palestine our thematic work focuses on national reconciliation, partnerships with national institutions of higher education and consultancy work. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in some 170 countries and territories, UNDP offers global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations. For more information on UNDP s work in the occupied Palestinian territory visit

3 Table of Contents Table of contents I. Introduction and Methodology 1 II. Historical Background 1 III. Priority Areas of Civil Society Activities ( ) 2 A. Mediation and Bridge Building Efforts: Reducing the Negative Effects of the Split 2 B. Providing Visions, Plans or Forums for Overcoming the Split 3 C. Advocacy Activities: calls, demonstrations, vigils and movement building 4 D. Creating Networks and Coalitions 5 E. Capacity Building / Trainings /Sensitisation for a culture of tolerance 5 IIII. Analysis of successes and challenges 6 A. Success 6 B. Challenges 7 V. Workshop: Reflecting on the study 9 A. Situation analysis 9 B. Areas of the future 11 C. Recommended next steps 11 VI. Conclusion 12 VII. Bibliography

4 I. Introduction and Methodology This mapping study reviews the efforts of some of the Palestinian civil society organisations (CSOs) and national figures in the field of national reconciliation. The study, carried out between June and September 2015, aims to document the role of civil society organisations in pushing for the realisation of intra-palestinian national reconciliation and ending the division. It also includes preliminary findings regarding successes and challenges of civil society activities in this regard. The aim of the study is to further an on-going dialogue among Palestinian and international civil society organisations about future civil society roles and strategies for fostering national reconciliation. Key findings from the study were presented at a workshop held in the West Bank in December 2015, and the discussions and recommendations served to further develop this study. A summary of the workshop is also attached in annex 1. The study is the result of joint efforts of Pal Think for Strategic Studies and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute, Birzeit University, in cooperation with the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with funding from the Swiss federal government. The selection of CSOs to be interviewed was made through a consultative process and as a result of ongoing research. The list of CSOs that participated in the interviews, however, is not exhaustive of all organisations that are working in the area of reconciliation. The study provides some examples of both local and international institutions working in the area of national reconciliation and has therefore avoided attributing certain initiatives to specific organisations, fearing that it otherwise could be felt as unfair by other organisations that do similar and equally relevant work. In-depth interviews were carried out with 23 NGOs operating in Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Both Palestinian Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), as well as some international NGOs that are working on reconciliation were interviewed. The study also offers a glimpse of the historical context of the Palestinian division, and reviews the initiatives presented by civil society to end the Palestinian society divide and the main obstacles facing them. II. Historical Background The Palestinian Division (inqisam) has now lasted for more than eight years. The Division is a term that refers to the emergence of two political and executive authorities in 2007, the first in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been in control, and the second in the West Bank, where Fatah has been in control. 1

5 The Division came as a result of the Hamas victory within the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 during which Hamas won a majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) seats (76 seats out of 132, equivalent to 57.5%). On 19 March 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, on behalf of Hamas, delivered a list of his government to President Mahmoud Abbas. Other parties, however, refused to participate in the new Hamas-led government, which was immediately confronted with crippling political and economic measures that considerably hindered its work due to its unwillingness to accept the Quartet principles that the international community had made a prerequisite to cooperation. Disagreements between the President of the Palestinian Authority and Prime Minister Haniyeh continued to deepen over the next months, with tensions increasing and the number of violent incidents rising steadily. The occasional fighting became fiercer in February to May 2007 and finally culminated in massive factional fighting in June 2007, the dissolution of government by President Abbas, and ultimately the geographical political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 14 June On the political front, many initiatives to resolve the division have been launched over the past eight years, but none has managed to lastingly overcome the split. The key agreements include the Prisoner s Document (May 2006); the Mecca Agreement (2007); the Cairo Agreement (2011) and the Beach Camp Agreement (2014). The Beach Camp Agreement did succeed in creating a Government of National Consensus made up of technocrat ministers. This is different from a Government of National Unity, as this would still be unacceptable to the many members of the international community, which require Hamas to accept the Quartet principles before engaging directly with the party. On the ground, however, none of the provisions of the Beach Camp agreement have been implemented including security sector reform, PLO reform, reconvening of the PLC and the integration of all governmental employees into one reunified civil service structure. III. Priority Areas of Civil Society Activities ( ) This section roughly outlines the priority areas within the reconciliation portfolio civil society has focused its activities over the last years. A. Mediation and Bridge Building Efforts: Reducing the Negative Effects of the Split Some civil society organisations attempted to work against the factional split through mediation and bridge building between the two main political factions (Hamas and Fatah). These efforts contributed to preventing the split from taking further root as well as to reduce the 2

