New Hampshire Supreme Court October 17, 2013 Oral Argument Case Summary

Transcription

1 New Hampshire Supreme Court October 17, 2013 Oral Argument Case Summary CASE #1 State of New Hampshire v. Chad Belleville ( ) Deputy Chief Appellate Defender David M. Rothstein, for the appellant Chad Belleville Assistant Attorney General Diana E. Fenton for the appellee, State of New Hampshire QUESTION PRESENTED ON APPEAL Did the trial judge make a mistake when he found Chad Belleville guilty of acting negligently or recklessly after he lost control of his car while looking down at his cell phone to check a text message, causing a serious accident with other vehicles when he crossed into on-coming traffic? LAWS TO CONSIDER NEW HAMPSHIRE CRIMINAL CODE RSA 265:105-a Prohibited Text Messages and Device Usage While Operating a Motor Vehicle A person operating a moving motor vehicle who writes a text message or uses 2 hands to type on or operate an electronic or telecommunications device, is guilty of a violation. A person does not write a text message when he or she reads, selects, or enters a phone number or name in a wireless communications device for the purpose of making a phone call. RSA 265:79-a Vehicular Assault Any person who, without intent, causes death or serious bodily injury as defined in RSA 625:11, VI to another while using a vessel or propelled vehicle as defined in RSA 637:9, III shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, where such person's unlawful operation of the propelled vehicle or vessel causes or materially contributes to the collision. Evidence that the driver violated any of the rules of the road shall be prima facie evidence that the driver caused or materially contributed to the collision. 1

2 RSA 626:2, II (c) General Requirements of Culpability "Recklessly.'' A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of having voluntarily engaged in intoxication or hypnosis also acts recklessly with respect thereto. RSA 626:2, II (d) General Requirements of Culpability "Negligently.'' A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he fails to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that his failure to become aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. RSA 626:2, III General Requirements of Culpability When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element is also established if the person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices, the element is also established if the person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices, the element is also established if a person acts purposely RSA 631:2 Second Degree Assault A person is guilty of a class B felony if he or she: Knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another FACTS OF THE CASE On December 23, 2010, around 9:15 p.m., Chad Belleville was driving his 2003 Ford Explorer SUV southbound on Route 28 in Pittsfield. The weather that night was dry, clear and cold. The road was straight and flat. This section of Route 28 is divided into three lanes: northbound, southbound and a middle lane used for turning. At the time Belleville was driving southbound on Route 28, three cars were headed northbound on the same stretch of road. Corey Pickering was driving the first car, followed by the Flanders family in a Subaru wagon and Evan Welch. 2

3 When Pickering noticed the Explorer drifting into his lane, he swerved to avoid a collision. The Explorer then hit the Subaru carrying the Flanders. As a result of the crash, one of the Flanders children was thrown from the car. He sustained a traumatic brain injury, lost his left eye socket and his jaw bone was dislocated and fractured. Next, the Explorer hit Evan Welch s car and ended up a few hundred yards down the road in a ditch. State Police investigators who responded to the scene testified that the Explorer crossed two sets of double yellow lines before hitting the Subaru. There were no indications the driver of the Explorer tried to brake. A post collision inspection by State Police determined that there was no mechanical problem with the Explorer that would have led to the collision. Chad Belleville is not alleged to have been speeding, nor was he under the influence of alcohol or drugs. At the scene, he denied to a state trooper that he made any calls on his cell phone before the accident. In a statement to police after the accident, Belleville admitted that he was checking a text message at the time of the crash. Belleville told a state trooper on the scene that he had erased the call history on his phone that would have detailed any activity before the accident. However, Belleville s cell phone records between 8:50pm and 9:25pm indicated a number of calls and texts. There was no phone activity between 9:05pm, which was before the accident, and 9:18pm which was right after. Chad Belleville was charged with one count of vehicular assault and one count of second-degree assault. He waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial was held on July 24 and 25, 2012, in Merrimack Superior Court where he was found guilty of both charges. Mr. Belleville was sentenced to serve 3 1/2 to 7 years at the NH State Prison and pay $5,000 in restitution. LEGAL ISSUES In his appeal to the state Supreme Court, Mr. Belleville, through his lawyer, contends the trial judge made a mistake finding him guilty of acting negligently or recklessly. He argues because he was only looking down to read a text on his cell phone, and not under the influence of alcohol, speeding, weaving around cars or otherwise driving to endanger, his conduct falls below the threshold necessary to establish recklessness under state law. 3

