Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

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1 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16 Civil Action No. 12-cv MCA-MJW CITIZEN CENTER, v. Plaintiff, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO SCOTT GESSLER, in his official capacity as Colorado Secretary of State, et al., Defendants. SECRETARY S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant Scott Gessler, in his official capacity as Colorado Secretary of State (the Secretary ), by and through undersigned counsel, moves to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ( Complaint ). [Doc. 1]. DUTY TO CONFER In accordance with D.C.COLO.L.CivR 7.1A, undersigned counsel certifies that she conferred in good faith with counsel for Plaintiff prior to filing this motion. Plaintiff opposes the relief requested. INTRODUCTION Although the first five claims in the Complaint alleged violations of different Fourteenth Amendment protections, all five claims flow from the same alleged injury namely, that the Defendants actions and omissions injured Citizen Center s members by destroying the secrecy of the ballot and chilling the exercise of their associational rights to vote, engage in anonymous speech, and engage in anonymous political

2 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 16 association. This common denominator is significant because a plaintiff s alleged injury is the lynchpin of a federal court s analysis of whether Article III standing exists. If no cognizable injuries have been suffered, then no violations of the Fourteenth Amendment have occurred and this Court may not consider the merits of Citizen Center s first through fifth claims. In this case, the Complaint failed to establish that Citizen Center has organizational standing because the alleged injury from which all five federal claims spring is nothing more than a generalized grievance about the conduct of state government. The Complaint also failed to establish that Citizen Center s members would have standing to sue in their own right because subjective claims of chilled associational rights do not constitute injuries under Article III. And, even if this Court finds that Citizen Center or its members suffered or are threatened with direct injuries, the Complaint should still be dismissed as to the Secretary for lack of standing due to non-redressability. Finally, the Eleventh Amendment bars Citizen Center s sixth claim for violation of the Colorado Constitution. PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT Plaintiff, Citizen Center, is a non-profit membership organization concerned with voting issues. [Doc. 1, 5]. On February 12, 2012, Citizen Center filed suit under 42 U.S.C ( Section 1983 ), 28 U.S.C ( Declaratory Judgment Act ), and 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) ( supplemental jurisdiction ) alleging that the Secretary and the Clerk and Recorders of six Colorado counties ( County Clerks ) violated and will continue to violate the federal and state constitutional rights of the organization and its members. 2

3 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 16 [Doc. 1, 17; 20-21; 6-8]. Specifically, Citizen Center alleged that the County Clerks have adopted and implemented election practices that allow them to trace voted ballots in their possession to individual voters in their respective county. [Doc. 1, 24-29]. Such election practices allegedly destroy the secrecy of the ballot required by the federal and state constitution, and infringe upon the federal constitutional rights of Citizen Center s members by chilling the exercise of their associational rights to vote, engage in anonymous speech, and engage in anonymous political association. [Doc. 1, 2-3; 57; 41-42; 52-53]. The Complaint also alleged that the Secretary has had knowledge of the County Clerks challenged election practices since the 2010 election cycle. [Doc. 1, 32]. Citizen Center contends that, while the Secretary has the power to supervise the conduct of elections by the County Clerks and to enforce election laws, he has failed and will continue to fail to prevent the County Clerks from continuing to compile and maintain information, including tracking reports, that permits the government to trace voted ballots to individual voters. [Doc. 1, 31-32]. Citizen Center further contends that the Secretary has acquiesce[d] to the County Clerks destruction of the secrecy of the ballot and tolerat[ed] the County Clerks infringement upon the federal constitutional rights of Citizen Center s members by chilling the exercise of their associational rights to vote, engage in anonymous free speech, and engage in anonymous political association. [Doc. 1, 57; 63; 2-3; 41-42; 52-53]. 3

