IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY OF THURSTON. No. 1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES HEREIN, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

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1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY OF THURSTON 1 1 CREDIT UNION, fka CREDIT UNION, a Washington corporation, vs., Plaintiff, Defendant. No. 1 ANSWER, GENERAL DENIAL, AND SPECIAL OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MONIES DUE TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES HEREIN, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:, the above-named Defendant, hereby answers the complaint of Plaintiff, and denies and alleges as follows: ANSWER and SPECIAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES Comes now the Defendant, ( PIERRE ), by way of answer, general denial, and special affirmative defenses, Defendant first denies, generally and individually, all and singularly the material allegations of Plaintiff s complaint which constitute a claim or grounds for recovery against the property described as a, Washington license No.. Page 1 of

2 1 1 (Hereinafter Subject Property ). Further defendant, in regard to each paragraph of the Plaintiff s complaint,/ specifically states in regard to factual allegations: Section I, Paragraph 1: Admit the first sentence. Deny the second sentence. Mr. Pierre does not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of whether or not Plaintiff has paid all fees and costs necessary to the maintenance of this action and Mr. Pierre must therefore deny the same. Section II, Paragraph 1: Admit. Section III, Paragraph 1: Deny every sentence in the entire paragraph. Regarding the first sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that he borrowed the sum of $,0. from the Plaintiff on or around September, 0. The alleged contract is dated September, 0; a full days prior to the Plaintiff s allegations. Additionally, there is a handwritten notation with an unintelligible date which alleges that the notation has the legal effect of making that contract supersede all others. Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff s Complaint. Mr. Pierre s alleged signature on that document may in fact be a forgery based on the enormous disparity of the dates on the documents and a possible fraud in factum has occurred. It appears there have been material alterations to Loanliner Credit Agreement and Security Agreement attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff s Complaint. Regarding the second sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff s Complaint grants the plaintiff a security interest in the Subject Property; the contract is illegal, possibly fraudulent and definitely void. If the agreement is even valid, it is clear the Plaintff did not perform as claimed and therefore breached the alleged agreement. Regarding the third sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that Plaintiff is the legal owner of the Subject Property. The Affidavit in Lieu of Title appears to be some type of print Page of (

3 1 1 out dated in December of 0. Exhibit to Plaintiff s Complaint. The Affidavit is not notarized and does not constitute competent evidence under the loosest definition of the term. Exhibits 1- attached to Mr. Pierre s Declaration clearly show WEYERHEYSER s name on documents purporting to give legal title to WEYERHEYSER dated September, 0. Yet the document the Plaintiff is claiming was the Agreement between it and Mr. Pierre was also executed on September a full days before the Plaintiff itself claims it gave Mr. Pierre a loan. Section IV, Paragraph 1: Deny every sentence in the entire paragraph. Regarding the first sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that he defaulted under the terms of any alleged agreements with the plaintiff. The Plaintiff has a claim of default predicated upon a bald assertion unsupported by even a single piece of documentary evidence. This whole action is predicated upon the Plaintiff s claims that Mr. Pierre defaulted under the terms of an alleged agreement. They provide a contract which appears to be illegal under numerous provisions of State and Federal law, an uncertified Affidavit, and a declaration from its own counsel of record. Yet, not a single document showing what sums Mr. Pierre was even asked to pay, whether or not that sum requested was even correct under their perceived loan, and how or when Mr. Pierre defaulted under whatever alleged terms of whatever alleged agreement. Plaintiff has merely alleged a default at an unknown time of an unknown amount of a yet unverified claim of debt. Moreover, any alleged agreements between Mr. Pierre and the Plaintiff are void or voidable for substantive and procedural violations of Washington State Law, Constitution, Commercial Law, Financial Institution Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines, and contract law. Page of

4 1 1 Regarding the second sentence, Mr. Pierre is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of this statement and must therefore deny the same. Regarding the third sentence, Mr. Pierre is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of this statement and must therefore deny the same. Section V, Paragraph 1: Deny every sentence in the entire paragraph. Regarding the first sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that there is any balance currently owing on any alleged obligation between the Plaintiff and Mr. Pierre. The Plaintiff has yet to even assert, let alone stipulate to whether or not the Loanliner Credit Agreement and Security Agreement acts like money or money equivalent used to give value to a bank check. Plaintiff has yet to, and cannot stipulate to all of the material facts about the Loanliner Credit Agreement and Security Agreement so Mr. Pierre actually knows what that document is so he knows what his claimed signature is actually validating as to the agreement. It is not clear in the alleged agreement whether Mr. Pierre provides the capital or if the Plaintiff does to fund the Loanliner Credit Agreement/check. If the Plaintiff claims it lent Mr. Pierre money to purchase his Loanliner Credit Agreement, it may very well have acted in direct violation of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Plaintiff has yet to produce a single accounting record verifying what exactly took place as opposed to what Plaintiff is claiming took place. Regarding the second sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the Subject Property, as all of its claims of title appear to be based on void documents, unverified claims of debt and obligation, and unverified claims of default on those unverified claims of debt and/or obligation. Most notably, the Affidavit of Title relied on by Page of

