LAW DIVISION. Plaintiff, v. Case No. 16-L DEFENDANT S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF S AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS 5/2-615 and 2-619

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1 CALENDAR: B PAGE 1 of 15 CIRCUIT COURT OF IN THE CIRCUIT COURT COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS LAW DIVISION LAW DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN Alvin Tillery, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 16-L Jacqueline Stevens, Honorable Daniel T. Gillespie Defendant. DEFENDANT S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF S AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS 5/2-615 and The defendant, Jacqueline Stevens ( Plaintiff or Dr. Stevens ), by and through her attorneys, moves to dismiss the instant action with prejudice for the following reasons: I. Introduction and Background This Court previously granted Defendant s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Alvin Tillery s ( Plaintiff or Dr. Tillery ) complaint pursuant to section of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 10, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint ( Compl., attached hereto as Exhibit 1) which repeated most of the allegations verbatim and made some non-probative edits, including attaching a few of the allegedly defamatory statements to the complaint, as instructed by the Court. Because many of the complaint s defects remain, there is therefore a great deal of overlap between the original motion to dismiss and the instant motion. In sum, Dr. Tillery s claims warrant dismissal because the statements on which they are based 1) are capable of innocent construction; 2) are impermissibly vague; 3) are substantially true, 4) fail to plead malice, and/or 5) are barred by the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. 1

2 II. Plaintiff s allegations warrant dismissal pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/ Claims may be stricken or dismissed if they are substantially insufficient in law. 735 ILCS 5/ Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven which will entitle a plaintiff to recover. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488 (1994). Plaintiff s allegations are insufficient at law because they can be innocently construed and are not pleaded with sufficient particularity. A. Certain of the allegations Plaintiff characterizes as defamatory are capable of innocent construction. Plaintiff s complaint fails to allege defamation per se on the basis of criminal conduct. Although courts must accept as true the facts alleged in a complaint, courts are not PAGE 2 of 15 required to accept the plaintiff s interpretation of the disputed statement as defamatory per se. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 510 (2006) (emphasis in original). An alleged statement cannot be defamatory per se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Kapotas, 2015 IL App (1st) , 58. Under this rule, courts must consider the statement in context and give the words of the statement, and any implications arising from them, their natural and obvious meaning. Id.; see also Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 512. The Rogers case illustrates the fact that defamation per se actions require that the defamatory meaning of the alleged statements be evident on the face of the statement. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Plaintiff exhibited a long pattern of misconduct with children which was not acceptable for CHLL coaches and that Plaintiff abused players, coaches, and umpires. Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 493 (2009). The Court held that the defamatory meaning of the statements was far from obvious because they were ambiguous and lacked sufficient contextual detail. Id. at The words used to describe Defendant s allegedly defamatory statement have similarly broad meanings to the ones in Rogers. In fact, in this case, the allegations are far more innocuous and amenable to an innocent construction than those quoted in Rogers. Here, the complaint on its face 2

3 concedes that Plaintiff s allegations regarding defamation based on criminal conduct are capable of innocent construction. He alleges, Since the publication of the False and Defamatory Statements, any individual hearing and/or reading the statements might believe that Tillery engaged in criminal conduct. Compl. 77 (emphasis added). Plaintiff also alleges in 101, By stating that the Plaintiff verbally abused and exhibited aggression toward her, the Defendant s False and Defamatory Statements convey a meaning that the Plaintiff engaged in criminal conduct. Alleging verbal abuse and aggression is not sufficient to impute criminal conduct; those statements could certainly be construed innocently as falling short of criminal conduct. Moreover, when Dr. Stevens actual statements are examined in context, it is even clearer that the words do not impute criminal conduct. Dr. Stevens alleges on her blog that Dr. PAGE 3 of 15 Tillery shouted Get out!, raised his voice, and slammed the door. Compl. Ex. B (introductory post) at p. 4. Her subsequent characterization of the conduct as abusive must therefore be seen in the context of those specific allegations. Id. (... I have no intention of relinquishing my responsibilities for faculty self-governance, including challenging and reporting, in accordance with NU s policy, conduct that I find unprofessional or abusive; the single factual allegation on which the Dean based his ban -- that I spoke aggressively and was threatening -- is from a faculty member whose aggressive conduct toward me was the reason the investigator was called in! ). Plaintiff s allegations that Defendant accused him of being verbally abusive and exhibiting aggressive conduct are reasonably capable of non-criminal interpretations and therefore cannot be defamatory per se. B. Certain of Plaintiff s allegations are impermissibly vague. Because defamation per se claims require no proof of actual damages, they must be pled with a heightened level of precision and particularity. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d at 495. When the 3

