THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA

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1 Summary of: THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of RHODES UNIVERSITY by CLIVE PLASKET Now Dr Plasket and Justice of the High Court June 2002 The postscript to the interim Constitution made this clear when it said that this Constitution provided a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. The preamble of the final Constitution speaks of it healing the divisions of the past, establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights and laying the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law. ABSTRACT For most of its existence South African administrative law has been shaped by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty the heart of the constitutional order from 1910 to 1994 and a racist political system that favoured the white minority at the expense of the black majority. In these circumstances, the rules of administrative law were of limited use in protecting the individual from exercises of administrative power that infringed fundamental human rights, often on a grand scale. On 27 April 1994, however, a new political and constitutional order came into existence that swept away the very foundations of the old order: parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by constitutional supremacy and the racial exclusivity of the old order was replaced by a commitment to equality, freedom and dignity in a democratic state. A justiciable Bill of Rights was at centre stage in this new order. That Bill of Rights includes a fundamental right to just administrative action. It is both the new constitutional order and this rather unusual fundamental right that have changed the nature of South African administrative law. This thesis examines the effect of the fundamental right to just administrative action on the law and practice of the judicial review of administrative action. It does so principally by examining the legal position before and after 27 April 1994 with particular reference to: what is meant by administrative action; the exercise of administrative power by private bodies regulated by the rules of administrative law, on the one hand, and exercises of private power regulated by rules of private law, on the other; the rules of standing, the notion of justiciability and the constitutionality of rules that seek to limit the right

2 of the individual to approach a court to review administrative action; the meaning and scope of the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action, in terms of the common law, the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000; the meaning, scope and efficacy of the rights to reasons for administrative actions and of access to information; the procedure of judicial review and remedies that may be granted for the infringement of a person s right to just administrative action; and conclusions and recommendations with regard to progress made in the construction of South Africa s new, democratically based, administrative law. Practicing law now in this environment of freedom and democracy is something few of us who practiced during the dark days of the 1980s could even have dreamt of then. Now, instead of ouster clauses, we have a fundamental right of access to court; instead of having to establish standing under the restrictive and inappropriate rules of the common law, we have the bounty of s38 of the Constitution; instead of official secrecy, we have a fundamental right of access to information; instead of forced removals, separate amenities, group areas, detention without trial, bannings of meetings, of people, of organisations, of publications, we have a democratic state founded on values of human dignity, freedom, equality, non-racialism, non-sexism, constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, universal adult suffrage, multi-party democracy, accountability, responsiveness and openness; and instead of a system of administrative law labouring under the twin disabilities of parliamentary sovereignty and racial domination, we now have a fundamental right to just administrative action that protects every person from unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair administrative action and gives to everyone a right to reasons for adverse administrative action. Within the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights, a number of related rights are of importance for administrative law: s33(1) creates a right to administrative action that is lawful. All of these rights flow from and are the concrete manifestations of two sets of founding values the values of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law26 and of democratic governance to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.27 Prior to the adoption of the interim Constitution, the predominant influence on South African administrative law was English Law. This is not surprising because of the English pedigree of South African constitutional institutions until with the passing of the South Africa Act in 1909, the entire country, irrespective of the constitutional histories of the constituent provinces, embraced the Westminster system and what went with it. For administrative law, it meant, most importantly, the acceptance of the ultra vires doctrine as the rationale for the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to review administrative action.32

