IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Between. And THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

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1 THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CLAIM NO. CV Between BUILDING CONCEPTS & CONSTRUCTION LTD. Claimant And THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Defendant BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. DES VIGNES Appearances: Mr. Rishi P. A. Dass instructed by Ms. Faikah Carrmuddeen for the Claimant Mrs. Deborah Peake, SC and Mr. Ravi Heffes-Doon instructed by Mr. Andre Rudder for the Defendant JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. On 8 th September 2005 the Claimant and the Defendant entered into a Joint Venture Agreement, (hereinafter referred to as the Contract ) whereby the Claimant was required to carry out certain works consisting of the design, financing and construction of 162 housing units known as Peastree Development in Tunapuna, Trinidad. 2. The Claimant s claim against the Defendant is for the sum of $15, as damages for breach of the Contract. This amount comprises (a) $8,627, for fluctuations, being the Page 1 of 26

2 increased costs of materials and related items resulting from inflation; (b) $470, for project management services being 1.5% of the final contract sum of $49,902,885 less the sum of $277, paid on account; (c) $2,505, for increased preliminaries for 18 months by reference to the contract rate/sum for preliminaries; and $3, for overheads calculated in accordance with the Hudson formula for 18 months delay being 7.5% of the contract sum. Alternatively, the Claimant claims the amount of $470, for project management services on a quantum meruit basis. The Claimant also claims interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the claim to the date of judgment and costs. 3. The Defendant denies liability for the amounts claimed by the Claimant on the following grounds: i. The claim for fluctuations was made after the expiry of four (4) years from the date on which the cause of action accrued and was barred by the Limitation of Certain Actions Act, Chapter 7:09; ii. iii. The Contract provided that the Project Manager was required to act on behalf of the Defendant in all matters regarding the administration of the Contract, determine the value of work executed by the Claimant and give instructions to the Claimant under the Contract. There was no agreement, oral or otherwise, with the Defendant to vary the Contract to make provision for the Claimant to provide such services on behalf of the Defendant. Further, the Claimant did not provide any project management services for the Defendant and/or the Defendant did not receive the benefit of same and the inclusion of the item Project Management Fee in the Final Account relates to the cost of services that the Claimant undertook in the internal management of its operations. Therefore, the Claimant is not entitled to any quantum meruit for works that were not done and were not undertaken at the Defendant s request. In any event, any claim for project management services is statute barred; and The Claimant s representatives met with the Quantity Surveyor appointed by the Defendant and agreed a Final Account which was duly signed by the Claimant s Managing Director on behalf of the Claimant on 9 th October As a consequence, the Defendant is not liable to pay for increased preliminaries or overheads. Page 2 of 26

3 4. The Defendant also counterclaims against the Claimant for the repayment of $8,500, paid by the Defendant to the Claimant on 28 th August 2013 (hereinafter referred to as $8.5M ) pursuant to an agreement made between the parties on 27 th August 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement ) on the grounds that the Claimant, in breach of the fundamental term and/or implied term and/or condition of the Agreement, re-registered a judgment against the Defendant on 19 th December, Further or alternatively, the Claimant s re-registration of the Judgment and/or refusal to proceed to arbitration amounted to a repudiation or renunciation of the Agreement. Accordingly, the consideration for the $8.5M wholly failed and/or the Claimant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Defendant and the Claimant is liable to repay the $8.5M to the Defendant. Further or alternatively, the Defendant will seek to set off its Counterclaim in extinction or diminution of the Claimant s claim. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 5. On 22 nd June, 2012, the Claimant instituted proceedings against the Defendant claiming $31,019, as damages for breach of the Contract, restitution and quantum meruit. The Claimant also claimed interest and costs. 6. On 27 th September 2012, the Defendant s Attorney-at-Law, Mr. Gerald Ramdeen entered an appearance. 7. On 17 th October 2012, the Claimant filed an Amended Claim Form and Amended Statement of Case which, inter alia, reduced its claim to $15,345, together with interest and costs. 8. On 24 th January 2013, by consent of the parties, this Court extended the time for the Defendant to file its Defence to 25 th January, However, the Defendant failed to file a Defence by 25 th January, By electronic mail dated 28 th May, 2013 the Claimant s Attorney-at-law, Mr. Garvin Simonette wrote to Mr. Ramdeen and attached for his approval the following drafts: (i) letter from Mr. Ramdeen to Mr. Simonette regarding a stay of the proceedings and the appointment of Mr. Adrian Byrne as an Arbitrator; (ii) Notice of Application to stay the proceedings; (iii) a draft Order; and (iv) agreement for the appointment of an Arbitrator. 10. On 9 th July, 2013, the Claimant entered judgment against the Defendant in default of Defence for $16,315, together with interest and costs (hereinafter referred to as the Judgment ). On 23 rd July 2013 the Claimant registered the Judgment at the office of the Registrar General. Page 3 of 26