6 negative effects of the split on the society at large. Three examples can serve to illustrate this area of engagement: Example 1: The split caused a rupture in the patients referral system from Gaza to the West Bank. The PA stopped issuing permits for patients to be treated outside of Gaza. The de-facto government in Gaza for its part closed the referral branch in Gaza, citing allegations of corruption. As a result several patients died. Civil society actors therefore decided to initiate a mediation process. They managed to get the relevant people and the two ministries of health around the table, and facilitated the creation of a committee that subsequently managed to deal with referral cases smoothly. This committee was made up of persons respected and trusted by both sides. Example 2: Civil society organisations and activists engaged in field visits to the families of victims of the clashes that occurred between both factions due to the division and provided them with psychological support through specialised staff. These visits were an attempt to ease the tension between the partisan supporters, to alleviate the pain caused by violent acts as a result of the divide, and to promote the unity of the Palestinian people. Example 3: Civil society actors succeeded in gathering student councils from Palestinian universities to sign a common document in order to distance universities from the on-going process of political polarisation. This document was the first of its kind, in which student representative bodies from all sides called for the promotion of freedom of opinion and expression in Palestinian universities in Gaza, as a first step towards formal political reconciliation. B. Providing Visions, Plans or Forums for Overcoming the Split Several organisations and individuals have been engaged in developing visions and roadmaps to overcome the split. This included engagements in different sectors such as the security sector, institutional reform, and the issues around the civil servants. Such initiatives came from the various components of civil society, including political parties (other than Fatah and Hamas) or research and policy institutes. Examples from research and policy institutions: 1. A roadmap entitled The First Road Map Towards Exit the Present Palestinian Crisis was produced in September 2007 by Gaza-based civil society organisations. It was the result of several brainstorming sessions held in Gaza over a period of 3 months. The participants in the meetings included representatives of political parties, members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, academics, representatives of civil society and the private sector. 2. Between January 2010 and October 2011 a West-Bank-based organisation implemented, together with an international NGO, a multi-stakeholder dialogue process, with the aim of 3

7 supporting the national reconciliation process. Several workshops were held and led to the publication of a study paper called Initiatives to support and develop the Palestinian reconciliation process. It was followed up by the creation of a Group to Support and Develop the Palestinian Reconciliation Process that published in August 2013 a policy paper regarding Rebuilding the Institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. 3. An international and national CSO convened discussion rounds over several years to strengthen inclusive strategic-thinking. They provided space for more than 50 Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and the diaspora from across the political spectrum to conduct policy discussions which help inform and guide the national project. 4. In another initiative, national and international NGO s partnered with international actors to produce a sectoral assessment and plans for re-unifying the public administration in the health and education sectors. This included in-depth mapping of employees and their situation in these sectors, and suggesting specific options for reunification, including cost implications and engagement with line ministries and political decision makers. 5. Efforts are currently on-going to create an independent body for monitoring the newly issued laws and directives from both authorities. CSO s have already put together a considerable body of knowledge regarding the implications of the divide on the legal system, and they continue documenting and monitoring the legislation issued after the division. This should strengthen accountability in the absence of independent legislative and judicial bodies. In addition to these longer-term processes, numerous workshops, meetings and conferences were held in the occupied Palestinian territory and abroad. They discussed all the issues arising from the division such as public freedoms, community reconciliation, elections, reform of the political system, civil servants, electricity and reconstruction issues. The conference held on 15 March 2009, entitled Visions to support the Palestinian National Reconciliation can serve as an example of this type of civil society activity. The objective of this and other conferences was to enrich the on-going Palestinian dialogue and to enhance the role of civil society towards achieving sustainable national reconciliation. C. Advocacy Activities: calls, demonstrations, vigils and movement building Another avenue for protesting against the continued division was through public demonstrations organised by civil society actors. 1. The major women s organisations called for a protest against the on-going division. It included a weekly sit-in in the Park of the Unknown Soldier in Gaza City to demand the end of the Palestinian political division, and lasted from September 2012 until June Despite frequent harassment by the security organs it managed to continue for a 4

