Sullivan and Driedger on thè Construction of Statutes

Transcription

1 Sullivan and Driedger on thè Construction of Statutes Fourth Edition by Ruth Sullivan Professor of Law University of Ottawa LexisNexìs*

2 Table ofcontents Foreword to thè Fourth Edition Foreword to thè Third Edition Foreword to thè Second Edition Foreword to thè First Edition Table of Cases vii ix xiii xv xxxiii CHAPTER 1 DRIEDGER'S MODERN PRINCIPLE 1 Analysis of Modern Principle 1 Introduction 1 Relation of modern principle to rules of statutory interpretation 3 The evolution of statutory interpretation 4 Current theory and practice 7 The Modern Principle and thè Plain Meaning Rule 9 The plain meaning rule 9 Incompatibility between thè modern principle and thè plain meaning rule 9 Problems with thè Plain Meaning Rule 12 Unacknowledged choices 12 Faulty assumptions about language and communication 15 Inconsistent reliance on plain meaning rule 17 Rhetorical use of plain meaning rule 18 CHAPTER 2 ORDINARY MEANING 19 Introduction 19 The multiple meanings of "meaning" 19 The ordinary meaning rule 20 What is Meant by Ordinary Meaning 21 Ordinary meaning defined 21 Ordinary meaning is not dictionary meaning 22 Ordinary meaning is not literal meaning 23 How Ordinary Meaning is Proven 24 Judicial notice 24 Linguistic intuition 25 Dictionaries 26 Other ways of proving ordinary meaning 31 Primary versus secondary meaning 33 Applications of thè Ordinary Meaning Rule 34 When ordinary meaning is binding 34 Refusai to narrow generai terms 35

3 xviii Table ofcontents When ordinary meaning is not binding 36 Presumption is rebutted 37 CHAPTER 3 TECHNICAL AND LEGAL MEANING 39 Introduction 39 Technical Meanings 39 The relation between ordinary and technical meaning 39 Technical terms 40 Presumption in favour of ordinary, non-technical meaning 41 Qualification 42 Governing principle 43 Other relevant considerations 46 Proof of technical meaning 46 Legai Meanings 47 Legai terms of art 47 Plain legai meanings 50 Statutory definitions 51 Application provisions 55 Interpretation Acts 55 "may'7 "shall" / "must" 56 Discretionary vs. non-discretionary "may" 57 Mandatory or directory "shall" / "must" 60 "should" 65 "and"/"or" 66 Deems 69 Use of "deem" (or "consider") to create legai fictions 69 Use of "deem" (or "consider") to create presumptions 71 CHAPTER 4 BILINGUAL AND BIJURAL MEANING 73 Introduction 73 PART 1. BILINGUAL LEGISLATION 73 The Constitutional and Legislative Framework 73 Legislation to be enacted in French and English 73 Constitution Acts 74 Equal authenticity rule 74 Neither version has paramountcy 76 Both versions must be read 77 The 1985 revision 78 Overview of Interpretation 79 Introduction 79 The shared meaning rule 80 Reliance on Shared Meaning 81 Shared meaning confirms ordinary meaning 81 Shared meaning resolves ambiguity 82 Shared meaning confirms ordinary or technical meaning 85 Shared meaning creates meaning 86

4 Table ofcontents xix Shared Meaning is Not Decisive 87 Shared meaning may be rejected 87 Absence of shared meaning 90 Other sources of meaning 92 Legislative origin 93 The Interpretation of Bijural Legislation 94 Theproblem 94 Constitutional framework 95 Respect for Quebec's civil law 96 Approaches to drafting bijural legislation 96 General terms applicable to either legai System 97 Analogous legai terms 99 Failure to provide clear civilian solution 101 CHAPTER 5 ORIGINAL MEANING 105 Introduction 105 Theproblem 105 Criticisms of thè originai meaning rule 106 Conclusion 108 Coment of thè Originai Meaning Rule 108 Formulation of thè rule 108 Originai meaning rule distinguished from contemporanea expositio 108 Originai meaning rule distinguished from reluctance to overturn established interpretations 109 Dynamic vs. static interpretation 110 Application of thè Rule 112 How thè rule is applied by thè courts 112 Legislative intention 112 Functional equivalence 113 Discretion 114 Specific and technical terms 115 Courts avoid second-guessing thè legislature 116 Courts avoid politicai choice 117 Obsolescence 118 Introduction 118 Obsolete application 118 Reduced application 119 Obsolete purpose 120 Absurdity 121 CHAPTER 6 PLAUSIBLE MEANING, MISTAKES AND GAPS 123 Introduction 123 The Plausible Meaning Rule 123 Judicial formulation of thè rule 123 Paraphrase vs. amendment 124

5 xx Table ofcontents Plausible meaning as constraint 125 Strained Interpretation 126 Theproblem 126 Jurisdiction to adopt a strained interpretation 127 Drafting Mistakes 129 Presumption of perfection 129 Jurisdiction to correct mistakes 131 Unacceptable absurdity 132 Gaps and Oversights 134 Theproblem 134 Absence of jurisdiction to fili gaps 136 Courts sometimes fili gaps 138 Courts may supplement legislation 139 Avoidance Schemes 142 Introduction 142 Avoidance defined 142 Evolution of anti-avoidance jurisdiction 142 Lord Tomlin's principle 143 Values favouring restraint 144 Values favouring judicial control 144 Type of legislation 145 Interpretation to promote compliance 145 Illustration 146 Setting aside avoidance measures 147 Illustrations 148 Conclusion 150 CHAPTER 7 TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 151 Introduction 151 Legislation as a literary genre 151 Legislative drafting conventions 151 Interactions of drafting conventions and statutory interpretation Overview 154 PART 1. PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT HOW LEGISLATION IS DRAFTED 154 Presumed Knowledge and Competence 154 Presumed knowledge of everything 154 Presumed linguistic and drafting competence 155 Presumption of straightforward expression 156 Presumption of orderly and economical arrangement 157 The Presumption Against Tautology 158 Governing principle 158 Rebuttai 161 The Presumption of Consistent Expression 162 Same words, same meaning 163 Different words, different meaning 164 Recurring pattern of expression 165

6 Table of Contents xxi Factors affecting weight of presumption 166 The Presumption of Coherence 168 Governing principle 168 PART 2. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION 169 Introduction 169 Textual Analysis 170 Basic technique 170 Collocation 172 Associated Words 173 The associated words rule (noscitur a sociis) 173 Limited Class 175 The limited class rule (ejusdem generis) 175 Specific items must belong to a single identifiable class that is narrower than thè generai class 177 Alistofone 179 General words precede specific words 180 Reasons not to apply limited class rule 182 Grammatical structure 184 Implied Exclusion 186 Failure to mention comparable items 187 Failure to follow a pattern of express reference 189 The role of policy 191 Rebuttai 192 Relation to overlap 194 CHAPTER 8 PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS 195 Introduction 195 Propositions underlying purposive 195 Evolution of Purposive Analysis 196 Heydon'sCase 196 Doctrine of equitable construction 196 Modern purposive analysis 197 Purposive analysis distinguished from purposive approach 198 Legitimacy of purposive analysis 199 Reform legislation 201 Program legislation 201 Purposive approach in Charter interpretation 203 What is Meant by Legislative Purpose 204 Introduction 204 The "mind" of thè legislature 204 Purpose versus motive 205 Aimor object 205 Principles and policies 205 Balancing competing purposes 207 How Purpose is Established 209 Direct and indirect evidence 209

7 xxii Table of Contents Legislative statements of purpose 210 Non-legislative statements of purpose 210 Norms of plausibility 211 Purpose inferred from text alone 213 Purpose inferred from legislative scheme 215 Purpose inferred from external context thè mischief to be cured 216 Purpose inferred from tracing legislative evolution 218 Uses of Purposive Analysis 219 Introduction 219 Resolving ambiguity 220 Determining scope 221 Purpose may justify a restrictive interpretation 223 Purpose may justify a large, liberai interpretation 225 Scope of powers 228 Guiding discretion 229 Some Limitations of Purposive Analysis 230 The purpose is indeterminate 230 The problem of limited means 232 Conclusion 234 CHAPTER 9 CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS 235 Introduction 235 Relevance of consequences in interpretation 235 Propositions comprising consequential analysis 236 Evolution of thè presumption against absurdity 237 Questions raised by thè presumption against absurdity 237 Evolution of Consequential Analysis 238 "Objective" absurdity 238 "Subjective" absurdity 239 The current view of absurdity 239 The judicial response to absurdity 240 Governing principle 241 Justification 242 Currently Recognized Categories of Absurdity 243 Purpose is defeated 243 Irrational distinctions 244 Misallocation and disproportion 246 Contradictions and anomalies 247 Inconvenience 248 Interference with thè efficient administration of justice 249 Consequences that are self-evidently irrational or unjust 251 Techniques Relied on to Avoid Absurdity 251 Resolving ambiguity 252 Justifying a restrictive interpretation 253 Justifying an expansive interpretation 254 Determining scope of power or discretion 255 Other uses 256

8 Table ofcontents xxiii CHAPTER 10 WORDS IN TOTAL CONTEXT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE 259 Introduction 259 The Contextual Principle 259 Meaning depends on context 259 Categories of context 260 Conclusion 262 The Presumption of Coherence 262 Governing principle 262 Overview of strategies for achieving coherence 263 Overlapping provisions are presumed to apply 264 Defining conflict 265 Exhaustive provisions 266 Reliance on interpretation to establish priority 268 Strained interpretation 269 Fundamental humanrights law is paramount 271 Statutes are paramount over regulations 272 Implied exception (generalia specialibus non derogant) 273 Implied repeal 275 Simultaneously enacted provisions 277 Implied exception preferred to implied repeal 277 Legislative solutions 278 CHAPTER 11 THE ACTAS AWHOLE 281 Introduction 281 The governing principle 281 Amendments 281 Regulations 282 Other Provisions in thè Act 283 Related provisions 283 The legislative scheme 284 The Components of an Act 288 Introduction 288 Internai versus external components 288 Recommended rule 290 Titles 290 General 290 Usesoflongtitle 291 Refusai to narrow scope 293 Uses of short title 294 Weight to be accorded titles 295 Preambles 296 General 296 Preambles reveal legislative purpose 296 Preambles as source of legislative values 297 Other uses 298 Weight of preamble 299

9 xxiv Table of Contents Purpose Statements 300 Definition of purpose statement 300 Function of purpose statement 301 Purpose statements define limits of discretion 302 Weight of purpose statements 303 Headings 305 General 305 Uses of headings 306 Grouping of provisions under headings 307 Weight ofheading 308 Marginai Notes 309 General 309 Reliance on marginai notes 310 Weight 311 Punctuation 312 General 312 Reliance on punctuation 312 Weight 313 Schedules 314 Types of scheduled material 314 Schedules are internai to Act 314 Scheduled materials incorporated into Act 315 Scheduled materials not incorporated but validated 316 Scheduled materials included for convenience only 317 Classifying scheduled materials 318 Forms 319 CHAPTER 12 THE STATUTE BOOK AND RELATED LEGISLATION 323 Introduction 323 The Statute Book as a Whole 323 Governing principle 323 Statutes on thè same subject {statutes in pari materia) 324 Integrated scheme 324 Defined terms 326 Same subject matter 327 Departure from a pattern 328 Related Statute Law of Other Jurisdictions 330 Governing principle 330 Cross-jurisdictional comparison 331 Cross-jurisdictional policy analysis 333 Reliance on Interpretations of Related Legislation 334 Governing principle 334 Case law 335 Legislative history 336 Weight 337

10 Table ofcontents xxv CHAPTER 13 RELATIONTOCOMMONLAW 339 Introduction 339 PART 1. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES 340 Legislation is paramount 340 Presumption against changing thè common law 341 Area of law dealt with 341 Adequacy of thè legislation 342 PART 2. USE OF COMMON LAW IN INTERPRETATION 343 Reliance on Common Law to Interpret Statutory Language 343 Incorporation of common law concepts or terms 343 Provisions that codify thè common law 344 Provisions that modify thè common law 345 Interpreting an "exhaustive code" 347 The Use of Common Law to Supplement Legislation 348 Introduction 348 Considerations governing resort to common law 349 Express indication of legislative intent 350 Legislation offers comprehensive scheme 350 Legislation implements specific policy choice 352 Legislation duplicates or supersedes thè common law 352 Common law is unsatisfactory 353 Legislation offers inadequate solution 354 Specific provision displaces generai common law 355 Implied exclusion 355 Mix of considerations 356 Common Law Evolution Precluded by Legislation 357 Courts may change common law 357 Common law is expressly preserved 358 Timing 359 CHAPTER 14 PRESUMED LEGISLATIVE INTENT 361 Introduction 361 Legitimacy of presumed intent 363 Legai effect of presumptions 363 Jurisidictional Limitations and thè Entrenched Constitution 366 Presumption of compliance with limits on jurisdiction 366 Presumption of compliance with constitutional norms 367 Rebuttai 369 Presumption of validity 369 Reading down 370 Reading down as a constitutional remedy 372 Human Rights and Other Quasi-Constitutional Legislation 373 Special status of human rights legislation 373 Liberai and purposive interpretation of human rights legislation Defences and exceptions in human rights legislation 375 Dynamic interpretation of human rights legislation 376

11 xxvi Table of Contents Language rights legislation 378 The Canadian Bill of Rights 380 Other quasi-constitutional legislation 380 Strict and Liberai Construction 381 Traditional distinction 381 Modern approach 382 Penai Legislation 384 The strict construction rule 384 Strict construction is rebuttable 387 Strict construction as last resort 389 Presumptions of Fault 390 Criminal and regulatory offences distinguished 390 Degrees of fault distinguished 391 The presumptions ofmens rea and of strict liability 392 The presumptions are rebuttable 393 Impact of thè Charter on common law presumptions 394 Legislation that Derogates from Established Law 395 Presumption against implicit alteration of law 395 Exceptions are strictly construed 396 Ousting jurisdiction of court 398 Legislation That Takes Away Rights 399 Introduction 399 Rights of action 399 Property rights 400 Social Welfare Legislation 404 Governing principle 404 CHAPTER 15 ABORIGINAL LAW 409 Introduction 409 Legislation relating to Aboriginal peoples 409 Liberai interpretation 409 Liberai interpretation as last resort 411 Interference with Aboriginal rights 412 Presumption against interference 412 Modern treaty rights 414 Presumption against extinguishment 415 Treaties with Aboriginal peoples 416 Governing principles 416 Use of extrinsic materials 419 Implementing legislation 420 CHAPTER 16 INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 Introduction 421 Presumed Compliance with International Law 421 Governing principle 421 Interpretation to ensure compliance 422

12 Table of Contents xxvii International law as legai context 425 Materials consulted 427 Presumption is rebuttable 429 Implementing Legislation 430 Domestic effect of international conventions 430 Incorporation by reference 431 Implementation through harmonizing legislation 434 Reliance on underlying convention to interpret harmonizing legislation 435 Express reference to convention not required 436 Ambiguity in implementing legislation not required 437 Legislation prevails over convention 438 CHAPTER 17 FISCALLAW 441 Fiscal Legislation The Traditional Approach 441 Introduction 441 Literal construction 441 Justification for literal approach 442 Strict construction 443 Avoidance schemes 444 The role of Iiteralism and formalism in avoidance 445 Modern Approach to Interpreting Fiscal Legislation 446 Rejection of literal construction 446 The legacy of Iiteralism and strict construction 447 The role of purposive interpretation 448 Presumption in favour of thè taxpayer 450 Anti-avoidance after Antosko 450 The ineffective transaction test 451 The sham test 452 The bona fide business purpose test 452 Purposive transaction analysis 453 Statutory provisions 454 Judicial attitudes toward avoidance 455 CHAPTER 18 THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT 457 Introduction 457 Background information 458 The mischief addressed by thè legislature 460 Use of social facts to confront cultural misunderstanding 463 Proving external context 464 CHAPTER 19 EXTRINSIC AIDS 467 Introduction 467 Reasons to Consult Extrinsic Aids 468 Legai context 468

13 xxviii Table of Contents Evidence of external context 468 Authoritative opinion 469 Materials noticed by legislature 469 Must thè legislation be ambiguous? 470 Legislative Evolution 471 Legislative evolution distinguished from legislative history 471 Reliance on legislative evolution is permitted 471 Presumption that change is purposeful 472 Substantive change is intended 473 Successive substantive changes reveal evolving policy 475 Formai change only is intended 475 Contemporaneous interpretation 477 Use of legislative history in tracing legislative evolution 478 Subsequent evolution 479 Limitations on thè use of legislative evolution 480 Legislative History 481 Definition 481 Issues to be addressed 482 Commission reports thè partial exclusion rule 483 The exclusionary rule 485 Reasons justifying thè exclusion of legislative history 486 Reasons to reject exclusionary rule 489 The Evolving Demise of thè Exclusionary Rule 490 Constitutional cases 490 Charter cases 492 Statutory interpretation cases 495 British approach 496 The Current Position 497 Categories abolished 497 Regulations 499 Summary 500 Professional and Academic Publications 500 Introduction 500 Reliance on academic material as evidence of external context 500 Reliance on academic materials as evidence of legai context 501 Use of academic materials as authoritative opinion 502 Administrative Interpretation 502 Introduction 502 Reasons to consult administrative interpretation 503 Need for caution 504 Admissibility and use of administrative interpretation 505 Detrimental reliance on administrative opinion 507 Judicial Interpretation 508 Introduction 508 Interpretations of re-enacted legislation 510 Judicial interpretations as precedent 512 Interpretations give meaning to vague terms 513 Reluctance to overturn established interpretation 514

14 Table of Contents xxix Reliance on administrative decisions 515 Persuasive authority distinguished from deference 516 Case law as source of legai scholarship 516 CHAPTER 20 APPLICATION RULES 519 PART 1. TEMPORAL OPERATION 519 Introduction 519 Defining events 519 Sources of law 520 Temporal operation distinguished from temporal application 520 Unit of analysis 521 Overview 521 Enactment 521 Effect of enactment 521 Use of legislation not in force 522 Commencement 523 Rules governing commencement 523 Delayed commencement 524 Deemed commencement 526 Repeal 527 Rules governing repeal 527 Repeal techniques 528 Implied repeal 529 Re-Enactment 531 Re-enactment defined 531 Consolidation 532 Revision 533 Legai effect of statute revision 534 Interpretation of revised statutes thè problem of change 535 Codification 537 Declaratory provisions 537 Amendment 538 Amending legislation 538 The temporal operation of amendments 539 Doctrine of merger 540 PART 2. TEMPORAL APPLICATION 542 Introduction 542 Sources of law 542 The challenges of transitional law 543 Principles underlying transitional law 544 Ways of applying legislation in time 545 Summary of generai application rules 546 "Retroactive" and "retrospective" 547 Situating facts in time 550 The Presumption Against thè Retroactive Application of Law 553 Retroactivity 553

15 xxx Table of Contents Principle-based analysis 554 Retroactive versus prospective effect 557 How to deal with retrospective applications 559 Provisions "designed to protect thè public" 559 Techniques to rebut presumption 562 Reasons for enacting retroactive legislation 563 Declaratory provisions 564 Survival of Repealed Law 565 The common law rule 565 Statutory survival 565 Relation of survival provisions to common law presumptions 568 Interference with Vested Rights 568 The common law presumption 568 Reasons for presumption 569 Recognizing vested or accrued rights 570 Accruing rights 574 Weight of thè presumption 576 Rebutting thè presumption 578 Purposive analysis 581 Procedural Legislation 582 Procedural legislation is presumed to have immediate application 582 Defining "pure" procedure 583 Limitation of actions 585 Rules of evidence 585 Suppression of evidence is not a protected interest 587 Presumption against retroactivity applies to procedural law 587 Rebutting presumption of immediate effect 588 Beneficiai Legislation 589 Regulations 589 Summary 590 PART 3. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION 591 The international law principle 591 The common law presumptions 592 Constitutional constraints 592 Penai legislation 594 Difficulties in applying presumption 595 Conflictoflaws 595 International comity 598 Interprovincial comity 599 Summary 601 PART 4. APPLICATION TO THE CROWN 602 The Presumption of Crown immunity 602 Formulations of thè presumption 603 Modern dislike of presumption 603 Scope of thè presumption 604 Federai and provincial Crowns 604

16 Table of Contents xxxi Rebutting thè presumption 605 Waiver 607 Crown agents may claim immunity 610 Agents must act within scope of agency 611 APPENDIXI DRAFTING CONVENTIONS OF THE UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA 613 Introduction 613 I. General 613 Logicai organization 613 Style 613 Sex-specific references 614 II. Divisions of an Act 614 Required elements 614 Optional elements 614 Subdivisions of sections 615 Definitions 615 Form of sections and their subdivisions 615 III. Arrangement 616 Preamble 616 Definitions 616 Interpretation or application provisions 616 Regulation-making powers 616 Transitional or temporary provisions 616 Repealing and amending provisions 617 Commencement provisions 617 Schedules 617 Forms 617 Marginai notes and table of contents 617 IV. Drafting Principles 617 Title 617 Preamble 617 Statement of purpose 618 Parts 618 Definitions 618 No substantive content 618 Artificiality 618 "Means" and "includes" 619 Consistency 619 Content of section 619 Single sentence 619 Short sentence 619 Use of clauses and further subdivisions 620 "Clause sandwiches" 620 Parallelism 620 Connecting words 620 Verbs in present indicative 620

17 xxxii Table ofcontents Passive undesirable 621 Duties and prohibitions 621 Powers rights and choices 621 Internai references 621 Derogations and restrictions 621 Placement of new provisions 621 Designation of new provisions 622 Changes to originai structure 622 Tables and mathematical formulas 622 Regulation-making powers 622 V. Language 622 Ordinary language 622 Intended audience 622 Redundancies and archaisms 622 Neologisms 623 Other languages 623 Consistency 623 Substance 623 Linguistic quality 624 Structure 624 Acceptable differences 624 Index 625