4 11. On 21 st August, 2013, the Defendant applied to set aside the Judgment. 12. By letter dated 27 th August 2013, Attorney-at-Law for the Claimant, Sophia Vailloo wrote to Mr. Ramdeen, confirming the following terms upon which the Claimant would release the Judgment at the office of the Registrar General: i. The Defendant would pay to the Claimant the $8.5M on or before 30 th August 2013 by cheque to Ignatius Chambers ; ii. iii. iv. The $8.5M represented a non-refundable part payment towards damages due to the Claimant as set out in the Amended Claim Form and Statement of Case; On receipt of the Defendant s cheque for the $8.5M, the Claimant s Attorney-at-Law would immediately file a Notice to release the Judgment at the Registrar General s Department; The Defendant would file a Notice of withdrawal of its Application to set aside the Judgment filed on 21 st August 2013 simultaneously with the Claimant s filing of a Notice to release the Judgment; v. The parties agreed that the balance of the claim would go to arbitration pursuant to terms of engagement as set out in Mr. Simonette s dated 28 th May, The parties would finalise an arbitration agreement, appointment of an Arbitrator together with Terms of Reference and directions on or before 15 th September 2013 for an arbitration hearing in early December 2013; vi. vii. The $8.5M was applicable to principal damages only with interest to be calculated by the Arbitrator; and The Claimant irrevocably undertook to refrain from enforcement of the Judgment between the date of the letter and formal finalisation of the arbitration documents. 13. Mr. Ramdeen irrevocably agreed to the terms of the letter on behalf of the Defendant by affixing his signature to a copy of the letter. 14. On 28 th August 2013, the Defendant paid the Claimant $8.5M and withdrew its Application to set aside the Judgment. 15. On 28 th August 2013, the Claimant released the Judgment registered on 23 rd July Page 4 of 26

5 16. The parties were in regular written communication by electronic mail concerning the proposed arbitration between 16 th September 2013 and 11 th November 2013, without finalizing the arbitration agreement, appointment of an Arbitrator together with Terms of Reference and directions (hereinafter referred to as the Arbitration Documentation ). However, on 19 th December 2013, Ms. Vailloo re-registered a judgment for $8,083, together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 28 th August 2013 to the date of payment. The Minute of Final Judgement stated that on the 28 th August, 2013 the judgment was partially satisfied in the sum of $8,500,00.00 and the Claimant filed a request to release the judgment on 28 th August, On 9 th January 2014, Mr. Simonette notified Mr. Ramdeen of such reregistration. On 5 th March 2014, Ms. Vailloo re-registered a judgment for the sum of $16, together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 9 th July 2013 to the date of payment. 17. On 28 th May 2014, this Court set aside the Judgment and gave directions, inter alia, for the filing and exchange of witness statements and for this matter to proceed to trial. ISSUES 18. The following issues arise for determination in this matter: i. Whether the Claimant is entitled to succeed in its claims against the Defendant for: a. Fluctuations in the price of materials and related items; b. The provision of project management services; c. Increased preliminaries; and d. Overheads. ii. Whether the Defendant is entitled to the repayment of the $8.5M paid to the Claimant on the grounds that: a. The Claimant breached the Agreement by reason of: (i) The Claimant s re-registration of the judgment on 19 th December, 2013 amounted to a breach of a fundamental term and/or implied term and/or condition of the Agreement; Page 5 of 26

6 (ii) The Claimant s re-registration of the judgment on 19 th December, 2013 and/or the Claimant s refusal to proceed to arbitration amounted to a substantial or serious failure to perform the Agreement and/or deprived the Defendant of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that it should obtain under the Agreement; (iii)the Claimant s re-registration of the judgment on 19 th December, 2013 and/or the Claimant s refusal to proceed to arbitration amounted to a repudiation or renunciation of the Agreement; b. The consideration for the payment of the said $8.5M wholly failed and/or the Claimant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Defendant? DISPOSITION 19. I am of the opinion that the Claimant is not entitled to succeed in its claims for: i. Fluctuations in the price of materials and related items on the ground that this claim is barred by the Limitation of Certain Actions Act, Chapter 7:09; ii. Project management services on the grounds that: a. By the terms of the Contract, the Claimant being the Contractor on the project was not entitled to claim for the provision of project management services; b. Further, the Claimant failed to prove that there was any agreement between the parties for the provision of project management services to the Defendant by the Claimant; and c. Further, the Claimant failed to prove that it provided any such services to the Defendant. iii. Increased preliminaries and overheads on the grounds that: a. The Final Account signed by the Claimant s Managing Director and the payment by the Defendant to the Claimant of the amount due thereunder debars the Claimant from maintaining these claims; and b. The Claimant failed to lead evidence to support either of these claims. 20. In respect of the Counterclaim for the refund of the $8.5M, I am of the opinion that: Page 6 of 26