4 allegedly defamatory statements are not identified in the complaint verbatim, the question becomes whether the complaint nevertheless sets forth the substance of those statements with sufficient specific precision and particularity so as to permit both initial judicial review and the formulation of an answer and potential affirmative defenses. Id. at In particular, plaintiffs must allege details such as when and where they were made, and to whom. Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 402 Ill. App. 3d 62, 71 (1st Dist. 2010); Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) , 54. (holding that the summary statements that Plaintiff exhibited a long pattern of misconduct with children which was not acceptable for CHLL coaches and abused players, coaches, and umpires in CHLL were devoid of any specifics about what type of abuse was at issue, and how that alleged PAGE 4 of 15 misconduct manifested itself, and was therefore impermissibly vague). Certain of Plaintiff s allegations depict Dr. Stevens statements in summary form and are so vague that it is impossible to ascertain what exactly he is alleging. For example, Plaintiff alleges: 69. The Defendant has continued to make false statements about Dr. Tillery (attached hereto as Exhibit C ). 70. In addition to the foregoing, the Defendant has through oral communications to third parties falsely stated that Dr. Tillery discriminates against her based upon her status in a protected class. 71. Dr. Tillery does not discriminate against the Defendant. 72. Dr. Tillery certainly does not discriminate against the Defendant because of her status in a protected class of individuals. 94. The Defendant made similar false statements about the Plaintiff on her blog on September 1, 2016, September 2, 2016, September 4, 2016, September 7, 2016, September 8, 2016, September 11, 2016, September 19, 2016, September 20, 2016, September 27, 2016, and October 7,

5 (Compl , 94). Paragraph 69 references a ten-page blog post written by Dr. Stevens without identifying what parts of the statements are allegedly defamatory nor why they may be defamatory. Nor is it obvious from reading Exhibit C what exactly Plaintiff finds objectionable; Dr. Stevens points out that Dr. Tillery supported the hire of a career military officer to head an academic post even though he had no academic experience, quotes Dr. Tillery s actual statement, and takes issue with Dr. Tillery s reasoning. Compl. Ex. C pp Paragraphs similarly do not identify what Dr. Stevens said that was defamatory. Dr. Tillery does not identify to whom, when, and where they were made, and does not explain what Dr. Stevens said to imply he was discriminating against her because of a protected class. In fact, he does not even identify a protected class; Defendant belongs to several. PAGE 5 of 15 Finally, in paragraph 94 Dr. Tillery cites to another wide-ranging set of blog posts and claims they are defamatory without specifying which parts of the posts he finds objectionable. Although in other parts of the complaint he does identify parts of some of these posts with which he takes issue, he does not explain whether there are other sections of those posts that he claims are defamatory, and does not identify defamatory language in the Sept. 2, Sept. 19, Sept. 27, or October 7 posts. Because Plaintiff s allegations are capable of innocent construction or impermissibly vague, they fail to allege defamation per se. III. Affirmative matters bar Plaintiff s claims of defamation and false light publicity pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/ An action may be dismissed pursuant to section of the Code of Civil Procedure when the defendant identifies affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9). An affirmative matter includes something in the nature of a defense that completely negates the alleged cause of action. Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 870 (1st Dist. 1995). 5

