TESTIMONIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS FOR CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE ADULTS (BILL C-2): CASE LAW REVIEW AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY

Transcription

1 TESTIMONIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS FOR CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE ADULTS (BILL C-2): CASE LAW REVIEW AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY

2 Testimonial Support Provisions for Children and Vulnerable Adults (Bill C-2): Case Law Review and Perceptions of the Judiciary Nicholas Bala, LL.M., Joanne J. Paetsch, B.A., Lorne D. Bertrand, Ph.D., and Meaghan Thomas, J.D. Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family rr10-vic03 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice Canada, the Government of Canada, or the Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family.

3 Catalogue No. J2-367/2011F J2-367/2011F-PDF ISBN ISBN (PDF)

4 Contents Acknowledgements... v Executive Summary...vii 1. Introduction Background Purpose of the Project Methodology Case Law and Canadian Literature Review Survey of Judges Limitations Review of Bill C-2 Case Law and Legal Literature The Competence of Child Witnesses: Canada Evidence Act s Elements of Testimonial Competence under s The Promise to Tell the Truth Conduct of the Competency Examination Constitutionality of Section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act Inherent Authority to Instruct Child Accommodating Child Witnesses: Introduction Support Person: s Use of a Screen or Closed-circuit Television: s Preventing Questioning by Self-represented Accused: s Video-recorded Evidence: ss and Results of the Survey of Judges Demographics of Survey Respondents Judges Use and Perceptions of Bill C Judges Experiences with the Provisions Contained in Bill C Competency Inquiries Support Persons Screens and Closed-circuit Television Counsel Appointed for Self-represented Accused Video-recorded Evidence Questioning of Children General Comments Summary of Survey Results Discussion and Conclusions Appendix A Appendix B iii

5 Tables Table 3.1: Number of Completed Surveys Returned by Jurisdiction and Level of Court Table 3.2: Characteristics of Judges Criminal Cases Table 3.3: Extent to Which the Judges Agree That the Provisions Amended in Bill C-2 are Useful Table 3.4: Characteristics of Judges Competency Inquiries by Age of Child Witness Table 3.5: Characteristics of Judges' Criminal Cases Involving the Support Person Provision Table 3.6: Point in the Proceeding When Applications for Various Provisions in Bill-C-2 are Most Commonly Made Table 3.7:Characteristics of Judges criminal Cases Involving the Provisions for Screens and Closed Circuit Television Table 3.8: Frequency of Provisions Granted in Successful Applications for Screens and Closed-Circuit Television Table 3.9: Characteristics of Judges Criminal Cases Involving the Appointment of Counsel for Self-Represented accused Table 3.10: Characteristics of Judges Criminal Cases Involving the Provision for Video-recorded Evidence Table 3.11: Judges Perceptions of How Often Child Witnesses are Asked Questions they are Incapable of Answering by Various Professionals Figures Figure 3.1: Proportion of Judges Reporting Familiarity with and Use of the Amendments in Bill C-2, by Level of Court Figure 3.2: Proportion of Judges Using Various Provisions Amended by Bill C-2, by Level of Court Figure 3.3: Most Common Support Person Used in Cases with Child Witness under 18 and Vulnerable Adult Witness...52 Figure 3.4: Judges Perceptions of Whether the New Provisions May Render the Trial Unfair to the Accused iv

6 Acknowledgements This project could not have been conducted without the assistance and support of many individuals and organizations. First, we would like to acknowledge the financial support of Justice Canada and the guidance provided by the Project Authority, Dr. Susan McDonald, and A/Senior Counsel, Ms Jocelyn Sigouin. We also appreciate the guidance provided by the Judicial Advisory Committee, namely: The Honourable R. Brian Gibson (Provincial Court of Nova Scotia); The Honourable Colleen Kenny (Court of Queen s Bench of Alberta); and the Honourable Heino Lilles (Territorial Court of the Yukon). We also thank Dr. Joseph Hornick, Executive Director of the Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family (CRILF) for his consultation throughout the project. We thank the Offices of the Chief Judges and Justices of the participating courts for facilitating distribution of the surveys to the judges in their jurisdictions. We would also like to thank the survey respondents who completed the survey and provided us with information on their experiences with and opinions of Bill C-2. Their contributions were invaluable. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Carrie McCarney (Queen s J.D. Candidate 2010) in updating the research for this report in the summer of Lastly, we thank Ms Linda Haggett of CRILF for her assistance with typing the tables for the report. The Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family is supported by a grant from the Alberta Law Foundation. v

