IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA. AAA INVESTMENTS PROPRIETARY LIMITED Applicant. PETER MARK HUGO NO First Respondent

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA NOT REPORTABLE EASTERN CAPE, GRAHAMSTOWN Case No.: 2088/10 & 2089/10 Date Heard: 19 August 2010 Date Delivered:16 September 2010 In the matters between: AAA INVESTMENTS PROPRIETARY LIMITED Applicant and PETER MARK HUGO NO First Respondent PIERRE DAVID HUGO NO Second Respondent LEE-ANNE VAN STADEN NO Third Respondent JUDGMENT EKSTEEN J: [1] These matters came before me as two separate applications in which the applicant seeks the provisional sequestration of the respondents. The respondents, save as set out below, have at all material times been, and are, alleged to be the trustees for the time being of the Mark Hugo Family Trust and of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust respectively. The applicant seeks the provisional sequestration of each of these trusts. [2] The matters are inter-related and in each instance the debt upon which the applicant relies arises from certain deeds of suretyship in respect of which the respondents are alleged to be co-sureties. In the circumstances it is convenient to deal with these matters in a single judgment.

2 2 [3] The applicant is a company which conducts the business of discounting and investments and, amongst other activities, advances money on loan. The first respondent, in his personal capacity (Mark Hugo) is the managing director of three companies being EL Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd (EL Joinery), Designer Windows (Pty) Ltd (Designer Windows) and East London Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd (East London Joinery). All three of these companies have now been liquidated. The Mark Hugo Family Trust (the respondent in case no. 2088/10) holds 60% of the issued shares in EL Joinery and Designer Windows. It holds 50% of the issued shares in EL Joinery. The Pierre Hugo Family Trust (respondent in case no. 2089/10) holds the remainder of the shares in these companies. [4] It is apparent that during the early half 2009 the companies ran into financial difficulties. A number of progressive loans were advanced by the applicant to EL Joinery over the period 29 April 2009 to 4 November As at 10 May 2010 EL Joinery was indebted to the applicant in the amount of R ,77. The debt is not in dispute nor is it disputed that it was then due and owing. The applicant contends that the respondents, amongst others, agreed to bind themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors with EL Joinery in respect of such debt. Three deeds of suretyship were signed as follows: 1. A suretyship for R ,00 dated 29 April 2009; and 2. A suretyship for R ,00 dated 22 August 2009; and

3 3 3. A suretyship for R ,00 dated 4 November [5] In each case the deed of suretyship which was purported to be signed on behalf of the Mark Peter Hugo Family Trust was signed by Mark Peter Hugo (Mark Hugo), acting on behalf of the Mark Hugo Family Trust duly authorised by a resolution and who warrants that he is so authorised. In each instance the deeds of suretyship on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust were signed by Pierre David Hugo (Pierre Hugo), acting on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust duly authorised by a resolution and who warrants that he so authorised. [6] It is not in dispute that these deeds of suretyship were duly signed. On behalf of the respondents in each case, as will appear more fully below, it is alleged that the signatory was not duly authorised by the trustees to enter into the deed of suretyship and accordingly it is contended that the deeds of suretyship are not binding upon the trusts. On this basis it is contended that the trusts have no liability to the applicant. [7] In addition to the said deeds of suretyship the applicant also secured certain additional security. One of these is significant to the present application. Applicant alleges that during or approximately February/March of 2010 it was apprehensive of EL Joinery s ability to repay the debt and accordingly it sought further security from the respondents herein. The applicant alleges that the Mark Hugo Family Trust and the Pierre Hugo Family Trust respectively agreed to cede and to make over in favour of the applicant

4 4 the shares which each of these trusts held in the three companies that make up the East London Joinery group. It has annexed to the papers two deeds of cession, one on behalf of the Mark Hugo Family Trust, signed by Mark Hugo in which the said Mark Hugo records, as in the case of the suretyship, that he is duly authorised by resolution of the trust to cede the trust s rights and interests in the shares and loan accounts in EL Joinery, East London Joinery and Designer Windows. An identical deed of cession was signed by Pierre Hugo on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust. In addition the applicants have annexed a resolution taken by each of the trusts on 23 March 2010 signed by each one of the respondents on behalf of each trust. In each case the resolution authorises signature of the attached deed of cession. [8] The respondents herein do not deny the signature of the deeds of cession neither do they deny the signature of the resolutions, however, the third respondent in each application, alleges, nevertheless that the signatories of the deeds of cession on behalf of the two trusts were not duly authorised and that she, as a trustee, had no knowledge of the content of the deeds of cession. [9] In due course and on 28 May 2010 each of three companies referred to above was provisionally liquidated and such orders were made final on 22 July The applicant has now called up its security and called upon the sureties to pay. This has not occurred and accordingly the present application was launched.

