IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PALM BEACH DIVISION AND 2005 DR XXXX NB SECOND NOTICE OF REMOVAL

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1 JEFFREY P. LAWSON IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PALM BEACH DIVISION PETITIONER, CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: AND KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON RESPONDENT, / Removed from 15th Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County, FL CAUSE OF ACTION No.: 2005 DR XXXX NB SECOND NOTICE OF REMOVAL 1. Civil Rights Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) must never be confused with Federal Question removal or diversity removal. Congress specifically enacted Civil Rights Removal to provide an escape route for a Defendant trapped in an unfair and oppressive legislatively created environment unconstitutionally applied and administered as a matter of local custom, practice, and policy, in State Courts. 2. First Amendment rights are seen by the United States Supreme Court as particularly worthy of protection under Dombrowski v. Pfister and Mitchum v. Foster to be discussed below. Respondent s entire inventory of complaints against Judge Richard L. Oftedal of the 15 th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, the Florida Domestic Relations Courts, and the Florida Family Code generally centers around three clauses of the First Amendment, namely the Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 1

2 Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the right to petition for redress clause, even though, in addition, the freedom of peaceful assembly (freedom of association) clause and freedom of speech clauses are implicated in regard to child custody and rearing issues, and the impairment of contracts clauses of Article I and takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial and the Ninth Amendment Reserved Rights provisions are implicated as well, along with Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. 3. One specific (albeit pessimistic) purpose of this Notice of Civil Rights Removal is to Complete and Consolidate Records for purposes of a combined appeal to the 11 th Circuit of this case and the last (original) removed case remanded in November Respondent s problem is Court has previously shown no more interest in addressing the Respondent s general Constitutional Challenges to the Domestic Relations laws of the State of Florida than the Courts of the 15 th Judicial Circuit in Florida, but Respondent simply cannot mount a complete or comprehensive appeal without bringing together in one record all the elements of her First Federal District Court Case, her entire State Circuit Court Case, her first naïve removal to this Court, believing that the Court would allow her to be heard, and the outrageous series of orders that have been entered since this Court first labeled Respondent an obstructionist on November 20, 2009 (Exhibit B) and said it Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 2

3 would no longer tolerate her attempts to challenge the state domestic relations laws as a violation of her First Amendment rights to Free Exercise, Free of State- Established Religion. 5. The use of the word obstructionist has become mantra-like in Judge Oftedal s orders entered since the December 16, 2009 order setting trial for February 26, 2010 (which date itself appeared to have acquired a certain religious value in Judge Oftedal s world, as he refused even to obey an automatic stay in bankruptcy related to Respondent s estate filed in February 2010 in Texas). 6. Respondent charges that the Florida Domestic Relations scheme of marital licensing, divorce, and dissolution with state-assignment of child custody rights is, as single statutory scheme, a comprehensive establishment of religion and a violation of her free exercise rights, as well as an infringement upon her rights to freedom of contract, and in general constitute a law or statutory scheme whose sole and exclusive purpose is to restrict freedom of contract and impair the obligations of all contracts between husband and wife by imposition of a one size fits all ( contract of adhesion -style) remedy without any real regard for the individual agreements which couples make in the course of any relationship. 7. The original Petitioner who filed and caused this civil case (2005 DR XXXX NB) to be served upon the Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson is Jeffrey P. Lawson) (Exhibit A). Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 3

4 8. Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson counts 30 days from Judge Richard L. Oftedal s order of February 8, 2010, on which he announced clearly that he would not allow constitutional defenses, objections, or any other issues or arguments except those fitting within the ordinary confines of state-mandated divorce pursuant to state-mandated marriage license to be heard from respondent or any other party. Judge Oftedal s February 8, 2010 Order was defendant s notice which she was first able to ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. Thus, although this is Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s second notice of civil rights removal, such notice is permissible under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)- (c), which sections clearly contemplate and allow for the possibility of successive notices of removal U.S.C (see especially (b)-(c) state in the following in respect to removal procedure and specifically in respect to successive removals: Procedure for removal (a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. (b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 4