4 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 16 The Complaint set forth seven claims for relief, of which the first five arise under the United States Constitution, and the sixth arises under the Colorado Constitution. 1 All Defendants have been sued in their official capacities only, and Citizen Center seeks only prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as reasonable attorney s fees and costs. [Doc. 1, 9-16]. ARGUMENT I. Standard of Review The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). At its most basic level, a complaint is legally sufficient if it contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Thus, to withstand a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must include enough facts to nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Id., at 570. Fed. R. Civ. P. ( Rule ) 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 1 The Seventh claim for relief improperly alleged a violation of Section 1983 and, therefore, will not be addressed by this motion. [Doc. 1, 96-98]. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but instead provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, (1979). 4

5 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 16 do. Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Accordingly, Rule 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Id., at [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id., at 679, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plausibility standard that the Supreme Court outlined in Twombly and Iqbal applies to questions of standing under Article III. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2010). As such, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that she has standing to assert each of her claims. See Braddock Fin. Corp. v. Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F.Supp. 924, 927 (D. Colo. 2009); see also Cornerstone Christian Schools v. University Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, (5th Cir. 2009). It is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must affirmatively appear in the record[.] Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, (1998), quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Hence a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to raise a plausible claim that Article III standing exists. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. II. Citizen Center did not assert a plausible injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III, declaratory judgment, or prudential standing. For a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the party bringing the suit must establish standing. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The Supreme Court s standing jurisprudence contains two 5

6 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 16 strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution s case-or-controversy requirement, and prudential standing, which embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The Wilderness Society v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show for each type of relief sought: (1) injury in fact, i.e. an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical ; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations omitted); see also Utah Ass n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1100 (10th Cir. 2006). Article III standing requirements ensure that claims are presented by a plaintiff who has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). It is not enough to simply have a personal, ideological interest that creates adverseness between the parties. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, (1982). Rather, adverseness is the consequence of a party s ability to satisfy the Article III requirement of injury-in-fact. Id. The requirements of Article III standing are not satisfied by the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by... citizens. Id., at 482, quoting 6

7 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 16 Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223, n. 13 (1974). The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law[.] Id., at , quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922); citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 208; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at ; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Such claims amount to little more than attempts to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air... generalized grievances about the conduct of government. Id., at 483, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1942). Standing to seek declaratory relief imposes a related set of requirements. Although the standing requirements for declaratory relief are less severe than those for injunctive relief, not even declaratory relief is available where the threat of state action is imaginary, speculative, or chimerical. Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 213 (1979), citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, (1974). Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, there must be a live and acute controversy, that is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. Id., quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). If a complaint fails to allege that state officials have ever taken or threatened to take any action with respect to a state statute, then there is no actual controversy within the Declaratory Judgment Act, and no case or controversy within Article III. Id., quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459, 476. In such cases, federal courts are 7

8 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 16 not empowered to give plaintiff advisory opinions[.] Id., citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971). Prudential standing also imposes a related set of requirements. In general, a plaintiff must have: 1) a specific grievance as opposed to a general injury shared by a large class of citizens; 2) assert its own rights rather than those of third parties; and 3) have a complaint that falls within the zone of interest defined by the constitutional provision at issue. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at A. Citizen Center lacks organizational standing. To establish standing to seek judicial relief as an organization, Citizen Center must meet the same Article III requirements that apply to individuals. See National Taxpayers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995). When an organization sues on its own behalf, it must allege that it has been injured as an entity. Colorado Common Cause v. Buescher, 750 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2010), citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Citizen Center here must establish that it has suffered an injury in fact, including concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization s activities with a consequent drain on the organization s resources. See National Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at The facts alleged in the Complaint must demonstrate more than simply a setback to the organization s abstract social interests. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ( The court has distinguished between organizations that allege that their activities have been impeded from those that merely allege that their mission has been compromised. ) 8