7 Executive Summary Background Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Protection of Children and Other Vulnerable Persons) received royal assent on July 21, 2005 (S.C. 2005, c.32). The Bill contained a package of amendments to the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act designed to facilitate testimony by child victims and vulnerable adults, which came into force on January 2, It changed the approach for determining if child witnesses are competent to testify, allowing them to testify if they are able to understand and respond to questions. In cases involving children and vulnerable adults, the amendments facilitate the use of testimonial aids, including screens, closed-circuit television, support persons, as well as the use of video-recorded statements. Under the new test, testimonial aids are available for all child victims and vulnerable adult witnesses, on application, unless it would interfere with the proper administration of justice. The Bill also gave judges the authority to appoint counsel for self-represented accused persons for the purposes of preventing cross-examination of children and vulnerable adult witnesses, unless doing so would interfere with the proper administration of justice. Purpose of the Project The Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family (CRILF) was contracted by Justice Canada to conduct this project on testimonial support provisions for children and vulnerable adults in the criminal courts. The purpose of this research project was to explore judicial experiences with and opinions about the amendments to the Criminal Code and Canada Evidence Act introduced by Bill C-2 for children and vulnerable adult witnesses. The project addressed the following research questions: 1. Since Bill C-2 came into effect, what does case law reveal about the new law and how has Canadian legal literature dealt with these legal reforms? 2. Are judges familiar with the amendments contained in Bill C-2? Have they had the opportunity to use them? Do they think they re useful? 3. How often are applications being made for testimonial supports? Are the applications generally successful? If not, why not? 4. Have judges had any difficulties with the implementation of any of the testimonial support provisions contained in Bill C-2? 5. How often are applications being made for appointment of counsel to self-represented accused for purposes of cross-examination? Are the applications generally successful? If not, why not? vii

8 6. Have the judges held competency inquiries? How often is the child witnesses competence accepted without inquiry? How often is the child found incompetent to testify? 7. Do the judges have any concerns regarding any of the provisions contained in Bill C-2? Methodology In order to address the research questions listed above, the project included two major components: (1) a review of relevant case law and Canadian legal literature; and (2) a survey of judges in four Canadian jurisdictions. The methodology used for these two components is described below. Case Law and Canadian Literature Review The new legislation governing the testimony of children and vulnerable adults as witnesses has been interpreted and applied in a significant number of recent reported Canadian cases, and discussed in a few articles. This report includes an analysis and summary of the reported Canadian case law (to June 30, 2009) and legal literature dealing with the new provisions, and related issues concerning vulnerable witnesses. Survey of Judges A survey of provincial and superior court judges in four jurisdictions in Canada was conducted to elicit their experiences with and opinions on the Bill C-2 amendments. Four jurisdictions agreed to participate in the project: Nova Scotia (both levels of court), Alberta (both levels of court), British Columbia (Provincial Court), and the Yukon (Territorial Court). Data collection occurred from November 26, 2007 to January 15, The judges survey consists of 36 questions and contains the following sections: Background Information; Your Perceptions of Bill C-2; Your Experiences with the Provisions Contained in Bill C-2; Credibility Assessment and Questioning of Children; and General Comments. Summary and Conclusions A review of the reported case law applying Bill C-2 and the survey of judges reveals that these legislative reforms have facilitated the giving of evidence by children in criminal proceedings, and that they are generally well received by the judiciary. In the survey, almost all of the judges indicated that they consider Bill C-2 to be useful, and a clear majority considered that the provisions continue to treat the accused fairly. In the reported case law, all of the Charter-based challenges to the new provisions have failed, and the courts are generally interpreting the new provisions in a way that has helped children to testify. One of the Charter cases has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the question of the constitutional validity of the new provisions is likely to be resolved in The new competency test in Canada Evidence Act s has clearly simplified and shortened the process of qualification for child witnesses. In a significant portion of cases, the child is viii

9 accepted as competent without inquiry, often based on interview material disclosed to the defence before the hearing. In the survey, judges reported that in about one-fifth of cases with the youngest age group (3-5 years), there was no competency inquiry, rising to almost three-quarters with the older age group (10-13 years). In the reported case law, there were no instances of judges writing decisions to explain why a child is incompetent to testify. In the survey, while some children in all age groups were found incompetent, even in the youngest age group (3-5 years) almost one-half of the judges reported that they had never found a child incompetent under the new provision. Judges reported that the average length of time spent on a competency inquiry is now 12 minutes. The case law reveals that judges may allow questions about the child s understanding of the concepts of truth and lie during cross-examination, though published commentary raises the appropriateness of such questions. The courts have accepted that in enacting ss , 486.2, and 486.3, Parliament intended to increase the use of accommodations for child witnesses, by increasing the use of support persons, closed-circuit television and screens, and counsel appointed to cross-examine child witnesses where accused persons are self-represented. There are very few reported cases in which use of an accommodation was requested and the accused satisfied the court that use of the accommodation would interfere with the administration of justice. The courts, however, remain alive to the need to protect the rights of the accused; in the reported cases, use of an accommodation is denied if the appropriate equipment is not available, or the conduct of the witness or nature of the evidence would mean that use of the accommodation would render the trial unfair. The survey suggests that applications under s to allow a support person to sit near a child or vulnerable adult witness are made in a minority of cases involving children and rarely in cases with adults. When an application is made under s for a child witness, it is almost always successful, and usually successful with a vulnerable adult. The survey results suggest that the most common support persons for child witnesses are family members and victim services workers. In the survey, some judges raised some concerns about the implementation of s , in particular that in some cases the support person may influence the witness. The case law review reveals that judges recognize that Bill C-2 establishes a high standard for the accused to satisfy if the court is to reject an application for the use of closed-circuit television or a screen with a child witness under s The survey reveals that applications under s for screens or closed-circuit televisions are most likely to be made at the pre-trial hearing conference. The survey suggests that an application under s is made in a minority of cases involving child witnesses, and is more likely to be for use of a screen than closed-circuit television, but when an application is made, it is almost always successful. The case law review and survey suggest that there continue to be logistical and technical concerns about the equipment and, in the survey, one-half of the judges reported that they had experienced problems in arranging for appropriate equipment. The survey reports that appointment of counsel of s to question a vulnerable witness rather than allowing a self-represented accused to do this is more likely to occur in provincial court, perhaps because accused persons in superior court are more likely to have counsel. The survey also revealed that applications under s are made most often at the pre-trial hearing conference, and the survey and case law review indicate that such applications are almost always ix

10 successful. The survey, case law review, and published commentary reveal concerns about the implementation of s , in particular about how counsel is to be paid. The survey also revealed some judicial concern about delay that may result when an order is made under s , especially if it is not clear how counsel is to be paid, and about how counsel can cross-examine only one witness without being involved in the entire trial. Despite the variation in the reported case law about how the courts are dealing with issues of payment for counsel and how counsel is being selected for s orders, the survey and case law review indicate that these issues are being adequately addressed; there are no reports of cases in which proceedings have had to be stayed because counsel could not be appointed. The case law review and survey showed that applications under s to have a videorecorded interview with the child admitted in evidence are almost never denied. The survey indicates that applications for the video-recorded evidence provision are made most often during the pre-trial hearing conference. The case law review suggests that judges recognize that the video-recorded interview may be given considerable weight, since it is made closer to the events in question when a child is likely to be able to give a fuller and more accurate description of the events at issue. The survey suggests that the Crown only seeks to have a video-recorded interview admitted in less than half of cases, and that s is in practice not being used with vulnerable adult witnesses. When asked about the credibility of witnesses in general in the survey, judges reported that the younger the witness, the more likely they are to make an unintentional false statement, for example, due to their memory of events being imperfect. Conversely, in the survey, judges reported that they perceived adults and older children to be more likely to be dishonest and make intentionally false statements. Judges in the survey also reported concerns that children who are testifying are frequently asked overly complex or developmentally inappropriate questions, especially by defence counsel. The case law review revealed that even in cases where children have been afforded accommodation, there continue to be cases where the courts acquit persons charged with offences against children, even if the judge believed the child, if the court was satisfied that the Crown did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The vulnerable adult witness provisions have been the subject of very little reported case law, and the survey indicates that there have been relatively few applications for the use of testimonial aids for adults. When applications are made for the use of testimonial aids for adults, they are generally successful, but they are less likely to be granted than applications for child witnesses. In line with the findings from the case law review, overall, the judges who completed the survey were very positive about the amendments contained in Bill C-2. The vast majority of judges were familiar with the amendments and a substantial proportion had used them. Almost all of the judges reported that the amendments are useful, and over three-quarters did not think they might render the trial unfair to the accused. Despite some concerns about implementation of these provisions as reflected in reported case law and survey comments, the amended provisions for child and vulnerable adult witnesses contained in Bill C-2 appear to be working well. Judges in both levels of court are familiar with the amendments and are using them. x

11 1. Introduction 1.1 Background Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Protection of Children and Other Vulnerable Persons) received royal assent on July 21, The Bill contained a package of amendments to the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act designed to facilitate testimony by child victims and vulnerable adults, which came into force on January 2, It changed the approach for determining if child witnesses are competent to testify, allowing them to testify if they are able to understand and respond to questions. In cases involving children and vulnerable adults, the amendments facilitate the use of testimonial aids, including screens, closed-circuit television, support persons, as well as the use of video-recorded statements. Under the new test, testimonial aids are available for all child victims and vulnerable adult witnesses, on application, unless it would interfere with the proper administration of justice. The Bill also gave judges the authority to appoint counsel for self-represented accused persons for the purposes of preventing cross-examination of children and vulnerable adult witnesses, unless doing so would interfere with the proper administration of justice. 1.2 Purpose of the Project The Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family (CRILF) was contracted by the Department of Justice Canada to conduct this project on testimonial support provisions for children and vulnerable adults in the criminal courts. The purpose of this research project was to explore judicial experiences with and opinions about the amendments to the Criminal Code and Canada Evidence Act introduced by Bill C-2 for children and vulnerable adult witnesses. The project addressed the following research questions: 1. Since Bill C-2 came into effect, what does case law reveal about the new law and how has Canadian legal literature dealt with these legal reforms? 2. Are judges familiar with the amendments contained in Bill C-2? Have they had the opportunity to use them? Do they think they re useful? 3. How often are applications being made for testimonial supports? Are the applications generally successful? If not, why not? 4. Have judges had any difficulties with the implementation of any of the testimonial support provisions contained in Bill C-2? 1 S.C. 2005, c Some of the other provisions of Bill C-2 amending offence provisions of the Criminal Code, came into effect on November 16,

12 5. How often are applications being made for appointment of counsel to self-represented accused for purposes of cross-examination? Are the applications generally successful? If not, why not? 6. Have judges held competency inquiries? How often is the child witnesses competence accepted without inquiry? How often is the child found incompetent to testify? 7. Do judges have any concerns regarding any of the provisions contained in Bill C-2? 1.3 Methodology In order to address the research questions listed above, the project included two major components: (1) a review of relevant Canadian legal literature and case law; and (2) a survey of judges in four Canadian jurisdictions. The methodology used for these two components is described below. CRILF established a Judicial Advisory Committee at the outset of the project to provide guidance to the research team throughout the project, including reviewing the survey, helping to facilitate participation of judges in their respective jurisdictions, and reviewing the draft final report. Members of this Committee were: The Honourable R. Brian Gibson, Provincial Court of Nova Scotia; The Honourable Colleen Kenny, Court of Queen s Bench of Alberta; and The Honourable Heino Lilles, Territorial Court of the Yukon Case Law and Canadian Literature Review The new legislation governing the testimony of children and vulnerable adults as witnesses has been interpreted and applied in a significant number of recent reported Canadian cases, and discussed in a few articles. This report includes an analysis and summary of the Canadian case law and legal literature dealing with the new provisions, and related issues concerning vulnerable witnesses. The focus is on cases decided since the new law came into force on January 2, 2006 (and reported prior to June 30, 2009 the cut-off date for the review 3 ) Survey of Judges A survey of provincial and superior court judges in four jurisdictions in Canada was conducted to elicit their experiences with and opinions on the Bill C-2 amendments. In a teleconference meeting held in September 2007 with representatives from Justice Canada and the research team, it was decided that five jurisdictions would be approached to participate in the study: Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon. Justice Canada agreed to make the initial contact with the jurisdictions, and to provide a letter of information from the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister that could be sent by the contractors to the Chief Judge/Justice of the Provincial and Superior Court in each jurisdiction. CRILF would then follow-up with their offices to discuss implementation of the study. Once a jurisdiction s participation was confirmed, the Chief s Office was sent the survey and cover electronically for distribution to their judges. Four of the five jurisdictions approached agreed to participate in the project: Nova Scotia (both levels of court), Alberta (both levels of court), British Columbia (Provincial Court), and the 3 The original cut-off date was January 2, 2008, but an update was done in the summer of 2009 to bring the case law review up to June 30,

13 Yukon (Territorial Court). Data collection occurred from November 26, 2007 to January 15, The cover used for the survey is contained in Appendix A. It includes a brief description of the study, as well as instructions for completing the survey and returning it to CRILF. The cover also contains an ethics statement indicating that the survey is being conducted in accordance with freedom of information and protection of privacy legislation and that data will only be presented in aggregate form and that individual respondents will not be identified. The survey is contained in Appendix B. The survey was created using Forms in Word, allowing respondents to complete it electronically. The judges survey consists of 36 questions and contains the following sections: Background Information; Your Perceptions of Bill C-2; Your Experiences with the Provisions Contained in Bill C-2; Credibility Assessment and Questioning of Children; and General Comments. 1.4 Limitations Certain limitations to the data presented in this report affect the ability to generalize the findings to the judiciary as a whole. Specifically, it should be kept in mind that participants in the project do not represent a random sample of judges in Canada, nor do they represent a random sample of judges in their respective jurisdictions. Further, the sample was small, also limiting the ability to generalize the findings to the judiciary in Canada. While we were unable to calculate a response rate since we do not know how many surveys were actually distributed, we do know that the response rate was relatively low, likely in the range of 10% to 20% of the judges surveyed. Despite these limitations, the survey participants provided valuable information regarding the amendments contained in Bill C-2. 13

14 2. Review of Bill C-2 Case Law and Legal Literature In 1988 Parliament enacted very significant legislative reforms to the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act to facilitate children coming to court to testify in criminal cases, with further reforms in 1993 and In 2005, Parliament enacted amendments to the earlier statutory reforms to further facilitate the testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses. These amendments came into effect on January 2, This chapter addresses the first research question outlined in Section 1.2: Since Bill C-2 came into effect, what does case law reveal about the new law and how has Canadian legal literature dealt with these legal reforms? The discussion which follows reviews the provisions of Bill C-2 that relate to child and adult vulnerable witnesses and the reported case law which has applied and interpreted those provisions, and considers the Canadian legal literature 5 which discusses those provisions and the case law. The focus is on cases decided since January 2, 2006 (and reported prior to June 30, 2009 the cut-off date for the review). In order to understand the significance of this recent case law, there is also limited discussion of the pre-2006 case law that interpreted the previous provisions, though the discussion of the older case law is not comprehensive. 2.1 The Competence of Child Witnesses: Canada Evidence Act s The reforms to the Canada Evidence Act that came into effect in 2006 significantly changed the process and standard for assessing the competence of children to testify in criminal proceedings. Prior to the Bill C-2 amendments, a child under the age of 14 offered as a witness could testify under oath, on affirmation or after promising to tell the truth. The test for testifying on a promise was twofold, requiring the child to have: (1) the ability to answer questions that demonstrate an understanding of the importance of truth telling, and (2) the ability to meaningfully communicate in court proceedings. If the child lacked the maturity and mental capacity to satisfy the test for giving testimony, the child was incompetent to testify in any form. This old test and the 4 Bill C-2, S.C. 2005, c Three recent articles were located in the Canadian legal literature discussing child witness issues and Bill C-2: Nicholas Bala, Katherine Duvall-Antonacouplos, R.C.L. Lindsay, Kang Lee & Victoria Talwar, Bill C-2: A New Law for Canada s Child Witnesses (2006), 32 C.R. (6 th ) 48-69; Jula Hughes, Peetooloot: Who Pays the Costs of Appointing Counsel to Cross-examine Complainants? (2006) 42 C.R. (6th) 57; Lisa Dufraimont, S. (J.): Care in Cross-Examining Child Witnesses (2007), 48 C.R. (6th) 357. Another recent article that deals with child witness issues but does not directly discuss Bill C-2 or the new provisions is: Timothy E. Moore & Cindy R. Wasser, Social Science and Witness Reliability: Reliable Science Begets Reliable Evidence (2006), 33 C.R. (6th) 316. Another recently published article deals with an analysis of reported Canadian cases from 1986 to 2002 dealing with prosecutions of historic child abuse cases; although a related topic, that paper is not discussed in this report: Deborah.A. Connolly, Heather L. Price & Heidi Gordon, Judging the Credibility of Historic Child Sexual Abuse Complainants: How Judges Describe Their Decisions (2009), 15 Psychology, Public Policy & Law

15 jurisprudence concerning it will continue to apply to persons over 14 years of age whose mental capacity is challenged (s. 16(1) Canada Evidence Act, as amended). Section 16.1(1) now provides that a person under 14 years of age is presumed to have the capacity to testify. The test for the receipt of a child s evidence is simply that the child is to be able to understand and respond to questions. It is for the party challenging the child s capacity to establish that there is an issue as to capacity to understand and respond to questions (s. 16.1(4)). A child under the age of 14 is neither to take an oath nor make a solemn declaration, but must promise to tell the truth. No inquiry is permitted into a child s understanding of the meaning of a promise, or the meaning of concepts like truth or lie (s. 16.1(7)). The evidence given by a child after a promise has the same legal effect as if it were taken under oath (section 16.1(8)) Elements of Testimonial Competence under s The competency provision of s of the Canada Evidence Act begins with the statement in s. 16.1(1) that children are presumed to have the capacity to testify, while s. 16.1(4) places a burden on the party who challenges the capacity of a child to satisfy the court that there is an issue as to the capacity of the child to understand and respond to questions. Subsection 16.1(4) might suggest that there is an onus on the party not calling the child as a witness (usually the accused) to raise the issue of competence. However, s. 16.1(5) also provides that if the judge is satisfied that there is an issue as to a child s capacity to understand and respond to questions, then before permitting the child to testify, the judge shall conduct an inquiry to determine whether the child is able to understand and respond to questions. Thus Bala et al. 6 argue that the words of s.16.1(5) allow the court itself or the party calling the child witness (usually the Crown) to also raise the issue of a child s competence, though the effect of ss. 16.1(1) and (4) is that there will be a presumption of competence at the inquiry. Under the test in s. 16.1(5) the focus is now on whether the child is able to understand and respond to questions, words that are similar to a part of the pre-2006 inquiry that focused on whether the child was able to communicate the evidence. Most significantly, however, s. 16.1(7) makes clear that unlike under the pre-2006 provision, there is to be no inquiry into the child s understanding of the meaning of such abstract concepts as truth, lie and promise. In R. v. Marquard, 7 McLachlin J. considered the interpretation of the phrase in the former s. 16 able to communicate the evidence, and held that testimonial competence includes: (1) the capacity to observe (including interpretation); (2) the capacity to recollect; and (3) the capacity to communicate (at ): The threshold is not a high one. What is required is the basic ability to perceive, remember and communicate. This established, deficiencies of perception and recollection of the events at issue may be dealt with as matters going to the weight of the evidence. 6 Bala et al., ibid. 7 (1993), 85 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 15

16 The former competence inquiry concerned the capacity of the child to communicate about past events in general. A child was required to be capable of giving more than yes or no responses to straightforward questions. 8 The courts also required that the child demonstrate an ability to distinguish between fact and fiction, and a capacity and a willingness to relate to the court the essence of what happened to her. 9 Bala et al. suggest that the new test requires that the same communication and memory criteria are to be satisfied, despite the change in wording, which now focuses on the ability to understand and respond to questions. 10 The issue is whether the child has the basic cognitive and language abilities, and sufficient social skills, to give meaningful answers to questions in the court setting. Whether a child witness is able to understand and respond to questions will be a matter for the judge to determine, and expert testimony will normally not be admissible about this issue. 11 In exceptional circumstances, where the child would be so traumatized by the experience of appearing in court even for the limited purpose of establishing the inability to understand and respond to questions, an expert might be called to establish that the child is not able to testify; if this is established to the satisfaction of the court, this may be a ground for establishing the necessity for the admission of hearsay evidence instead of having the child testify. Bala et al. 12 suggest that in practice the application of the current test the ability to understand and respond to questions is likely to be very similar to that part of the old inquiry which focused on the child s capacity to meaningfully communicate evidence in court. They argue that, as required by the Supreme Court in applying the provision in the former s. 16(1) in R. v. Marquard 13 there should be a relatively brief inquiry into whether the child has the capacity to remember events and answer questions about those events. The inquiry into the child s capacity should be conducted by having the judge or counsel ask the child questions about a noncontentious past event. In assessing the competence of children, it is important for judges to be mindful of the particularities of children s cognitive and language abilities at various stages of development. For example, in R. v. L.(D.O.), 14 L Heureux-Dubé J. observed:... social science data... makes clear that recollection decreases in accuracy with time... although children may have clear and accurate memories at the time of the occurrence, studies illustrate that children s memories may fade faster than those of adults. 8 R. v. Caron (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 466, at 471 (Ont. C.A.). 9 R. v. Parrott (2001), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.): expert testimony was not normally required even when the test was more complex. 10 Bala et al., supra, note Although see, for example, R. v. Sheridan, [2004] O.J. No (Ont. C.A.), leave denied [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 537 where the Ontario Court of Appeal found ample reason to doubt the reliability of the complainant s estimate of physical dimensions. She was 11 years at time of alleged event and 15 years at time of trial. 12 Bala et al., supra, note Supra, note [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 1985 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C) (QL) at

17 Likewise, McLachlin J. noted in R. v. W.(R.) 15 that since children may experience the world differently from adults, it is hardly surprising that details important to adults, like time and place, may be missing from their recollection. Wilson J., in R. v. B.(G.), 16 held that while children may not be able to recount precise details and communicate the when and where of an event with exactitude, this does not mean that they have misconceived what happened to them and who did it. 17 Therefore, a competence inquiry which focuses on abstract concepts or expects a child to be able to provide detailed information about past events may not fairly assess the child s basic ability to understand and respond to questions. The test now simply requires that a child be able to cognitively process a question and to verbally respond to that question. Of course, if a party has not raised the issue of competence, and the court itself is not satisfied there is an issue, a competence inquiry will not be held at all. In R. v. Prue, 18 Bovard J. noted the presumption of competence in section 16.1(1) and explained the process that he followed with an 11-year-old complainant who had learning disabilities and could not remember the name of his school or what grade he was in at first (i.e., during the qualification process). Out of an abundance of caution, I questioned him on various things such as his schooling, his friends, what was the last movie that he went to see and other such matters. I found that he understood my questions and that his responses were coherent and reasonable. He demonstrated to my satisfaction that he could understand and respond to questions adequately and that his memory was fine. He promised to tell the truth, therefore I allowed him to testify. Later, while giving his evidence, he remembered that he was in grade six. Overall, the required capacity under the new section 16.1 is a more concrete and focused inquiry. The new test for child witnesses prohibits any questions regarding the meaning of such abstract concepts as truth, lie and promise during the competenecy inquiry for a child witness. In R. v. D.I., 19 the court ruled on whether to admit the hearsay statement of a 22-year-old woman with a mental age of 3 years. In holding that she was not competent to testify, the court found that she had not met the criteria required by s.16 of the Canada Evidence Act: she had no concept of truth or lies, nor the consequences of telling a lie. (For persons age 14 or older at the time of testifying, the old test of section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act continues to apply, and the court must be satisfied that the witness understands the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation. ) 15 (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 134 (S.C.C.). 16 (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 200 (S.C.C.). 17 R. v. Bannerman (1966), 55 W.W.R. No. 257 (Man. C.A.) (aff d [1966] S.C.R. v); see also in R. v. Ferguson (1996), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 342 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. F.(W.J.) (1999), 138 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Khan (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). 18 [2008] O.J. 644 (Ont. Ct. J.). 19 [2008] O.J (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 17

18 2.1.2 The Promise to Tell the Truth Section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act now requires that a child testify under a promise to tell the truth. Formerly, an inquiry was required as to every child s ability to testify under oath, resulting in an often unhelpful focus on a child s ability to understand the particular nature of an oath rather than on her ability to undertake to testify truthfully. 20 Under the previous s. 16, where the child was able to communicate the evidence but did not understand the nature of an oath, she could give unsworn testimony upon promising to tell the truth. It was held that this required an actual commitment to tell the truth; an inference was insufficient, 21 although the commitment could be articulated in a variety of ways. Subsection 16.1(7) now makes it clear that no questions are to be asked regarding the child s understanding of the nature of the promise to tell the truth as part of the competence inquiry. The present provision reflects the reality that children are often unable to articulate the meaning of such abstract concepts as truth and lie, even though they may well know the difference between the truth and a lie. Psychological research has established that there is no relationship between a child s ability to define truth and whether a child will tell the truth. 22 Given these findings, Parliament eliminated the possibility of any questioning of children about such abstract concepts as truth, lie or promise. As with adults who take the oath, a child who promises to tell the truth is to be accepted as having made a commitment to do so, though of course it is for the trier of fact to determine the veracity and reliability of the testimony. However, as further discussed below, in a number of cases, including R. v. J.S., 23 Metzger J., the court held that while a child cannot be questioned about his or her understanding of the meaning of the promise to tell the truth at the competence inquiry, counsel for the defence can question a child witness s understanding of truth-telling during cross-examination, with the answers possibly affecting the weight or credibility of the child s evidence, but not its admissibility. Prof. Lisa Dufraimont commented on the decision in R. v J.S., questioning whether, in light of the psychological research and the enactment of s. 16.1(7) there is any real value to having such questions posed in cross-examination R. v. Farley (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.). In this very close case the Ontario Court of Appeal went so far as to say that a proposed witness need not make an actual commitment to tell the truth before being allowed to testify under s.16(3). This approach appears to have conflicted with the clear wording of the old s.16(3). See also R. v. G.(C.W.) (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (B.C.C.A.) where the necessity of eliciting a promise is discussed. See also R. v. Rockey (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) and R. v. B.(R.J.), [2000] A.J. No. 363 (Alta. C.A.). 21 R. v. Peterson (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 739 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. M.(M.A.) (2001), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (B.C.C.A.) (application for leave to appeal denied [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 62 (S.C.C.). 22 See Nicholas Bala, Victoria Talwar, Kang Lee & R.C.L. Lindsay, A Legal & Psychological Critique of the Present Approach to the Assessment of the Competence of Child Witnesses (2000) 38(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal ; Talwar, Lee, Bala and Lindsay, Children s Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and its Relation to their Actual Behaviors: Implications for the Court Competence Examination (2002) 26 Law and Human Behavior ; Bala, Lee. Lindsay, Talwar, The Competency of Children to Testify: Psychological Research Informing Canadian Law Reform (2009),17 International Journal of Children s Rights 1-25; and Lyon, Malloy, Quas & Talwar, Coaching, Truth Induction and Young Children s False Allegations and False Denials (2008, forthcoming), Child Development. 23 [2007] B.C.J (S.C.). 24 Dufraimont, supra, note 4. 18

19 In R v. F.(J.), 25 [2006] A.J. No. 972 (Prov. Ct.) in a video-recorded interview that was admitted in evidence under s , the 7-year-old complainant was asked questions by a police interviewer about her understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie. The court accepted the child s testimony and convicted the accused, with Ho Prov. Ct. J. commenting (at para. 39): not being able to provide a satisfactory definition of the difference between a truth and a lie does not negate the ability of C.S. [the complainant] to provide reliable evidence to the court. Subsection 16.1(6) specifically requires a child to make a promise to tell the truth before testifying. Bala et al. 26 suggest that this is best done by having the child explicitly make the promise, but it should suffice to obtain an affirmative answer to the question: Do you promise to tell the truth? In the rare event that a child refuses to make the promise, then like an adult refusing to be sworn or to affirm, the witness should be precluded from testifying. 27 Section 16.1(8) now makes it clear that the fact that the child testifies on a promise rather than under oath does not mean the testimony should be afforded less weight, which position had been espoused by the courts prior to this amendment. However, it would seem that a judge still has the discretion to warn a jury about the dangers of convicting upon the basis of the unconfirmed and unsworn testimony of a child witness where warranted by the circumstances Conduct of the Competency Examination In R. v. Bannerman, 29 it was held that the inquiry should be conducted by the trial judge; the nature and number of the questions will depend on the particular circumstances of the child; the questions should be age appropriate and intelligible; and the appellate courts should defer to the discretion of the trial judge in determining competency unless that discretion has been manifestly abused. The Manitoba Court of Appeal also accepted that it was quite appropriate for Crown Counsel, a parent, or another person to prepare the child for testifying by providing instruction about the importance of truth telling in court before the child comes to court. In R. v. Ferguson, 30 Finch J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal reviewed the case law and also concluded that the court has a discretion to permit counsel to ask questions on the inquiry and the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities [2007] B.C.J (S.C.). 26 Bala et al., supra, note In R. v. Enuaraq, [2005] Nu.J. No. 6, 2005 NUCJ 6 (Nu. Ct. J.), the judge described the 13-year-old complainant in a sexual assault case as a frightened and reluctant witness. Her response to the question of whether she promised to tell the truth was: I don t know. The trial judge ruled that the girl had not satisfied the standard of the Evidence Act for a promise and she could not testify. 28 R. v. Bannerman (1966), 55 W.W.R. No. 257 (Man. C.A.) (aff d [1966] S.C.R. v); and R. v. Ferguson (1996), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 342 (B.C.C.A.). 29 (1966), 48 C.R. No. 110, 55 W.W.R. No. 257 (Man. C.A.); aff d [1966] S.C.R. v, 50 C.R. 76n, 57 W.W.R. 736n (S.C.C.). 30 Ferguson, supra, note See also R. v. F.(R.G.), [1997] 6 W.W.R. 273 (Alta. C.A.), at