5 whichever period is shorter. If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title [28 USCS 1332] more than 1 year after commencement of the action. (c) (1) A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than thirty days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown the United States district court may enter an order granting the defendant or defendants leave to file the notice at a later time. (2) A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall include all grounds for such removal. A failure to state grounds which exist at the time of the filing of the notice shall constitute a wavier of such grounds, and a second notice may be filed only on grounds not existing at the time of the original notice. For good cause shown, the United States district court may grant relief from the limitations of this paragraph. (3) The filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State court in which such prosecution is pending from proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the prosecution is first remanded. (4) The United States district court in which such notice is filed shall examine the notice promptly. If it clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand. (5) If the United States district court does not order the summary remand of such prosecution, it shall order an evidentiary hearing to be held promptly and after such hearing shall make such disposition of the prosecution as justice shall require. If the United States district court determines that removal shall be permitted, it shall so notify the State court in which prosecution is pending, which shall proceed no further. 10. On the one hand, this court has charged that Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson is an obstructionist, and that could be considered a fair charge (Judge Marra s November 2009 order remanding case, Exhibit B). Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 5

6 11. On the other hand, each of the five orders entered during the past 30 days by Florida 15 th Judicial Circuit Judge Richard L. Oftedal clearly confirm that nothing will stop Judge Oftedal from entering a final decree of divorce in this case at the earliest remotely possible date and on the flimsiest possible pretext, so is it not at least equally fair to say that Judge Oftedal is implementing a systematic state scheme? He has no known extra-judicial source of bias or prejudice against the Respondent, and yet he seems to believe that the world itself will stop, that the sun might stop shining in Florida, if he were to allow a constitutional hearing and full airing on the facts relating to the Respondent s constitutional challenges to divorce in his court, especially if he were to allow a jury to sit and hear and judge these facts (and yes, in fact, knowing that her purpose was to try constitutional rather than normal divorce issues, he has even denied Respondent s jury demand, summarily and without explanation in violation of the U.S. Seventh Amendment and of the Constitution of the State of Florida as well). 12. However, Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson contends that she is entitled to be an obstructionist under the First Amendment Right to Petition, her Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, her Ninth Amendment rights reserved to the people, and her Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and to the incorporation of the bill of rights to the States, so as to prohibit the mandatory imposition and establishment of State-Mandated Secular Humanistic Rules, Rites Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 6

7 and Rituals, especially when these State-Mandated Secular Humanistic Rules, Rites, and Rituals take the place of and performing the functions of traditional religion in Western Society. 13. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson has merely sought to assert her First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be an obstructionist by way of petitioning for redress of grievances, and that her right to be a conscientious obstructionist has been denied and will inevitably be denied by the Courts of the State of Florida. 14. However, this court s charge of obstructionism has to such a degree become the law of the case in Judge Richard L. Oftedal s court during the past days that it can be fairly said that United States District Judge Kenneth A. Marra is now either a material and factual or an expert witness in this case, and that Judge Marra s involvement in clarifying his choice of words and language is so utterly critical to due process of law, that Judge Marra should perhaps recuse himself from hearing the present notice of removal, especially since U.S. District Judge Marra, like Florida Fifteenth Circuit Judge Oftedal, has threatened this Removing Obstructionist Housewife with the most severe Sanctions (in Judge Oftedal s case including sanctions for contempt of court) if she continues to seek an understanding and explanation of how the State has effectively instituted and Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 7