8 considerable time. After the Beach Camp Agreement and the formation of the Government of National Consensus in June 2014, the vigil was discontinued. 2. A group of young activists started organising a larger movement with the aim of translating efforts on social media to action on the ground. The emerging movement called for national reconciliation and used the rallying cry of ending the Hamas-Fatah division. Large protests took place in Gaza City and in Ramallah on the 15th of March Local media therefore dubbed it the 15 March movement. However, the movement was stillborn and was met with severe policing measures from national authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza. A deeper reason for the failure was disagreement within the youth movement itself on who should be considered the primary target of this movement: the Israeli occupation or Palestinian national authorities, which were (and remain) chronically divided. Despite its failure, the 15 March movement managed to bring the cause of national unity back to the Palestinian street. Within this framework, civil society organised many signature campaigns that gathered the signatures of thousands of Palestinians inside and outside Palestine demanding an end to the division. D. Creating Networks and Coalitions An important network that was established is the National Forces Alliance that sought to end the division since It consists of more than 100 members of political figures, journalists, intellectuals, experts, institutions of civil society, women's organisations, and youth groups that are calling for an end to the division and for achieving lasting reconciliation. E. Capacity Building / Trainings /Sensitisation for a Culture of Tolerance Another priority area of civil society action in the past eight years has been the promotion of a culture of tolerance among Palestinians, with a particular focus on youth. To this end civil society organisations have a long track record of organising cultural, artistic and sports events, Sometimes this included the participation of victims of factional violence from both sides, aimed both at overcoming individual pain and the suffering of society as a whole. Other initiatives focused on training a variety of youth groups on tolerance and acceptance of others in the Palestinian community. The efforts succeeded in establishing a network of volunteers in Gaza working on cultivating tolerance within their communities. 5

9 IV. Analysis of Successes and Challenges On a general level it can be argued that the examples in chapter 3 and results from the many interviews held with civil society organisations indicate that Palestinian civil society has been more active than is generally known. It continues to act as a connector, despite the continued rift between the two main political factions. This opens the question of how successful these activities were, and what key challenges or obstacles they faced. A. Success The assessment of the level of success of civil society actions towards national reconciliation must start with the obvious acknowledgement that national reconciliation is not fully within the sphere of influence of civil society organisations. It is among other things contingent also on political will of the key national political stakeholders. However, since both political will to reconcile among the key political stakeholders, and reconciliation itself have not materialised, it is hard to argue that civil society activity on this level has been a stunning success. However, civil society managed to do crucial work in the following roles and areas: 1. Non-partisan convener: Mitigating the state of division early, through its ability to convene both sides of the division around the same table. Civil society both nationally and internationally managed time and again to open a connection between the rival groups. It thus provided the room in which each party could listen to the other and several organisations and individuals from civil society can still today serve as honest brokers and credible non-partisan convenors. 2. Advocate for national unity as a strategic necessity: despite obstruction and frequent harassment from the respective authorities, civil society managed to remain vocal in continuously calling for national unity as the demand and priority of the Palestinian people. It still advocates for this demand boldly and mostly impartially. Thus, the achievement is that reconciliation is still on the agenda and in the public discourse, and is seen as one of the most important strategic imperatives for the future of the national struggle. 3. Mediator and problem solver: CSOs have provided or facilitated responsible solutions to several urgent files for the Palestinian citizenry through mediation and facilitation work between the parties. Examples were cited in chapter 3 above in fields like: medical referral system, the entry of medicine into Gaza, the chronic electricity crisis, as well as providing ideas and visions to key issues of reconciliation. 4. Insulator and damage control: civil society work and advocacy had prevented the split to permeate among even more institutions and social spheres, thus protecting some institutions and some social space from splitting along factional lines. Distancing to a large extend Palestinian universities from the current crisis is an achievement given the historic importance of these institutions for the Palestinian national struggle. On-going advocacy for 6

