OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990

Transcription

1 33 U.S.C Definitions OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 For the purposes of this Act, the term (2) barrel means 42 United States gallons at 60 degrees fahrenheit; (7) discharge means any emission (other than natural seepage), intentional or unintentional, and includes, but is not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, or dumping; (21) navigable waters means the waters of the United States, including the territorial sea; (30) remove or removal means containment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and beaches; (31) removal costs means the costs of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident; (32) responsible party means the following: (A) Vessels. In the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel. In the case of a vessel, the term responsible party also includes the owner of oil being transported in a tank vessel with a single hull after December 31, 2010 (other than a vessel described in section 3703a (b)(3) of title 46). (B) Onshore facilities. In the case of an onshore facility (other than a pipeline), any person owning or operating the facility, except a Federal agency, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body, that as the owner transfers possession and right to use the property to another person by lease, assignment, or permit. (C) Offshore facilities. In the case of an offshore facility (other than a pipeline or a deepwater port licensed under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C et seq.)), the lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is located or the holder of a right of use and easement granted under applicable State law or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C ) for the area in which the facility is located (if the holder is a different person than the lessee or permittee), except a Federal agency, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body, that as owner transfers possession and right to use the property to another person by lease, assignment, or permit. (D) Deepwater ports. In the case of a deepwater port licensed under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C ), the licensee. (E) Pipelines. In the case of a pipeline, any person owning or operating the pipeline. (F) Abandonment. In the case of an abandoned vessel, onshore facility, deepwater port, pipeline, or offshore facility, the persons who would have been responsible parties immediately prior to the abandonment of the vessel or facility. 33 U.S.C Elements of liability

2 (a) In general. Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident. (b) Covered removal costs and damages (1) Removal costs. The removal costs referred to in subsection (a) of this section are (A) all removal costs incurred by the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (l) of section 1321 of this title, under the Intervention on the High Seas Act (33 U.S.C et seq.), or under State law; and (B) any removal costs incurred by any person for acts taken by the person which are consistent with the National Contingency Plan. (2) Damages. The damages referred to in subsection (a) of this section are the following: (A) Natural resources. Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing the damage, which shall be recoverable by a United States trustee, a State trustee, an Indian tribe trustee, or a foreign trustee. (B) Real or personal property. Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property. (C) Subsistence use. Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the resources. (D) Revenues. Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by the Government of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. (E) Profits and earning capacity. Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant. (F) Public services. Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional public services during or after removal activities, including protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a discharge of oil, which shall be recoverable by a State, or a political subdivision of a State. 33 U.S.C Limits on liability (a) General rule Except as otherwise provided in this section, the total of the liability of a responsible party under section 2702 of this title and any removal costs incurred by, or on behalf of, the responsible party, with respect to each incident shall not exceed (1) for a tank vessel the greater of

3 (A) with respect to a single-hull vessel, including a single-hull vessel fitted with double sides only or a double bottom only, $3,000 per gross ton; (B) with respect to a vessel other than a vessel referred to in subparagraph (A), $1,900 per gross ton; or (C) (i) with respect to a vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons that is (I) a vessel described in subparagraph (A), $22,000,000; or (II) a vessel described in subparagraph (B), $16,000,000; or (ii) with respect to a vessel of 3,000 gross tons or less that is (I) a vessel described in subparagraph (A), $6,000,000; or (II) a vessel described in subparagraph (B), $4,000,000; (2) for any other vessel, $950 per gross ton or $800,000, whichever is greater; (3) for an offshore facility except a deepwater port, the total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000; and (4) for any onshore facility and a deepwater port, $350,000,000. (b) Division of liability for mobile offshore drilling units (1) Treated first as tank vessel. For purposes of determining the responsible party and applying this Act and except as provided in paragraph (2), a mobile offshore drilling unit which is being used as an offshore facility is deemed to be a tank vessel with respect to the discharge, or the substantial threat of a discharge, of oil on or above the surface of the water. (2) Treated as facility for excess liability. To the extent that removal costs and damages from any incident described in paragraph (1) exceed the amount for which a responsible party is liable (as that amount may be limited under subsection (a)(1) of this section), the mobile offshore drilling unit is deemed to be an offshore facility. For purposes of applying subsection (a)(3) of this section, the amount specified in that subsection shall be reduced by the amount for which the responsible party is liable under paragraph (1). (c) Exceptions (1) Acts of responsible party. Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if the incident was proximately caused by (A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or (B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by, the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail). 33 U.S.C Relationship to other law (c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), [1] or section 9509 of title 26, shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or

4 (2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law; relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.