3 English precedent has been applied slavishly by South African courts. The case law reveals important areas of divergence. For example, the review of administrative action for unreasonableness is a ground recognised in English law but not fully recognised in South African common law.36 Secondly, in Staatspresident v United Democratic Front,37 the Appellate Division went to lengths to avoid following English law, distinguishing it (erroneously at times) in its efforts to give effect to an ouster clause contained in s5b of the Public Safety Act 3 of On the other hand, reliance was placed on English law when, in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub,39 the Appellate Division accepted into South African law the concept of legitimate expectation Sources of Authority for Administrative Action The first principle of administrative law is that public authorities derive their authority (also referred to as power or jurisdiction) from a legal instrument or legal rule and they may only do what that law authorises them to do.47 This, the principle of legality, is said to require not only that the administrative authorities should not break the law, but also that all of their decisions have a basis in law and that their content complies with the law.48 The law empowers and limits the powers of the administration in this way.49 The most significant source of authority for administrative action is statute,50 although common law, especially in the form of the prerogative, has also been regarded as a limited source of authority.51 The Constitution the founding document of the democratic South Africa is the ultimate source of all state power, whether legislative, executive or judicial. To be valid, every exercise of state power must have a legal pedigree that can be traced back to the Constitution.52 The Constitution is the specific source of authority for a variety of institutions of an administrative nature. Chapter 9, for instance, creates the office of the Public Protector,53 the Human Rights Commission,54 the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities,55 the Commission for Gender Equality,56 the Auditor General,57 the Electoral Commission, 58 and an independent body to regulate broadcasting.59 It describes these institutions as bodies designed to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic. The Constitution also places limits on the power of administrative agencies, principally through s2 which provides that the Constitution is the supreme law and that law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the duties imposed by it must be performed, and Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights, which applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state.74 Apart from s33, which deals directly with just administrative action, Chapter 2 limits the power of administrative officials because they may not, for instance, discriminate,75 infringe a person s right to human dignity,76 or infringe a person s rights to freedom and security,77 to name three examples, unless they have been authorised to do so by a

4 law of general application which is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom Common Law Common law as a source of authority was mainly limited to the prerogative.92 It has now been settled by the Constitutional Court, in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,93 that the common law prerogative no longer exists in South African law as an independent source of power. Section 84(1) of the Constitution provides that the President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and legislation, including those necessary to perform the functions of Head of State and head of the national executive. Section 84(2) sets out a list of the responsibilities of the President as Head of State. The exhaustive codification of these former prerogative powers is consonant with the new constitutional order because, as Erasmus has argued, the `executive branch cannot retain inherent or common law powers going beyond the ambit of the supreme constitution.100 Apart from the prerogative, there may still be occasional residues of common law freedoms that are recognised by the law and that the executive may rely on to justify certain of its administrative actions. An example is provided by the Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association case101 in which the executive s decision to create a transit camp for flood victims on its own land was held to be clothed in legality on this account, when viewed with its constitutional obligations and the general constitutional powers of the executive. In addition, as Bennett has pointed out, some rules of customary law, such as those rules that relate to the allocation of land, empower chiefs to exercise administrative powers.102 In addition, as will be discussed in detail below, administrative power may be created consensually in certain instances.103 The definition of an empowering provision in s1(vi) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act recognises all of the above sources of administrative power: an empowering provision is a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken. The first definition of importance is the definition of administrative action. This term is defined to mean a decision taken or a failure to take a decision by, first, an organ of state,63 when it is exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution or when it is exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation 64 or, secondly, by a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision ;65 and which decision or failure adversely affects the rights of any person and has a direct, external legal effect.66 Because of the inclusion of private actors in the definition of administrative action, the term empowering provision was defined too. This term means a law, a rule of common

5 law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken The Terms of the Act (a) General Provisions and Application The long title of the Act provides that its purpose is to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and to the right to written reasons for administrative action as contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; and to provide for matters incidental thereto. It also contains a preamble that states that the Act was passed in order to promote an efficient administration and good governance and to create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function, by giving effect to the right to just administrative action. (b) Definitions The first definition of importance is the definition of administrative action. This term is defined to mean a decision taken or a failure to take a decision by, first, an organ of state,63 when it is exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution or when it is exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation 64 or, secondly, by a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision ;65 and which decision or failure adversely affects the rights of any person and has a direct, external legal effect.66 Because of the inclusion of private actors in the definition of administrative action, the term empowering provision was defined too. This term means a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken.67 The definition of administrative action expressly excludes nine categories of exercises of power or performance of functions. The first three sets of exclusions relate to the exercise of executive powers or the performance of executive functions in the national, provincial and local spheres of government.68 The second set exclude the legislative functions of the legislative organs in the three spheres of government.69 The third set of exclusions are the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in section 166 of the Constitution or of a Special Tribunal established under section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act No. 74 of 1996), or the judicial functions of a traditional leader under customary law or any other law.70 Fourthly, decisions to institute or continue prosecutions do not fall within the definition of administrative action.71 Fifthly, decisions of the Judicial Service Commission regarding the appointment of a judicial officer are excluded from the operation of the Act72 as are, in the sixth and seventh places, any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any provision of

