NO IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Transcription

1 NO IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT LUTHER SCOTT, JR. AND THE LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOM SCHEDLER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LOUISIANA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant-Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA USDC No. CIV. A PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT AND RE-URGE MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & Ronald L. Wilson EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 701 Poydras Street Sherrilyn Ifill Suite 4100 Director-Counsel New Orleans, LA Elise C. Boddie (504) Ryan P. Haygood (504) (Fax) Counsel of Record Natasha M. Korgaonkar Leah C. Aden 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 New York, NY (212) (212) (Fax) rhaygood@naacpldf.org

2 PROJECT VOTE Sarah Brannon Niyati Shah Michelle Rupp 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC (202) Ext. 302 (202) (Fax) FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP Michael de Leeuw Israel David Jesse Ryan Loffler David Yellin One New York Plaza New York, NY (212) (212) (Fax) Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees

3 Case No LUTHER SCOTT, JR., for himself and all other persons similarly situated; LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, for themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOM SCHEDLER, in his official capacity as the Louisiana Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant. The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Fifth Circuit Rule have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal. 1. Those persons listed by Appellant 2. Tom Schedler, in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State, Appellant 3. Luther Scott, Jr., Appellee 4. Louisiana Conference of the NAACP, Appellee 5. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Counsel for Appellees 6. Sherrilyn Ifill, Counsel for Appellees 7. Elise C. Boddie, Counsel for Appellees 8. Ryan P. Haygood, Counsel for Appellees 9. Natasha M. Korgaonkar, Counsel for Appellees i

4 10. Leah C. Aden, Counsel for Appellees 11. Project Vote, Counsel for Appellees 12. Sarah Brannon, Counsel for Appellees 13. Niyati Shah, Counsel for Appellees 14. Michelle Rupp, Counsel for Appellees 15. Ronald L. Wilson, Counsel for Appellees 16. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Counsel for Appellees 17. Michael B. de Leeuw, Counsel for Appellees 18. Israel David, Counsel for Appellees 19. Jesse R. Loffler, Counsel for Appellees 20. David Yellin, Counsel for Appellees 21. Bruce D. Greenstein, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Defendant in District Court proceedings 22. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals (Bureau of Legal Services), Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 23. Douglas L. Cade, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 24. Brandon J. Babineaux, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 25. David L. McCay, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 26. Kimberly L. Humbles, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 27. Rebecca C. Clement, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein ii

5 28. Stephen R. Russo, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 29. Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 30. Amy Collier Lambert, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 31. Harry Joseph Philips, Jr., Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 32. Katia Desrouleaux, Counsel for Defendant Bruce D. Greenstein 33. Suzy Sonnier, in her official capacity as Secretary of Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, Defendant in District Court proceedings 34. State of Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 35. Celia Marie Williams-Alexander, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 36. Ebony M. Townsend, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 37.Charles Leopold Dirks, III, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 38. Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 39. Amy C. Lambert, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 40. Harry J. Philips, Jr., Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier 41. Katia Desrouleaux, Counsel for Defendant Suzy Sonnier Counsel is unaware of any other persons with an interest in this brief. Dated: May 9, 2013 Respectfully submitted, s/ Michael de Leeuw iii

6 Michael de Leeuw Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees iv

7 TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 1 LEGAL STANDARD. 2 ARGUMENT... 3 I. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION COMPLIES WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE II. III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT A PERMANENT INJUNCTION APPLYING TO SCHEDLER WAS NECESSARY.. 7 SCHEDLER MAY NOT SEEK IN HIS MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT AN ISSUE THAT IS ABSENT FROM HIS MERITS MOTION.. 9 CONCLUSION. 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.. 15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. 17 RECORD EXCERPTS.. 18 v

8 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987). 8 Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat l Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968)... 2 CPC Int l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000). 5 Ergo Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 1996)... 6 Hall v. GE Plastic Pacific PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2003). 6 Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008). 9 Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987).. 2 Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2012). 6 MedEx Inc. v. Ranger, 788 F.Supp. 288 (E.D. La. 1992).. 8 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) 2, 12 Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).. 4 Vladez v. Herrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. N.M. Dec 21, 2010). 9 vi

9 STATUTES & OTHER AUTHORITIES 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a)(2) U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a)(3) Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)... 4 La. Admin. Code tit. 31, pt. II, 503 (2011) Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 2904, at (2012)... 3 vii