8 established a Secular Humanist 1 Sacrament of Marriage which, by state licensing, imposes a mandatory prior restraint (censorship and tax) on the exercise of a fundamental right and required all bishops, ministers, preachers, priests, prelates, rabbis, and all other religious practitioners to obey and follow that sacrament blindly and unquestioningly. 15. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson believes that she is probably the first to allege that State-Licensed Marriage is an aspect of the State s establishment of Secular Humanism as the New Established and Accepted Religion in Florida in particular and in the United States in general, but she submits that this analysis is not only accurate from a philosophical and historical standpoint but also so constitutionally valid and cognizable as a claim under the civil rights laws of the United States that she should not be forced to submit to the Florida state-mandated divorce without asserting her fundamental right to be an obstructionist to the degree that, as she has been trying to do for five years now, she seriously challenges 1 John Dewey described Humanism as our "common faith." Julian Huxley called it "Religion without Revelation." The first Humanist Manifesto spoke openly of Humanism as a religion. Many other Humanists could be cited who have acknowledged that Humanism is a religion. In fact, claiming that Humanism was "the new religion" was trendy for at least 100 years, perhaps beginning in 1875 with the publication of The Religion of Humanity by Octavius Brooks Frothingham ( ), son of the distinguished Unitarian clergyman, Nathaniel Langdon Frothingham ( ), pastor of the First Unitarian Church of Boston, In the 1950's, Humanists sought and obtained tax-exempt status as religious organizations. Even the Supreme Court of the United States spoke in 1961 of Secular Humanism as a religion. It was a struggle to get atheism accepted as a religion, but it happened. From this was not a controversial issue. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted described Secular Humanism as a constitutionally recognizable religion in the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Watkins (367 U.S. 488). Roy Torcaso, the appellant, a practicing Humanist in Maryland, had refused to declare his belief in Almighty God, as then required by State law in order for him to be commissioned as a notary public. The Court held that the requirement for such an oath "invades appellant's freedom of belief and religion." The Court declared in Torcaso that the "no establishment" clause of the First Amendment reached far more than churches of theistic faiths, that it is not the business of government or its agents to probe beliefs, and that therefore its inquiry is concluded by the fact of the profession of belief. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 8

9 the constitutionality of the state coerced procedures being applied, enforced, and used against her under threat of multiple kinds and species of sanctions for nonconformity, or in Judge Kenneth A. Marra s words, quoted repeatedly by Judge Oftedal, Obstructionism. 16. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson accepts, up to a point, the charge and label of obstructionist. The members of the Boston Tea Party were much more violent and destructive obstructionists than Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson has ever been. The abolitionists who assisted runaway human chattels held in chains of slavery prior to 1865 were far more violent and destructive in their obstructionism than the members of the Boston Tea Party. And those who advocate pro choice practices relating to abortion have cheered and supported the life-obstructing termination and extinguishment of tens of millions of [what can only be called, at the very minimum, in the most uncontroversial terms] potential human lives in the name of a woman s right to choose, and yet even this seemingly lethal obstructionism by curtailment of potential lives is widely held to be a legitimate practice, and in fact is an issue at the very heart of modern jurisprudence in this same field of law known as Civil Rights in America. 17. So if the purpose of the Courts were held to be to uphold the constitution while maintaining peace, then Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s obstructionism should be called a minor offense indeed. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 9

10 18. Thomas Jefferson is often quoted as having said that Resistance to Tyrants is Obedience to God on the one hand, and that "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man", on the other. 19. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson notes that, surely, Thomas Jefferson was every tyrant s nightmare of obstructionist behavior and philosophy. 20. And yet it is also true that Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson has tried very hard to follow Judge Kenneth A. Marra s directions and dictates in regard to giving the State Courts a chancem giving Judge Oftedal the opportunity to rule on constitutional issues, and generally working within the system. Except that working within the system, and trying to challenge its very core assumptions, are not only logically but practically impossible. It would be as if an Abolitionist had tried to advocate emancipation of slaves while participating in a auction of freshly captured Africans from Ghana or Benin. In certain atmospheric circumstances, civil rights arguments simply die from lack of oxygen---they are asphyxiated whether intentionally or merely because they are incompatible with all the other more noxious and poisonous gasses in the room (chambers?) or Family Courts generally. 21. The simple truth is that civil rights laws are often framed in terms of protecting individuals from prejudice of one kind or another, but the United States Supreme Court has, in Greenwood v. Peacock and its companion case Rachel v. Georgia, made it clear that mere prejudice is not enough to justify civil rights removal under 28 U.S.C. 1443(1): only absolute certainty of a predetermined outcome indicative of an overwhelming pre-judgment and fixed outcome of all cases of a certain kind can justify civil rights removal, but Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson submits that such certainty of a Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 10