5 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON in Gulf..., Not Reported in ERC 1192, 2013 A.M.C WL United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana. In re OIL SPILL BY the OIL RIG DEEPWATER HORIZON IN the GULF OF MEXICO, on April 20, Applies to Pleading Bundle B3. MDL No Nov. 28, BARBIER, District Judge. ORDER & REASONS *1 Before the Court is Defendant Nalco s 1 Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. Doc. 6541, and related briefing. 2 Nalco s motion seeks to dismiss all claims asserted against it I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 20, 2010, a blowout, explosion, and fire occurred aboard the semi-submersible drilling rig DEEPWATER HORIZON as it was preparing to temporarily abandon the Macondo Well, located on the Outer Continental Shelf approximately fifty miles south of the Louisiana coast. Eleven workers died in the explosion, and many others were injured. On April 22, the DEEPWATER HORIZON sank into the Gulf of Mexico, breaking the marine riser that had connected it to the Macondo Well. Over the next three months, millions of barrels of oil flowed up the well, through the broken riser, and into the Gulf. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and/or its affiliated entities (collectively BP ) owned the Macondo Well, leased the area where it was located, and chartered the DEEPWATER HORIZON. BP was designated a responsible party for the oil spill under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C et seq. The oil spill instigated a massive response involving government entities and officials, BP and its contractors and subcontractors, and thousands of individuals. Responders attempted a number of countermeasures, including skimming, absorbing, burning, and most relevant here chemically dispersing oil. Dispersants are chemical agents that emulsify, disperse, or solubilize oil into the water column or promote the surface spreading of oil slicks to facilitate dispersal of the oil into the water column. 40 C.F.R The intended result is to reduce the risk of direct contact by wildlife and reduce the amount of oil impacting sensitive nearshore and shoreline areas. Furthermore, microbial biodegradation of oil appears to be enhanced by dispersal because of the larger surface area available as compared to a surface slick. 3 Approximately 1.8 million gallons of the dispersants Corexit EC9500A and Corexit EC9527A (collectively, Corexit ) were applied either to the water s surface or beneath the water s surface, near the source of the discharge. Nalco is the manufacturer of Corexit. III. DISCUSSION B. Statutory and Regulatory Background *6 Since it was enacted in 1972, Section 311 of the Clean Water Act ( CWA ) 4 has declared, it is the policy of the United States that there should be no discharges of oil... into or upon the navigable waters of the United States... Pub.L. No , 86 Stat. 816, 863 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(1)). Consistent with this policy statement, the CWA established certain federal obligations and powers with respect to an oil spill. As detailed below, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ( OPA ) made significant changes to these provisions. However, even before OPA s amendments the CWA authorized the President to act to remove or arrange for the removal of discharged oil, 5 unless he determines such removal will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which the discharge occurs. 33 U.S.C. 1321(c)(1) (1988), amended by OPA, Tit. II, Sec.2001, Pub.L. No , 104 Stat 484, (1990). In the case of a large discharge of oil that created a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public health or welfare of the United States (hereinafter, Substantial Spill ) the CWA permitted, but did not require, the federal government to coordinate and direct all public and private response efforts and summarily remove, and, if necessary, destroy such vessel by whatever means are available without regard to any provisions of law governing the employment of personnel or the expenditure of appropriated funds. Id. 1321(d) (1988) Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

6 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON in Gulf..., Not Reported in ERC 1192, 2013 A.M.C OPA amended the CWA to, among other things, expand federal authority over, and responsibility for, oil spill responses. For all spills, regardless of size or character, the CWA now requires that [t]he President shall, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and any appropriate Area Contingency Plan, ensure effective and immediate removal of a discharge... of oil U.S.C. 1321(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In the case of smaller spills, the President may choose from a variety of options when determining how to ensure effective and immediate removal: the President may remove or arrange for the removal of the discharge; direct removal actions; remove or destroy a vessel discharging oil by whatever means are available ; or simply monitor removal efforts. Id. 1321(c)(1)(B). However, when there is a Substantial Spill, the CWA deletes the option of monitoring removal efforts. Instead, [t]he President shall direct all Federal, State, and private actions to remove a Substantial Spill. Id. 1321(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Legislative history states that this provision was designed to eliminate the confusion evident in recent spills where the lack of clear delineation of command and management responsibility impeded prompt and effective response. H.R.Rep. No , at 45 (1990) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 825. When addressing a Substantial Spill, the President may remove the discharge, arrange for the removal of the discharge, or destroy a discharging vessel, as he could for smaller spills; however, to facilitate emergency response, the President may perform these actions without regard to any other provision of law governing contracting procedures or employment of personnel by the Federal Government. 