7 i. The Defendant is entitled to an award of nominal damages of $5, for the Claimant s breach of the Agreement; and ii. Issue 1(a): The Defendant is not entitled to succeed in its claim for the repayment of the $8.5M based on the unjust enrichment of the Claimant. The Claimant is not entitled to succeed in its claim against the Defendant for fluctuations in the price of materials and related items 21. At the commencement of the trial, Counsel for the Defendant, Mrs. Peake, SC submitted, as a preliminary point, that the Claimant s claim in respect of fluctuations should be struck out as the same was barred by Section 3(1)(a) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act, Chapter 7:09. She pointed out that the Claimant s cause of action arose on 26 th March, 2008, which was the date of the invoice submitted by the Claimant to the Defendant. 1 However, the Claimant instituted this action on 22 nd June, 2012 which is more than four (4) years after the accrual of the cause of action. 22. In response, Counsel for the Claimant, Mr. Dass submitted that the liability did not arise from date of the invoice since, in a fluctuations claim, adjudication was first required to determine the amount that the Claimant was entitled to. 23. I disagreed with Mr. Dass submissions and upheld the submissions of Mrs. Peake, SC and struck out the Claimant s claim for fluctuations. I did so on the grounds that, upon my review of the pleadings and the evidence, it was clear that this claim was based on the allegation that the Defendant had failed and/or refused and/or neglected to pay the Claimant s invoice dated 26 th March Therefore, the cause of action arose on 26 th March Since this claim was filed more than four (4) years after that date and the Claimant has not pleaded any facts in its Reply or given any evidence to bring itself outside the provisions of the Limitation Act, this claim was bound to fail. Accordingly, I struck out the Claimant s claim for fluctuations. Issue 1(b): The Claimant is not entitled to succeed in its claim against the Defendant for project management services 24. I am of the opinion that the Defendant is not liable to the Claimant for the cost of project management services for the following reasons: 1 Paragraph 21 of the Re-Amended Statement of Case and paragraph 8 of the Witness Statement of Mark Gransaull Page 7 of 26

8 i. Based on the evidence before me, the functions that Mr. Gransaull seeks to rely on as being provided by the Claimant in the capacity of Project Manager for the Defendant are in fact contractual functions of the Claimant in its capacity as Contractor. 2 Further, I am not persuaded that the functions of the Project Manager under the Contract could be undertaken by the Claimant as Contractor since the Claimant could not have managed and instructed himself on behalf of the Defendant as employer. 3 The unchallenged evidence of the Witnesses for the Defendant, namely, Mr. Tiwary, Mr. Garcia and Ms. Chow, all attest to the fact that it would be a conflict of interest for a Contractor employed on a project to perform project management services on behalf of the employer. Further, under cross-examination, Mr. Gransaull conceded that the functions of the Project Manager as set out in the Contract were not functions that the Claimant, as Contractor/Developer, could perform as Project Manager on behalf of the Defendant; ii. Mr. Gransaull gave contradictory evidence with regard to an oral agreement with Mr. Garcia on behalf of the Defendant to provide project management services for the Defendant. In the Re-Amended Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that there was an oral agreement made between Mr. Garcia and Mr. Gransaull for the provision of these services. However, in his Witness Statement, Mr. Gransaull stated that Mr. Garcia and Mr. Edgar Williams on behalf of the Defendant requested him to provide project management services and Mr. Garcia promised to provide the Claimant with a letter in confirmation of that request but he failed to do so. Under cross-examination, Mr. Gransaull stated that the request made of him was equivalent to an oral agreement. Further, when questioned about the Claimant s letter to the Defendant dated 13 th July, 2006 which the Claimant alleged set out the agreed rate for the project management services, Mr. Gransaull accepted that this letter did not refer to any request by Mr. Garcia or Mr. Williams or any agreement for the Claimant to provide project management services. Mr. Garcia was unshaken in his evidence that he never asked the Claimant to undertake project management duties on behalf of the Defendant. 2 See Statutory Requirements, Brief/Employer s Requirements dated September 2004, Appendix 2 of the Contract 3 See Articles 2.1, 3.1, , 6.13, , 9.2, , 11.4, and 11.9 of the Contract Page 8 of 26

9 Based on this evidence, I do not accept that there was any oral agreement between the Defendant and the Claimant for the Claimant to provide project management services to the Defendant; iii. The Claimant has failed to adduce any proof that it provided project management services to the Defendant. In the Re-Amended Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that Project Control Associates Limited and QS Services provided the critical functions of project coordination, superintendence and supervision of the Project and after the Defendant terminated their services, the Claimant was left to provide these project management services. In his Witness Statement, Mr. Gransaull asserted that the Claimant performed these services at 1.5% of the then approved contract sum of $49,902, However, as earlier stated, the functions performed by the Claimant were contractual functions of the Claimant in its capacity as Contractor and the functions of the Project Manager under the Contract could not be undertaken by the Claimant as Contractor since the Claimant could not have managed and instructed itself on behalf of the Defendant as employer. Mr. Garcia gave evidence that after the termination of the services of QS Services, the Defendant carried out the project management services in-house and that as far as he was aware, the Claimant did not undertake any project management duties nor did he ask the Claimant to do so. Mr. Garcia was not shaken on this evidence in crossexamination. Further, I do not accept the submissions of Mr. Dass that the Claimant s claim is substantiated by virtue of Mr. Tiwary s evidence under cross-examination that the payment for project management in the Final Account was previously approved by the Defendant or by Mr. Garcia s evidence that a payment was in fact made. In my opinion, the inclusion of the entry in the Final Account for project management fees does not prove that the Claimant actually provided project management services to the Defendant to the value of the amount claimed by the Claimant in this action. The Claimant bore the burden of proving that it provided such services to the Defendant in accordance with the terms of either the Contract or at the request of the Defendant but it has failed to discharge that burden. Page 9 of 26