5 5 [10] Urgency The applicant has launched these applications as a matter of urgency. The respondent opposes these applications on the basis, inter alia, that the matters were not urgent. I need do no more than to refer to the dictum of this court in Absa Bank Limited v De Klerk and Related cases 1999 (4) SA 835 (E) at 839B-D where Jones J stated as follows: any application for sequestration merely as such contains an element of urgency: if a case for sequestration can be made, ex hypothesi, a removal of his property from the control of the debtor and a suspension of enforcement of creditors' rights of action and execution in the ordinary course as soon as possible. Accordingly, in all cases the Court, acting under Rule 6(12) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, should permit the making of the application under Rule 6(4) (a) of such Rules read with Form 2 in the First Schedule thereto, subject to the applicant's giving informal prior notice of the hearing to the debtor (of (say) two or three days) save in cases where additional considerations of urgency justify the withholding even of such notice. Such considerations should not lightly be found to exist by the Court. Suffice it to say that I am satisfied that the applicant was justified in launching the applications in the manner in which he did. [11] Locus standi of third respondent On the papers the third respondent contends that the first and second respondents have resigned as trustees of each of the trusts and that steps are currently underway to have new trustees appointed. She contends therefore that she is currently the only trustee. [12] On behalf of the applicant it is denied that such resignation is in

6 6 accordance with the terms of the trust deed and it is alleged that until the Master has issued new letters of authority the first and second respondents are required to participate in the administration of the trusts. The Master has at present neither recorded the resignations nor issued new letters of authority. [13] The first and second respondents have not opposed the applications and the third respondent does not allege that she is authorised by them to oppose the application. On this basis the applicant argues that the third respondent has no locus standi to oppose the application and she is not properly before me. [14] In view of the conclusion to which I have come below I do not consider it necessary to determine this issue. Suffice it to say that, prima facie, the submissions made on behalf of the applicant in this regard appear to me to have considerable force. [15] The merits The applicant herein alleges that the trust, in each of these cases, is factually insolvent. In each case the third respondent, who attested to the affidavits on behalf of the trusts denies that the trusts are insolvent. It appears from a reading of the opposing affidavits that the basis for the denial is to be found in the denial that the trusts are bound by the deeds of suretyship. This assertion proceeds, in each case, on the strength of the allegation that the signature of the deeds of suretyship was not duly authorised by the trustees and that they

7 7 are accordingly not binding on the trust. There is a substantial dispute of fact relating to this issue. For purposes hereof, in my view, it is not necessary to consider each of the deeds of suretyship. The final deed of suretyship dated 4 November 2009 would be decisive of the matter. If that deed of suretyship is valid as against the trusts then, on a reading of the papers before me, I consider that it has been established that the trusts are indeed factually insolvent. [16] There is accordingly, prima facie, a material dispute of fact. Mr De la Harpe, on behalf of the respondents, has urged me to adopt the approach set out in Plascon Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 AD and that I should accordingly decide the matter on the facts as stated by the respondent together with the admitted facts contained in the applicant s affidavits. [17] I do not consider this approach to be correct. In the Plascon Evans Paints matter Corbett JA held as follows at 634E-I: In such a case the general rule was stated by VAN WYK J (with whom DE VILLIERS JP and ROSENOW J concurred) in Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd 1957 (4) SA 234 (C) at 235E - G, to be: "... where there is a dispute as to the facts a final interdict should only be granted in notice of motion proceedings if the facts as stated by the respondents together with the admitted facts in the applicant's affidavits justify such an order... Where it is clear that facts, though not formally admitted, cannot be denied, they must be regarded as admitted." This rule has been referred to several times by this Court It seems to me, however, that this formulation of the general rule,