11 predetermined outcome of all cases clearly exists and could be demonstrated as a matter of irrefutable fact (were any case permitted to go forward to a discovery and evidentiary phase regarding this question) in the Family Courts and generally in Domestic Relations jurisprudence in Florida---there is a state mandated statutory scheme which, either on its face or as applied or both, has the effect of severely trampling in particular the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, and resistence to change is so stiff that Judge Oftedal and others have gone out of their way to render the Family Courts unfit for petitions for redress of grievances, so the First Amendment is all but extinct. 22. It is a side issue to say here that doctrines such as parental alienation tend to suppress the very most private freedom of speech inside the home in relation to child rearing and education in moral values, and that customary, practical, and politically motivated and implemented interference with substantive due process fundamental rights to child custody based on the pattern and substance of intrafamilial speech and discussion is a severe and serious concern relating to the child custody side of the Family Court behemoth. 23. Within the past 30 days, that is between February 8-24, 2010, Removing Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson and the intervenors who previously joined in her first Notice of Removal were informed officially, by the 15 th Judicial Circuit itself, that Judge Oftedal would not hear any constitutional challenges to divorce law prior to entering precisely the divorce which Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson sought to challenge (February 8, 2010, Order entered by Judge Oftedal, Exhibit C). 24. Respondent asks how much clearer Judge Oftedal has to make it that he will enter the divorce first, consider allowing questions later? 25. As a consequence, all the running dialogue which this Court has had with the Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson since the hearing held in January 2009 Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 11

12 about how the Respondent should give the State Court a chance and should allow these issues to be heard in State Court seems pointless and moot now. 26. In the five orders which Judge Oftedal has entered since February 8, 2010, it is increasingly apparent if not absolutely, perfectly well-established FIRST, that only one outcome is possible, the entry of a final decree of divorce, SECOND, that this outcome will happen PRIOR to and INDEPENDENT OF any constitutional assessment of the constitutionality either of state-licensed marriage or its all-butinevitable consequence, namely state-mandated divorce, THIRD that in true Orwellian ( 1984 ) or Huxleyan ( Brave New World ) fashion, all challenges to the norm of fast and easy (but for all lawyers profitable) divorce are seen, described, and categorized as conduct which anti-social, even irrational psychotic, bordering on illegal or criminal (is that not the implicit meaning of Judge Marra s word obstructionist? ), FOURTH, that both Judge Oftedal and Judge Marra are prepared to sanction Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson to the maximum extent allowed by law for her social deviance in opposing quick and easy, almost thoughtless, divorce (except with regard to all-important, Federally significant, money matters and state supervised allocation of control over children), FIFTH, accordingly, the outcome of the case is in every wise pre-determined. 27. Judge Marra made a great argument with this Respondent in January 2009, (Transcript, January 2009, Exhibit D) that she should submit to final hearing Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 12

13 before judging the outcome pre-determined nature of Florida State-Licensed Divorce (there is no purpose to the Florida State Marriage License except to approve Florida State Divorce, as Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson showed by exhibits to her Court)(Objections to Trial Setting, Exhibit E, which were denied within 3 days, See Exhibit F). At the hearing in January 2009, at one point Respondent (therein Plaintiff) Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson misspoke. Judge Marra, perhaps derisively, asked Respondent whether she wanted the Federal Court to save her from the State Court system---i.e. enter an injunction. The correct answer to that question was, of course, YES, that Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia- Lawson did quite certainly come to Federal Court hoping to be saved from an unconstitutional scheme devoid of fairness or substantive due process, whether a veneer of merely procedural due process cloaks it or not---family law is traditionally an area in which substantive due process has repeatedly been found and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 28. Respondent has been asking this Court to consider Dombrowski v. Pfister as controlling law, along with Mitchum v. Foster as the controlling law in this case---because these are the cases which effectively bracket or sandwich Younger v. Harris and give it meaning. 29. Younger v. Harris abstention, quite simply, is meant to respect state court integrity where such integrity exists, NOT to ignore consistent patterns of abuse Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 13

14 and pre-judged automatic outcomes. Dombrowski v. Pfister expressly disavows the notion that a defendant must wait and take his chances with a clearly and plainly biased and rigged state system: A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms. See, e. g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too readily to denial of those rights. The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded in such cases. See Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at 379. For "the threat of sanctions may deter... almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions...." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433. Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free expression -- of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights -- might be the loser. Cf., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, For example, we have consistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98; NAACP v. Button, supra, at ; cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, ; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, We have fashioned this exception to the usual rules governing standing, see United States v. Raines, supra, because of the "... danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." NAACP v. Button, supra, at 433. If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out case by case -- and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation. Cf. Ex parte Young, supra, at By permitting Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 14