10 I also do not accept Ms. Dass submission that if the Court does not find that there was an oral agreement, the Claimant ought to be awarded quantum meruit at a rate of 1.5% since the Claimant failed to adduce evidence that it provided project management services to the Defendant. Issue 1(c): The Claimant is not entitled to succeed in its claim against the Defendant for increased preliminaries 25. Having considered the evidence adduced in respect of this issue, I am of the opinion that the Defendant is not liable to pay the Claimant for loss and damage suffered in respect of increased preliminaries for the following reasons: i. I agree with the submissions of Mrs. Peake, SC that the Final Account in the sum of $47,728, constituted a mutually agreed assessment of the final value of the works performed by the Claimant on the Peastree Housing Development. This Final Account was prepared by Mr. Tiwary, the Quantity Surveyor appointed by the Defendant, after extensive negotiations and joint site visits with the Claimant s representative, Mr. Superville. In his evidence, 5 Mr. Tiwary described the process by which a Final Account is completed, outlining that a contractor would submit its claims for works done and any variations and these would be evaluated before the Final Account was prepared. In the event of any disagreement with the Final Account, either party could request a re-evaluation or the process may be terminated or suspended so that the parties could revert to dispute settlement pursuant to the contract. Where the parties agreed with the Final Account, it was signed off and the Contractor was paid the stated sum. Mr. Tiwary indicated that all the Claimant s claims were fully discussed, evaluated, assessed, and taken account of. Mr. Tiwary s unchallenged evidence was that the Claimant claimed to be entitled to payment for additional preliminaries based on the extended time spent on the project which resulted in it incurring additional expenses and the Claimant wanted the Final Account to reflect this. Therein, sums were agreed upon by the parties and subsequently paid by the Defendant to the Claimant in respect of increased preliminaries. Mr. Tiwary stated that $25,000 per month was initially arrived at and the Claimant made an 5 Witness Statement of Mr. Tiwary at paras , Page 10 of 26

11 additional claim for $15,000 per month which was agreed to and signed off by both parties. Accordingly, the Claimant was paid $720,000 in increased preliminaries and has no basis for an additional claim under this heading; and ii. By way of its Re-Amended Statement of Case, the Claimant claimed increased preliminaries for 18 months by reference to the contract rate/sum for preliminaries. This amounted to $2,505,214.40, which was the exact sum outlined in the Claimant s cost summary which was attached to its Letter of Acceptance for the project. In his witness statement, Mr. Gransaull provided some explanation for the claim by stating, for the first time, that during the 18 month period of delay full preliminaries were maintained on the project site, including, inter alia, site supervision, security, scaffolding. He also stated that the sum was calculated by multiplying the preliminaries from the Bills of Quantities by the delay period. In answer to questions from the Court in respect of how the figure claimed was arrived at, Mr. Gransaull stated that it was a percentage, specifically 1% of the final contract amount and was similar to the Hudson formula. He later resiled from that answer and stated that he did not know how the amount was arrived at and it was arrived at on the advice of Counsel. He also indicated to the Court that he did not think that the percentage value would be in the Contract but that he could be mistaken. When the cost summary was brought to his attention, he then stated that the Claimant was claiming the exact amount as stated in the cost summary for the 18 month period and the figure paid in the Final Account was to be deducted therefrom. Mr. Gransaull failed to adduce any evidence of the actual monies expended by the Claimant in respect of increased preliminaries and he was unable to justify the Claimant s claim under this head. On the other hand, Mr. Tiwary gave helpful evidence under cross-examination on this aspect of the claim. He stated that the sum outlined in the Contract for preliminaries was not automatically payable for the extended period where delays occurred. His evidence was that although 18 months was accepted as the delay period, this did not mean that the preliminaries ought to have been maintained at the contract value in the Cost Summary. He also stated that the contractor was entitled to claim what its actual expenditure would have been during the extended period. He accepted that in the Final Account, the Claimant would have been allocated a meagre Page 11 of 26

12 amount under this head, but the Claimant would not have incurred substantial running costs for the 18 month delay period. He indicated that this was discussed with the Claimant s representative, Mr. Superville and they made allowances for the services provided on site at the expense of the Claimant based on the personnel on site. In answer to questions from the Court, Mr. Tiwary stated that the Claimant would have to produce bills to support its expenditure, which it did not do. However, he acknowledged that the Claimant had security, a site foreman and Mr. Superville who was the Claimant s Project Manager and on this basis an agreed figure was arrived at. Mr. Dass relied on Keating on Construction Contracts at pp to support his submission that claims for increased preliminaries are frequently made and, for convenience allowed upon a calculation which uses bills proportioned to the length of the delay compared with the original contract period. However, Keating (supra) also states that, for a claim under a contract, such a calculation must be justified under the terms of the contract and that the basis for calculation is often excessively theoretical, ignoring the principle that damages are to compensate for actual loss and must be proved.for damages, the calculation should be of the actual additional costs. His actual additional costs ought to be known, recorded and capable of being proved. 6 Issue 1(d): The Claimant is not entitled to succeed in its claim against the Defendant for overheads 26. Having considered the evidence adduced in respect of this issue, I am of the opinion that the Defendant is not liable to pay the Claimant for overheads for the following reasons: i. As earlier stated at paragraph 25(i) herein, I agree with the submissions of the Defendant that the Final Account constituted a mutually agreed assessment of the final value of the works performed on the project and that the Defendant made a final payment of $5,029, in settlement of the outstanding sums due to the Claimant on the basis of the Agreed Final Account. Accordingly, the Claimant has no basis for an additional claim under this heading; and ii. In any event, the Claimant has failed to prove its claim for overheads. In its Re- Amended Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that its claim for overheads was 6 Paragraphs and Page 12 of 26

