Human Rights in Europe

Transcription

1 Human Rights in Europe Legal Bulletin Issue 29 May 2002

2 AIRE Centre London Editors: Nuala Mole Biljana Braithwaite Assistant editor: Catharina Harby Printout (Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian):2000 Printout (Albanian):600 Printout (Polish):500 Printout (Moldavian): 500 The production of this publication is supported by The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Joint Programme of the Council of Europe and the European Commission This publication is protected by international copyright law. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the editors

3 The prohibition on assisted suicide examined under several Convention Articles JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF PRETTY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (application no. 2346/02) 1. Principal facts 29 April 2002 Diane Pretty was a United Kingdom national, born in 1958 and living in Luton. She was dying of motor neurone disease, a degenerative disease affecting the muscles, for which there is no cure. The disease was at an advanced stage; the applicant was paralysed from the neck down and her life expectancy was very poor. However, her intellect and capacity to make decisions were unimpaired. Given that the final stages of the disease are distressing and undignified, she wished to be able to control how and when she dies and be spared that suffering and indignity. Although it is not a crime to commit suicide in English law, the applicant was prevented by her disease from taking such a step without assistance. It is however a crime to assist another to commit suicide under section 2 1 of the Suicide Act Mrs. Pretty wished to be assisted by her husband in committing suicide, but the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has refused her request to guarantee her husband freedom from prosecution if he does so. Her appeals against that decision have been unsuccessful. 2. Decision of the Court The applicant complained, under Article 2 of the Convention, that it is for the individual to choose whether to live and that the right to die is the corollary of the right to live and also protected. She also complained under Article 3 that the United Kingdom Government is obliged not only to refrain from inflicting inhuman and degrading treatment itself, but also to take positive steps to protect persons within its jurisdiction from being subjected to such treatment. She further relied on Article 8, arguing that this explicitly recognised the right to selfdetermination, and Article 9, complaining that the failure to give the undertaking and provide a lawful scheme for allowing assisted suicide violated her right to manifest her beliefs. Under Article 14, she argued that the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide discriminates against those who are unable to commit suicide without assistance, whereas the able-bodied are able to exercise the right to die, under domestic law. 1 This judgment is not final. Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.

4 Article 2 The Court recalled that Article 2 safeguarded the right to life, without which enjoyment of any of the other rights and freedoms in the Convention was rendered nugatory. It covered not only intentional killing, but also the situations where it was permitted to use force which resulted, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The Court had moreover held that the first sentence of Article 2 1 enjoined States not only from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This obligation might also imply, in certain well-defined circumstances, a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. In its case-law in this area the Court had placed consistent emphasis on the obligation of the State to protect life. In these circumstances, it was not persuaded that "the right to life" guaranteed in Article 2 could be interpreted as involving a negative aspect. Article 2 could not, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor could it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life. The Court accordingly found that no right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, could be derived from Article 2. There had therefore been no violation of that provision. Article 3 It was, the Court noted, beyond dispute that the respondent Government had not, itself, inflicted any ill-treatment on the applicant. Nor was there any complaint that the applicant was not receiving adequate care from the State medical authorities. The applicant claimed, rather, that the refusal of the DPP to give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her to commit suicide and the criminal law prohibition on assisted suicide demonstrated inhuman and degrading treatment for which the State was responsible. This claim, however, placed a new and extended construction on the concept of treatment. While the Court had to take a dynamic and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention, any interpretation also had to be in accord with the fundamental objectives of the Convention and its coherence as a system of human rights protection. Article 3 had to be construed in harmony with Article 2. Article 2 was first and foremost a prohibition on the use of lethal force or other conduct which might lead to the death of a human being and did not confer any claim on an individual to require a State to permit or facilitate his or her death. The Court could not but be sympathetic to the applicant s apprehension that, without the possibility of ending her life, she faced the prospect of a distressing death. Nonetheless, the positive obligation on the part of the State which had been invoked would require that the State sanction actions intended to terminate life, an obligation that could not be derived from Article 3. The Court therefore concluded that no positive obligation arose under Article 3 in this context and that there had, accordingly, been no violation of that provision.