4 Belleville maintains his case is comparable to State v. Shepard, 158 N.H. 743 (2009), where the court ruled that a defendant who crossed a solid yellow line for two seconds was not criminally negligent. The driver in Shepard was also not intoxicated or speeding. Regarding criminal negligence To support his argument that simply reading a text message while driving is not unlawful conduct and was not criminally negligent under the circumstances of this case, Belleville cites RSA 265:105-a in which the state legislature, in 2010, prohibited writing, but not reading, a text message while driving. Belleville concedes that a driver whose conduct does not violate a statue can still act negligently. However, he also maintains the fact that the legislature choose not to enact a per se ban on the basic conduct of looking at a phone while driving is significant in two respects. First, it means that the legislature, when faced with several options, did not intend to prohibit this type of distracted driving. Second, it means Mr. Belleville was not on notice that it was against the law to look at his cell phone while driving, which renders his conduct less blameworthy than if the legislature had adopted a ban on any cell phone use. Regarding recklessness Under state law, a person acts recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. RSA 626:2, II (c) (emphasis added). The statue goes on to state that the risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the situation. Belleville argues that, even if he is negligent when compared with the driver in the Shepard case, his conduct does not rise to the level of recklessness required under state law. In concluding his brief, Belleville s attorney admits his client s showed extremely poor judgment with devastating results. But citing a New York case, he argues the Court must look to Mr. Belleville s conduct which caused the accident in determining the legal sufficiency of the evident not the results, no matter how tragic those results. The attorney asked the Court to vacate both of his client s convictions. However, if it finds Mr. Belleville s conduct criminally negligent, but not reckless, the attorney maintains the Court should affirm the vehicular assault conviction, but vacate the second degree assault conviction sentence. 4

5 In its brief to the Court, the state maintains the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that Chad Belleville was criminally reckless, as well as criminally negligent. The state based its position on three things: Belleville was so distracted by reading a text message that he drove out of his lane of travel and across the median, almost colliding with one vehicle, then crashing into two others; he never braked or took other evasive action and that he erased his cell phone call history log which showed that he was aware that his conduct was a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person. It is the state s position that Belleville s actions went far beyond a simple failure to pay attention to the road for a few seconds, so the ruling in Shepard does not apply. Instead, the state argued that Belleville s behavior behind the wheel constituted both criminal recklessness and criminal negligence under the standard set in State v. Cameron, 121 N.H. 348, (1981): The difference between recklessness and negligence is that a person is reckless if he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk that a material element of the crime exists or will result from his conduct, whereas one is negligent when he fails to become aware of a substantial risk that an essential element of the crime exists or will result from his conduct. Under [the New Hampshire] Criminal Code, both must constitute a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person. From the state s perspective, Belleville s persistent and continued inattention to the roadway and other vehicles on the roadway constituted a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person. Since the defendant was on a public road where other cars were traveling, the state believes he was aware of the risk that he might hit another vehicle when he chose to divert his attention from the roadway to read a text message. In doing so, the state argued Belleville s behavior also met the standard for recklessness under RSA 626:2, II (c), as well as negligence under RSA 262:2, II (d) because he failed to perceive an ordinary risk and is considerably blameworthy in the conduct that caused serious bodily injury. 5

6 QUESTIONS FOR STUDENTS TO CONSIDER 1. Should New Hampshire make it a crime to check text messages while driving a car? To do so, is this a policy issue that should be decided in the state legislature and not through a court case? 2. If the New Hampshire legislature intended for people like Mr. Belleville to serve time in jail for checking his text messages while driving a car, wouldn t they have said so specifically by passing a law banning such conduct? This summary was prepared by the Judicial Branch Communications Office based on legal briefs filed by the parties to the appeal. Dated: September 19,