9 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 16 They must also demonstrate the diversion of organizational resources in an attempt to counteract the allegedly illegal conduct. See N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Texas, 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010). The Complaint wholly failed to allege that Citizen Center suffered a plausible injury in fact. To the contrary, the Complaint only alleged that [t]he interests that the Citizen Center seeks to protect in this action are germane to the organization s purposes. [Doc. 1, 7]. Aside from this vague assertion, the Complaint pled no facts to support a finding that Defendants alleged acts or omissions have impeded Citizen Center s activities and programs. In fact, the Complaint failed to even identify any of Citizen Center s activities and programs, much less to explain how Defendants alleged misconduct hindered same. This stands in sharp contrast to organizational plaintiffs such as those in Havens, where a non-profit alleged that the defendants conduct prevented it from engaging in the business in which it was normally engaged. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (concluding that a non-profit had standing based in part on its allegations of a concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization s activities ); see also Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008) (organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if the defendant s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts ) (emphasis added). Simply put, allegations of germaneness do not state a cognizable injury for purposes of establishing Article III organizational standing and Declaratory Judgment Act standing in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. 9

10 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 16 At most, the Complaint alleged that Citizen Center disagrees with the County Clerks election practices, and disagrees with the Secretary s alleged acquiescence to and toleration of same. This action is, therefore, little more than Citizen Center s attempt to use this federal Court as a forum to air general grievances about the conduct of Colorado government. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at Generalized grievances fail to satisfy prudential standing considerations and are better addressed by the political process, rather than the courts. Id., at Accordingly, Citizen Center lacks Article III, Declaratory Judgment Act, and prudential standing to obtain relief on its own behalf. B. Citizen Center lacks associational standing because its members do not otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. An organization has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests that it seeks to protect are germane to the organization s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see also Utah Ass n of Counties, 455 F.3d at The Complaint failed this test for two reasons. The first prong requires a plaintiff-organization to make specific allegations establishing the standing of at least one identified member of the organization. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009). In this case, the Complaint failed to identify even one member of Citizen Center, and instead made general allegations about what its members would like to do, but will not do as a result 10

11 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 16 of Defendants alleged acts and omissions. See, e.g., [Doc. 1, 35; 37; 41; 43; 48; 52; 54]. More importantly, even if eventually identified, the Complaint also failed the first prong of the associational standing test because it did not plead that Citizen Center s members have suffered plausible direct injuries sufficient to confer standing in their own right. As noted above, the first five claims in the Complaint are based on the same alleged injury namely, that Citizen Center s members subjectively feel that their associational rights to vote, engage in anonymous speech, and engage in anonymous political association have been chilled by the Defendants alleged acts and omissions. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), the Supreme Court considered: whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose. Id., at 10. In Laird, plaintiffs alleged that their associational rights were chilled by the Department of the Army s surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity, which was neither authorized by an act of Congress, nor by the United States Constitution. Id., at 2 (majority), 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The district court dismissed the complaint based, in part, on plaintiffs failure to allege any injury or realistic threats to their rights growing out of the Army s actions. Id., at 8. The D.C. Circuit reversed and the Army appealed to the Supreme Court. On appeal, the court noted that, while several of its then recent decisions had recognized constitutional violations based on the deterrent, or chilling, effect of 11

12 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 16 governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights, in none of those cases did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the individual s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that individual. Id., at 11. The Supreme Court further noted that its prior chilling effect decisions had not eroded the established principal that a plaintiff must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental action. Id., at 13. Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that: The respondents do not meet this test; their claim, simply stated, is that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs and that the very existence of the Army s data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights. Allegations of a subjective chill are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. Id., at 13-14, quoting United Public Workers of American (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947). In this case, a subjective chill is the only injury Citizen Center alleged on behalf of its members. The Complaint did not allege that any of the County Clerks have actually traced voted ballots to Citizen Center s members, or even threatened to do so in the future. It also did not allege that the Secretary knew of any County Clerk who actually traced voted ballots, or that he knows of any County Clerk who has threatened 12