20 The Ontario Court of Appeal held in R. v. Peterson 32 that who asks the relevant questions is of little importance, provided the inquiry is fairly conducted under the control of the trial judge. R. v. Leonard 33 and R. v. D.(R.R.) 34 provide examples of instances where the court held that it was appropriate to let the Crown prosecutor ask questions to the child owing to his/her familiarity with the child. If the child is young and appears intimidated or is having difficulty in communicating, it may be preferable to have counsel who has called the child lead this questioning. Similarly, the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. F.(R.G.) 35 held that a trial judge is mandated only to control the interrogation and not necessarily to conduct it. Bala et al. 36 argue that under the 2006 provision, if the issue of the child s competence to testify arises, it will generally be preferable for the trial judge to ask the child questions to ascertain the child s ability to respond to questions. If the judge asks the questions, this should tend to ensure an objective and optimal opportunity to assess the child s competence to answer questions both in examination-in-chief and on cross-examination. However, Bala et al. argue that the case law under the previous provision continues to apply, and that where a child is not responsive to the judge s questions, the trial judge may allow counsel who is calling the witness to ask the child questions that will establish the child s ability to understand and respond to questions. Before deciding whether to have counsel take the lead, however, the trial judge should invite comment from both counsel concerning the advisability of doing so. 37 In R. v. F.(R.G.), 38 the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the ability is to be assessed on the basis of age appropriate questions on matters about which the child might be familiar. The court stated as follows. Here, it was apparent that R.F. was able to understand questions and recall and relate details concerning her age, school and its location, so that a minimal ability to communicate was established. She also responded when prompted by the Court to reply with a yes or no when asked if she knew why she was in Court. The questions which appeared to render the child mute were focused on her own perception of her ability to hear and speak, and an explanation for her attendance in Court. In our view, those questions were unnecessarily complex as a basis for determining the testimonial competency of a 5 year-old child, and may explain her ensuing silence. The ability to communicate should be assessed on the basis of age-appropriate questions on matters about which the child might be familiar. The child s inability or reluctance to explain her attendance in Court is hardly surprising... These comments should continue to be applicable to an inquiry into a child s ability to understand questions and respond to them under the present s [1996] 106 C.C.C. (3d) 64 (Ont. C.A.). 33 [1990] O.J. No. 427 (Ont. C.A.). 34 [1989] 47 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Sask. C.A.). 35 [1997] 6 W.W.R. 273 (Alta. C.A.). 36 Bala et al., supra, note Supra, note 30, at Supra, note

21 2.1.4 Constitutionality of Section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act Given the low standard and simple process for establishing the competence of child witnesses under the new s. 16.1, it is understandable that there is very little reported case law dealing with its interpretation or application. Almost all of the reported cases that mention this provision deal with its constitutionality, and all of these cases have held that it is constitutionally valid. A Charter challenge to s of the Canada Evidence Act was rejected by Antifaev Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. S.(M.) 39 in a case involving proposed testimony by a 4-year-old child. The court held that the accused s right to a fair trial was not affected by the legislative reform. The court noted that social science research establishes that children s ability to answer questions about such abstract concepts as truth and promise is not related to whether or not they will in fact tell the truth. The court accepted that while children cannot be asked questions about their understanding of the nature of a promise as a precondition of being allowed to testify, they may still be asked questions about this later in their testimony, with a witness, with their answers going to the weight of their testimony rather than its admissibility. The court observed:...even a gentle cross-examination will be sufficient to disclose that a child who is mature enough to understand and respond to questions may still not have understood and accepted the duty to tell the truth. The question really is not whether the child understands the duty of telling the truth or can articulate that duty, but whether the child is in fact telling the truth. The court noted that with very young witnesses with limited verbal abilities and memory, there may be a need for caution in relying on their evidence. Antifaev Prov. Ct. J. observed that an apparent lack of knowledge of the concepts of truth and falsity and the duty to speak the truth will bring a heightened need for caution. However, she concluded that this need for caution if the child cannot demonstrate an understanding of the duty to speak the truth in cross-examination does not render the child s testimony inadmissible, but only affects its weight. In R. v. S.(M) the defence also argued that because the accused was a young person, he was entitled to more procedural fairness with regards to s of the Canada Evidence Act than would be afforded an adult in his position. The defence argued that the Youth Criminal Justice Act s. 3 required a higher degree of procedural protection, and consequently a competence hearing should be held before determining that the child witness, who was age 4 at the time, was competent to testify. Judge Antifaev rejected this argument, observing that there was no case cited where it was accepted that a youth charged with an offence is entitled to any more favorable interpretation of a law of general application than an adult who was similarly charged. In R. v. Persaud, 40 the court also upheld the constitutional validity of s of the Canada Evidence Act, with Epstein J. noting that the objective of Bill C-2 as a whole was to enhance the participation of and respect for, children in the justice system. She also observed that the accused is still afforded a full right to cross-examine a child, including asking questions at that 39 Unreported Aug. 31, 2006 (Port Coquitlam, File. No. 7740). 40 [2007] O.J. 432 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 21