10 the protection of freedom of opinion and expression helped in assuring space for nonpartisan critique of the two government s actions and behaviour. 5. Grassroots mobiliser: civil society action towards training and dissemination of a culture of tolerance among large numbers of Palestinian youth helped protecting this culture of tolerance as a cornerstone for building a society reconciled with itself. Civil society also succeeded in establishing a network of volunteers in the field of tolerance in Palestinian society. B. Challenges This chapter should in no way be understood as criticising the work of civil society organisations, but to serve as a foundation for learning and future joint strategy-building. The following obstacles and challenges were mentioned by interview respondents: 1. Lack of unified strategy in a fragmented Civil Society: There is no unified strategy guiding civil society actions for strengthening reconciliation and there is fragmentation between civil society organisations in general and specifically between Gaza and the West Bank. Almost all respondents found that the lack of cooperation between Palestinian civil society organisations is negatively affecting any work on reconciliation. Civil society therefore rarely managed to facilitate real collective efforts. The lack of a long-term unified vision, and sometimes the polarisation between different civil society organisations make it difficult to overcome the obstacles that are inherent to the division, and rather contribute to its continuation. Some respondents attribute this civil society fragmentation to donor conditionality and the sector s inherent funding competition between organisations, while others referred to the fact that this fragmentation and at times polarisation is merely a reflection of the polarisation and fragmentation of Palestinian society as a whole. Organisations thus mostly work individually in the area of national reconciliation in the absence of collective action. It was stated that the role of civil society organisations will be more effective if they are united in the call for ending the division. 2. Lack of momentum building: Respondents termed civil society work as scattered efforts that failed to build momentum and to progressively include more actors. Several reasons were given for this: some observed an overdose of NGO trainings, seminars, and conferences that appeared to be donor /funding driven which led to indifference amongst grassroots organisations. Other activities failed to be credibly non-partisan or robustly unified themselves. The one movement that was indeed able to build a certain level of momentum, (the15 March popular protest movement in 2011), was not robustly unified enough and allowed itself to be divided by internal dissent and outside influence. Furthermore, some respondents pointed to the failure in the formation of a Palestinian lobby to put pressure on political decision makers for reconciliation. 7

11 3. Little real or sustained cooperation between Gaza / West Bank / Jerusalem: Similar to having no unified strategy, a recurring weakness of civil society action was the lack of strong and sustained cooperation between actors in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. Factors relating to the feasibility of movement, the political divide, and donor interventions were all stated as negatively affecting any sustained cooperation. As there is little cooperation, there is often a disconnect with what other organisations are working on, leading to either overlapping projects, or as mentioned above activities with limited potential to build momentum. 4. Difficulties in keeping the projects relevant to get out of conference halls and beyond appeals on paper: Many meetings regarding reconciliation were held in expensive hotels and produced joint statements and appeals that were not tied to tangible plans. Over time, this gave the impression that this was yet another elitist activity that NGOs are engaged in that is not directly linked to the reality on the ground. Many of these events were exclusive and not open to the public. Too many events were organised within sectorial or thematic silos, such as jurists, youth, women, journalists and failed to translate into inclusive decisionmaking and action. 5. Almost no cooperation among international expert organisations: While there were several cooperation s and partnerships between international and national civil society organisations, it seems striking that almost no attempts at cooperation amongst international civil society organisations happened in the past. 6. Failure to have an impact on decision-makers: While workshop and dialogue series with the inclusion of all relevant sides produced some results, they failed to gain wider traction within the decision-making structures of the main parties, Fatah and Hamas. Fatah and Hamas themselves did not participate in many of the events which called for ending the division. On the contrary, other parties and institutions participated and initiated these, most of the time yielding no tangible results or political buy-in due to the non-participation of decision makers from both parties. 7. Superficial understanding of the challenges of reconciliation: Some respondent criticised that civil society calls for national unity and reconciliation were based on an only superficial understanding of the issue. As such, they failed to include important prerequisites for a successful reconciliation, such as the question of a political framework within which work on reconciliation would be based, or the question of what the goal of reconciliation would be in terms of an ideal future system 8. Success ultimately prevented because of a lack of political will, both nationally, regionally and internationally: A recurring major obstacle that was mentioned by respondents is the lack of political will of the political authorities in charge. Respondents referenced to the political nature of reconciliation as an ultimate problem as to how much room civil society ultimately has to influence the process. It was also added that despite the fact that there were a large number of workshops, seminars, and discussions with different parties, 8