6 A. All of the allegations in Counts I and II which Dr. Tillery claims are false are in fact substantially true. Substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation actions. Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 3d 443, (1st Dist. 2000) ( One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true. ). To establish the defense of substantial truth, the defendant need only show that the gist or sting of the allegedly defamatory material is true. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 298 Ill. App. 3d 419, 424 (1st Dist. 1998). One of the ways in which substantial truth can be established is by showing that the plaintiff s own characterization is not substantially different from the allegedly defamatory language. Harrison PAGE 6 of 15 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2003). When a statement is demonstrated to be substantially true by virtue of an allegation or an exhibit to the complaint, it is a binding judicial admission. Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) , (dismissing Plaintiff s defamation per se action based on 2-619). Moreover, where factual matters in an exhibit contradict those in the complaint, the exhibit controls. Id. 46. A statement may be substantially true even if it describes a factual occurrence which the parties may not characterize in the same way. For example, a statement that an individual had been convicted of defrauding the union was substantially true even though the conviction was merely an adverse finding in an internal union investigation. J. Maki Const. Co. v. Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 379 Ill. App. 3d 189, 204 (2nd Dist. 2008); see also Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 839 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (the statement that the plaintiff took a leave of absence when he was not teaching classes was not technically correct but substantially true, and therefore not actionable). Paragraphs 33-68, which are substantially repeated in Counts I and II as paragraphs , relate to Dr. Stevens description of the March 8 Meeting. In those paragraphs, Dr. 6

7 Stevens is alleged to have accused Dr. Tillery, on her blog and in an internal report, of yelling at her; slamming a door; engaging in aggressive and unprofessional conduct; engaging in threats, bullying and retaliation; violating Northwestern s civility policy; and lying about the March 8 meeting. All of those statements are substantially true. Former Northwestern student Matthew Greene witnessed part of the March 8 meeting. When combined with Plaintiff s own admissions, it is clear that Plaintiff s statements about Dr. Tillery were substantially true. Mr. Green testifies in part,... I heard a male voice yelling and heard the phrase Get out! and then I heard a door slam. I did not hear any female voice. I then saw Professor Stevens walking towards me looking startled and flustered. Compl. Ex. B (Sept. 2 post) at p. 4; see also Ex. 2, Stevens Decl. attachment 5. PAGE 7 of 15 Although Mr. Greene does not identify the male voice as that of Dr. Tillery, Dr. Tillery admits to this conversation and meeting having taken place, admits to having asked Plaintiff to leave his office, and admits to closing the door behind her. (See e.g. Compl ). Tillery s complaint, its internal references and the declaration support Stevens argument that her alleged statements are substantially true. Nothing in the complaint contradicts affiant Matthew Greene heard a male voice say Get out! and then heard the door slam. Dr. Tillery does newly allege that three colleagues did not hear the door slam, but fails to allege they were in their offices at the time the conversation occurred. Compl. 43. Mr. Greene s testimony that he did hear it slam does not contradict that allegation. Moreover, Dr. Tillery s new allegation that an attorney hired by Northwestern s administration believed that Mr. Greene was coached into corroborating Dr. Stevens version of the events (Compl. 54) is contradicted by the Rinehart report itself: [Stevens] has had no further conversation with the undergraduate student; she only talked about the incident with him right after it 7

8 happened on March 8. (Compl. 47, incorporating Rinehart Report, p. 8, at Dr. Tillery never definitively states that Mr. Greene s affidavit was untruthful, despite having had access to Mr. Greene s statement not only through Defendant s initial motion to dismiss but by reading Defendant s blog, which reproduced the statement in its entirety. Compl These allegations and declaration make clear that Dr. Tillery yelled at Dr. Stevens, told her to Get out!, and slammed the door behind her. These are precisely the allegations Dr. Tillery claims are defamatory. Dr. Stevens alleged characterizations of that behavior as abusive, aggressive, and unprofessional accurately describe the encounter. Certainly, the gist or sting of those statements is true. PAGE 8 of 15 Whether Tillery thinks it is accurate to characterize his tone of voice as yelling is not material, because Mr. Greene s affidavit makes the gist of the statement true. Mr. Greene s affidavit is referenced in the complaint itself through the citation to Plaintiff s blog, on which the entire affidavit appears. (Compl. 47). Similarly, although Tillery denies threatening Stevens, the website he references in the complaint contains a copy of the April 2016 letter from his own attorney in which he does in fact threaten Stevens in no uncertain terms. Compl. Ex. B (Sept. 11 post) at p. 2. Finally, although Tillery generally denies retaliating against Stevens, he does not deny the more specific examples of retaliation that are documented on Stevens blog, which his complaint incorporates, for example, that following her report of his uncivil conduct, he told the Dean he felt unsafe around her and thought she might shoot him, which led to Stevens suspension and a forced psychological examination (the examination immediately established Tillery s claims were baseless). See e.g. Compl. Ex. B (introductory post) at p. 4; Stevens Decl. 4. Moreover, Tillery s difference of opinion about how to characterize these undisputed factual occurrences does not affect their substantial truth. Perhaps one could disagree about whether the 8

9 occurrences in Mr. Greene s declaration and counsel s letter could be characterized as retaliation, threats, bullying, unprofessional, or abuse, but the gist of the statements is true. Dr. Tillery also takes issue with the fact that Dr. Stevens accused him of lying about the March 8 incident. Compl A statement that an individual is lying is not defamatory per se if it is substantially true. Clarage v. Kuzma, 342 Ill. App. 3d 573, 581 (3rd Dist. 2003). Mr. Greene s declaration makes clear that Dr. Stevens characterization of Dr. Tillery having lied is substantially true, even if some of the differences between their statements result from differing interpretations. It is also substantially true that the behavior Mr. Greene and Dr. Stevens describe was in violation of Northwestern s Guidance on Civility Policy, which describes uncivil conduct as PAGE 9 of 15 behavior that escalate[s] into behavior that is disrespectful, such as raised voices and petty meanness. Compl It is substantially true that Dr. Tillery s having told Dr. Stevens to Get out and slammed the door behind her violated this policy, whether or not Dr. Tillery would characterize it that way. Dr. Tillery also complains that Dr. Stevens accused him of threats, bullying, and retaliating. (Compl. 64, 85, 121). Dr. Tillery not only threatened Dr. Stevens but followed up on this threat; on April 6, his lawyer sent her a letter threatening her with a lawsuit, and subsequently filed the instant lawsuit. (Compl. Ex. B (September 11 post) at p. 2 referencing see also Attachment 1, Stevens Decl. 2). Moreover, telling someone to Get out! and slamming a door in their face could reasonably be construed as bullying. Finally, Dr. Tillery, who was Associate Chair at the time, did in fact retaliate against Dr. Stevens for making her complaint. He told counsel for the university and others that he felt unsafe around Dr. Stevens and that he thought she might shoot him. (Compl. Ex. B (September 4 post) at p. 4; 9

10 Attachment 1, Stevens Decl. 3, 4). As a result, Dr. Stevens was suspended from her job, forced to submit to a psychiatric evaluation, banned from contacting students, banned from campus, and relocated to an office across campus. Id. A reasonable person could construe that as retaliation for Dr. Stevens complaint to the chair. All of Dr. Stevens statements which are cited in the Amended Complaint are substantially true. B. Plaintiff s allegation that Defendant acted with actual malice is contradicted by his own public statement, as well as Dr. Stevens internal complaint. Dr. Tillery s complaint fails to sufficiently allege actual malice, which is necessary to state a claim of false light invasion of privacy. 1 A claim of false-light invasion of privacy requires PAGE 10 of 15 pleading that (1) the plaintiffs were placed in a false light before the public as a result of the defendants actions; (2) the false light in which the plaintiffs were placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendants acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether the statements were true or false. Kapotas v. Better Gov't Ass'n, 2015 IL App (1st) , 77 (2015). Actual malice must also be established in order to recover punitive damages in a defamation action. Gibson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 267, 279 (5th Dist. 1997). Here, Plaintiff alleges merely: 10. The Defendant has engaged in intentional conduct with actual malice by publishing false and defamatory statements about Dr. Tillery with the knowledge the statements were false. 78. By publishing the False and Defamatory Statements, the Defendant intended and sought to harm Dr. Tillery personally and professionally. 79. The Defendant acted with intent and actual malice when she engaged in the 1 If the Court deems Plaintiff s defamation per se claim to be unsuccessful, his false-light invasion of privacy claim fails as well. Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 659 (7th Cir. 2008). 10

11 foregoing conduct because she intended to harm Dr. Tillery The Defendant made the False and Defamatory Statements with actual malice knowing the falsity of the statements and an intent to cause Dr. Tillery harm. (Compl. 10, 78, 79; see also nearly identical allegations in 148, 150, 156, 173). According to the Bergfeld case, a mere averment that an act was done with a certain purpose or intent, without a statement of the facts showing such purpose or intent, is a conclusion of law. Bergfeld v. Stork, 7 Ill. App. 3d 486, 491 (5th Dist. 1972). In this case, Plaintiff s allegations that Defendant acted with actual malice are conclusory at best. Moreover, Dr. Tillery admitted on his own public Facebook post that Dr. Stevens did not have the requisite intent. He wrote, in reference to the March 8 Meeting, In this PAGE 11 of 15 administrative role, a simple conversation over her teaching turned into an episode where she had a break from reality and began to imagine that I was verbally abusing her. (Attachment 1, Stevens Decl. at 3). A break from reality in which one imagines something to be true cannot also be an intentional falsehood. Moreover, Dr. Stevens complaint against Dr. Tillery, cited as evidence of defamation, concludes by stating, This is out of character for Al and I m hopeful we can work out it. Compl. Ex. A at 1. In fact, until Dr. Tillery identified himself publicly as the individual about whom Dr. Stevens was writing on her blog, Dr. Stevens did not even identify him by name, but rather referred to him as Slammer (as in door-slammer). Compl. 48; Stevens Decl. Ex. 3 (in which Dr. Tillery identifies himself as the faculty member described in Dr. Stevens post). If her motivation was malice towards Dr. Tillery, she presumably would have identified him by name from the beginning. It is clear from the context, therefore, that the complaint was not malicious or intended to harm Dr. Tillery, but rather was Dr. Stevens attempt to seek her chairperson s assistance in mediating the conflict between her and Dr. Tillery. 11

12 Plaintiff has failed to plead actual malice, and statements cited in the exhibits to Dr. Tillery s complaint undercut his conclusory statements about Defendant s malice. C. Plaintiff s defamation claim is barred by qualified privilege. Even if this Court deems Dr. Stevens alleged statements to be defamatory, a defamation action cannot proceed if the statements are protected by the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law. Turner v. Fletcher, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1055 (4th Dist. 1999). One of the types of circumstances that renders a defamatory statement privilege is when a communication results from some recognized duty or interest, such as situations which involve some interest of the person who publishes the defamatory matter or situations involving a recognized public interest. Id.; see also Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 PAGE 12 of 15 Ill.2d 16, 27 (1993). In determining whether a qualified privilege exists, Courts must look only to the occasion giving rise to the defamation action to determine whether, as a matter of public policy, the occasion created some recognized duty or interest that makes communication of the defamatory statement in that situation conditionally privileged as a matter of law. The inquiry is a general one, requiring the court to weigh the value of the type of interest to be protected against the degree of damage to be expected from release of the type of defamatory matter involved. Turner, 302 Ill. App. 3d at (internal citation omitted). For example, corporations have an interest investigating or correcting employee wrongdoing, and therefore a qualified privilege exists for communication made concerning such investigation. Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) , 43; Stavros v. Marrese, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1058 (2001) ( Village officials... clearly have an interest in knowing whether Village employees are performing their official duties in a professional manner and whether Village residents have negative feelings with respect to interactions with those employees. ) 12

13 Once qualified privilege has been established, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant either intentionally published the material while knowing the matter was false, or displayed a reckless disregard as to the matter s falseness. Coghlan, 2013 IL App (1st) , 43 (internal citations omitted). However, it is not sufficient to merely allege that a defendant acted maliciously and with knowledge of the falsity of the statement; the plaintiff must allege facts from which actual malice may be inferred. Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, Dr. Stevens sent a complaint about Tillery pursuant to the university s civility policy, which states, Any individual who believes he or she has been treated in a manner that is inconsistent with this policy should contact his or her supervisor. (Stevens Decl. Ex. 6, p. 1) (emphasis added). Dr. Stevens followed this policy in reporting Dr. Tillery s conduct to her PAGE 13 of 15 supervisor. The university has an interest in insuring that its employees act in a professional manner. Therefore, the statement should be protected by qualified privilege. Further, Dr. Stevens was banned from campus, forced to submit to a psychological evaluation and suspended from her position. Compl. Ex. B (introductory post) at p. 1. She therefore had an interest in clearing her name and ensuring that the materials reviewed by the psychiatrist she was being forced to see included perspectives other than those of individuals like Tillery who had a vendetta against her. There is also a public interest in making sure tenured professors are not banned from their positions without being permitted due process or the opportunity to defend themselves fully. In her introductory blog post, under the heading How Can I Help, Stevens wrote: to Northwestern, short is fine, from people who know me and simply can vouch they have never known me as unbalanced, retaliatory, or physically threatening in any way would be extremely helpful. To date Randolph has completely disregarded positive letters--he omitted any reference to them in his summaries or his August 17, 2016 letter for the psychiatrist-- but perhaps if they are tallied in the dozens or more this will make a difference. Compl. Ex. B (introductory post) at p. 7. As her September 1 blog post makes clear, the Tillery incident was described to give context to the administration s lack of good faith in banning her from 13

14 her position. Ex. B p. 4 (describing the fact that the administration s investigation of Dr. Stevens was sparked by her complaint about Dr. Tillery). If the post s aim were instead to harm Dr. Tillery personally and professionally, she would have identified him by name rather than by a pseudonym. Dr. Stevens subsequent posts to which Dr. Tillery cites were largely repetitions or elaborations about her initial statements about the incident. They responded to the public statements of Drs. Tillery and Monoson, and constituted self-defense as Northwestern s administration, particularly her chairperson, did its best to marginalize her. Compl , 62-63, 65, 67; Stevens Decl. 4. The allegedly defamatory statements were made in the context of Dr. Stevens reporting unprofessional conduct within official channels as well as in the context of defending herself against the administration s allegations that she was a threat to safety and the resulting suspension from PAGE 14 of 15 her position. They are therefore protected by the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. As argued in section B supra, Dr. Tillery mere provided conclusory statements and no specific facts that demonstrate Dr. Stevens acted with malice or reckless disregard of the truth. Plaintiff therefore failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege. WHEREFORE, Jacqueline Stevens respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiff s complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Respectfully Submitted, /s/rima Kapitan Rima Kapitan Yusra Gomaa Kapitan Law Office P.O. Box 6779 Chicago, IL rima@kapitanlaw.net Firm No

15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, an attorney, hereby certifies that on May 31, 2017 she filed electronically the foregoing motion, and sent a copy to Plaintiff s counsel via electronic mail to the following addresses: Tatyana L. Ruderman Ronnie A. Farhat MUDD LAW OFFICES tlr@muddlaw.com raf@muddlaw.com /s/ Rima Kapitan PAGE 15 of 15 15