13 calculated in accordance with the Hudson formula for the 18 month delay at 7.5% of the contract sum. However, Mr. Gransaull failed to give any evidence to explain what was the meaning and relevance of the Hudson Formula or how 7.5% was arrived at. Under cross examination, Mr. Gransaull stated that he was not a Quantity Surveyor and took advice from people and on that basis he could not explain what the Hudson Formula was to the Court. When questioned as to basis of the claim for $3.7 million for overheads, Mr. Gransaull stated that it related to overheads, security on site and scaffolding. He later admitted that some of what he stated would be included under preliminaries but maintained that the calculation was based on the Hudson Formula which his former Counsel was very familiar with and was easily obtainable. In my view, this is not an acceptable basis upon which this claim can be proved. Issue 2(a): The Defendant is not entitled to the repayment of the $8.5M paid to the Claimant on basis of the Defendant s breach of the Agreement but is entitled to nominal damages. Issue 2(b): The Defendant is not entitled to the repayment of the $8.5M paid to the Claimant on basis of unjust enrichment. 27. In its Counterclaim the Defendant alleged that it was a term and/or a fundamental term and/or implied condition of the Agreement that once the Defendant paid over the $8.5M to the Claimant and withdrew the Notice of Application to set aside the Judgment, the Claimant would not re-register the Judgment against the Defendant and that the matter would proceed to arbitration. In accordance with the Agreement, on 28 th August, 2013, the Defendant paid to the Claimant the $8.5M and withdrew its Application to set aside the Judgment and the Claimant filed a Notice to release the Judgment. Further, the Defendant alleged that subsequent to 15 th September, 2013, the parties were in communication via electronic mail with a view to finalizing the Arbitration Documentation and proceeding to arbitration. It contends that by November, 2013 the parties had agreed on the location of the arbitration, the Arbitrator and his fee and a draft arbitration agreement had been circulated between the parties. However, on 19 th December, 2013 the Claimant re-registered the Judgment without notice to the Defendant. 28. The Defendant alleged that: Page 13 of 26

14 i. The re-registration of the Judgment was in breach of the term and/or fundamental term and/or implied term and/or condition of the Agreement; ii. iii. iv. The re-registration of the Judgment and/or the refusal to proceed to arbitration amounted to a substantial or serious failure to perform the Agreement and/or deprived the Defendant of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that it should obtain under the said Agreement; The re-registration of the Judgment and/or refusal to proceed to arbitration amounted to a repudiation or renunciation of the Agreement and consequently the Claimant was obliged to return the $8.5M to the Defendant; The payment the $8.5M which was expressed to be a non-refundable part payment in the Agreement was on the basis of or subject to the condition that the Claimant perform its contractual obligation to release the Judgment and not re-register it once the monies were paid and proceed to arbitration; and v. The consideration for the payment of the $8.5M has wholly failed and/or the Claimant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Defendant and is liable to repay the said amount. 29. Therefore, the Defendant counterclaimed against the Claimant for an Order that the Claimant repay the $8.5M to the Defendant or alternatively damages for breach of the Agreement. 30. In its Defence to the Counterclaim, the Claimant responded that: i. The Claimant unequivocally undertook to refrain from enforcement of the Judgment only until the formal finalization of the Arbitration Documentation on or before 15 th September, 2013; ii. iii. There was no term and/or condition of the Agreement, implied or otherwise, in respect of a later registration of the Judgment and/or of enforcement of the Judgement after 15 th September, Therefore, the Claimant was entitled to re-register the Judgment after 15 th September, 2013; The payment the $8.5M was agreed to be and was a non-refundable part payment which the Claimant properly retained and which remains the property of the Claimant; Page 14 of 26

15 iv. The Claimant did not acquiesce with respect to non-compliance with the agreed date of 15 th September, 2013 and Mr. Simonette made concerted efforts to contact Mr. Ramdeen by telephone on at least 8 occasions in or around the beginning of September, 2013 but his calls were unreturned. Further, a meeting was scheduled to take place at the office of Mr. Ramdeen but, on Mr. Simonette s arrival, Mr. Ramdeen was not there; v. Consideration for the payment the $8.5M has not wholly failed in that the Defendant obtained the benefit of performance as agreed until 15 th September, In any event, the Defendant is not entitled to a repayment on the grounds of unjust enrichment since the Defendant voluntary elected to pay the $8.5M on a non-refundable, irrevocable and unconditional basis in respect of the admitted loss and expense caused by the Defendant and suffered by the Claimant; vi. vii. The Defendant, by co-signing the Agreement, is estopped from denying that the $8.5M was non-refundable; and Alternatively, the Claimant is entitled to retain the said sum in satisfaction of its claim as set out in the Re-Amended Statement of Case. Interpretation of the Agreement 31. The parties agree that the applicable principles for the construction of contractual agreements has been recently restated in the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank. 7 Therein Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony stated that: 14 the ultimate aim of interpreting a provision in a contract, especially a commercial contract, is to determine what the parties meant by the language used, which involves ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant. As Lord Hoffmann made clear in the first of the principles he summarised in the Investors Compensation Scheme case [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912 h, the relevant reasonable person is one who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract 21 The language used by the parties will often have more than one potential meaning. I would accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the exercise of 7 [2011] 1 WLR 290 Page 15 of 26