6 the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000'73 and any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of section 4(1) of the Act itself.74 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Judicial authority (1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. (2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. (3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. (4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts. (5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies Judicial system - The courts are - (a) the Constitutional Court; (b) the Supreme Court of Appeal; (c) the High Courts, including any high court of appeal that may be established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts; (d) the Magistrates Courts; and (e) any other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates Courts. The term decision is related conceptually to the term administrative action. A decision, in terms of s1(v) means:... any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision, including a decision relating to (a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or determination; (b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission; (c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or other instruments; (d) imposing a condition or restriction; (e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative nature, and a reference to a failure to take a decision must be construed accordingly. (c) Procedural Fairness75

7 Two sections of the Act deal with the requirements of procedural fairness in the form of the right to a hearing.76 Section 3 sets out the general requirements of the right to a hearing when administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person. Section 4 deals with the requirements of procedural fairness when the rights of the public are materially and adversely affected. It thus serves to extend the right to a hearing to circumstances not recognised by the common law.77 It does so by empowering administrators who contemplate taking action that will affect the public generally to either hold a public enquiry, to follow a notice and comment procedure, to do both or to utilise another fair but different procedure provided for by any other applicable legislation.78 (d) Reasons Section 5(1) gives effect to s33(2) of the Constitution, the right to reasons.79 This right is vested in any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by administrative action and who has not been given reasons for the action. Such a person may request reasons within 90 days after the date on which that person became aware of the action or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action. An administrator must, within 90 days after receiving the request, give that person adequate reasons in writing for the administrative action.80 If the administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons, it must be presumed, on review, (and subject to the administrator being able, validly, to refuse to furnish adequate reasons) that the administrative action was taken without good reason.81 An administrator is relieved of the obligation to furnish adequate reasons for his or her decisions when he or she decides that a refusal to furnish reasons is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.82 An administrator will not be required to comply with the provisions of s5 in one further instance, namely, when an empowering provision provides for a reason-giving procedure which is fair but different. The administrator will be required, in such cases, to act in compliance with the empowering provision in question. Finally, s5(6) makes provision for the giving of reasons automatically. Section 5(6)(a) provides that, in order to promote an efficient administration, the Minister may, at the request of an administrator, by notice in the Gazette publish a list specifying any administrative action or a group or class of administrative actions in respect of which the administrator concerned will automatically furnish reasons to a person whose rights are adversely affected by such actions, without such person having to request reasons in terms of this section. Section 5(6)(b) provides that the Minister, must, within fourteen days after the receipt of a request referred to in paragraph (a) and at the cost of the relevant administrator, publish such list, as contemplated in that paragraph. (e) Judicial Review and Remedies The Act sets out grounds of review, the procedure to be followed in applications for review, time limits applicable to such applications and the remedies that a court may