5 1 1 the Plaintiff is not certified or authenticated in any other way and is not properly before this Court. The uncertified Affidavit does nothing for any illusory claims of title by the Plaintiff. Regarding the third sentence, Mr. Pierre specifically denies that he should be directed to return said collateral to plaintiff as the claimed security agreement forming the basis of plaintiff s is void or, at the least, voidable. WHEREFORE, the Defendant Affirmatively Answers and Specially Denies Plaintiff s Complaint insofar as it asserts any Right to Recover any sum of money under the any alleged agreement attached to its Complaint as Exhibit 1. Pursuant to RCW A, Mr. Pierre denies that the Plaintiff has standing to sue in the expressly stated or implicitly implied status of holder in due course of his Loanliner Credit Agreement and all associated rights derivative therefrom, Plaintiff has no equitable interest or investment in the contract or the Plaintiff s promissory note, and hence no equitable right whatsoever to possession of the property. Plaintiff does not approach this court with clean hands, because Plaintiff has not entered this contract openly or honestly to assert any legitimate or lawful claim. Exhibit 1 attached to the Plaintiff s Complaint clearly evidences bushing, a practice and act explicitly prohibited by Washington State Law. As stated RCW.0.0-Unlawful acts and practice: Each of the following acts or practices is unlawful: () To commit, allow, or ratify any act of "bushing" which is defined as follows: Entering into a written contract, written purchase order or agreement, retail installment sales agreement, note and security agreement, or written lease agreement, hereinafter collectively referred to as contract or lease, signed by the prospective buyer or lessee of a vehicle, which: (a) Is subject to any conditions or the dealer's or his or her authorized representative's future acceptance, and the dealer fails or refuses within four calendar days, exclusive of Saturday, Page of (

6 1 1 Sunday, or legal holiday, and prior to any further negotiations with said buyer or lessee to inform the buyer or lessee either: (i) That the dealer unconditionally accepts the contract or lease, having satisfied, removed, or waived all conditions to acceptance or performance, including, but not limited to, financing, assignment, or lease approval; or (ii) that the dealer rejects the contract or lease, thereby automatically voiding the contract or lease, as long as such voiding does not negate commercially reasonable contract or lease provisions pertaining to the return of the subject vehicle and any physical damage, excessive mileage after the demand for return of the vehicle, and attorneys' fees authorized by law, and tenders the refund of any initial payment or security made or given by the buyer or lessee, including, but not limited to, any down payment, and tenders return of the trade-in vehicle, key, other trade-in, or certificate of title to a trade-in. Tender may be conditioned on return of the subject vehicle if previously delivered to the buyer or lessee. The provisions of this subsection ()(a) do not impair, prejudice, or abrogate the rights of a dealer to assert a claim against the buyer or lessee for misrepresentation or breach of contract and to exercise all remedies available at law or in equity, including those under chapter A.A RCW, if the dealer, bank, or other lender or leasing company discovers that approval of the contract or financing or approval of the lease was based upon material misrepresentations made by the buyer or lessee, including, but not limited to, misrepresentations regarding income, employment, or debt of the buyer or lessee, as long as the dealer, or his or her staff, has not, with knowledge of the material misrepresentation, aided, assisted, encouraged, or participated, directly or indirectly, in the misrepresentation. A dealer shall not be in violation of this subsection ()(a) if the buyer or lessee made a material misrepresentation to the dealer, as long as the dealer, or his or her staff, has not, with knowledge of the material misrepresentation, aided, assisted, encouraged, or participated, directly or indirectly, in the misrepresentation. When a dealer informs a buyer or lessee under this subsection ()(a) regarding the unconditional acceptance or rejection of the contract, lease, or financing by an electronic mail message, the dealer must also transmit the communication by any additional means; (b) Permits the dealer to renegotiate a dollar amount specified as trade-in allowance on a vehicle delivered or to be delivered by Page of