8 8 and particularly the second sentence thereof, requires some clarification and, perhaps, qualification. It is correct that, where in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on the affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict or some other form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits which have been admitted by the respondent, together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order. The power of the Court to give such final relief on the papers before it is, however, not confined to such a situation [18] It is abundantly clear that Corbett JA was there addressing the position where final relief is sought in motion proceedings. In the present matter a provisional order of winding-up is sought. The approach to be adopted where a provisional order of sequestration is sought was equally authoritatively dealt with by Corbett JA in the matter of Kalil v Decotex (Pty) Ltd and Another 1988 (1) SA 943 (A) at 979B-C where Corbett JA stated: Where on the affidavits there is a prima facie case (ie a balance of probabilities) in favour of the applicant, then, in my view, a provisional order of winding-up should normally be granted and, save in exceptional circumstances, the Court should not accede to an application by the respondent that the matter be referred to the hearing of viva voce evidence. This does no lasting injustice to the respondent for he will on the return day generally be given the opportunity, in a proper case and where he asks for an order to that effect, to present oral evidence on disputed issues. [19] In Payslip Investments Holdings v Y2K Tec Ltd 2001 (4) SA 781 at 783G-I Brand J considered the judgment of Corbett JA in Kalil v Decotex, supra and concluded as follows: According to these guidelines a distinction is to be drawn between disputes regarding the respondent's liability to the applicant and other disputes. Regarding the latter, the test is whether the balance of probabilities favours the applicant's version on the papers. If so,

9 9 a provisional order will usually be granted. If not, the application will either be refused or the dispute referred for the hearing of oral evidence, depending on, inter alia, the strength of the respondent's case and the prospects of viva voce evidence tipping the scales in favour of the applicant. With reference to disputes regarding the respondent's indebtedness, the test is whether it appeared on the papers that the applicant's claim is disputed by respondent on reasonable and bona fide grounds. In this event it is not sufficient that the applicant has made out a case on the probabilities. [20] Against these principles the allegations in the papers fall to be considered. It is not in dispute that the applicant loaned monies to EL Joinery. The applicant contends that a series of loans were affected. Each was recorded in a written agreement with EL Joinery. In each case it was expressly recorded that EL Joinery agreed that it shall simultaneously provide suretyships as set out in each agreement. In respect of the loan agreement entered into with EL Joinery dated 4 November 2009 the following was recorded: SECURITY The DEBTOR agrees that it shall simultaneously provide suretyship as follows: Suretyships from Mark Peter Hugo for R ,00 (forty million rand) plus interest and costs, for the obligations of the DEBTOR. 3. Suretyships from Pierre David Hugo for R ,00 (forty million rand) plus interest and costs, for the obligations of the DEBTOR. 4. Suretyships from Mark Hugo Family Trust for R ,00 (forty million rand) plus interest and costs, for the obligations of the DEBTOR. 5. Suretyships from Pierre Hugo Family Trust for

10 10 6. R ,00 (forty million rand) plus interest and costs, for the obligations of the DEBTOR. [21] This agreement, ex facie the document, was signed on 4 November On behalf of EL Joinery Mark Peter Hugo signed. Immediately below his signature where it is appended by him on the document the following appears: DEBTOR M P HUGO ON BEHALF OF EL JOINERY WORKS (PTY) LIMITED [22] Immediately adjacent to this signature the third respondent signed the agreement as witness to the signature of M P Hugo. The purpose for her to append her signature is of course to witness that Mark Hugo was indeed the signatory. The capacity in which he signs is conspicuously recorded immediately below his signature. [23] The deed of suretyship on behalf of the Mark Hugo Family Trust which EL Joinery had undertaken to provide was signed, ex facie the document, on the same day. It was signed on behalf of the Mark Hugo Family Trust by Mark Hugo. Immediately below his signature appears the following inscription.