33 U.S.C. 1321(c)(2)(B); H.R.Rep. No , at 45. *7 The CWA also required the President to prepare a National Contingency Plan ( NCP ), which shall provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil..., including containment, dispersal, and removal..., as well as a National Response System that is consistent with the NCP. Id. 1321(d), (j). The National Response System establishes three levels of federal contingency plans: the NCP, Regional Contingency Plans, and Area Contingency Plans. 40 C.F.R The NCP mirrors the CWA s provision regarding federal authority and responsibility. Under the NCP, the Federal On Scene Coordinator ( FOSC ) 6 directs response efforts and coordinates all other efforts at the scene of the discharge or release. Id (a). 7 When there is a Substantial Spill, the [F]OSC must direct all response efforts and should declare as expeditiously as practicable to spill response participants that the federal government will control the response. Id (d)(2); see also id (b). The FOSC also may take additional response actions not explicitly provided in the NCP. Id (c)(3); see also id (a)(4) (permitting similar actions when there is a worst case discharge ). If a spill is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the discharge, the Coast Guard may declare a spill of national significance and name a National Incident Commander who will assume the role of the [F]OSC in communicating with affected parties and the public, and coordinating federal, state, local, and international resources at the national level. Id , The CWA similarly states that each federal agency, State, or private party participating in an oil spill response under the CWA shall act in accordance with the NCP (or other response plan required by the CWA), unless directed otherwise by the President or the FOSC. 33 U.S.C. 1321(c)(3); see also id. 1321(d)(4) ( After publication of the [NCP], the removal of oil... and actions to minimize damage from oil... shall, to the greatest extent possible, be in accordance with the [NCP]. ). Furthermore, parties rendering care, assistance, or advice consistent with the NCP or as directed by the President are explicitly immunized from removal costs or damages that result from their actions or omissions. Id. 1321(c)(4)(A). 8 Legislative history states that this immunity is intended to encourage immediate and effective responses and that [w]ithout such a provision the substantial financial risks and liability exposures associated with spill response could deter vessel operators, cleanup contractors, and cleanup cooperatives from prompt, aggressive response. H.R.Rep. No , at 45. The CWA also immunizes the federal government for any damages arising from its actions or omissions relating to any response plan required by [Section 311 of the CWA]. 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(8). *8 The CWA and the NCP contemplate that chemical dispersants may be used in response to an oil discharge. The CWA requires the NCP to contain, inter alia, [p]rocedures and techniques to be employed in identifying, containing, dispersing, and removing oil..., id. 1321(d)(2)(F) (emphasis added), as well as: A schedule, prepared in cooperation with the States, identifying 2014 Thomson Reuters. 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7 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON in Gulf..., Not Reported in ERC 1192, 2013 A.M.C (i) dispersants, other chemicals, and other spill mitigating devices and substances, if any, that may be used in carrying out the Plan, (ii) the waters in which such dispersants, other chemicals, and other spill mitigating devices and substances may be used, and (iii) the quantities of such dispersant, other chemicals, or other spill mitigating device or substance which can be used safely in such waters... Id. 1321(d)(2)(G) (emphasis added); see also id. 1321(j)(4) (requiring Area Contingency Plans to list available dispersants or other mitigating substances and devices ). Furthermore, in the case of any dispersant... not specifically identified in such schedule[,]... the President, or his delegate, may, on a case-by-case basis, identify the dispersants... which may be used, the waters in which they may be used, and the quantities which can be used safely in such waters. Id. 1321(d)(2)(G). Accordingly, the EPA prepared and maintains the NCP Product Schedule. 40 C.F.R (a), If a dispersant is listed on the NCP Product Schedule, then the FOSC may authorize its use if the EPA (and sometimes other state representatives) concurs in such use and, when practicable, after consulting with certain natural resource trustees. Id (b). However, if a dispersant listed on the NCP Product Schedule is also preauthorized for use in specified circumstances under a Regional Contingency Plan or Area Contingency Plan, then the FOSC may authorize the use of that dispersant without the concurrence of, or consulting with, any other agency or officer. Id (a). The NCP also permits the FOSC to authorize the use of dispersants not listed on the NCP Product Schedule when it is necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life. Id (d). documentation or conduct its own testing on the product. Id. The regulation notes, however, that [t]he listing of a product on the NCP Product Schedule does not constitute approval of the product. Id (e). 9 C. The Use of Corexit During the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Macondo Well Oil Spill *9 Corexit EC9527A and Corexit EC9500A have been listed on the NCP Product Schedule since 1978 and 1994, respectively, and continue to be listed to this day. Nalco s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts 2 3 ( SUMF ), Rec. Doc Both versions of Corexit also were preauthorized for use under the circumstances described in the Regional Response Plans for Region IV (covering Gulf waters adjacent to Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and other areas) and Region VI (covering Gulf waters adjacent to Texas and Louisiana). Id. 7. Preauthorization under these plans generally permitted the FOSC to quickly authorize surface application of any dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule to waters either ten meters deep or three nautical miles from shore, whichever is farther from the shore. The Commander of the Coast Guard s Marine Safety Unit at Morgan City, Louisiana became the first FOSC to direct the response to the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Macondo Well incident. Nalco SUMF 13. On April 23, Rear Admiral Mary Landry succeeded as FOSC and established the Unified Area Command (discussed below). Id On April 29, the United States Coast Guard classified the spill as a spill of national significance pursuant to 40 C.F.R , and Admiral Thad Allen subsequently was named National Incident Commander. Id On June 1, Rear Admiral James Watson succeeded Admiral Landry as FOSC, who in turn was succeeded by Admiral Paul Zukunft on July 12. Id To be included on the NCP Product Schedule, the manufacturer must submit certain data to the EPA. See id (2), (a). This includes special handling and worker precautions; shelf life; recommended application procedures, concentrations, and conditions for use depending on water salinity, water temperature, and types and ages of pollutants; results of certain effectiveness tests; results of certain toxicity tests; and component information. Id (a) & app. C. After reviewing the submission, the EPA determines whether to add the dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule. Id (a)(2). The EPA may also request further The Unified Area Command included representatives from the Coast Guard, EPA, BP, and Transocean (owner of the DEEPWATER HORIZON). Id. 30. Each day, the FOSC and other members of the Unified Area Command would evaluate the risks posed by the oil spill, the tools available to minimize the damage, and otherwise manage the response. Id However, the FOSC exercised ultimate decision-making authority over response activities, including the use of dispersants. Id. 33, On April 21, 2010, the FOSC determined that the use of 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

8 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON in Gulf..., Not Reported in ERC 1192, 2013 A.M.C dispersants would likely provide a net environmental benefit and authorized the first aerial application of Corexit under the preauthorization guidelines of the Regional Contingency Plan for Region VI. Id Between April 22 and July 19, the FOSC, with the appropriate concurrence of and/or consultation with other officials (when required), approved surface and subsea applications of Corexit on a daily basis. Nalco SUMF 34 35, 43 45, These authorizations included limits on when, where, and in what quantities Corexit could be applied. Id , At times the FOSC authorized the use of dispersants outside the preauthorization zones (e. g., within three nautical miles of the shore) when it was deemed necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life. Nalco SUMF 64. Nalco did not decide whether, when, where, how, or in what quantities Corexit was applied in response to the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Macondo Well oil spill. Id. 72. D. Arguments and Law Regarding Preemption [The Court held that state law claims were preempted by general maritime law and the OPA] E. Analysis A fundamental objective of the CWA is to ensure effective and immediate removal of a discharge... of oil U.S.C. 1321(c)(1)(A). Likewise, a goal of the NCP is to provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil... Id. 1321(d)(2). In the case of an oil spill as massive and dangerous as the one from the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Macondo Well (i.e., a Substantial Spill and a spill of national significance ), Congress determined that these objectives are best achieved if the President directs all levels of the response federal, state, and private. See id. 1321(c)(2)(A). The purpose was to eliminate confusion that impeded past oil spill responses by establishing a clear chain of command and responsibility. See H.R.Rep. No , at 45 (1990) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 825. Notably, the EPA s comments accompanying its post-opa revisions to the NCP similarly reflect that when the FOSC directs a response, States and private parties cannot deviate from this direction: Two commenters suggested that, contrary to proposed language in [40 C.F.R.] (c), the [F]OSC lacks authority to direct state and local agency actions, but rather should/must coordinate with these parties through the unified command system. However, the language to which the commenters objected, that the [F]OSC may direct or monitor all Federal, State, and private actions to remove a discharge is taken directly from CWA section 311(c) [33 U.S.C. 1321(c) ], as amended by the OPA. Thus, EPA disagrees that the OSC does not have the authority to direct state, local, or private actions.... Another commenter suggested that inclusion of the unified command concept would clarify that a state is not at liberty to impose more stringent measures when a federal OSC is directing the response. EPA disagrees with the commenter s view that a state could initiate more stringent measures than the [F]OSC when the latter is directing the response. When directing a response, the [F]OSC is more than managing the response. He or she has specific legal authority to guide the activities of all parties responding to a discharge, and all actions would have to be authorized or approved by the [F]OSC. *14 59 Fed.Reg. 47,384, 47, (Sept 15, 1994) (emphasis added). The CWA/NCP also expressly contemplated that dispersants may be used in response to an oil spill. See 33 C.F.R. 1321(d)(2), (d)(2)(f), (d)(2)(g); 40 C.F.R The NCP established procedures for submitting and listing a dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule, and empowered the FOSC (sometimes with the concurrence of the EPA, etc.) to determine when to use a dispersant. 40 C.F.R Although chemical dispersants have been used as an oil spill countermeasure for decades, it is clear that they are not without controversy. See, e.g., Queale, supra note 3, at (noting that dispersants have been used over 213 times since 1967 and explaining that [i]t is the trade-off between effectiveness and toxicity that is at the heart of the dispersant controversy ). Likewise, the fact that the NCP Product Schedule requires the manufacturer to provide toxicity data and handling precautions suggests that the federal government has long been aware that there may be dangers or drawbacks associated with dispersants. See 40 C.F.R (a)(8). However, this also reflects that these dangers do not preclude the use of a dispersant they are one of several factors to be considered by the FOSC. According to the EPA: 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

9 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig DEEPWATER HORIZON in Gulf..., Not Reported in ERC 1192, 2013 A.M.C EPA believes that the best approach to regulating dispersants is to... provide [F]OSCs, RRTs [Regional Response Teams], and Area Committees the toxicity data and allow them to make decisions on dispersant use by weighing the toxicity data against other variables and the effectiveness data for those dispersants that meet or exceed the effectiveness threshold. 59 Fed.Reg. 47,384, 47,410 (Sept. 15, 1994) (emphasis added). The documents provided to the Court similarly evince that the FOSC knew there were potential dangers associated with Corexit, but also that there may be significant negative consequences if Corexit was not used. 14 Thus, the design of the CWA/NCP is that the FOSC (and sometimes with the concurrence of the EPA, etc.), after weighing the pros and cons, will determine whether it is appropriate to use a particular dispersant. When this is considered with the fact that the CWA and NCP required the FOSC to direct all levels of this response, it follows that it would be improper for the Court to second guess the FOSC s decision to use (or not use) a particular dispersant just as it would be improper for a State or private person to disobey the FOSC s direction during a response. This conclusion is clear even if the CWA did not expressly immunize the government from suit. See 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(8). The PSC essentially admits this point, but urges that the B3 claims are not preempted because they target the allegedly defective nature of Corexit, not the government s decision to use it. See Hr g Tr., July 13, 2012, pp. 100, 105, 107, Rec. Doc This distinction lacks significance, however, because as further discussed below the B3 claims would still create an obstacle to federal law. Cf. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497 ( This delineation of authority represents Congress considered judgment as to the best method of serving the public interest and reconciling the often competing concerns of those affected by the pollution. It would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine this regulatory structure. (emphasis added)). If the Court were to permit the B3 claims (and irrespective of whether Corexit is found to be defective or unreasonably dangerous), then, during the next Substantial Spill or spill of national significance, the threat of liability might cause the manufacturer of dispersant X to refuse to provide its product, even though the FOSC determined that dispersant X should be used. Such a refusal, or perhaps even a hesitation by the manufacturer, would conflict with the statutory and regulatory design of placing the FOSC in charge of all levels of the response and empowering him or her to determine if, when, where, and how dispersants should be used. 15 More importantly, this refusal would deprive the response of a tool expressly contemplated by federal law and, consequently, impede the FOSC s ability to ensure effective and immediate removal of oil and the efficient, coordinated, and effective response intended by the NCP. 16 Thus, despite the fact that the B3 claims avoid a direct attack on the FOSC s decisions to use Corexit, they still stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. The issue before the Court is whether the claims against Nalco are, as a matter of law, preempted by the CWA and NCP. For clarity, the Court does not decide whether Corexit was toxic, defective, unreasonably dangerous, etc. While the Court is sympathetic to these complaints, they are irrelevant to the issue of preemption. The Court also makes clear that today s decision is limited to Nalco. The Court does not address the pending motions by the Clean Up Defendants, nor does this decision affect the liability of BP or any other defendants. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the claims in the B3 Master Complaint asserted against Nalco, whether brought under state law or general maritime law, are preempted by the Clean Water Act and the National Contingency Plan. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Nalco s Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. Doc. 6541, is GRANTED and the claims against Nalco in the B3 Master Complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5

10 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the..., 808 F.Supp.2d ERC 1668, 2011 A.M.C F.Supp.2d 943 United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana. In re OIL SPILL BY THE OIL RIG DEEPWATER HORIZON IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, on April 20, Applies to: B1 Master Complaint. MDL No Aug. 26, BARBIER, District Judge. ORDER AND REASONS This multi-district litigation ( MDL ) consists of hundreds of consolidated cases, with thousands of claimants, pending before this Court. These cases arise from the April 20, 2010 explosion, fire, and sinking of the DEEPWATER HORIZON mobile offshore drilling unit ( MODU ), which resulted in the release of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico before it was finally capped approximately three months later. The consolidated cases include claims for the death of eleven individuals, numerous claims for personal injury, and various claims for environmental and economic damages. In order to efficiently manage this complex MDL, the Court consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several pleading bundles. The B1 pleading bundle includes all claims for private or nongovernmental economic loss and property damages. There are in excess of 100,000 individual claims encompassed within the B1 bundle. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In the B1 Master Complaint, the PSC identifies a number of categories of claimants seeking various types of economic damages, including Commercial Fishermen Plaintiffs, Processing and Distributing Plaintiffs, Recreational Business Plaintiffs, Commercial Business Plaintiffs, Recreation Plaintiffs, Plant and Dock Worker Plaintiffs, Vessel of Opportunity ( VoO ) Plaintiffs, Real Property Plaintiffs, Real Property/Tourism Plaintiffs, Banking/Retail Business Plaintiffs, Subsistence Plaintiffs, Moratorium Plaintiffs, and Dealer Claimants. Plaintiffs allege claims under general maritime law, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ( OPA ), 33 U.S.C et seq., and various state laws. Under general maritime law, Plaintiffs allege claims for negligence, gross negligence, and strict liability for manufacturing and/or design defect. Under various state laws, Plaintiffs allege claims for nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment, Additionally, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages under all claims and request declaratory relief regarding any settlement provisions that purport to affect the calculation of punitive damages. *949 III. PARTIES ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION The subject Motions to Dismiss go to the heart of Plaintiffs claims in this case. At bottom, however, all Defendants seek dismissal of all non-opa claims for purely economic damages resulting from the oil spill. 1 Essentially, Defendants move to dismiss all claims brought pursuant to either general maritime law or state law. All parties advance a number of arguments regarding the law that should apply to the Plaintiffs claims for economic loss. The Defendants Motions raise a number of issues involving choice of law, and especially the interplay among admiralty, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ( OCSLA ), 43 U.S.C et seq., OPA, and various state laws. A. Vessel status [1] Plaintiffs and all other Defendants [except Cameron] agree that the DEEPWATER HORIZON MODU was at all material times a vessel as that term is defined and understood in general maritime law. Cameron argues that although the DEEPWATER HORIZON may have been a vessel during the times it was moved from one drilling location to another, at the time of the casualty it was stationary and physically attached to the seabed by means of 5,000 feet of drill pipe. Cameron relies on a line of cases beginning with Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), for the proposition that a drilling platform permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf is considered an fixed structure and not a vessel. Accordingly, argues Cameron, admiralty 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

11 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the..., 808 F.Supp.2d ERC 1668, 2011 A.M.C jurisdiction is absent and general maritime law does not apply. of the accident. Id. at , 125 S.Ct (internal citation omitted). The Court is not persuaded by Cameron s arguments. Under clearly established law, the DEEPWATER HORIZON was a vessel, not a fixed platform. Cameron s arguments run counter to longstanding case law which establishes conclusively that the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit, was a vessel. In the seminal case of Offshore Co. v. Robison, the Fifth Circuit held that a special purpose vessel, a floating drilling platform could be considered a vessel. 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir.1959). Specifically, the defendants in that case, who claimed that the floating platform should not be considered a vessel, argued that [t]he evidence shows that Offshore 55 was a platform designed and used solely for the purpose of drilling oil wells in offshore waters in this instance, the Gulf of Mexico. That the platform was not self-propelled and when moved from one well to another, two large tugs were used. Further, when an oil well was being drilled the platform was secured to the bed of the Gulf in an immobilized position with the platform itself raised forty to fifty feet above the water level... Id. at 773 n. 3. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit held that *950 such a floating drilling platform can be a vessel, though secured to the seabed while drilling a well. Cameron s argument is also foreclosed by more recent Fifth Circuit precedent in Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n. 18 (5th Cir.2002) ( This circuit has repeatedly held that special-purpose movable drilling rigs, including jack-up rigs, are vessels within the meaning of admiralty law. ), overruled in part, on other grounds by, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 788 & n. 8 (5th Cir.2009) (en banc). In fact, in Demette, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the very same argument that Cameron makes in this case. Id. More recently, the Supreme Court held a vessel is any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005). Noting that a watercraft need not be in motion to qualify as a vessel..., the Supreme Court explained that [l]ooking to whether a watercraft is motionless or moving is the sort of snapshot test that we [previously] rejected... Just as a worker does not oscillate back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other remedies depending on the activity in which the worker was engaged while injured, neither does a watercraft pass in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time B. OCSLA jurisdiction All parties agree that at the time of the spill, the DEEPWATER HORIZON was operating in the Gulf of Mexico approximately *951 fifty miles offshore, above the Outer Continental Shelf, triggering OCSLA jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has already held in this MDL that it has OCSLA jurisdiction pursuant to 43 U.S.C because (1) the activities causing the injuries in question could be classified as an operation on the OCS involving exploration or production of minerals, and (2) because the case arises in connection with the operation. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 747 F.Supp.2d 704 (E.D.La.2010). C. Admiralty jurisdiction [3] The test for whether admiralty jurisdiction exists in tort cases was outlined by the Supreme Court in Grubart, Inc v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.: [A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water. The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise of the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The location test, which is satisfied when the tort occurs on navigable water, is readily satisfied here. The B1 Master Complaint alleges that the blowout, explosions, 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

12 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the..., 808 F.Supp.2d ERC 1668, 2011 A.M.C fire, and subsequent discharge of oil, occurred on or from the DEEPWATER HORIZON and its appurtenances, which was operating on waters overlying the Outer Continental Shelf; i.e., navigable waters. The connection test is also met. First, there is no question that the explosion and resulting spill caused a disruption of maritime commerce, which exceeds the potentially disruptive threshold established in Grubart. Second, the operations of the DEEPWATER HORIZON bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. See Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, (5th Cir.1986) ( oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime commerce ). Further, injuries incurred on land (or in the seabed) are cognizable in admiralty under the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C [4] [5] This case falls within the Court s admiralty jurisdiction. With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545, 115 S.Ct [W]here OCSLA and general maritime law both could apply, the case is to be governed by maritime law. Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir.1996). D. Plaintiffs state law claims [omitted] E. General maritime law claims [14] Defendants seek to dismiss all general maritime claims, contending that when Congress enacted OPA, it displaced pre-existing federal common law, including general maritime law, for claims covered by OPA. Defendants argue that OPA provides the sole remedy for private, non-governmental entities asserting economic loss and property damage claims. They urge that when Congress enacts a comprehensive statute on a subject previously controlled by federal common law, the federal statute controls and displaces the federal common law. Defendants further argue that under OPA, Plaintiffs are allowed to pursue their claims for economic damages solely against the designated Responsible Party and that OPA does not allow claims directly against non- Responsible Parties. Prior to the enactment of OPA in 1990, a general maritime negligence cause of action was available to persons who suffered physical damage and resulting economic loss resulting from an oil spill. General maritime law also provided for recovery of punitive damages in the case of gross negligence, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008), and strict product liability for defective products, E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct (1986). However, claims for purely economic losses unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest were precluded under Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290 (1927). The Fifth Circuit has continuously reaffirmed the straightforward application of the Robins Dry Dock rule, explaining that although eloquently criticized for its rigidity, the rule has persisted because it offers a brightline application in an otherwise murky area. Mathiesen v. M/V Obelix, 817 F.2d 345, (5th Cir.1987) (citing Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.1985)); see also Wiltz v. Bayer CropScience, Ltd., 645 F.3d 690 (5th Cir.2011); Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Ltd. v. Ingram Barge Co., 639 F.3d 207 (5th Cir.2011) (both reaffirming the applicability of Robins Dry Dock ). One relevant exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule applies in the case of commercial fishermen. See Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 524 F.Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D.La.1981) ( claims for [purely] economic loss [resulting from an oil spill and subsequent river closure] asserted by the commercial oystermen, shrimpers, crabbers, and fishermen raise unique considerations requiring separate attention... seamen have been recognized as favored in admiralty and their economic interests require the fullest possible legal protection. ). A number of other courts have recognized that claims of commercial fishermen are sui generis because of their unique relationship to the seas and fisheries, treating these fishermen as akin to seamen under general maritime law. See Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389 (4th Cir.1997); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.1974). Accordingly, long before the enactment of OPA, this was the state of general maritime law. Persons who suffered physical damage to their property as well as commercial fisherman had a cause of action under general maritime law to recover losses resulting from unintentional maritime torts. In the case of gross negligence *959 or malicious, intentional conduct, general maritime law provided a claim for punitive or exemplary damages. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 128 S.Ct And, in the case of a defective product involved in a maritime casualty, maritime law imposed strict liability. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct (1986). In the wake of the EXXON VALDEZ spill in 1989, there 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

13 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the..., 808 F.Supp.2d ERC 1668, 2011 A.M.C were large numbers of persons who suffered actual economic losses but were precluded from any recovery by virtue of the Robins Dry Dock rule. At that time, an oil spill caused by a vessel on navigable water was governed by a web of different laws, including general maritime law, the CWA, and the laws of states affected by the spill in question. Various efforts had been made in the past to enact comprehensive federal legislation dealing with pollution from oil spills. With impetus from the EXXON VALDEZ incident, Congress finally enacted OPA in claim against the government-created Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund or file suit in court. Id There was much debate in Congress about whether or not this new federal statute should completely preempt or displace other federal or state laws. Ultimately, the statute included two saving provisions, one relating to general maritime law 10 and the other to state laws *960 (discussed above). The question arises in this case as to whether, or to what extent, OPA has displaced any claims previously existing under general maritime law, including claims for punitive damages. OPA is a comprehensive statute addressing responsibility for oil spills, including the cost of clean up, liability for civil penalties, as well as economic damages incurred by private parties and public entities. Indeed, the Senate Report provides that the Act builds upon section 311 of the Clean Water Act to create a single Federal law providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution. S. Rep (1989), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730. One significant part of OPA broadened the scope of private persons who are allowed to recover for economic losses resulting from an oil spill. OPA allows recovery for economic losses resulting from or due to the oil spill, regardless of whether the claimant sustained physical damage to a proprietary interest. OPA allows recovery for [d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant. 33 U.S.C. 2702(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the House Report noted that [t]he claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or income. H.R. Conf. Rep (1990), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781. Clearly, one major remedial purpose of OPA was to allow a broader class of claimants to recover for economic losses than allowed under general maritime law. Congress was apparently moved by the experience of the Alaskan claimants whose actual losses were not recoverable under existing law. Another obvious purpose of OPA was to set up a scheme by which a Responsible Party (typically the vessel or facility owner) was designated and made strictly liable (in most instances) for clean up costs and resulting economic damages. The intent is to encourage settlement and reduce the need for litigation. Claimants present their claims to the Responsible Party, who pays the claims and is then allowed to seek contribution from other allegedly liable parties. 33 U.S.C. 2709, 2710, If the Responsible Party refuses or fails to pay a claim after ninety days, the claimant may either pursue its Only a handful of courts have had the opportunity to address whether OPA displaces general maritime law. For example, the First Circuit in South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Limited Partnership, 234 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.2000), held that punitive damages were not available under OPA. The First Circuit began by noting that in enacting OPA Congress established a comprehensive federal scheme for oil pollution liability and set[ ] forth a comprehensive list of recoverable damages. Id. at 64. Absent from that list of recoverable damages is any mention of punitive damages. Id. In Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., 623 F.Supp.2d 741, 747 (E.D.La.2009), the district court determined that OPA preempted maritime law claims for economic loss, using the four factors articulated in United States v. Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir.1981), to analyze whether OPA displaced general maritime law: (1) legislative history; (2) the scope of legislation; (3) whether judge-made law would fill a gap left by Congress s silence or rewrite rules that Congress enacted; and (4) likeliness of Congress s intent to preempt long established and familiar principles of the common law or the general maritime law. However, more recent Supreme Court precedents cause this Court to question the notion that long-standing federal common law can be displaced by a statute that is silent on the issue. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (holding that the CWA did not displace a general maritime remedy for punitive damages) The question presented in Baker was whether the CWA preempted or displaced general maritime punitive damages for economic loss. The Court first stated that it saw no clear indication *961 of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies. Next, the 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4