10 RECORD EXCERPTS CONTENTS Tab Document Description RE1 Permanent Injunction, Doc 437 (Jan. 23, 2013), R RE2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Doc 436 (Jan. 23, 2013), R RE3 Order and Reasons on Partial Summary Judgment, Doc 212 (May 3, 2012), R RE8 RE9 Schedler s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and to Dispense with Bond, Doc 445 (Feb. 22, 2013), R Schedler s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Doc (Feb. 22, 2013), R RE10 Order and Reasons Denying Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, Doc 467 (Apr. 25, 2013) RE12 RE14 RE15 Certification on Behalf of Tom Schedler, Louisana Secretary of State, Doc 465 (Mar. 15, 2013) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Schedler s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Doc 456 (Mar. 5, 2013) Motion for Extension of Time to File Certification of Compliance by DHH s Disability Service Progams, Doc 443 (Feb. 19, 2013), R viii

11 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiffs-Appellees Luther Scott, Jr. and the Louisiana State Conference of the NAACP ( Appellees ) file this opposition to Defendant-Appellant Louisiana Secretary of State Tom Schedler s ( Schedler ) Motion to Supplement and Re- Urge Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. On March 13, 2013, Schedler filed a Motion to Stay the District Court s Permanent Injunction Pending Appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c). RE8. 1 Without waiting for the District Court to rule, Schedler filed a similar motion to stay, purportedly under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8, in this Court on March 22, Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, Doc , Mar. 22, 2013 (hereinafter Mot. to Stay ). In the interim, on March 15, 2013, Schedler filed a Certificate of Compliance with the Injunction. RE12. Appellees timely opposed both motions. RE14; Br. of Pls.-Appellees in Opp. to Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal, Doc , Apr. 1, 2013 ( Opp. to Mot. for Stay ). On April 25, 2013, the District Court denied Schedler s motion to stay. RE10. Schedler subsequently filed an additional motion and memorandum supplementing his second motion to stay (again under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8), 1 Appellees abbreviate Record Excerpts as RE. Where appropriate, Appellees also provide pincites to the District Court record, abbreviated as R. All Record Excerpts cited in this opposition are provided. Appellees kept the same RE numbering used in all documents relating to Schedler s motion to stay, with the exception that there were two RE10s. (Department of Children and Family Service s certification of compliance with the Injunction, and the District Court s Order and Reasons Denying Motion to Stay Pending Appeal). The RE10 used in this opposition is the District Court s Order and Reasons Denying Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. 1

12 re-urging this Court to grant a stay pending appeal. Doc , Apr. 29, 2013 (hereinafter Supp. Br. ). Appellees continue to oppose Schedler s request for a stay for the reasons presented in the earlier opposition filed with this Court. Opp. to Mot. for Stay. 2 Furthermore, for the reasons set forth here, Appellees also respectfully request that this Court reject Schedler s motion to supplement and to re-urge. LEGAL STANDARD A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and thus is an extraordinary remedy, Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat l Bank, 395 F.2d 685, 685 (5th Cir. 1968). A party seeking a stay pending appeal bears the heavy burden of establishing four separate factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken, 556 U.S. at (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). Given this stringent standard, more commonly stay requests will not meet this 2 Appellees continue to assert all of the arguments provided in the original opposition. However, since the District Court s ruling on the Rule 68 motion to stay, Appellees argument that the Motion to Stay before this Court was premature under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) is now rendered moot. Opp. to Mot. for Stay at

13 standard and will be denied. 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 2904, at (2012). ARGUMENT In denying Schedler s motion to stay, the District Court held that Schedler was not likely to succeed on the merits; that the Permanent Injunction (the Injunction ) complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65; that Schedler is not likely to suffer irreparable harm warranting a stay due to the Injunction; that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer harm without the Injunction; and that Schedler failed to demonstrate that the public interest favors a stay. RE10. Now, in his motion to re-urge, Schedler continues to claim that the District Court erred and raises three arguments: (1) that the Injunction violated Federal Rule Civil Procedure 65, Supp. Br. at 1-3; (2) that the District Court erred in finding that the Plaintiffs will be injured if Schedler does not exercise meaningful oversight over DHH and DCFS during the appeal, Supp. Br. at 4; and (3) that the District Court erred in stating that its holding that mandatory voter registration agencies are to offer voter registration during remote transactions does not apply to optional voter registration agencies, Supp. Br. at 4-7. For the reasons discussed below, this Court should reject Schedler s supplemental motion because it is wholly without merit. 3