8 grant in review proceedings. Section 6(1) provides that any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative action. Section 6(2) sets out the grounds of review.83 The first set of grounds, in giving effect to the right to lawful administrative action, deals with the authority of administrators to act and also gives effect to the right to procedural fairness in both of its manifestations. Section 6(2)(a), (b) and (c) provide that administrative action may be reviewed if: (a) the administrator who took it (i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision; (ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not authorised by the empowering provision; or (iii) was biased or reasonably suspected of bias; (b) a mandatory and material procedure or condition prescribed by an empowering provision was not complied with; (c) the action was procedurally unfair. The next set of grounds relates, again, to the right to lawful administrative action, but these grounds deal with abuses of discretion, as well as with some aspects of the right to reasonable administrative action. In terms of s6(2)(d), (e) and (f), administrative action may be reviewed if: (d) the action was materially influenced by an error of law; (e) the action was taken (i) for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision; (ii) for an ulterior purpose or motive; (iii) because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or relevant considerations were not considered; (iv) because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another person or body; (v) in bad faith; or (vi) arbitrarily or capriciously; (f) the action itself (i) contravenes a law or is not authorised by the empowering provisions; or (ii) is not rationally connected to (aa) the purpose for which it was taken; (bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; (cc) the information before the administrator; or (dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator; (g) the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision. Section 6(2)(h) provides further for the right to reasonable administration, seeking as it does, to define this concept generally. It provides that administrative action may be

9 reviewed if the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed the function. The last ground of review, contained in s6(2)(i), is a catch all which will allow, potentially, for the development of the constitutional review of administrative action beyond the grounds of review that have been listed. It provides that administrative action may be reviewed, if the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful. Section 6(3) deals specifically with the review of failures by administrators to take decisions. It provides: If any person relies on the ground of review referred to in subsection 2(g), he or she may in respect of a failure to take a decision, where (a)(i) an administrator has a duty to take a decision; (ii) there is no law that prescribes a period within which the administrator is required to take that decision; and (iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision, institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of the failure to take the decision on the ground that there has been unreasonable delay in taking the decision; or (b) (i) an administrator has a duty to take a decision; (ii) a law prescribes a period within which the administrator is required to take that decision; and (iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision before the expiration of that period, institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review of the failure to take the decision within that period on the ground that the administrator has a duty to take the decision notwithstanding the expiration of that period. Section 7 concerns itself with procedural aspects of applications for judicial review. It provides, in the first place, that the constitutional rights to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action must be exercised within a specified time. Section 7(1) reads:84 Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date - (a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any proceedings instituted in terms of internal remedies as contemplated in subsection (2)(a) have been concluded; or (b) where no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned was informed of the administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons. Section 7(2) deals with the exhaustion of internal remedies.85 It provides, first, that no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted ;86 secondly, that if the court or tribunal is not satisfied that an internal remedy has been exhausted, it must direct that the person concerned must first exhaust such remedy

10 before instituting proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review in terms of this Act ;87 and, thirdly, that a court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the person concerned, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal deems it in the interest of justice.88 The rules of procedure to govern applications for judicial review must be made by the Rules Board for Courts of Law within one year of the date of commencement of the Act.89 These rules must be approved by Parliament before publication in the Government Gazette.90 Before these rules come into operation, proceedings for judicial review must be instituted in a High Court or the Constitutional Court.91 Section 8(1) provides that in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1), the reviewing court or tribunal may grant any order that is just and equitable. Such orders may include orders: (a) directing the administrator (ii) to give reasons; or (ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; (b) prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner; (c) setting aside the administrative action and (i) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without directions; or (ii) in exceptional cases (aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action; or (bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation; (d) declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which the administrative action relates; (e) granting a temporary interdict or any other temporary relief; or (f) as to costs. In cases where the cause of action is the failure of an administrator to act, the reviewing court or tribunal may also grant an order that is just and equitable.92 In these types of cases, this relief may include orders: (a) directing the taking of the decision; (b) declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the taking of the decision; (c) directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court or tribunal considers necessary to do justice between the parties; or (d) as to costs. Finally, s9 deals with time periods. Section 9(1)(a) allows for the possibility of the 90 day period for the requesting and furnishing of reasons to be reduced, while s9(1)(b) contemplates the possibility of the 90 day period and the 180 day period, for the requesting and furnishing of reasons and the launching of review proceedings