11 11 Signature on behalf of surety NAME: Mark Peter Hugo ID: TRUSTEE Capacity of signatory Again, immediately adjacent to this signature appears the signature of the third respondent appended to the document as a witness to the signature of Mark Hugo. Again the capacity in which he signed is conspicuously reflected. [24] The suretyship which EL Joinery undertook to provide on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust was similarly signed, ex facie the document, on 4 November It was signed on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust by Pierre Hugo. This document contains an identical inscription below the signature on behalf of the surety as that contained on the deed of suretyship by the Mark Hugo Family Trust, save that it sets out the personal particulars of Pierre Hugo. The document accordingly indicates in bold letters that Pierre Hugo was signing the document in his capacity as trustee. The signature of the third respondent appears immediately adjacent thereto, again purporting to witness the signature of Pierre Hugo. [25] Two further deeds of suretyship on behalf of Pierre Hugo personally and Mark Hugo personally, also dated 4 November 2009 were also provided. I pause to mention that the latter two deeds of suretyship do not form part of the papers in the present applications. These two matters were, however,

12 12 called simultaneously and argued jointly with the applications for the sequestration of Mark Hugo and Pierre Hugo respectively. The deeds of suretyship provided by Mark Peter Hugo and Pierre David Hugo are contained in those files. Each of those suretyships were similarly witnessed by the third respondent by the appendage of her signature immediately adjacent to those of Mark Hugo and Pierre Hugo respectively in their capacities as sureties. [26] The aforegoing observations are necessary to place into perspective of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. The respondents herein have relied for their contentions on the Trust Deeds of each of the two trusts (the Mark Hugo Family Trust and the Pierre Hugo Family Trust) which are identical in terms. Clause 7.1 of the trust deed in each case provides that all decisions of the trustees shall be taken unanimously. Clause 9, thereafter provides that the trustees may delegate to any individual trustee or trustees or committee any specific duty or assignment. In addition I have been referred to clause 12 of the trust deed which provides that a resolution in writing signed by all the trustees shall be as valid and effective as if it had been passed at a meeting of the trustees duly called and constituted. Finally, reliance is placed on clause 29 which provides that all deeds, documents or instruments required to be executed by the trustee shall be deemed to have been validly executed in the name of the trust by any one trustee if duly authorised thereto. Against this background the third respondent contends that no unanimous decision had been taken by the trustees and that the suretyship document in each case is therefore not valid because Mark Hugo and Pierre Hugo, respectively, were not duly authorised by the trustees and

13 13 therefore had no proper authority to sign the deeds of surety in cases 2088/10 and 2089/10 respectively. No meeting of trustees, so it is argued, ever took place and no written resolution as to a unanimous decision of the trustees exists. [27] In respect of the signature of the documents on the 4 November 2009 the applicant alleges that the three trustees (the three respondents in each of these applications) are siblings and were employed and fully engaged at EL Joinery. All three, it is alleged, were party to the arrangements with regard to credit and the provision of securities. By way of example, the deponent to the founding affidavits alleges, that he delivered and was present when the suretyships for the R ,00 were signed by the signatories thereto at the offices of EL Joinery. All three, it is alleged, of the trustees of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust and the Mark Hugo Family Trust were there and present when this deed of suretyship was signed along with the further deed of suretyship on behalf of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust. The deponent contends that at the time of the signing of the suretyship agreements none of the respondents voiced any objection thereto. On this basis it is argued that they have acted unanimously and for them to claim that the suretyship was not authorised defies the truth of the matter. That, it is alleged, is simply an attempt at avoiding the contractual liabilities of the trusts. [28] The third respondent, attesting to the affidavit in case 2088/10 on behalf of the respondents, states as follows in response:

14 14 I refer to the suretyship document annexed to the Applicant s Founding Affidavit marked PM9 and deny that the aforesaid suretyship is valid and binding upon the Mark Hugo Family Trust as it was not consented to, authorised or signed by all the Trustees. I confirm that I signed the document as a witness. At the time of signing of the document PM9, I was unaware of the contents thereof, which had not been discussed or canvassed with me at all, and the document was presented to me at the my place of work at EL Joinery by Desiree Pieterse, who signed as witness number one, and requested me to witness the document as witness number two. I confirm that when I witnessed the document I was not in the presence of Mark Peter Hugo when he signed the document. At the time was not aware that this document related to the Mark Hugo Family Trust. I often witnessed signatures for documents signed for and on behalf of the East London Joinery Works group of companies. I did not concern myself with the contents of these documents and the nature of the documents were not brought to may attention while witnessing. At no stage was this particular deed of suretyship discussed in a meeting by the Trustees of the Mark Hugo Family Trust, and at no stage did I sign a resolution or consent to the conclusion of the aforesaid suretyship in favour of the applicant. Save as is state above, I have no knowledge of the remaining allegations contained herein. An identical averment is made in application number 2089/10 in respect of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust. [29] Later in her affidavit in case number 2088/10 she states as follows: At the outset I must state that I first met Pieter De Villiers Moll at the offices of Charterers and Barnes at a meeting held at the beginning of March 2010 which dealt with a particular creditor s claim, namely Lumber One (Pty) Ltd, as well as steps to be taken to reduce costs and for additional capital injection by Pierre Hugo and Mark Hugo. PM9 reflects that it was signed on the 4 th November This is a suretyship document for R ,00. As stated above, I was not present with Mark Hugo when he signed this document and I signed the document at EL Joinery as witness number two when asked to do so by Desiree Pieterse the first witness. I deny that Pieter De Villiers Moll was present at the offices of EL Joinery and that I witnessed the suretyship PM9 in his presence. The contracts between the Applicant and East