12 ultimately the decision for action lies in the hands of decision makers. Therefore, there is a general sense of frustration within the Palestinian society, and in effect civil society, related to the reconciliation process. The politicised nature of reconciliation was often mentioned along with the international and regional involvement in the process. The international pressure on different sides, the nature of the talks, and the different donor entities were cited as challenges to reconciliation, and to the ability for civil society organisations to have a real influence. 9. Shrinking space for effective civil society action: Calls for national unity are to some extent understood as open critique of the respective authority / party in power. With the outlook of successful reconciliation getting bleaker, the two factions have invested increased efforts to uphold their (exclusive) power. This limits the space in the West Bank and Gaza to call for national unity, as it is easily being portrayed as being directed against the respective authority in power. 10. Lack of new approaches/actors to reconciliation: An additional obstacle mentioned is the fact that political decision-makers continue to use the same approach: signing agreements between parties, which they then fail to implement. And the same individuals who failed in advancing reconciliation several times are still those that are involved. Respondents believe that since the international context has not changed, donor countries not favorable to reconciliation continue to impose their agendas. The suggestion to civil society would therefore be, not to repeat things that have not worked but to revolutionise the overall approach. V. Workshop: Reflecting on the Study An informal expert workshop took place on December 8 in the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies Center, Birzeit University in the West Bank. The workshop gathered around 20 civil society organisations from Gaza and the West Bank that were involved in the mapping study and also some representatives from international experts organisations. Besides discussing and refining the findings of the mapping study, the main focus of the workshop was discussing possible future strategies for a more sustained and effective engagement of civil society. The discussions will be categorised into: a situation analysis of civil society, challenges highlighted, lines of engagement in the future, and recommendations for action in the above mentioned fields. A. Situation Analysis In general, participants viewed the topic of the workshop positively. There was agreement about the importance of the role of civil society in ending the division and the need to enhance 9

13 coordination between those working in different sectors and regions. In this respect, there were important inputs that were echoed with regard to key terminologies and concepts used in the mapping study or generally in relation to reconciliation. 1. Reconciliation/ending the split/unity: Participants began the workshop questioning the concept of reconciliation as it has been referred to in the media and political discourse. Some participants stated that it was a term of the past and that has worn out. Others echoed that reconciliation is a matter that concerns Hamas and Fatah relations, with no place for civil society. In the same respect, some dismissed the multiple agreements for reconciliation (Cairo, the Beach Camp, etc.) as having provisions that are neither applicable nor realistic to the extent that advocating for their application will not yield practical results. It was also stated that reconciliation cannot be solved by technical measures and that the political divide between the two factions requires a political decision that would only be resolved once there is political will from both parties. Participants argued that full political reconciliation could only be realised at the societal level through a Government of National Unity that would be unified in its approach to governing the West Bank and Gaza. However, there was no consolidated view among participants on whether technical interventions in different sectors would have a positive impact in this respect. In the same manner, there were discussions on whether partial reconciliation, can be an area for civil society intervention with some participants stating that without a broader solution, any partial work would be insufficient for achieving results. Several suggestions encouraged working on different tracks, a national vision track, and also on partial interventions or social projects that would contribute to overcoming the split and/or ease the effects of the split. Participants agreed that instead of referring to reconciliation the effort of civil society should be focused on bridging the gaps that have been caused by the division and in promoting national unity from a social cohesion and societal point of view. Ending the split and Palestinian/National Unity were suggested as better practical alternatives to describe the work that CSOs could work on. 2. Civil Society Organisations: Participants agreed that a broader range of actors should be included in consultations with civil society, rather than just Civil Society Organisations or NGOs. This would include trade unions, universities, and the media. This would be important since these entities are integral for ending the split and formalised NGOs could be limited in their reach. Second, participants cited further examples of CSOs successfully working together in reconciliations such as the recent initiative by Miftah that gathered 900 women from Gaza and the West Bank together. Some participants also questioned the extent to which formalised CSOs and NGOs are connected or influential with the grass-roots and the street. 10