5 Article 8 The applicant was prevented by law from exercising her choice to avoid what she considered would be an undignified and distressing end to her life. The Court was not prepared to exclude that this constituted an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8 1. The Court recalled that an interference with the exercise of an Article 8 right would not be compatible with Article 8 2 unless it was "in accordance with the law", had an aim or aims that was or were legitimate under that paragraph and was "necessary in a democratic society" to attain such aim or aims. The only issue arising from the arguments of the parties was the necessity of any interference and those arguments had focussed on its proportionality. In this connection the applicant had attacked the blanket nature of the ban on assisted suicide. The Court found, in agreement with the House of Lords, that States were entitled to regulate, through the operation of the general criminal law, activities which were detrimental to the life and safety of other individuals. The law at issue in this case, section 2 of the Suicide Act, was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and vulnerable and especially those who were not in a condition to make informed decisions against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life. The Court did not consider that the blanket nature of the ban on assisted suicide was disproportionate. The Government had stated that flexibility was provided for in individual cases by the fact that consent was needed from the DPP to bring a prosecution and by the fact that a maximum sentence was provided, allowing lesser penalties to be imposed as appropriate. It did not appear to be arbitrary for the law to reflect the importance of the right to life, by prohibiting assisted suicide while providing for a system of enforcement and adjudication which allowed due regard to be given in each particular case to the public interest in bringing a prosecution, as well as to the fair and proper requirements of retribution and deterrence. Nor in the circumstances was there anything disproportionate in the refusal of the DPP to give an advance undertaking that no prosecution would be brought against the applicant s husband. Strong arguments based on the rule of law could be raised against any claim by the executive to exempt individuals or classes of individuals from the operation of the law. In any event, the seriousness of the act for which immunity was claimed was such that the decision of the DPP to refuse the undertaking sought could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court concluded that the interference could be justified as "necessary in a democratic society" for the protection of rights of others. There had therefore been no violation of Article 8. Article 9 The Court observed that not all opinions or convictions constituted beliefs as protected by Article 9 1. The applicant s claims did not involve a form of manifestation of a religion or belief, through worship, teaching, practice or observance as described in the second sentence of the first paragraph. The term "practice" did not cover each act which was motivated or influenced by a religion or belief. The Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 9.

6 Article 14 For the purposes of Article 14, a difference in treatment between persons in analogous or relevantly similar positions was discriminatory if it had no objective and reasonable justification. Discrimination could also arise where States without an objective and reasonable justification failed to treat differently persons whose situations were significantly different. There was, in the Court s view, objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing in law between those who were and those who were not physically capable of committing suicide. The borderline between the two categories would often be a very fine one and to seek to build into the law an exemption for those judged to be incapable of committing suicide would seriously undermine the protection of life which the 1961 Act was intended to safeguard and greatly increase the risk of abuse. Consequently, there had been no violation of Article Comment The European Convention on Human Rights is a living instrument and the Court has always held that its jurisprudence must be dynamic and evolutive. Convention rights are thus not frozen into the social attitudes of the 1940 s when the Convention was first drafted. The Court, however, will move with the times but not ahead of them, particularly in relation to moral issues where widely divergent views are held. The Court has always been reluctant to rule on highly contentious issues of this kind. It has refused both to recognise a right to abortion, or to find that abortion violates the right to life. It refused to find a violation of the Convention when a state had no possibility of divorce. The Court's substantive decision in this case was that the U.K. had not violated the Convention by failing to provide a legal framework within which Mrs. Pretty s husband could lawfully comply with her wish to be assisted to die. The approach taken by the Court will make this judgement a paradigm for the examination of some fundamental constitutional approaches to the Convention. The Court formally recognised the role of its case-law in establishing legal precedent. Repeating the view that under Article 34 of the Convention it is not its role to issue opinions in the abstract but to apply the Convention to the concrete facts of the case, the Court nevertheless added judgements issued in individual cases establish precedents a decision in this case could not be framed in such a way as to prevent its application in later cases. The Court will frequently decide to examine a case from the perspective of only one of the Articles under which the complaint has been made, stating that it is not necessary to look at the complaints under the other Articles. Conscious that this judgement will be closely examined when this contentious issue comes up again in the future, the Court was careful to give a ruling under all the headings. It predictably declined to find in Article 2 the right to die, or even the right to choose death rather than life. Under Article 3, the Court noted that the ill-treatment that was alleged was the failure to protect her from suffering by refusing to give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her suicide. The Court declined to extend the meaning of

7 the word treatment to include this situation, noting additionally that to do so would be inconsistent with its findings under Article 2. The approach taken under Article 8 was significantly different. The Court recognised that the law which would have criminalised her husband s assistance prevented her from exercising her choice to avoid an undignified death. This constituted an interference with her Article 8 right to personal autonomy guaranteed under the private life rubric of the Article. However, it held that this interference was justified under the second paragraph of the Article. It noted that the general vulnerability of terminally ill persons justified the laws in place. Under Article 9, the Court noted that not all opinions are protected under that Article (see e.g. Arrowsmith v U.K, Commission's report of 12 October 1978). Although the Court found no violations of any of the other Articles, it was obliged to consider the allegation of discrimination under Article 14 because it had found an interference, albeit justifiable, under Article 8. It considered that there had been no discrimination. Mrs. Pretty died naturally a few days after the judgement.