15 determination of the invalidity of these statutes without regard to the permissibility of some regulation on the facts of particular cases, we have, in effect, avoided making vindication of freedom of expression await the outcome of protracted litigation. Moreover, we have not thought that the improbability of successful prosecution makes the case different. The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure. See NAACP v.button, supra, at ; cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at ; Bush v. Orleans School Board, 194 F.Supp. 182, 185, affirmed sub nom. Tugwell v. Bush, 367 U.S. 907; Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S U.S. at , 85 S.Ct. at , 14 L.Ed.2d at (emphasis added). 30. Here, it is not clear to the Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson who is more interested in chilling her constitutional challenge to the Florida State Family Law/Domestic Relations Regime---State Judge Richard L. Oftedal or U.S. District Judge Kenneth A. Marra. Respondent knows that there are only two court systems available to her; she has no intention of seeking U.N. High Commission on Human Rights for protection or appealing to the World Court in the Hague, and so she must try to navigate the treacherous straights between the Scylla and Charybdis of State and Federal Courts---where will she be sanctioned? 31. Where will Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson be stopped? She will never be satisfied with anything less than a full-trial on the merits of her petition for declaratory judgment regarding the constitutional entanglement of the Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 15

16 FUNCTIONS of Church and State, whether the language and iconography of religion survives in State Regulated Marriage and Divorce or not. 32. So who (or which Court) will finally suppress Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s questioning and move to cut off forever her right to petition for redress of what she perceives as an outrageous constitutional grievance against the State of Florida which is undermining every possible value in the United States Constitution s state and federal impairment of contracts clauses, the First Amendment on religious and petitioning grounds, the Fifth Amendment on due process grounds, the Ninth Amendment on grounds of rights reserved to the people, and on Fourteenth Amendment grounds of equal protection. 33. For a state to set up sham proceedings whose outcome is a foregone conclusion is a violation of fundamental federally guaranteed civil rights and is specifically a grounds for the Civil Rights Removal, which Respondent attempted in this case (currently under appeal) under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808; 86 S.Ct. 1800; 16 L. Ed.2d 944 (1966). 34. Greenwood v. Peacock is a case which involves and governs removal under 28 U.S.C. 1443(1), and the Supreme Court articulated that removal is proper ONLY in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 16

17 inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court. 384 U.S. at 828, 86 S.Ct. at 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d at Here in Florida, Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson has clearly articulated and expressly alleged that by reason of the operation of the pervasive and explicit State Marriage-License to Get a State Divorce Law, both on their face and as applied, the very act of Jeffrey P. Lawson s (or ANY DIVORCE PETITIONER) bringing Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson (or ANY DIVORCE RESPONDENT) to trial in State Court will inevitably lead to the denial of the Respondent s First Amendment rights to be free of an established state religion, to her free exercise of religion, and to the obliteration of her rights to freedom of contract, and to the stateeffected impairment of the obligations of other contracts made during marriage. 36. In essence, this partially came true on Friday, February 26, While respondent was attending a seminar on constitutional law in Atlanta sponsored by the Tenth Amendment Center in Los Angeles, Judge Richard L. Oftedal, utterly UNOBSTRUCTED by Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson, went ahead with a partial divorce trial, engaging in what was apparently a good old boys chat about a crazy woman for most of the day. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 17