15 15 London Joinery Group, and the suretyship agreements with the Trusts were never discussed with Pieter De Villiers Moll in my presence. As is stated above, the remaining allegations contained herein are denied. Again an identical assertion is made in application number 2089/10 in respect of the Pierre Hugo Family Trust. Neither Mark Hugo nor Pierre Hugo have attested to supporting affidavits in this regard. This is, I think, significant for each of them expressly warranted that they had in fact been so authorised. I think it can justifiably be inferred that the absence of these supporting affidavits arise from their arrangement on these factual averments. [30] I consider that the overwhelming balance of probabilities favours the version put up by the applicant. Numerous documents were signed simultaneously. In each instance the capacity in which Mark Hugo and Pierre Hugo signed appears in bold capital letters below their signature. In each instance the third respondent signed immediately adjacent thereto. I think that it is untenable to suggest, as third respondent does, that she, as a cotrustee, did not know that she was witnessing the signature of a trustee in the case of each of the suretyships which are decisive of the matter currently under consideration. Having seen that she was witnessing the signature of a trustee, and herself being a trustee, I consider it equally untenable that she was oblivious of the content of the documents. She signed as witness on no less than five documents simultaneously. I consider that her suggestion that she may have thought them to be documents on behalf of East London Joinery group to be so untenable as to reject it on the papers.

16 16 [31] It does not appear to me that the events which occurred at the signature of the documents are disputed on reasonable and bona fide grounds. I must however weigh the evidence in the context of the totality of the evidence. I have referred above to the cession of shares by each of the trusts to the applicant. In regard to this alleged cession the third respondent declares in case 2088/10 as follows: I have no knowledge of the deeds of cession marked PM11 and PM12 annexed to the Applicant s Founding Affidavit. The first time I saw the aforesaid cessions was when they were attached to the Works (Pty) Ltd, at the end of May / beginning of June I was not party to the signing of the deeds of cession annexed marked PM11 and PM12 and did not sign such a cession binding the Trust. I left on holiday for Istanbul, Turkey, on the 28 th March 2010 and only returned to South Africa on the 10 th April I was accordingly not in East London when the aforesaid cessions marked PM11 and PM12 were signed on 29 March I admit that my signature appears on the resolutions annexed as PM13 and PM14 to the Applicant s Founding Affidavit. There was no attachment to the resolutions when I signed them, and accordingly did not have any sight of the cession referred to therein at the time of the signing of the resolution. To the best of my knowledge and recall, I signed the aforestated resolutions upon my return from Turkey after the 10 th April An identical assertion is made in the case of 2089/10. [32] Again, neither Mark Hugo nor Pierre Hugo have provided confirmatory affidavits. I do not consider that there is any material significance in the date upon which it was signed. The resolutions referred to are resolutions signed by each one of the three respondents authorising the signature of the attached deed of cession. In addition the applicant has annexed the minutes of a meeting held on 23 March 2010, the date of signature of the resolution referred to above, at the offices of the respondents accountant at which the