16 construction is essentially one unitary exercise in which the court must consider the language used and ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have meant. In doing so, the court must have regard to all the relevant surrounding circumstances. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other 23 Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it 32. In Society of Lloyd s v Robinson 8 Lord Steyn stated: Loyalty to the text of a commercial contract, instrument, or document read in its contextual setting is the paramount principle of interpretation. But in the process of interpreting the meaning of the language of a commercial document the court ought generally to favour a commercially sensible construction. The reason for this approach is that a commercial construction is likely to give effect to the intention of the parties. Words ought therefore to be interpreted in the way in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them. And the reasonable commercial person can safely be assumed to be unimpressed with technical interpretations and undue emphasis on niceties of language. 33. As to the implication of any terms in an agreement, the authority of The Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. is instructive. Therein, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council took a broader approach to the implication of terms and held that the principles that traditionally govern such, namely, where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and where the term implied represents the obvious, but unexpressed intention of the parties, should no longer be regarded as tests to be surmounted but rather, as guidelines to assist the court in answering the question of what the instrument means. As to the broader approach Lord Hoffman stated as follows: 9 in every case in which it is said that some provision ought to be implied in an instrument, the question for the court is whether such provision would spell out in 8 [1999] WLR 756, [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 W.L.R at paras. 21 and 28 Page 16 of 26

17 express words what the instrument read against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean 34. The circumstances that existed when the parties entered into the Agreement were that the Claimant had obtained a Judgment against the Defendant on 9 th July 2013 for $16,315, and had registered same on 23 rd July The registration of the Judgment created a charge over the real property of the Defendant encumbering same and preventing transactions in which the Defendant was involved or wished to become involved from being completed. 10 On 21 st August 2013, the Defendant had applied to set aside this Judgment and the hearing of this Application was pending. The terms of the Contract provided that in the event of a dispute which was not resolved within the negotiating period, the parties should submit the dispute to non-binding mediation. In the event that the dispute was not resolved through mediation, the dispute should be settled exclusively and finally by binding arbitration In my opinion, a reasonable person, having all the background knowledge which was reasonably available to the parties at the time of the Agreement, would have understood the parties to have meant by the terms of the Agreement that: i. The Defendant agreed to make a payment of $8.5M by the Defendant to the Claimant in order to secure the release of the registration of the Judgment as a matter of extreme urgency. This payment was to be applied as a part-payment towards the damages claimed in CV and the balance of the Claimant s claim would be referred to arbitration to determine whether or not the Claimant was entitled to the balance of the claim as well as interest; ii. iii. iv. The Claimant would not be obliged to refund this payment to the Defendant; Upon receipt of this payment, the Claimant would release the registration of the Judgment and the Defendant would withdraw its Application to set aside the Judgment; The parties would agree upon and finalise the Arbitration Documentation on or before 15 th September 2013 for an arbitration in early December, 2013; v. The Claimant would refrain from enforcing the Judgment between 27 th August, 2013 and the formal finalization of the Arbitration Documentation; 10 Section 5, Remedies of Creditors Act, Chap. 8:09 11 See Article 19 of the Contract Page 17 of 26

18 vi. Once the matter proceeded to arbitration in early December 2013, as contemplated in the Agreement, the Claimant would not re-register and enforce the Judgment until the hearing and determination thereof. However, if as a consequence of the Defendant s default, the arbitration did not proceed in early December 2013, the Claimant would be entitled to re-register and enforce the Judgment for the balance due and owing from the Defendant, after giving credit for the payment of the $8.5M. Undisputed Facts 36. The following facts are not in dispute: i. On 28 th August, 2013, the Defendant made the payment of $8.5M. On the same day, the Claimant released the registration of the Judgment and the Defendant withdrew its Application to set aside the Judgment; ii. The Arbitration Documentation were not finalized by the parties by 15 th September, 2013; iii. The Attorneys-at-Law for the parties exchanged correspondence by electronic mail relative to the terms of the Arbitration Documentation, the choice of venue and the costs of the arbitration between 16 th September 2013 and 11 th November 2013; iv. The arbitration did not proceed in early December 2013; and v. The Claimant re-registered the Judgment on 19 th December, 2013 for the amount of $8,083, and notified the Defendant of such registration on 9 th January 2014; vi. The Claimant re-registered the Judgment on 5 th March, 2014 for $16,315, Time of the essence for finalizing Arbitration Documentation 37. Mrs. Peake, SC submitted that the Agreement was silent as to time being of the essence and the surrounding circumstances did not imply that it was. Mr. Dass submitted that the time provisions stated in the Agreement were to be strictly complied with. 38. Having regard to the fact that the Claimant had the benefit of the default judgment against the Defendant for $16,315, and had agreed not to re-register or enforce the judgment on the basis that the parties would proceed to arbitration for the balance of the Claimant s claim, I am of the opinion that, by necessary implication, time was of the essence with respect to the finalization of the Arbitration Documentation on or before 15 th September, Page 18 of 26