14 I. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION COMPLIES WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65 The Injunction at issue does not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which requires that every order granting an injunction... must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail and not by referring to the complaint or other document the act or acts restrained or enjoined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). The Injunction was issued by the District Court in response to violations of the NVRA by Schedler and the other Defendants. RE1 at 1, R Under the Injunction, Schedler is required to maintain certain newly-revised policies, procedures, and directives relating to NVRA coordination, and, for areas in which Schedler s current policies and directives are not consistent with the District Court s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to implement conforming policies and procedures. Id. at 2-3. Schedler asserts that the Injunction s reference to the District Court s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law violates Rule 65 s prohibition on referring to the complaint or other document. Supp. Br. at 1-3. In fact, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued concurrently with the Injunction, and courts have routinely considered other papers filed concurrently with, and as support to, injunctions as sufficient under Rule 65(d). See, e.g., Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (consulting both the brief judgment order [and] the accompanying opinion in reviewing an injunction under Rule 4

15 65(d)); CPC Int l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 459 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering a detailed Schedule A filed with an injunction in review under Rule 65(d)). 3 Schedler also argues that the Injunction is not specific enough, an argument that is belied by his Certificate of Compliance and contradicted by the clear terms of the document. Having filed a certification of compliance with the District Court on March 15, 2013, asserting that he had undertaken [seven enumerated] actions to adopt and implement policies, procedures and directives referenced in the Permanent Injunction, Schedler cannot now make a credible claim to this Court that he does not understand the terms with which he has complied. RE12. Moreover, given that the two non-appealing defendants in this lawsuit, having been given identical instructions in the Injunction, also timely certified their compliance with the Injunction, Schedler s argument is further undermined. Moreover, because Schedler certified compliance with the list of actions that he acknowledged were referenced in the Permanent Injunction, RE12, he is now judicially estopped from claiming that the Injunction is too vague under Rule 65(d) and that he has been left to guess what the Injunction requires. Judicial estoppel 3 The District Court stated [t]he Court concurrently filed the Permanent Injunction in the instant matter with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ; and then held that [t]he Court details in both the Permanent Injunction and its Findings the reasons why the Permanent Injunction is issued, states the terms specifically, and described in reasonable detail what the Secretary of State is required to do. RE10 at 4. 5

16 is appropriate where (1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently. Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The District Court and the Appellees have accepted Schedler s certification as evincing his compliance with the clear terms of the Injunction and his representation to the District Court certified that he understood the requirements of the Injunction and acted upon that understanding. Indeed, the sole purpose of such certification is to attest to Schedler s compliance with the Injunction. By now claiming that the Injunction is unclear, Schedler is asserting a position that is inconsistent with the one he took when filing his Certificate a stance that contradicts the position the District Court relied upon when accepting his Certificate. Schedler is in effect disavowing the representations in his certification and playing fast and loose with the court by changing positions based upon the exigencies of the moment. Hall v. GE Plastic Pacific PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 400 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ergo Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996). 4 4 The timeline of Schedler s various motions to resist the terms of the Injunction is itself revealing. The District Court issued its Injunction on January 23, RE1. Appellant then waited a full month until February 22, 2013 before seeking to stay the Injunction. RE8. At no time in the interim did Appellant seek to clarify the Injunction s terms with the District Court. Additionally, unlike another defendant, RE15, Appellant did not separately seek relief from the March 15 deadline; he could have done so if his professed confusion prevented his ability to certify compliance on that date. Similarly, Appellant did not request expedited review of any of his three motions for a stay. By the time Appellant requested a stay in this Court, on March 22, 6

17 II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT A PERMANENT INJUNCTION APPLYING TO SCHEDLER WAS NECESSARY The District Court held that it is imperative that Schedler take meaningful and important steps to comply with the Court s orders and the mandates of the NVRA, and that both Appellees and the agency defendants will be injured if Schedler fails to coordinate NVRA responsibilities. RE10 at 7-8. This important finding of liability followed the District Court s recognition that the Appellees injuries resulted from Schedler s failure to comply with his responsibilities under the NVRA. RE2 at 33, R ( This Court finds that Scott and the [Louisiana State Conference of the] NAACP were irreparably injured by the failure of DCFS, DHH (as to LSC NAACP only) and the SOS to comply with the mandates of the NVRA. ). Schedler quarrels with the District Court s conclusion that an injunction is required and takes issue with the term meaningful oversight ; but this complaint is both inappropriate and meritless. Schedler claims to find it odd that the District Court referred to his duty to exercise meaningful oversight 5 over the 2013, the certification deadline had already passed and Appellant had already certified his compliance with the Injunction. RE12. 5 As an initial matter, Schedler mischaracterizes the District Court s opinion; in using the term, the District Court was actually referring to Appellees argument. The court s ruling stated Defendants [sic, context makes clear District Court meant Plaintiffs ] argue that the Court has found that the SOS is responsible for coordinating and for compliance for the State of Louisiana under the NVRA. Accordingly, without this meaningful oversight in place there will be injury to both Plaintiffs. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The SOS is responsible for coordinating Section 7 of the NVRA for the State of Louisiana. RE10 at 7. 7

18 agency defendants, given that both agencies filed their own Certificates of Compliance, Supp. Br. at 4. But this is consistent with the District Court s holding that Schedler, as the chief election official in Louisiana, is ultimately responsible for Louisiana s compliance with the NVRA, including Section 7 s requirement that voter registration services be provided to public assistance clients. RE2 at 31-32, R The purpose of a permanent injunction is remedial.... MedEx Inc. v. Ranger, 788 F.Supp. 288, 289 (E.D. La. 1992) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 (1987)). Thus, there is nothing unusual about a district court requiring a defendant to perform duties that he is responsible for yet is failing to perform. Moreover, it is inappropriate for Schedler to raise this argument for the first time in this supplement. This is not a new issue it did not arise for the first time in the District Court s denial of a stay, but was part of the District Court s Injunction and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See RE1, RE2. Thus, when he submitted his Motion to Stay to this Court, Schedler was already aware of the District Court s holding that as the chief election official he is responsible for the compliance of the agency defendants and therefore is responsible for oversight of their activities. To the extent that Schedler rejects this holding by the District Court, he has made such an objection in his merits brief. See Original Brief of Appellant, Tom Schedler, in His Official Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State, 8

19 Doc , Apr. 15, 2013 (hereinafter Merits Br. ). But, in his original motion for a stay, Schedler did not address the likelihood of success on the merits of his objection to this holding as a reason that a stay should be granted. By raising it now, Schedler impermissibly attempts to get a second bite at the apple. And, Schedler cannot now expedite review of the substantive question under the guise of challenging the Injunction while the merits briefing is ongoing. Even if Schelder could raise the issue in his supplement, he could not (and indeed does not) demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, because the District Court s ruling and Injunction are consistent with the opinions of the two other courts that have considered this issue. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, (6th Cir. 2008); Vladez v. Herrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , *34-35 (D. N.M. Dec 21, 2010). Therefore, it is Appellees who are likely to prevail on the merits of this issue, and a stay is unwarranted. III. SCHEDLER MAY NOT SEEK IN HIS MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT AN ISSUE THAT IS ABSENT FROM HIS MERITS MOTION In his third and final supplemental argument, Schedler takes issue with the District Court s ruling with regard to remote transactions, meaning transactions that occur via telephone, internet, mail, or other remote means rather than in person. The District Court only held that mandatory voter registration agencies, meaning those agencies that must be designated as voter registration agencies under Section 7(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a)(2) (agencies that provide public 9

20 assistance and disability services offices), are required by the NVRA to offer voter registration during remote transactions. RE3 at 21, R The District Court did not apply its ruling regarding remotes transactions to voluntary or optional voter registration agencies, meaning those designated under Section 7(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a)(3) (other agencies or offices that a state designates and which may include public libraries, public schools, office of the city, etc.). Id. This is reflected in the District Court s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. RE1 at 20, 25, 28, R , 21459, When Schedler submitted his motion to stay to the District Court, he complained that [r]equiring the optional voter registration agencies to offer voter registration services with every remote transaction will erect barriers and undoubtedly deter participation in voter registration, RE9 at 24, R , and argued that this militated in favor of a stay on public interest grounds. In its denial, the District Court quite clearly corrected Schedler s misapprehension: Schedler's brief misinterprets both the law and this Court's ruling. First, the requirements of Subsection (a)(6) do not apply to all voter registration agencies, but only mandatory voter registration agencies.... Schedler's arguments are without merit and are an attempt to misconstrue the Court's ruling in an effort to obtain a stay. RE10 at 8-9 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, Schedler intentionally misleads this Court by claiming that optional voter registration agencies must offer voter 10

21 registration opportunities during remote transactions. Supp. Br. at 4-5. Relying on a misreading of the statute and an unreliable FEC manual, 6 Schedler argues that the District Court s holding is wrong; that in fact, if there is a requirement that voter registration be offered during remote transactions, then it applies to all voter registration agencies, not just the mandatory voter registration agencies. Id. at 4-6. He concludes with the apocryphal prediction that [t]he broad sweep of the district court s injunction would... cause harm to the public interest and likely drive optional agencies out of the voter registration business. 7 Id. at 6. Schedler s position is clearly wrong for the reasons explained by the District Court. RE10 at 8-9. But moreover, it is completely inappropriate for Schedler to raise this issue in a supplement to his Motion to Stay. When considering a motion to stay, a court looks to four factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 6 The manual is unreliable at best. It explicitly notes that its interpretations are offered without force of law, regulation, or advisory opinion. FEC Manual at P-1, R Moreover, in just the portion on Section 7, there is at least one other place where (like the portion quoted by Schedler), the manual contradicts the NVRA s plain language. On pages 4-6 and 4-7, R , the manual sets out the requirements of the declination form. It lays out the requirements found in Section 7(a)(6)(B), but then it goes on to say that States are required to add two additional statements if the declination is contained on a separate form. The two additional statements quoted are actually from Section 9(b)(4), which sets forth requirements for the mail-in voter registration application, not the declination form. Clearly, the FEC manual is not a reliable source of information for how to interpret the NVRA. 7 In fact, because optional voter registration agencies are designated by state statute, only an act of the Louisiana State Legislature could permit such agencies to stop offering voter registration services. See La. Admin. Code tit. 31, pt. II, 503 (2011). 11

22 whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, (2009). Schedler unsuccessfully tries to shoehorn his argument into the fourth factor (where the public interest lies), but his absurd prediction relies entirely on his substantive argument that the District Court erred in its holding. Thus, his argument actually belongs to the first factor (whether he is likely to succeed on the merits), except for one fatal fact: Schedler has not raised this issue in his merits brief. Schedler s merits brief does raise the issue of remote transactions, but he did not argue that the District Court s holding would require optional voter registration agencies to offer voter registration during remote transactions. Instead, his argument is that the NVRA does not require any voter registration agencies to offer voter registration during remote transactions. Merits Br. at Having failed to raise the issue in his merits brief, Schedler cannot claim that he is likely to prevail on it. This argument, therefore, is not relevant to the question of whether a stay should be granted. 12

23 CONCLUSION Schedler s original and supplemental arguments are unavailing, and he is estopped from claiming that the permanent injunction was unclear. For these reasons, this Court should deny both his original motion to stay and his motion to supplement and re-urge a stay. Dated this 9 th day of May, Respectfully submitted, s/ Michael de Leeuw FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP Michael de Leeuw Israel David Jesse Ryan Loffler David Yellin One New York Plaza New York, NY (212) (212) (Fax) PROJECT VOTE Sarah Brannon Niyati Shah Michelle Rupp 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC (202) Ext. 302 (202) (Fax) NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 13

24 Sherrilyn Ifill Director-Counsel Elise C. Boddie Ryan P. Haygood Counsel of Record Natasha M. Korgaonkar Leah C. Aden 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 New York, NY (212) (212) (Fax) Ronald L. Wilson 701 Poydras Street Suite 4100 New Orleans, LA (504) (504) (Fax) 14

25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule , I hereby certify that on May 9, 2013, an electronic copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs-Appellees Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant-Appellant s Motion to Supplement and Re-Urge Motion to Stay Pending Appeal was filed with the Clerk of Court and served on the following counsel through the Court s electronic filing system: Celia R. Cangelosi, Attorney at Law 918 Government Street Suite 101 Baton Rouge, LA Tel: (225) Fax: (225) celiacan@bellsouth.net Carey Thompson Jones, Esq. Carey T. Jones, Attorney at Law 1234 Del Este Avenue Suite 803 Denham Springs, LA Tel: (225) Fax: (225) tjones@tomjoneslaw.com Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Ryan P. Haygood Counsel of Record Natasha M. Korgaonkar NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Ind. 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 New York, NY (212) (212) (Fax) rhaygood@naacpldf.org nkorgaonkar@naacpldf.org Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees 15

26 I further certify that I served a copy of the same in paper format by first class mail on the following: Sarah Brannon Niyati Shah Michelle Rupp Project Vote 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC Tel: (202) Fax: (202) sbrannon@projectvote.org nshah@projectvote.org mrupp@projectvote.org New York, NY this 9 th day of May, 2013 s/ Michael de Leeuw Michael de Leeuw Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees 16

27 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) Certificate of Compliance with Typeface and Type Style Requirements 1. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6) because: ( ) this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2008 in 14-point Times New Roman, or ( ) this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state name and version of word processing program] with [state number of characters per inch and name of type style]. Dated: May 9, 2013 s/ Michael de Leeuw Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees 17

28 RECORD EXCERPTS 18

29 RE 1

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