17 17 third respondent was present. It records as follows: It was then discussed whether Peter Moll should purchase the Land and Buildings in East London Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd or if he should take cession of the shares It was decided that he take cession of the shares Peter is to draw up or have drawn up an agreement whereby the shares of all the companies in the EL Joinery group are ceded to Peter Moll and a resolution of trusts is to be drawn up indicating this as well (Mark Hugo Family Trust and Pierre Hugo Family Trust). [33] On a consideration of all these matters I find that the protestations of the third respondent are so untenable that I may dismiss them on the papers. The applicant s version of events relating both to the signature of the suretyships and of the resolution in respect of the cession commends itself to me as being inherently credible when read together with the documentation referred to above. [34] In any event I am of the view that even if the third respondent had not in fact authorised the signature of the suretyships or the cession this cannot avail the respondents. It is indeed so that as a matter law the trustees can only act jointly and the trust deed in the present matter requires a resolution to be taken unanimously. The fact, however, that trustees have to act jointly does not mean that the ordinary principles of law of agency do not apply. The trustees may expressly or impliedly authorise someone to act on their behalf and that person may be one of the trustees. This flows both from the common law and from the terms of the trust deeds to which I have referred. There is no reason why a third party may not act on the ostensible authority of one of the trustees, but whether a particular trustee has the ostensible

18 18 authority to act on behalf of the other trustees is a matter of fact and not one of law. See Nieuwoudt and Another NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Beperk 2004 (3) SA 486. [35] In each of the applications presently under consideration the first and the second respondents signed deeds of suretyship in the amount of R ,00 in favour of the applicant on behalf of the Mark Hugo Family Trust and the Pierre Hugo Family Trust respectively. These were procured in consequence of the commitment given by EL Joinery in terms of the loan agreement. First and second respondents are the directors of EL Joinery. In each case they warranted that they had been duly authorised to sign the suretyships by resolution. In each case the third respondent, the only remaining trustee, appends her signature as a witness to the signature on behalf of the trust immediately adjacent thereto. I have held above that she was present with Pieter De Villiers Moll and the first and second respondents at the time when the signature was appended. Ex facie the document she was, after all, witnessing the application of the first and second respondents signatures to the document. Neither first nor second respondent have disputed the applicant s assertion that all three of them were present together. Even if she was not her signature as witness represented to the applicant that she was so present. In the circumstances irrespective of whether the trustees had in fact met and consciously taken a resolution to authorise the signature of the deeds of suretyship, I find that they acted unanimously and in concert representing to Pieter De Villiers Moll and to the applicant that the trustees had authorised the first respondent and the second respondent

19 19 respectively to represent the Mark Hugo Trust and the Pierre Hugo Trust respectively in binding these trusts as sureties. The applicant was entitled to reply on this representation. At best for the respondents each of the signatories had the ostensible authority to bind the trusts. In all the circumstances it does not appear to me that the respondents indebtedness is disputed on reasonable and bona fide grounds. [36] In the result a proper case for a provisional order of sequestration is made out and I accordingly make the following orders: 1. In case number 2088/10 it is ordered that: (a) The Mark Hugo Family Trust (IT2279/95) represented by its trustees, Mark Peter Hugo, Pierre David Hugo and Lee-Ann Van Staden NNO, be and is hereby placed under provisional sequestration in the hands of the Master of this Court; (b) A rule nisi will issue calling upon the respondents, in their capacities aforesaid to show cause, if any, to this court at 10h00 on Thursday, 21 October 2010 why the estate of the respondent should not be placed under final sequestration order in the hands of the Master of this Court. (c) This order is to be served in the following manner: (i) (ii) by one publication in the Daily Despatch. by the sheriff personally:

20 20 (1) on the respondents and (2) on the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services, East London. 2. In case number 2089/10 it is ordered that: (a) The Pierre Hugo Family Trust (IT2281/95) represented by its trustees, Mark Peter Hugo, Pierre David Hugo and Lee-Ann Van Staden NNO, be and is hereby placed under provisional sequestration in the hands of the Master of this Court; (b) A rule nisi will issue calling upon the respondents, in their capacities aforesaid to show cause, if any, to this court at 10h00 on Thursday, 21 October 2010 why the estate of the respondent should not be placed under final sequestration order in the hands of the Master of this Court. (c) This order is to be served in the following manner: (i) (ii) by one publication in the Daily Despatch. by the sheriff personally: (1) on the respondents and (2) on the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services, East London.

21 21 J W EKSTEEN JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Appearances: For Applicant: Adv I Smuts SC & Adv Beard instructed by Messrs Netteltons, Grahamstown For Respondents: Adv D de la Harpe instructed by Wheeldon Rushmere & Cole, Grahamstown