11 respectively, being extended. These periods may be reduced or extended by agreement between the parties or, failing such agreement, by a court or tribunal on application by the person or administrator concerned. Section 9(2) provides that an application for the reduction or extension of the time limit may be granted where the interests of justice so require.93 CHAPTER FOUR: THE BOUNDARIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 4.1. The Administrative State The scope of bureaucratic activity in the modern state is vast: as Beinart wrote, in 1948, `the public service has been given powers of intervention, powers of compulsion, powers of inspection, powers of decision, usually of a wide discretionary nature, which have constant impact on the person, property, labour and trade of the individual. What is more, they are supplemented by powers to make rules and regulations in relation to those powers, and often to conduct investigations and decide disputes....1 More recently, Wiechers wrote that via the state administration the state provides services, regulates the subject s life in many respects, determines the circumstances in which the citizen lives and works, and ensures economic, social and labour peace and progress. The modern state, and in particular the administration as its executive arm, is not merely a guard or nightwatchman combatting evils, but an active entrepreneur, welfare officer, teacher, builder, planner, guardian of morals and much more.2 One of the defining characteristics of administration in the modern state is the delegation of discretionary powers to administrators. Such powers are no longer regarded as the threat to the foundations of the constitutional order that prompted Lord Hewart to write The New Despotism9 and a member of the Pretoria Bar to foresee with alarm not unmixed with despondency, the subtle but powerful attack which is being made upon those ancient and honourable institutions by the crafty and iconoclastic public servant, resulting in a country in which Parliament retains but a mere vestige of its legislative authority and the Courts of Justice are abandoned to the rat and the spider.10 The influence of Dicey can be blamed, at least in part, for these alarmist views of administration in the modern state,11 for it was his unsound critique of the exclusive administrative jurisdiction vested in the French Conseil d Etat, which he stigmatised as being opposed to the fundamental principles of the rule of law that pervaded the British Constitution 12 which fuelled Lord Hewart s intemperate attack on administrative law13 and blunted the development of administrative law for years.14 Since Dicey s time, the nature of the state has changed (from nightwatchman to benefactor 15) and, with it, conceptions of public power and the role of law in its control have changed as well.

12 4.2. What is an Organ of State? Organs of state, along with the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, are bound by the Constitution.19 In terms of s7(2), they are obliged to `respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. In terms of s237 they must perform all constitutional obligations `diligently and without delay. It is, therefore, important to ascertain who or what is an organ of state. Section 239 defines an organ of state as: (a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; (b) any other functionary or institution (i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or judicial officer. The first part of the definition should not provide difficulties. The identification of a `department of state or administration is relatively easy (although identifying the correct one to sue may be difficult in certain cases). It will be noticed that, in the second part of the definition, the terms `public power and `public function are linked to `legislation. In other words, it is only a person or body exercising or performing a statutory power or function that falls within the definition of an organ of state. This means that disciplinary bodies of voluntary associations or other domestic tribunals, whose decisions attract public law-style judicial review at common law, fall outside of the definition. These powers will be subject to review either through an implied term of a contract or through s8(2) and s33 of the Constitution, read with s1(i)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.20 Administrative acts of governmental functionaries that are performed outside will be subject to control through s33 of the Constitution, read with s1(i)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in that they would involve the exercise of public power or the performance of public functions, in terms of an empowering provision, by functionaries who, although not private individuals, are nonetheless natural or juristic persons other than organs of state.21 If all else fails, and the power or function concerned is a public one, its exercise or performance will be subject to control through s1(c) of the Constitution, the principle of legality that flows from the founding value of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law What is Administrative Action? The definition of administrative action should be wide enough to cover all aspects of administrative activity, whether adjudicative, legislative or bureaucratic, and should reflect the reality of state activity on a bureaucratic level. Klaaren has suggested that the term includes all action taken by bodies exercising public power.56 His statement requires clarification. First, he overshoots the mark somewhat when he suggests that bodies exercising all types of public power undertake administrative action for the purposes of the Constitution. It is only those bodies or persons who are