13 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 16 to do so. Absent such allegations, Citizen Center cannot satisfy the Article III injury in fact requirement. Likewise, Citizen Center s members cannot plausibly claim to have prudential standing based on an alleged injury to some general right to have Colorado government administered according to law. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at (quotation omitted). Finally, the subjective chill that Citizen Center s members allegedly sustained was nothing more than an imaginary, speculative, or chimerical injury, and did not create the actual controversy needed for this Court to award declaratory relief. Shell Oil Co., 608 F.2d at 213. Accordingly, the Complaint failed to plausibly allege that Citizen Center s members have standing under Article III, prudential considerations, or the Declaratory Judgment Act. The first through fifth claims in the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing. III. Even if Citizen Center has associational standing, a lawsuit against the Secretary cannot provide relief. If this Court determines that Citizen Center or its members have suffered a cognizable injury, their claims will be directly redressed by an award of declaratory and injunctive relief against the County Clerks only. The third element of Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the alleged injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at (citations and footnote omitted). Additionally, what makes a declaratory judgment action a proper judicial resolution of a case of controversy rather than an advisory opinion is the settling of some dispute which effects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994), quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 483 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis added). Assume 13

14 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 16 arguendo, that this Court orders the Secretary to exercise his supervisory power over the County Clerks by either ordering them to cease the complained of election practices or promulgating rules. In such a scenario, any ameliorating effect upon Citizen Center s injury would be purely speculative due to the operation of Colorado law. County Clerks, in rendering decisions and interpretations under [the Election Code], shall consult with the secretary of state and follow the rules and orders promulgated by the secretary of state pursuant to this code (1), C.R.S. The Election Code authorizes the Secretary to file an action for injunctive relief in state court against a County Clerk who fails to follow the Secretary s rules or orders (2), C.R.S. Thus, in the event that this Court orders the Secretary to promulgate rules or issue orders and the County Clerks disobey those rules or orders, the dispute would have to be resolved in state court with all of the uncertainties inherent to litigation. Furthermore, a legal dispute is not merely a hypothetical posed by the Secretary in this case, but rather is a reality of the Secretary s office. See Gessler v. Johnson, et al., Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 11CV6588 (Bronfin,J., presiding) (action to enforce the Secretary s order prohibiting the Clerk and Recorder for the City and County of Denver from mailing ballots to registered electors whose status was inactive failed to vote for the November 2011 Coordinated Election); Gessler v. Doty, 2012 WL (Colo. App. 2012) (unpublished; cert. pending) (action to enforce the Secretary s order requiring the Clerk and Recorder for Arapahoe County to pay the costs of providing drop-off boxes for mail-in ballots at every polling place). If Citizen Center or its members have been 14

15 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 16 injured by the County Clerks election practices, then relief entered only against the County Clerks will directly redress their injury. IV. The sixth claim for relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Complaint asks this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Citizen Center s sixth claim for relief that the Defendants actions and omissions have violated the Colorado Constitution s requirement of secrecy of the ballot. COLO. CONST. Art, VII, Sec. 8. In a nutshell, Citizen Center asks this Court to order Defendants to follow state law. However, it is well settled that [a] federal court s grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the authority of federal law, and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1979); U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Secretary respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DATED this 16th day of April, JOHN W. SUTHERS Attorney General s/ LeeAnn Morrill LEEANN MORRILL Assistant Attorney General 1525 Sherman Street, 7th Floor Denver, Colorado Telephone: FAX: leeann.morrill@state.co.us 15

16 Case 1:12-cv CMA-MJW Document 31 Filed 04/16/12 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 16, 2012, I served a true and complete copy of the foregoing SECRETARY S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS upon all counsel of record listed below via the CM/ECF system for the United States District Court for the District of Colorado: Party Counsel of Record Counsel s Address Service Method Citizen Center Robert A. McGuire ram@lawram.com ECF Service Shiela Reiner Maurice L. Dechant David R. Frankel Lyle.Dechant@mesacounty.us david.frankel@mesacounty.us ECF Service Scott Doyle David Ayraud William Ressue dayraud@larimer.org wressue@larimer.org ECF Service Pam Anderson Writer Mott David R. Wunderlich wmott@jeffco.us dwunderl@jeffco.us ECF Service Hillary Hall David Hughes dhughes@bouldercounty.org ECF Service Joyce Reno Jennifer A. Davis jdavis@chaffeecounty.org ECF Service Teak Simonton Bryan R. Treu Thomas J. Lyons Gillian Dale bryan.treu@eaglecounty.us lyonst@hallevans.com daleg@hallevans.com ECF Service s/ LeeAnn Morrill 16