8 Procedure for determining eligibility for election was not in line with the Convention requirements JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF PODKOLZINA v. LATVIA 2 (application no /99) 1. Principal facts 9 April 2002 Ingrida Podkolzina, a Latvian national born in 1964 and resident in Daugavpils (Latvia), is a member of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia. She stood as a candidate in the Latgale constituency on the list of the National Harmony Party for election to the Latvian parliament in the general election of 3 October The list in question was registered with the Central Electoral Commission after the National Harmony Party had supplied it with all the documents required by the legislation on parliamentary elections, including a copy of the certificate attesting to the fact that the applicant knew the State s official language - Latvian - issued by the Standing Committee for Language Certification of the town of Daugavpils, a branch of the State Language Centre, an administrative institution which was itself answerable to the Ministry of Justice. During the following week an examiner belonging to the language examination service of the State Language Centre came to the applicant s workplace to check how well she knew Latvian, and, to that end, began a conversation with her in that language in the course of which Ms. Podkolzina was asked, among other questions, why she supported the National Harmony Party rather than another party. The examiner returned the next day accompanied by witnesses and asked the applicant to write an essay in Latvian. Being extremely nervous, because she had not expected such an examination and because of the constant presence of the witnesses, the applicant stopped writing and tore up her work. The examiner then drew up a report to the effect that the applicant did not have an adequate command of the official language and the Central Electoral Commission struck the applicant s name off the list of candidates. The National Harmony Party, acting on the applicant s behalf, asked the Riga Regional Court to set aside the above decision. This application was refused on the ground that possession of a certificate attesting to knowledge of the official language was a precondition for registration on a list of candidates for persons who had not completed their studies in Latvian. A third-party application against that judgment by the National Harmony Party to the President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General was also refused. 2. Decision of the Court The applicant complained that the removal of her name from the list of candidates for the parliamentary elections on the ground that she had an inadequate command of Latvian, infringed her right to stand as a candidate in elections, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She further alleged violations of Articles 13 and This judgment is not final.

9 Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 The Court found that the purpose of the legislation on parliamentary elections barring citizens without an advanced degree of proficiency in the national language from standing for election was to ensure the proper functioning of the Latvian institutional system. It added that it was not for the Court to determine the choice of the working language of a national parliament, as that choice was dictated by historical and political considerations and, in principle, was exclusively for the State concerned to determine. The Court therefore had to decide whether the measure removing the applicant s name from the list of candidates had been proportionate to the aim pursued. The Court noted that the applicant held a valid language certificate in due form that had been issued by a standing committee following an examination. The standing committee had deliberated and had followed objective marking criteria and a set of rules when voting. Although the Latvian authorities had not contested the validity of that document, the applicant had nonetheless been required to sit a further language examination, in company with eight of the twenty-one candidates who had been required to furnish a certificate of proficiency in the national language. The assessment had been left to the sole discretion of an official whose discretionary powers the Court considered to be excessive. The Court also expressed surprise that, according to the applicant in an account that was not disputed by the Government, the official had questioned the applicant about the reasons for her political affinities. Consequently, the Court determined that, in the absence of any objective guarantees, the procedure followed in the applicant s case was incompatible with the procedural requirements of fairness and legal certainty for determining eligibility for election. The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Articles 13 and 14 The Court determined that the complaint under Article 14 was essentially the same as that under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It therefore found it unnecessary to examine that complaint separately. The Court determined that its finding of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone made it unnecessary for it to carry out an examination of the complaint under Article 13 as well. Article 41 The Court awarded the applicant 7,500 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 for legal costs and expenses. 3. Comment This important decision sends timely warnings to those States which,as a result of recent political events, have a significant minority of their electorate who do not speak the majority language as their mother tongue, or with a stipulated degree of proficiency.

10 The Court found that States have a wide margin of appreciation in deciding the rules which will apply to candidates wishing to stand in elections. Making fluency in the national language a criteria for eligibility for standing for Parliament was not in itself inconsistent with the Convention. In this judgement the Court was suggesting that Article 3 of Protocol 1 has inherent procedural safeguards and that if those safeguards against arbitrariness are not both in place and observed, the Convention will be violated. The Court was not only concerned that the applicant had been asked about her political allegiance in the course of the examiners visit, but also that the visit had taken place without notice during working hours and had interrupted her business dealings with her colleagues. Although the case was essentially about the discrimination which the russophone minority perceive that they suffer in Latvia, the Court declined to examine the complaint under Article 3 of the Protocol 1 taken in conjunction with the Article 14. It also unfortunately declined to consider the complaint under Article 13. A ruling on that complaint might have served as a useful guide for other States where comparable situations may arise.

11 The concept of 'home' in Article 8 explicitly extended to include business premises JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF STES COLAS EST AND OTHERS v. FRANCE 3 (application no /97) 1. Summary of the facts 16 April 2002 The applicants are Colas Est, Colas Ouest and Sacer, which are road construction companies in France. They were investigated in 1985 as part of an administrative inquiry in which investigators from the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Repression of Fraud investigated 56 companies simultaneously and seized several thousand documents from which they ascertained that illicit agreements had been made in respect of certain contracts. The investigating officers entered the premises of the applicant companies pursuant to the provisions of Order no On the basis of the seized documents the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Privatisation referred the matter to the Competition Council, which fined the applicants for engaging in illegal practices. The applicants appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal challenging the lawfulness of the searches and seizures, which had been effected without a warrant. The Court of Appeal fined the first applicant five million francs, the second applicant three million francs and the third applicant six million francs. The Court of Cassation dismissed their appeals. 2. Decision of the Court Relying on Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for home), the applicants submitted that the searches and seizures, which had been conducted by the investigating officers without any supervision or restriction, amounted to trespass against their "home". Article 8 The Court held that the time had come to acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention could be construed as including the right to respect for a company s head office, branch office or place of business. The Court found that the investigators had entered the applicants premises without a warrant, which amounted to trespass against their "home". The relevant legislation and practice did not provide adequate or sufficient guarantees against abuse. The Court determined that, at the material time, the relevant authority had had very wide powers and that it had intervened without a magistrate s warrant and without a senior police officer being present. The Court therefore held that there had been a violation of Article 8. 3 This judgment is not final, see fn. 1.

12 Article 41 The Court awarded each applicant EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage and 6,700 to Colas Est, EUR 10,200 to Colas Ouest and EUR 4,400 to Sacer for costs and expenses. 3. Comment This case originally comprised two complaints relating to proceedings brought against the applicant companies for violations of competition law. The first, made under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) concerned the search and seizure of documents which were subsequently used as a basis for bringing charges. This complaint was rejected at the admissibility stage. The second complaint that the right to respect for home had been violated was declared admissible. Two aspects of this judgement deserve special mention. The first is the enlargement of the concept of home to include a company s registered offices and any business premises. The protection offered by the Convention is not, despite its name, limited to humans. Legal persons such as companies, political parties, churches or non-governmental organisations enjoy the protection of the Convention in their own right quite independently of any rights which their members or shareholders may have individually or collectively as human beings. In Comingersoll S.A. v Portugal, 6 April 2000, the Court held that a legal person as well as a physical person was entitled to non-pecuniary damages. The Court saw the extension of the application of term home to include business premises as logical and overdue, but did not provide any explanation as to why this was so. The term had previously only been used in relation to personal residences until it was applied to a lawyer s office because of the personal and private nature of a legal practice (Niemietz v Germany, 16 December 1992). This is a much more far-reaching application, which appeared to have been expressly based, at least in part, on the wider meaning of the French language term domicile over the English home. The second element of interest lies in the interface between EU and ECHR case-law, which the judgement highlights. The European Court of Justice determines disputes under EU law, applying ECHR standards where this is appropriate. It has long been established as EU jurisprudence that business premises are not covered by the term home under Article 8 ECHR. This decision of the Strasbourg Court will pose very interesting questions of application for the EU court in Luxembourg, and for the national courts when applying EU law in this field.

13 Decision of the Court to strike out cases concerning serious allegations of torture and uninvestigated disappearances CASES T.A. v. TURKEY AND TOGCY v. TURKEY (application nos /95 and 27601/95) 9 April Principal facts T.A. v. Turkey T.A. is a Turkish national whose complaint concerns the disappearance of his brother, Mehmet Salim A., a farmer living in a village in the south-east Turkey. His brother was abducted in August 1994 by two unidentified persons - allegedly plain-clothes police officers. The applicant complained of the unlawfulness and excessive length of his brother s detention, of the illtreatment and acts of torture to which his brother was allegedly subjected in detention, and of the failure to provide his brother with the necessary medical care in detention. The applicant further complained that his brother was deprived of the services of a lawyer and of any contact with his family. He relied on Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and ill-treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 13 (right to an effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and 18 (limitation on use of restrictions of rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Toğcu v. Turkey Hüseyin Toğcu, a Turkish national, complained about the disappearance of his son, Önder. He alleged that Önder Hüseyin was taken into unacknowledged detention on or about 29 November 1994, and that the Turkish authorities failed to carry out an adequate investigation into alleged police involvement in his son s disappearance. He relied on Articles 2, 3, 5, 13, 14 and Decision of the Court In both cases, the Turkish Government offered to pay ex gratia 70,000 pounds sterling for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs. The Government also made a declaration stating that it regretted the actions which had led to the applications, in particular the disappearances in question and the anguish caused to their families. "It is accepted that unrecorded deprivations of liberty and insufficient investigations into allegations of disappearance, such as in the present case[s], constitute violations of Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention. The Government undertakes to issue appropriate instructions and adopt all necessary measures with a view to ensuring that all deprivations of liberty are fully and accurately recorded by the authorities and that effective investigations into alleged disappearances are carried out in accordance with their obligations under the Convention. The Government considers that the supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the execution of Court judgments concerning Turkey in this and similar cases is an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that improvements will be made in this context. To this end, necessary co-operation in this process will continue to take place..."

14 Both applicants asked the Court to reject the Government s initiative, arguing that the terms of the declaration were unsatisfactory. T.A. argued that, among other things, it contained no admission that there had been any Convention violation concerning his application or that Mehmet Salim had been abducted by State agents and that he must be presumed to have died, that it contained no undertaking to investigate the circumstances of the case and that the compensation would be paid ex gratia. Hüseyin Toğcu argued, among other things, that the declaration failed to mention the disappearance of Önder Toğcu as a result of State action or the Government s failure to disclose certain documents requested by the Court, which might have been decisive in establishing the facts and the Court s determination of the merits of the case. In both cases, taking into account the nature of the admissions contained in the Government s declarations, as well as the scope and extent of the various undertakings referred to therein and the amount of compensation proposed, the Court determined that it was no longer justified to continue the examination of the applications. The Court decided to strike out both cases. 3. Comment The Court has delivered two more decisions to strike out cases concerning serious complaints under Article 2 and Article 3 involving allegations of unlawful arrest, torture, and uninvestigated disappearances in circumstances implicating the security forces in Turkey (see Akman v Turkey, 26 June 2001). Article 38 of the Convention makes provision for the parties to reach a friendly settlement, which avoids the necessity of a judgement being delivered. In the discussions taking place about the reform of the Court s procedures, much emphasis is being placed on the possibility of making more effective use of the friendly settlement procedure. No friendly settlement was reached in these cases. The Court nevertheless used its powers under Article 37 1(c) of the Convention to strike the cases from the list on the basis that it was no longer justified to continue examining them. The applicants had strongly resisted this measure since the Turkish Government s declaration did not acknowledge that there had been a violation of the Convention in the specific cases nor had any proper investigation into the allegations of torture or the disappearances yet taken place. The opinions of Judges Costa and Loucaides reflect the considerable unease expressed by users of the European Court at this new development.

15 OTHER JUDGMENTS 4 Article 6 Anghelescu v. Romania (right to a fair trial, right of property) Violation Article 6 1, Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Erdös v. Hungary (length of civil proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Mangualde Pinto v. France (length of civil proceedings) No violation Article 6 1 Marcel v. France (length of civil proceedings) Friendly settlement Smokovitis and Others v. Greece (length of civil proceedings, right of property) Violation Article 6 1 Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Sakellaropoulos v. Greece (length of civil proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Mercuri v. Italy (right to a fair trial) Friendly settlement AEPI v. Greece (right to a fair trial) Violation Article 6 1 Angelopoulos v. Greece (length of proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Ouendeno v. France (length of civil proceedings) Violation of Article 6 1 Seguin v. France (length of administrative proceedings) Violation of Article 6 1 Goc v. Poland (length of civil proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Ouzounis and others v. Greece (right to a fair trial, right of property) No violation Article 6 1 No violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Examiliotis v. Greece (length of administrative proceedings) Friendly settlement Fernandes v. Portugal (length of proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Article 11 Cisse v. France (freedom of assembly) No violation Article 11 Article 1 Protocol 1 Hatzitakis v. Greece (right of property) Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Lallement v. France (protection of property) Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 S.A. Dangeville v. France (right of property) Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 4 Some of these judgments are not final, see fn. 1.