19 39. Mrs. Peake also submitted that even if time was of the essence, the Claimant waived the requirement to finalize the Arbitration Documentation by 15 th September, 2013 and to proceed to arbitration in early December, 2013 when it proposed new deadline dates as requested by the Attorney-at-Law for the Defendant, Ms. Rachel Jaggernauth. 40. The evidence shows that there was no communication between the parties or their Attorneysat-Law with respect to this issue until 16 th September, 2013 when Ms. Jaggernauth ed Ms. Vailloo requesting that new deadline dates be set. Thereafter, the parties continued to exchange electronic mails regularly up to 11 th November 2013, with a view to finalizing the Arbitration Documentation as well as the costs of the Arbitrator and the identification of a suitable venue and the costs thereof. 41. As earlier noted, the Claimant, in its Defence to Counterclaim, denied that there was any acquiescence on its part with respect to non-compliance with the deadline of 15 th September 2013 and alleged that its Attorneys-at-Law made concerted efforts to liaise with the Defendant s Attorneys via telephone in order to comply with that date. The Claimant alleged that Mr. Simonette telephoned Mr. Ramdeen on at least 8 occasions and left messages but his calls were not returned. Further, a meeting was scheduled to take place at the office of Mr. Ramdeen but, when Mr. Simonette arrived there, Mr. Ramdeen was not there. However, the Claimant failed to give any evidence in support of this allegation. In fact, Mr. Simonette gave evidence that in or around mind-november 2013, he telephoned Mr. Ramdeen on at least 8 occasions but he never returned his calls or his messages but for one occasion when they agreed to meet at Mr. Ramdeen s office. Upon his arrival at Mr. Ramdeen s office, Mr. Ramdeen was not there. 42. In my opinion, therefore, based on this evidence and the correspondence exchanged between the respective Attorneys-at-Law, the Claimant did not insist on strict compliance with the deadline of 15 th September 2013 for the finalization of the Arbitration Documentation. In fact, I am satisfied that up to 11 th November 2013 the parties were jointly engaged in doing all that was necessary to ensure that the arbitration was ready to proceed in early December In the circumstances, I find that the Claimant waived the requirement for the Arbitration Documentation to be finalized by 15 th September 2013 and I do not accept the Claimant s contention that since the deadline of 15 th September 2013 was not met, the Claimant was no Page 19 of 26

20 longer bound by its undertaking not to enforce the Judgment and that it was entitled to reregister the Judgment at any time thereafter. The Defendant s alleged breach of the Agreement 43. By letter dated 9 th January 2014, Mr. Simonette notified Mr. Ramdeen of the re-registration of the judgment based on (i) the Defendant s failure to sign the Arbitrator s terms of reference, and (ii) its disregard of the agreed time-table with impunity. 44. On 11 th November 2013 at p.m., Ms. Vailloo wrote to Ms. Jaggernauth in the following terms: We agree to your proposal regarding the request for the reasoned award and have revised paragraph 8 of the agreement to reflect this. Kindly confirm your agreement to the proposed timetable set out in paragraph 15. We look forward to your early reply. 45. On the same day at p.m., Ms. Jaggernauth replied as follows: The contents of your are duly noted with thanks. I will liaise with Counsel in relation to the revised dates and revert to your goodself. 46. According to Mr. Simonette s evidence, he made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Ramdeen in mid-november and early December According to Ms. Vailloo, all attempts to ascertain the Defendant s position were unsuccessful and on 19 th December 2013, she was instructed by the Claimant to re-register the judgment for the balance of the judgment that was unpaid, having taken into account the payment of $8.5M by the Defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was re-registered for $8,083, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 28 th August 2013 to the date of payment. 47. I have noted that although the Defendant referred to Mr. Simonette s letter dated 9 th January 2014 at paragraph 42 (g) of its Defence and Counterclaim, the Claimant did not respond to this subparagraph in its Defence to Counterclaim. Further, the Claimant did not allege that its reregistration of the judgment was a consequence of any default of the Defendant after the 15 th September However, notwithstanding this omission from its pleaded case, Mr. Simonette gave the following evidence to explain the Claimant s decision to re-register the judgment: Page 20 of 26