18 37. This hearing was a mockery of judicial process, procedural and substantive. Judge Oftedal heard Jeffrey P. Lawson s non-compus arguments based on multiple hearsay and innuendo after rejecting out of hand half a dozen motions and sets of objections by Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson without any serious attention. There is also a question about why no court reporter was present at this hearing despite an agreement for one to appear. There is anecdotal evidence that court reporters employed by lone women are frequently dismissed by Judges of the 15 th Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, particularly in Domestic Relations Courts. 38. In this her Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal, based on the events of the past 30 days since February 8, 2010 in Judge Oftedal s Court, Respondent Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson particularly urges this Court to consider a comprehensive re-evaluation of the Civil Rights Injunction doctrine in Dombrowski v. Pfister, Younger v. Harris, and Mitchum v. Foster, alongside the Civil Rights Removal doctrine articulated in Greenwood v. Peacock and Rachel v. Georgia, because, in essence, statutory removals are treated as stays (injunctions) of state court proceedings under the anti-injunction act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, and a comprehensive and color-blind State-to-Federal Civil Rights jurisprudence has yet to be developed, but such a constitutional jurisprudence is clearly necessary in light of the recent history of the United States. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 18

19 Stay of State court proceedings: A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 40. Dombrowski v. Pfister is one of a trio of cases, including Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37; 91 S. Ct. 746; 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), culminating in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225; 92 S.Ct. 2151; 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), which specifically addresses the relationship between removals of all kinds (though not specifically civil rights removals) civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988 and the anti-injunction act: 41. It is clear from the legislative debates surrounding passage of 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "against State action,... whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (emphasis supplied). Proponents of the legislation noted that state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights. 42. As Representative Lowe stated, the "records of the [state] tribunals are searched in vain for evidence of effective redress [of federally secured rights].... What less than this [the Civil Rights Act of 1871] will afford an adequate remedy? The Federal Government cannot serve a writ of mandamus upon State Executives or upon State courts to compel them to protect the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens.... The case has arisen... when the Federal Government must resort to its own agencies to carry its own authority into execution. Hence this bill throws open the doors of the United States courts to those whose rights under the Constitution are denied or impaired." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., (1871). This view was echoed by Senator Osborn: "If the State courts had proven themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should not have been called upon to legislate.... We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several states in the South what they have been unable to fully provide for themselves; i. e., the full and complete administration of justice in the courts. And the courts with reference to which we Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 19

20 legislate must be the United States courts." Id., at 653. And Representative Perry concluded: "Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices.... All the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice." Id., at App Those who opposed the Act of 1871 clearly recognized that the proponents were extending federal power in an attempt to remedy the state courts' failure to secure federal rights. The debate was not about whether the predecessor of 1983 extended to actions of state courts, but whether this innovation was necessary or desirable. 44. This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts. 45. Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights -- to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 346.In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a "suit in equity" as one of the means of redress. And this Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S For these reasons we conclude that, under the criteria established in our previous decisions construing the antiinjunction statute, 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized" exception of that law. 407 U.S , 92 S.Ct , 32 L.Ed.2d (bold added). 46. By its exhaustive review of the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. 1983, Mitchum concludes unequivocally that civil rights injunctions against state court proceedings ARE expressly authorized by Act of Congress (namely 1983) and Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 20

21 are therefore permitted under the anti-injunction act. Dombrowski and Mitchum both upheld Federal Court injunctions against state court proceedings on civil rights grounds, but all three cases emphasized the fact-specific inquiry which a District Court should make regarding the entry of an injunction against state court proceedings. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, for all the above-and-foregoing reasons, removal of this action from 15 th Judicial Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Palm Beach County Division, is proper pursuant to all relevant statutes and law. Respectfully submitted, KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON, pro se Respondent Wife in propia persona 2620 Nature s Way Palm Beach Gardens, Florida Telephone: Facsimile: garcialawson@hotmail.com Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 21

22 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT & VERIFICATION I have read and reviewed the above-and-foregoing Second Notice of Filing and I hereby acknowledge and verify this document as reflecting the facts known to me as of Wednesday, March 10, KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON Wife and Respondent 2620 Nature s Way Palm Beach Gardens, Florida Telephone: Facsimile: NOTARY S JURAT Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson appeared in person before me on this Wednesday, March 10, 2010, and, having presented sufficient lawful identification, I administered her the oath which she freely and willingly took, and she did then and there depose herself to verify and affirm that she verified all the terms of the above-and-foregoing Second Notice of Removal knowingly and willingly under penalty of perjury, and that all the statements contained therein above are true and correct and within her personal knowledge. Done and Executed in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida NOTARY PUBLIC, PALM BEACH GARDENS PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA Printed Name of Notary: My Commission Expires: Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 22

23 EXHIBIT A: Jeffrey P. Lawson s Original Petition In Fifteenth Judicial District Court Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 23

24 Exhibit B: Judge Marra s Order of Remand November 20, 2009: Case 9:09-cv KAM Document 6 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/20/2009 Page 3 of 4 The state court filings that were submitted with the notice of removal demonstrate a concerted effort by Respondent to interfere with the orderly prosecution of that case. While this Court has no ability to control the manner in which the state court proceeding is managed, this Court does have the ability to prevent the United States District Court from being an accomplice to the obstruction. The filing of any additional frivolous proceedings in this Court which prevent or interfere with the orderly prosecution of the state dissolution proceeding will result in the imposition of sanctions. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 24

25 Exhibit C: Judge Oftedal s February 8, 2010 This is the Removal- Triggering Order (which Respondent submits began the 28 U.S.C day period for removal) Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 25

26 Exhibit D: January 8, 2010 Transcript of Hearing CASE NO CIV-MARRA Page 29: 2 Well, is there anything else you want to tell me? 3 Because I hear what you are saying. I understand your 4 frustration with the system. I understand you think that going 5 through the state system in the ordinary course as one would be 6 required to do is futile, and you are not going to get anywhere 7 by proceeding that way so therefore you think you have to come 8 into federal court in order to, I guess, be saved from the 9 state court. 10 MS. GARCIA-LAWSON: Saved? 11 THE COURT: From the state court. I guess the system 12 that you believe is designed or is being implemented to deprive 13 you of your rights. So I understand that's your goal. 14 But I still really haven't heard you tell me anything 15 that convinces me that really this lawsuit has any chance of 16 going anywhere. Page 32: 7 THE COURT: What is the relief that you want me to 8 give? To say that the divorce laws in the State of Florida are 9 being improperly applied by the judges of the state and that 10 their procedures in citing whether a marriage is or is not 11 irretrievably broken are fraud and, therefore, they have to 12 actually rule in favor of a person who's challenging the 13 irretrievably broken approach? 14 MS. GARCIA-LAWSON: Absolutely not. 15 THE COURT: Then what? How do I cure the problem? 16 How do I cure the problem that you think exists in the system? 17 I'm going to issue in injunction telling all judges in the 18 State of Florida that you must listen to bolt sides and then 19 you must in 50 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent, 11 percent, percent rule in favor of the party who is claiming the marriage 21 is not irretrievably broken and if you don't reach that 22 threshold, then you must act ministerially and not judicially 23 and, therefore, you're acting unconstitutionally? I mean, I 24 don't know how to fix the problem that you're claiming exists. Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 26

27 EXHIBIT E: KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON S OBJECTIONS TO ORDER SETTING TRIAL Filed Tuesday February 16, 2010 Denied Friday February 19, 2010 By Exhibit F: Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 27

28 Exhibit F: The Honorable Richard L. Oftedal s Order Denying Objections Friday, February 19, 2010 Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 28

29 Exhibit G: Motion to Stay Proceedings and for Jury Trial JURY DEMAND UNANSWERED/UNADDRESSED Finally, but without waiving any other objection or contention, Respondent notes that this Court in its Order of February 19, 2010, has not addressed the Respondent s demand for a common-law trial-by-jury of all facts and mixed factual and legal issues so triable under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution AND the Florida Constitution s parallel guarantees. Even if there were no automatic stay in effect from a Bankruptcy Court, even if there were no appeal addressing jurisdictional issues from this Respondent and the intervenors, even if there were no objections to the creation of evidence against Respondent s liberty and property interests and will in violation of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, this Court has illegally and improperly ignored Respondent s demand for a jury trial by setting this case for a non-jury trial on February 26, Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 29

30 Exhibit H: December 2009 Order Setting Trial Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 30

31 Exhibit I Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 31

32 Exhibit J Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 32

33 Exhibit K Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 33

34 Exhibit L Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 34

35 Exhibit M Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 35

36 Exhibit O Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 36

37 Exhibit P Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 37

38 Exhibit Q Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 38

39 Exhibit R Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s Second Notice of Civil Rights Removal to U.S. District Court 39