13 bound by s8(1) or s8(2) of the Constitution whose exercises of certain public powers or performance of certain public functions powers and functions of an administrative nature may be held to constitute administrative action.57 The enquiry as to whether a particular exercise of power or performance of a function falls within the definition of administrative action is, for the most part, a functional one: in the context of government,58 if a public power is not an executive power, an original legislative power or a judicial power, it is likely to be an administrative power. Van Wyk says that in its most rudimentary form, administrative action can be described as any act of the administration and that there is no reason why the term should be given a narrow meaning The Test The test to determine whether a particular public function or exercise of public power constitutes administrative action, for the purpose of determining whether s33 of the Constitution applies to it, was set out by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union.60 The court began its analysis of this issue from the premise that the Constitution regulates public powers in different ways, depending, essentially, on whether the power in question is legislative, executive or judicial. It pointed out that an overarching Bill of Rights regulates and controls the exercise of public power, and specific provisions of the Constitution regulate and control the exercise of particular powers.61 Of the public administration, in particular, and the control of its powers, the court held:62 The Constitution is committed to establishing and maintaining an efficient, equitable and ethical public administration which respects fundamental rights and is accountable to the broader public. The importance of ensuring that the administration observes fundamental rights and acts both ethically and accountably should not be understated. In the past, the lives of the majority of South Africans were almost entirely governed by labyrinthine administrative regulations which, amongst other things, prohibited freedom of movement, controlled access to housing, education and jobs and which were implemented by a bureaucracy hostile to fundamental rights or accountability. The new Constitution envisages the role and obligations of government quite differently. The rule of law means, at least, that exercises of public power must be authorised by law,86 that the functionary involved must act in good faith and must not misconstrue his or her powers,87 that exercises of public power must be rational,88 that to protect fundamental rights laws should be pre-announced, general, durable and reasonably precise rules administered by regular courts or similar independent tribunals according to fair procedures89 and that rules must be stated in a clear and accessible manner.90

14 5.1. The Public Law/ Private Law Divide Public Power The meaning of public power is a topic of particular importance for public lawyers because changes in the way governments administer keeps the issue alive as the boundary line between public and private shifts over time.1 The first Breakwater Declaration of 1993,2 in setting out what it termed points of departure defined public power to include not only the power exercised by government institutions at all levels and of different kinds but also the exercise of power in some circumstances by nominally private bodies. The declaration concluded that in a democracy the exercise of public power should be accountable and be required to conform to the principles of fairness, equality and responsiveness.3 The second Breakwater Declaration of 1996 dealt with the nature of public power more extensively. It said of public power:4 The definition of public power, it is conceded, represents contested ground. Its complexity requires continual investigation because its scope and nature are ever changing. Public power is a creature of evolution: it includes not only the power exercised by governmental institutions at all levels and of different kinds, but also the exercise of power in some circumstances by nominally private bodies. Public functions exercised by such nominally private bodies should also be controlled by public law. A sophisticated and flexible measure of public power must, therefore, be developed, dependent on concepts such as: the availability of alternative means of control; the nature and extent of the power wielded; the vulnerability of the citizen; whether the public body5 operates in a competitive or monopolistic environment; and the applicable rules of private law. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act has included in its definition of administrative action the exercise of public power or the performance of public functions, in terms of an empowering provision,6 by natural or juristic persons other than organs of state.7 This definition does not, however, demarcate between the public and the private spheres any more clearly than the Breakwater Declarations or, for that matter, the rules of the common law. The line between the public and the private acts of natural and juristic persons will still have to be drawn, on a case by case basis, by the courts. In this endeavour, the courts must be guided by the particular values of the Constitution that relate to accountability, openness and responsiveness and the Constitution s commitment to control excesses of power on the horizontal as well as the vertical plains The Impact of the Constitution The Interim Constitution. A majority of the Constitutional Court held in Du Plessis v De Klerk61 that, in general, the Bill of Rights in the interim Constitution bound the state but not private persons: the Bill of Rights applied directly to all legislation and to common law of a