14 B. Areas of the future There was general agreement about the room for more activities by CSOs on ending the split and for further coordination between different organisations. There was clear agreement that coordination between CSOs does not mean attempting to homogenise activities, but that civil society must exist in its naturally diverse state. In this regard, the nature of this increased intervention varied between participants. In specific, the activities highlighted were: - Developing a national vision - Promoting National unity and social cohesion (on a social level; to work on generating harmonious relationships between Palestinians) - Working on Specific themes/sectors (within institutions or thematically) - Conducting Research on the impact of the division, e.g. the financial implications or other consequences - Connecting efforts to additional actors and to the grass-roots Yet, these activities overlap and there are cross-cutting themes across the sectors. C. Recommended next steps Preliminary feedback from the mapping study and the expert workshop clearly suggests that there indeed is a role for civil society to play in regard to Palestinian reconciliation. There is also a clear interest in better-coordinated efforts and strategising jointly with regard to working on reconciliation. However, the strategic priority lines of future interventions and practical formats for cooperation and coordination remain ambiguous. Therefore, the main recommended next step is to have in-depth consultations in order to have a gradual and widely consulted approach for convincingly formulating a future joint strategy. Planned activities would include: 1. Organising a series of consultations in Gaza and the West Bank to follow-up of the experts workshop with a broader range of actors that were not necessarily included in the first iteration. 2. Hold a follow-up workshop in Gaza for an in-depth discussion with CSOs and a broader group on concrete steps to be taken on the various work-streams outlined above. It could be that working groups are formed that will focus on one particular strategic line of intervention, i.e., These consultations should not be seen as one-off meetings but a collaborative process of the relevant organisations towards formulating a robust understanding of strategic priorities. 11

15 3. Depending on need and feasibility, efforts could be made to link good practice and lessons learned from civil society engagement in reconciliations processes from other contexts (South Africa, Ireland, Tunisia, etc.) as requested by participants in the Birzeit workshop. 4. Holding another meeting of an expanded network of organisations to present strategic priorities and decide on specific next steps. VI. Conclusion Civil society has over the past eight years done more reconciliation specific work than what is generally known. Some successes could be recorded, such as civil society s ability to act as a non-partisan convenor, and to remain a vocal and credible advocate for national unity. It was able to facilitate solutions to solve some pressing problems caused by the divide and to prevent the damage from spreading to even more social spheres and institutions than it already has. However, the defining feature of civil society efforts is how scattered and fragmented they have been. They lacked a unified understanding of the problem and its solution as well as a joint strategy of how civil society could successfully contribute to national unity. A lack of cooperation between and among Palestinian actors and also international civil society organisations has further reduced their ability to work in an effective way. Looking forward it will be crucial for civil society to develop activities that are unified and strategic, following local imperatives and that are able to spread and include an ever growing number of stakeholders. In the current national, regional and international context, it is unlikely that new champions for Palestinian reconciliation will emerge, other than civil society actors. No one will do the work, if it is not done by civil society and all Palestinians at large themselves. This further underlines the importance of the role of civil society in ending the division that soon enters its ninth year. It must refuse to give up, whatever failures it may meet along the way. 12

16 VII. Bibliography Saleh, Dr. Mohsen Moh'd. Political Opinion: The Long Term-Truce and Gaza s Separation From the West Bank. Al Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations [cited 17 May Available from Saleh, Dr. Mohsen Moh d. Political Opinion: The Fading Illusion of the Palestinian Government. Al Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations [cited 17 May Available from Saadi, Yazan al. Palestinian Reconciliation Between Hamas & Fatah: an Obsolete Endeavor. Muftah 2014 [cited 17 May Available from Pogodda, Sandra, and Oliver P. Richmond "Palestinian unity and everyday state formation: subaltern ungovernmentality versus elite interests." Third World Quarterly no. 36 (5): doi: / Omer, Mohammed. Analysis: One Year Later, Palestinian Reconciliation is Stalled. Middle East Eye 2015 [cited 17 May Available from Joshua Mitnick, Nicholas Casey "Palestinian Unity Effort Nears Collapse." The Wall Street Journal. Hatuqa, Dalia. One Year on, Palestinians Await National Reconciliation. Aljazeera 2015 [cited 17 May Available from Giacaman, George. Gaza [cited 17 May Available from Elgindy, Khaled. The Seven-Year Itch. The Brookings Institution 2014 [cited 17 May Available from Charles, Tom. Palestinian Reconciliation. Council for European Palestininan Relations. [cited 17 May Available from Balousha, Hazem. Hamas Unwilling to Jeopardize Palestininan Reconciliation. Al Monitor 2015 [cited 17 May Available from Palestinian Reconciliation: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Monitor 2015 [cited 17 May Available from Training needs assessment report: Strengthening Financial Oversight Institutions in the Palestinian Security Sector. DCAF Available from Financial-Oversight-Institutions-in-the-Palestinian-Security-Sector. 13

17 Making Peacebuilding Inclusive Available from acebuilding_inclusive_en.pdf. Palestinian Reconciliation. Haaretz [cited 17 May Available from 14