21 It was my understanding that judgment could be re-registered only if HDC failed to take part in arbitration by December. Whether or not arbitration took place, the payment would be converted to use of Claimant. I would expect that client would be able to re-register judgment and keep the $8.5M payment. If there was no hearing in early December, Claimant would be entitled to reregister judgment and keep the $8.5M. The claimant is entitled to re-register judgment if they did not finalise arbitration document or proceed to arbitration in early December. 48. Bearing in mind my earlier finding that the Claimant waived the requirement for the Arbitration Documentation to be finalized by 15 th September 2013, I am of the opinion that time was not of the essence with regard to the finalization of the Arbitration Documentation as well as the arbitration hearing in early December Therefore, if the Claimant was of the view that the Defendant was guilty of undue delay in responding to Ms. Vailloo s dated 11 th November 2013, it ought to have given notice requiring the Defendant to agree to the terms of reference and to the proposed timetable within a reasonable time. 14 However, the Claimant did not give any such notice to the Defendant and proceeded to re-register the judgment. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to prove that it was entitled to re-register the judgment based on the Defendant s failure to sign the Arbitrator s terms of reference and/or its disregard of an agreed timetable. 50. Further, I am of the opinion and so find that by re-registering the judgment on the 19 th December 2013, without the Defendant being in default of the terms of the Agreement, the Claimant committed a breach of the Agreement. Damages for Breach of the Agreement 51. Mrs. Peake, SC submitted that on an interpretation of the plain meaning of the Agreement, the $8.5M was only non-refundable subject to the condition that the Claimant perform the contractual obligation that the Judgment was not re-registered. Having re-registered the judgment, the Claimant was liable to refund the $8.5M. In response, Mr. Dass submitted that the fundamental nature of a claim for damages for breach of contract was compensatory for the loss of bargain and is designed to put the innocent party in the position that he would have been in had the contract been performed rather than the position he would have been in had 14 Chitty (supra) at para Page 21 of 26

22 no contract been made. On a plain reading of the Agreement, if the parties had proceeded to arbitration, the part payment of $8.5M was non-refundable and so would not, in any event, be recovered by the Defendant. Further, Mr. Dass submitted that the Defendant could not recover more than it would have been entitled to had the Claimant not breached the Agreement. 52. Halsbury s Laws of England states as follows in relation to the appropriate measure of damages: The normal function of damages for breach of contract is the same as that in tort: namely, compensatory, aiming to compensate the true loss suffered by the innocent party and place him in the same position, so far as money can do it, as if the contract had been performed. Only in exceptional circumstances do courts depart from this policy and award some greater sum. Unlike many torts, a breach of contract is actionable per se: from this it follows that a claimant who proves a breach, even if he proves no recoverable loss at all, is entitled at least to a nominal award 53. Had the Agreement been performed, the parties would have finalized the Arbitration Documentation and proceeded to arbitration to determine the balance to which the Claimant may be entitled. In addition, the Judgment would have not have been re-registered or enforced unless, after the Arbitrator made an award in favour of the Claimant, the Defendant failed and/or refused to pay the Claimant. In that event, the Claimant could apply to the Court for permission to enforce the award, enter a judgment against the Defendant and register same. 17 Most importantly, the Claimant would have retained the $8.5M since the parties agreed that this amount was paid towards the damages claimed by the Claimant in CV In the circumstances, I accept the submission of Mr. Dass that the Defendant is not entitled to a refund of the payment of $8.5M as damages for the Claimant s breach of the Agreement. 55. Apart from the Defendant s claim for the refund of the $8.5M, the Defendant failed to lead any evidence to prove that it suffered any loss as a consequence of the Defendant s breach. However, wherever a Defendant is liable for breach of contract, the Claimant is in general entitled to nominal damages although no actual damage is proved. 18 Accordingly, I am minded 16 Volume 29 (2014) at para Section 20, Arbitration Act, Chapter 5:01; Rule of the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998 (as amended) 18 Chitty (supra) at para Page 22 of 26

23 to award the Defendant the sum of $5, as nominal damages for breach of the Agreement. Unjust Enrichment 56. I am of the opinion that Defendant is not entitled to a refund of the $8.5M on the basis of unjust enrichment for the reasons set out hereunder. 57. According to Goff & Jones in The Law of Unjust Enrichment: a claimant must demonstrate three things in order to make out a cause of action in unjust enrichment: that the defendant has been enriched, that this enrichment was gained at the claimant s expense, and that the defendant s enrichment at the claimant s expense was unjust. If these three requirements are all satisfied, then the further question arises, whether there are any defences to the claim, and if there are not, then the court must decide what remedy should be awarded 58. On the facts of this case, it is undisputed that the Claimant would have received the $8.5M from the Defendant. This amounts to enrichment as the Claimant would have received value from the Defendant. 20 Accordingly, this would have been at the Defendant s expense. 21 As to the third limb of whether this enrichment at the Defendant s expense was unjust, Goff (supra) states that this is based on legally recognised factors referred to unjust factors. 59. The Defendant has submitted that the Claimant s enrichment is unjust because there is a total failure of consideration. Halsbury s Laws of England 22 states as follows in relation to the total failure of consideration: 492. The claim of the innocent party is one to recover upon a total failure of consideration; it does not arise where the failure is only partial. When seeking to determine whether or not there has been a total failure of consideration, it is always necessary to analyse carefully the nature of the contract between the parties. The task of the court is not to determine whether or not the claimant has received a specific benefit as a result of any performance on the part of the defendant but whether the defendant has performed any part of the contractual duties in respect of which the payment is due. Therefore the fact 19 (2011), 8 th Edition at para Halsbury s Laws of England, Volume 88 (2012) at para Goff (supra) at para Volume 88 (2012) at para Page 23 of 26