15 public law nature but not to common law of a private law nature.62 In respect of private common law, s35(3) of the interim Constitution provided for indirect application. This section stated that in interpreting any law and in applying and developing the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter. Kentridge AJ concluded that Chapter 3 does not have a direct horizontal application but that it may and should have an influence on the development of the common law as it governs relations between individuals.63 He had earlier spoken of s35(3) ensuring that the values embodied in Chapter 3 will permeate the common law in all its aspects including private litigation.64 Du Plessis v De Klerk has been overtaken by events.65 Section 8(2) of the final Constitution now provides for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in appropriate circumstances.66 Nonetheless, Du Plessis v De Klerk contains valuable observations on the control of power in a constitutional state. All of the judges accepted the need for some form of constitutional control of private power. They held different views on whether that control was to be exerted through the direct application of the Bill of Rights to private relationships or indirectly through the development of a constitutionally compatible common law.67 Mahomed DP s judgment is particularly important in this respect. Because of his concern that the Constitution should control private exercises of power effectively, so as to avoid the privatisation of apartheid, his judgment serves to illuminate the purpose that s8(2) of the final Constitution was intended to promote and so assists in its interpretation. Nowhere in his judgment is this concern for the proper control of private power clearer than in the following passage:68 What is patent from the preamble, the postscript and the substance of the Constitution is a very clear and eloquent commitment to the creation of a defensible society based on freedom and equality setting its face firmly and vigorously against the racism which has dominated South African society for so long and the repression which became necessary to perpetuate its untenable ethos and premises. To leave individuals free to perpetuate advantages, privileges and relations, quite immune from the discipline of Chapter 3, would substantially be to allow the ethos and pathology of racism effectively to sustain a new life, subverting the gains which the Constitution seeks carefully to consolidate. In throwing in his lot with the indirect application of Chapter 3 to private law relationships founded in the common law, Mahomed DP again dealt with private power and his concern of unchecked private power undermining the Constitution:69 Notwithstanding all these observations I would have remained profoundly uncomfortable if the construction favoured by Kentridge AJ meant, in practice, that the Constitution was impotent to protect those who have so manifestly and brutally been victimised by the private and institutionalised desecration of the values now so

16 eloquently articulated in the Constitution. Black persons were previously denied the right to own land in 87% of the country. An interpretation of the Constitution which continued to protect the right of private persons substantially to perpetuate such unfairness by entering into contracts or making dispositions subject to the condition that such land is not sold to or occupied by Blacks would have been for me a very distressing conclusion. These and scores of other such examples leave me in no doubt that those responsible for the enactment of the Constitution never intended to permit the privatisation of Apartheid or the privileges it bestowed on the few, or the offensive attitudes it generated amongst many to be fossilized and protected by courts rendered impotent by the language of the Constitution. The effect of the indirect application of Chapter 3 of the Constitution to such exercises of private power would be that most of the common law rules, upon which reliance would have to be placed by private persons seeking to perpetuate unfair privilege or discrimination, would themselves be vulnerable to invasion and reexamination in appropriate circumstances.70 The effect of Du Plessis v De Klerk is, therefore, that the boundary between public and private exercises of power must be re-assessed in the light of the Constitution s values Conclusion The Act does not define a public power or a public function. In order to interpret these terms guidance may be derived from pre-1994 common law and from comparative sources but it must be remembered that, in the final analysis, the definition must be consonant with the values of the Constitution and the constitutionally compatible legal traditions and usages of this country. This interpretation, it is submitted, involves the consideration of three inter-related aspects, namely, the nature of the person or institution exercising power or performing a function, the nature of the public power or public function and the underlying purpose of its exercise or performance, and the availability of means of controlling the power or function apart from those that could be imposed through administrative law.99 CHAPTER SIX: STANDING 6.1. Standing in Public Law Cameron is particularly forthright in this respect. After stating that the various rules of standing are highly manipulable, he says that [w]hether an applicant s interest is only academic or whether the litigation is premature involves a value judgment that will differ from judge to judge and from case to case. The standing requirement can be manipulated by judges who feel disinclined to hear certain cases or to decide certain issues for reasons which are not openly expressed.6 The fact that the rules of standing have been developed within an essentially private law paradigm has added to the problem. The same rules are not necessarily suited