7 1 1 the buyer or lessee as part of the purchase price or lease, for any reason except: (i) Failure to disclose that the vehicle's certificate of ownership has been branded for any reason, including, but not limited to, status as a rebuilt vehicle as provided in RCW..00 and..0; or (ii) Substantial physical damage or latent mechanical defect occurring before the dealer took possession of the vehicle and which could not have been reasonably discoverable at the time of the taking of the order, offer, or contract; or (iii) Excessive additional miles or a discrepancy in the mileage. "Excessive additional miles" means the addition of five hundred miles or more, as reflected on the vehicle's odometer, between the time the vehicle was first valued by the dealer for purposes of determining its trade-in value and the time of actual delivery of the vehicle to the dealer. "A discrepancy in the mileage" means (A) a discrepancy between the mileage reflected on the vehicle's odometer and the stated mileage on the signed odometer statement; or (B) a discrepancy between the mileage stated on the signed odometer statement and the actual mileage on the vehicle; or (c) Fails to comply with the obligation of any written warranty or guarantee given by the dealer requiring the furnishing of services or repairs within a reasonable time. Additionally, Plaintiff, if its claims of proper assignment are to be taken as true, is therefore necessarily liable for any and all legal violations relating to the contract the Plaintiff is now attempting to obtain Mr. Pierre s unrequired performance of. Plaintiff is a stranger to the original transaction of September, 0, and is attempting to maintain this action based on back-dated documents which violate all known tenants of contract formation, construction, and consideration under Washington State Law. Plaintiff is entitled to no money damages from Mr. Pierre because Plaintiff has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts as recognized by Washington Page of

8 1 1 law by asserting rights under a contract which give it no rights, with a party to whom Plaintiff is a stranger. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES First Affirmative Defense Fails To State Sufficient Facts Each purported cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a basis for relief against this answering Defendant. Second Affirmative Defense Waiver The claims being advanced by Plaintiffs are barred by virtue of the Plaintiff s acts and/or omissions that amount to a waiver, including but, not limited to attempting to enforce backdated, and/or forged, and/or fraudulent documents by way of a Replevin action premised upon a claim of default which was itself only supported by a declaration from the Plaintiff s current counsel. The Declaration does not meet the minimum standards required for it to even be considered by this Court, as the declaration does not even state that the Declarant is willing to testify to the facts so declared. Third Affirmative Defense Estoppel This answering defendant is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Plaintiffs have engaged in conduct and activities, and by reason of said activities and conduct are estopped from asserting any claims for damages or seeking any other relief against this answering Defendant. Fourth Affirmative Defense Page of

9 1 1 Failure To Mitigate Damages Plaintiffs though under a duty to do so, have failed and neglected to mitigate their damages and, therefore, cannot recover against this answering Defendant whether as alleged or otherwise. Fifth Affirmative Defense Statute of Frauds The present action is barred by application of the Statute of Frauds because of the clearly evidenced conduct of bushing, the possible forged agreement, the possible fraudulent documents which form the basis of the Plaintiff s entire claims in this action, and the agreement allegedly executed on September, 0, but signed and that signature certified by a notary back on September,. Sixth Affirmative Defense Statute of Limitations The present action is barred by application of the applicable statute of limitations. Seventh Affirmative Defense Unclean Hands By virtue of Plaintiff s conduct, Plaintiffs are barred from recovery therein by the doctrine of unclean hands. Eighth Affirmative Defense Standing This answering defendant alleges that the Plaintiff does not have standing because Plaintiff s standing is based solely upon void or voidable documents which were backdated, violate contract law, Washington Law, and simply cannot be enforced. Page of (

10 1 1 Ninth Affirmative Defense Reservation of Defendants Defendant hereby reserves all defenses unknown at the time of filing this response. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE Assignee Defendant moves and prays that the Plaintiff CREDIT UNION, fka CREDIT UNION, a Washington corporation,take nothing whatsoever by its suit, neither in the way of equitable rights to possess nor legal entitlement to damages, fees, or costs of suit, and that THEREFORE Defendant be dismissed from all further obligation to answer or respond to Plaintiff CREDIT UNION, fka CREDIT UNION, a Washington corporation, either in this court or elsewhere, sine die. Dated this day of,. Respectfully Submitted, DEFENDANT, PRO SE Page of (

11 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on this, the day of June,, I sent a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Answer, General Denial, and Special or Affirmative Defenses, Declaration in Support thereof, and all related Attachments and Exhibitst to: WSBA #0 SID, LON & MAR, LLP UNION STREET, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 1 By certified mail w/return receipt requested. Declarant. 1 Page of