17 to adjudication in which public law rights and interests are in issue.7 The reason for this, in this instance expressed within the specific context of the extended standing provisions of the interim Constitution, is explained by O Regan J in Ferreira v Levin NO:8 Existing common law rules of standing have often developed in the context of private litigation. As a general rule, private litigation is concerned with the determination of a dispute between two individuals, in which relief will be specific and, often, retrospective, in that it applies to a set of past events. Such litigation will generally not affect people who are not parties to the litigation. In such cases the plaintiff is both the victim of the harm and the beneficiary of the relief. In litigation of a public character, however, that nexus is rarely so intimate. The relief sought is generally forward-looking and general in its application, so that it may directly affect a wide range of people. In addition, the harm alleged may often be quite diffuse or amorphous. Of course, these categories are ideal types: no bright line can be drawn between private litigation and litigation of a public or constitutional nature. Not all non-constitutional litigation is private in nature. Nor can it be said that all constitutional challenges involve litigation of a purely public character: a challenge to a particular administrative act or decision may be of a private rather than of a public character. But it is clear that in litigation of a public character, different considerations may be appropriate to determine who should have standing to launch litigation. In recognition of this, section 7(4) casts a wider net for standing than has traditionally been cast by the common law. The constitutional significance of standing lies principally in two related issues: whether unlawful conduct may be permitted to persist because no individual litigant has a sufficient personal interest to be allowed by the courts to stop it,9 and its inverse, whether persons who do not necessarily have a direct, substantial and personal interest can approach the courts for relief because those with a direct, substantial and personal interest are not able to do so for one or other reason.10 The context within which these questions have to be answered is this: if the rules of standing are too restrictive, they will act as inhibitors to the achievement of justice and may undermine the rule of law; if, on the other hand, the rules are too loose, they may undermine the proper functioning of the courts by opening their doors to frivolous cases, utilizing judicial resources at the expense of more deserving cases.11 It has been suggested that if a legal system s rules of standing are properly constructed they should only prevent a litigant who has no legitimate reason for bringing proceedings from doing so.12 In this way, a premium would be placed on access to the courts and public spirited individuals or organisations would be able to ensure constitutional and lawful conduct by the state The Rules of Standing: the Common Law Limited concessions are made to the class nature of certain rights and interests in a few narrowly defined circumstances. The first entered our law by way of the rule that

18 is drawn from the case of Patz v Greene and Co18 but it falls far short of according standing to litigate in the public interest. The rule was articulated in the following terms by Solomon J, quoting from the English case of Chamberlaine v Chester and Birkenhead Railway Co:19 Where a statute prohibits the doing of a particular act affecting the public, no person has a right of action against another merely because he has done the prohibited act. It is incumbent on the party complaining to allege and prove that the doing of the act prohibited has caused him some special damage some peculiar injury beyond that which he may be supposed to sustain in common with the rest of the Queen s subjects by an infringement of the law. But where the act prohibited is obviously prohibited for the protection of a particular party, then it is not necessary to allege special damage. In endorsing this view, which Solomon J described as not only good law, but also common sense, he explained that where the act is expressly prohibited in the interests of a particular person, the Court will presume that he is damnified, but where the prohibition is in the public interest, then any member of the public who can prove that he has sustained damage is entitled to his remedy Standing and the Constitution General Remarks Section 7(4) of the interim Constitution provided for standing for a broad range of litigants in fundamental rights litigation. This provision did to South African law, on a formal level at least, what a number of years of judicial activism had done for Indian law.29 The purpose of s7(4) was to 'bring about bold reform to the law of standing, to overcome the inhibition of human rights litigation by the conventional rules of standing, ripeness and mootness'.30 Section 7(4) of the interim Constitution read: (a) When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to in paragraph (b) shall be entitled to apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of rights. (b) The relief referred to in paragraph (a) may be sought by (i) a person acting in his or her own interest; (ii) an associate acting in the interest of its members; (iii) a person acting on behalf of another person who is not in a position to seek such relief in his or her own name; (iv) a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of persons; or (v) a person acting in the public interest.' Section 38 of the final Constitution is the successor to s7(4) of the interim Constitution. It reads: