SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R. [2010] 4 S.C.R. 299

Transcription

1 [2010] 4 S..R SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. (ivil ppeal No of 2009) RURY 25, 2010* [R.V. RVNRN N K. S. RKRISNN, JJ.] Service Law: eneral Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scales and Other onditions of Service of evelopment Staff) mendment Scheme 2003: Special Voluntary Retirement Package Para 5, lauses (3), (4) and (5) mployees opting for the Scheme Later withdrawing the option mployer, accepting the offer, relieved the employees L: Where the voluntary retirement is governed by a contractual scheme, as contrasted from a statutory scheme, the principle of contract relating to offer and acceptance will apply and consequently the letter of voluntary retirement will be considered as an offer by the employee and therefore any time before its acceptance, the employee could withdraw the offer ut where the voluntary retirement is under a statutory scheme which categorically bars the employee from withdrawing the option once exercised, the terms of the statutory scheme will prevail over the general principles of contract In the instant case, the Special Voluntary Retirement Package being a part of the mendment Scheme 2003 framed by the entral overnment in exercise of the powers u/s.17 of the eneral Insurance usiness (Nationalisation) ct 1972, is a delegated legislation and statutory in character The validity of the said statutory scheme has been upheld by this ourt* (with reference to other provisions of the ct) onsequently, the *. Judgment recd on provisions of the Scheme will prevail over the provisions of ontract ct or any other law or any principle of contract, and having regard to the binding nature of the scheme, the employees, upon exercising the option, cannot withdraw from the same Paragraph 5(4) of the Special Voluntary Retirement Package categorically states that a evelopment Officer shall not be eligible to withdraw the option once made for the Special Voluntary Retirement Package Thus, the general principle of contract that an offer could be withdrawn any time before its acceptance stands excluded lauses (3) and (5) of Para 5 deal with the question as to whether the retirement, in pursuance of option exercised by the employee, will come into effect without acceptance by the employer These clauses have no bearing on the issue whether the employee can withdraw from the exercise of option and cannot be interpreted as giving an option to the employee to withdraw the option once exercised Principles laid down in the decision in Swarnakar** xplained eneral Insurance usiness (Nationalisation) ct 1972 s. 17- elegated Legislation ontract. [para 6,7,8,9 and 12] alram upta vs. Union of India 1987 SR 1173 = 1987 (Supp) S 228; Punjab National ank vs. P.K. Mittal 1989 (1) SR 612 = 1989 Supp (2) S 175; Union of India vs. Wg.omdr. T. Parthasarathy 2000 (4) Suppl. SR 531 = 2001 (1) S 158, relied on. *National Insurance o.ltd. v. eneral Insurance evelopment Officers ssociation 2008 (5) SR 1087 = 2008 (5) S 472; Kishan Prakash Sharma v. Union of India 2001 (5) S 212; and Union of India vs. opal handra Misra 1978 (3) SR 12 = 1978 (2) S 301, referred to. **ank of India vs. Swaranakar & Ors (5) Suppl. SR 438 = (2003) 2 S 721, explained. ase Law Reference: 2002 (5) Suppl. SR 438 referred to para 4

2 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R (5 ) SR 1087 relied on para (5) S 212 relied on para (3) SR 12 referred to para SR 1173 relied on para (1) SR 612 relied on para (4) Suppl. relied on para 7.4 SR 531 IVIL PPLLT JURISITION : ivil ppeal No of rom the Judgment & Order dated of the igh ourt of Judicature at Jabalpur, ench at Indore in Writ Petition No. 880 of Jaideep upta, inesh Mathur, Nishant Menon, Saurabh Jain, r. Ramesh handra Mishra for the ppellant. R. Santhan Krishanan, Praveen Pandey,. Mahesh abu for the Respondents. The Order of the ourt was delivered by O R R R.V. RVNRN, J. 1. The respondents were working as evelopment Officers under the appellant - New India ssurance o. Ltd. Section 17 of the eneral Insurance usiness (Nationalisation) ct, 1972 ( the ct, for short) inserted by the mendment ct 3 of 1985 empowered the entral overnment to regulate, by issue of notifications, the pay scales and other terms and conditions of service of officers and other employees of the appellant by framing one or more schemes and by adding, amending or varying any scheme. In exercise of the powers under Section 17 of the said ct, the entral overnment framed a Scheme by Notification dated to amend the eneral Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scales and Other onditions of Service of evelopment Staff) Scheme, Paragraph 15- inserted by the said mendment Scheme of 2003 gave a special option to the evelopment Officers of the appellant, to opt within 60 days of commencement of the said mendment Scheme: (a) for Special Voluntary Retirement Package as per nnexure 1 appended thereto; or (b) to render his services as evelopment Officer (dministration) under paragraph 21, as per nnexure II thereto. Sub-para (2) of the said Para 15- provided that a evelopment Officer, who does not exercise either of the options, under sub-para (1) within the stipulated period of sixty days, shall continue to render services as such under the eneral Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scales and Other onditions of Service of evelopment Staff) mendment Scheme, nnexure-1 appended to the mendment Scheme of 2003 contained the Special Voluntary Retirement Package ( SVRP for short). Para (1) of SVRP specified the eligibility criteria. Para (2) thereof prescribed the ex-gratia amount and lause (3) prescribed the other benefits, which a evelopment Officer seeking SVRP will be entitled. Para 5 thereof laid down the eneral onditions of the Scheme and lauses (3), (4) and (5) of para 5 which are relevant for our purpose are extracted below: (3) The mere request of such evelopment Officer seeking Special Voluntary Retirement Package shall not take effect unless it is accepted in writing by the ompany. (4) evelopment Officer shall not be eligible to withdraw the option once made for Special Voluntary Retirement Package. (5) The ompany shall have absolute discretion either to accept or reject the request of a evelopment Officer seeking Special Voluntary Retirement Package

3 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. [R.V. RVNRN, J.] SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. depending upon the requirement of the ompany. The reasons for rejection of request of a evelopment Officer seeking Special Voluntary Retirement Package shall be recorded in writing by the ompany. cceptance or rejection of the request of a evelopment Officer seeking Special Voluntary Retirement Package shall be communicated to him in writing. (emphasis supplied) 3. Respondents 1 and 2 on opted for the Special Voluntary Retirement Package. The Regional Office of appellant informed the ivisional Office at Indore by letter dated that in view of several writ petitions challenging the provisions of the mendment Scheme, the ead Office had instructed that it will not be possible to relieve all the opting evelopment Officers with effect from The respondents were, accordingly informed on This was followed by a circular dated issued by the appellant stating that status quo should be maintained in regard to evelopment Officers who have opted for Special Voluntary Retirement Package. On , the respondents requested the appellant to extend the scheme and give more time for exercising the option under the Scheme, and if that was not possible, then treat the option earlier exercised by them on as withdrawn as till that day ( ) there was no communication from the appellant regarding acceptance of the voluntary retirement. 4. On , the appellant relieved the respondents from the services of the ompany stating that the competent authority has accepted the voluntary retirement of the respondents. The respondents sent a letter dated stating that they should be permitted to continue in service until a fresh option was given. The appellant, by letter dated , informed the respondents that they cannot withdraw from the option already given. This was followed by letter dated wherein the appellant reiterated that the respondents were relieved on in view of the acceptance by the competent authority, of the option exercised by the respondents to retire from service. eeling aggrieved, the respondents filed a writ petition seeking a direction to the appellant to reinstate them in the post of evelopment Officer. The said writ petition was allowed by the Madhya Pradesh igh ourt by order dated , purporting to follow the decision of this ourt in ank of India vs. Swaranakar & Ors., (2003) 2 S 721. It held that the SVRP ontained in the mendment Scheme of 2003 was not a statutory scheme, but was contractual in nature; that the option exercised by the respondents to retire voluntarily in terms of SVRP was merely an offer by the respondents, and that before the acceptance of the request of respondents by the appellant, the respondents could withdraw their offer; and that as respondents had already withdrawn their offers on , there was no occasion for the appellant to accept their offers. The said decision is challenged in this appeal. 5. The contentions urged give rise to the question whether a evelopment Officer who exercises the option under the mendment Scheme of 2003, seeking the Special Voluntary Retirement Package, could withdraw the same before its acceptance. 6. The Special Voluntary Retirement Package was a part of the eneral Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scales and Other onditions of Service of evelopment Staff) mendment Scheme 2003 framed by the entral overnment in exercise of the powers in Section 17 of the eneral Insurance usiness (Nationalisation) ct The said Scheme is a delegated Legislation which is statutory in character. The validity of the said statutory scheme has been upheld by this ourt (with reference to other provisions in the Scheme) in National Insurance o.ltd. v. eneral Insurance evelopment Officers ssociation 2008 (5) S 472 following Kishan Prakash Sharma v. Union of India 2001 (5) S 212. Paragraph 5(4)

4 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. [R.V. RVNRN, J.] of the Special Voluntary Retirement Package categorically states that a evelopment Officer shall not be eligible to withdraw the option once made for the Special Voluntary Retirement Package. 7. It is true that the principles of ontract Law relating to offer and acceptance enables the person making the offer to withdraw the offer any time before its acceptance; and that any subsequent acceptance of the offer by the offeree, after such withdrawal, will not result in a binding contract. Where the voluntary retirement is governed by a contractual scheme, as contrasted from a statutory scheme, the said principle of ontract will apply and consequently the letter of voluntary retirement will be considered as an offer by the employee and therefore any time before its acceptance, the employee could withdraw the offer. ut the said general principle of ontract will be inapplicable where the voluntary retirement is under a statutory scheme which categorically bars the employee, from withdrawing the option once exercised. The terms of the statutory scheme will prevail over the general principles of contract. This distinction has been recognized by a series of decisions of this ourt. We may refer to a few of them : (7.1.) In Union of India vs. opal handra Misra 1978 (2) S 301, a onstitution ench of this ourt held : It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a prospective resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the officetenure of the resignor. In the case of a overnment servant/or functionary who cannot under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/ or office-tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. competent authority. [emphasis supplied] (7.2.) In alram upta vs. Union of India 1987 (Supp) S 228, this ourt held that independent of any statutory Rules, an employee who gives notice of voluntary retirement to take effect prospectively from a subsequent date, is at liberty to withdraw his notice of voluntary retirement, any time before it comes into effect. ut this normal rule would not apply, where having regard to the statutory Rules governing the matter, the employee cannot withdraw except with the approval of an authority. ut such approval can not be the ipse dixit of the approving authority. e should act reasonably and rationally. e cannot keep the matter pending for unduly long time, nor can he discriminate in dealing with applications of employees similarly situated. (7.3.) In Punjab National ank vs. P.K. Mittal 1989 Supp (2) S 175, this ourt held : The result of the above interpretation is that the employee continued to be in service till pril 21, 1986 or June 30, 1986, on which date his services would have come normally to an end in terms of his letter dated January 21, ut, by that time, he had exercised his right to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was written before the resignation became effective, the resignation stands withdrawn, with the result that the respondent continues to be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation. It is, however, not necessary that there should be any such specific rule. Until the resignation becomes effective on the terms of the letter read with Regulation 20, it is open to the employee, on general principles, to withdraw his letter of resignation. That is why, in some cases of public services, this right of withdrawal is also made subject to the permission of

5 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. [R.V. RVNRN, J.] the employer. There is no such clause here. [emphasis supplied] (7.4.) In Union of India vs. Wg.omdr. T. Parthasarathy 2001 (1) S 158, this ourt held : So far as the case in hand is concerned, nothing in the form of any statutory rules or any provision of any ct has been brought to our notice which could be said to impede or deny this right of the appellants. On the other hand, not only the acceptance of the request by the eadquarters, the appropriate uthority was said to have been made only on , a day after the respondent withdrew his request for pre-mature retirement but even such acceptance in this case was to be effective from a future date namely onsequently, it could not be legitimately contended by the appellants that there was any cessation of the relationship of master and servant between the epartment and the respondent at any rate before While that be the position inevitably the respondent had a right and was entitled to withdraw or revoke his request earlier made before it ever really and effectively became effective. [emphasis supplied] 8. In this case the statutory scheme contains a specific provision that a evelopment Officer shall not be eligible to withdraw the option once made for Special Voluntary Retirement Package. In view of the said statutory provision, the general principle of contract that an offer could be withdrawn any time before its acceptance stands excluded. 9. Let us now consider whether lauses (3) and (5) of Paragraph 5 of the Scheme have any relevance to the issue. lause (3) provides that when an employee exercises an option seeking Special Voluntary Retirement Package, it will not take effect unless it is accepted in writing by the employer ompany SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. lause (5) provides that the employer shall have the discretion either to accept or reject the request made by the evelopment Officer. The effect of these clauses is that voluntary retirement will not take effect unless it is accepted in writing by the employer. Where the employee exercises an option to retire from a future date, unless and until it is accepted in writing by the employer, the evelopment Officer will continue to be the employee, even after the date mentioned as the date of retirement. Similarly, where the employer rejects the request of the employee, the employer will continue as an employee, in spite of his exercise of option to retire. Neither lause (3) nor lause (5) can be interpreted as giving an option to the employee to withdraw the option once exercised. lauses (3) and (5) of Para 5 deal with the question as to whether the retirement, in pursuance of option exercised by the employee, will come into effect without acceptance by the employer. These clauses have no bearing on the issue whether the employee can withdraw from the exercise of option. 10. The igh ourt proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the voluntary retirement package was not part of any statutory scheme, but was contractual in nature and therefore the general principles of contract will apply. The reliance placed by the igh ourt upon the decision of this ourt in Swarnakar, to assume that every scheme for voluntary retirement is always contractual and not statutory, is misconceived. 11. detailed reference to the decision in Swarnakar is necessary, to clear the misconception under which the igh ourt has proceeded. The said decision related to VRS Schemes floated by Nationalised anks and the State ank of India. The VRS schemes of Nationalized anks contained a provision (Para 10.5) that it will not be open for an employee to withdraw the request made for voluntary retirement under the scheme, after having exercised such option. The scheme of State ank of India was slightly different as it permitted

6 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. [R.V. RVNRN, J.] withdrawal of the application before a given date and also contained a provision laying down the mode and manner in which applications for voluntary retirement should be considered, which created an enforceable right in the employee if State ank of India failed to adhere to its preferred policy. The Punjab & aryana igh ourt held the VRS Scheme of the Nationalised anks was not a valid piece of subordinate legislation. The other igh ourts, on the other hand, held that the lause 10.5 of the voluntary retirement scheme which barred an employee from withdrawing the request for voluntary retirement after having exercised the option was not operative as the employee had an indefeasible right to withdraw his offer before it was accepted. The decisions of the Punjab & aryana igh ourt as also of the other igh ourts were challenged by various anks including State ank of India and they were disposed of by the said common judgment. (11.1.) This ourt at the outset noticed that there was a difference in the scheme floated by the State ank of India and the schemes framed by the Nationalised anks. This ourt held that the schemes of the Nationalised anks were introduced by a circular dated with the purpose of downsizing the number of employees and that the terms and conditions of service of the employees of Nationalized anks (except in the matter of pension) were not statutory in nature and the VRS schemes of the Nationalised anks were floated by way of contract and did not have any statutory flavour. onsequently, it was held that the provisions of the Indian ontract ct, 1872 would apply to the VRS schemes of the Nationalised anks. This ourt also held that the scheme being an invitation to offer and not an offer by the anks, the employee made an offer when exercising the option, and he can withdraw the offer any time before it was accepted by the employer. This ourt further held that lause 10.5 of the scheme barring employee from withdrawing the request for the voluntary retirement was an agreement without consideration and was therefore not valid. This ourt observed that once it was found that by giving their SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. option under the Scheme, the employees did not derive an enforceable right, in the absence of any consideration, the term would be void in terms of Section 2(g) of the ontract ct as opposed to an enforceable agreement in terms of Section 2(h) of that ct. This ourt further therefore concluded that once the application filed by the employees is held to be an offer, Section 5 of the ontract ct would come into play, in the absence of any other independent binding contract or statute or statutory Rules to the contrary. (11.2.) In so far as the scheme of State ank of India, this ourt held that the terms and conditions of service of its employees were governed by statutory Rules and the scheme was also statutory in nature; that the provisions of the Scheme would show that there was some consideration for the employee agreeing not to withdraw the voluntary retirement and consequently the scheme would be binding. s a result this ourt allowed the appeals of the State ank of India but dismissed the appeals of the Nationalised anks except in cases where employees have accepted a part of the benefit under the scheme. (11.3.) The effect of the decision in Swarnakar can be summarized thus : (i) If a contractual scheme provides that the voluntary retirement by exercise of option by the employee, will come into effect only on its acceptance by the employer, it will not create any enforceable right in the employee to claim SV retirement. ny term in such a scheme that the employee shall not withdraw from the option once exercised, will be an agreement without consideration and therefore, invalid. onsequently, the employee can withdraw the offer (that is option exercised) before its acceptance. ut if the contractual scheme gives the option to an employee to voluntarily retire in terms of the scheme and if there is no condition that it will be effective only on acceptance by the employer, the scheme gives an

7 NW INI SSURN O. LT. v. RUVIR SIN NRN & NR. [R.V. RVNRN, J.] enforceable right to the employee to retire, by exercising his option. In such a situation, a provision in the contractual scheme that the employee will not be entitled to withdraw the option once made, will be valid and binding and consequently, an employee will not be entitled to withdraw from the option exercised. (ii) Where the scheme is statutory in character, its terms will prevail over the general principles of contracts and the provision of the ontract ct. urther, there will be no question of any consideration for the condition in the Scheme that the employee will not withdraw from the option exercised. Subject to any challenge to the validity of the scheme itself, the terms of the statutory scheme will be binding on the employees concerned, and once the option is exercised by an employee to voluntary retire in terms of the Retirement Package contained in the Scheme, the employee will not be entitled to withdraw from the exercise of the option, if there is a bar against such withdrawal SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. appellant). Sub-section (6) of Section 17 provides that the provision of Section 17 and of any scheme framed under it shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any agreement award or other instrument for the time being in force. Therefore the scheme is statutory in character. onsequently, the provisions of the Scheme will prevail over the provisions of ontract ct or any other law or any principle of contract, and having regard to the binding nature of the scheme, the employee upon exercising the option, cannot withdraw from the same. 13. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the igh ourt and dismiss the Writ Petition filed by the respondents before the igh ourt. R.P. ppeal allowed. 12. The question therefore is whether lause 4 of Para 5 of the SVRS contained in the mendment Scheme of 2003 is void and whether Section 5 of the ontract ct which enables the person making the offer, to withdraw the offer, any time before its acceptance, would apply. The special voluntary retirement package is a part of the eneral Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scales and Other onditions of Service of evelopment Staff) mendment Scheme, 2003, made by the entral overnment in exercise of the power under Section 17 of the eneral Insurance usiness Insurance (Nationalisation) ct, Section 17, as noticed above, authorizes and empowers the entral overnment, to frame, by notification published in the official gazette, one or more schemes for regulating the pay scales and other terms and conditions of service of officers and other employees of the orporation or of any acquiring company (including the

8 [2010] 4 S..R SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. RVINRN v. STT Y Y. SUPRIN. O POLI, MRS (riminal ppeal Nos of 2003) MR 25, 2010 [R. MUKUNKM SRM N.L. TTU, JJ.] Penal ode, 1860: ss. 120-, 420/120-, 477/120- and s.5(1)(d)/5(2) of Prevention of orruption ct Interpolation and forgery in permit for palmolein oil onviction by trial court, affirmed by igh ourt L: There is no evidence on record to indicate any link to prove and establish that the interpolation and forgery was done by any of the accused persons namely, 1, 2 or 4 Only because 4 is the brother of 3, it does not in any manner prove and establish that he had knowledge that the permit was interpolated when he had presented it before the office of the ederation In the considered opinion of the ourt, the interpolation as also the initials appended thereto have not been proved and established to be in the hand of 2 and 1 The prosecution has miserably failed to prove and establish that the alleged interpolation and forgery was done by either 1, 2 or 4 Since -3 died pending appeal, riminal ppeal Nos of 2003 stand abated ll the other appeals are allowed, the orders of conviction and sentences passed against each of the accused persons set aside batement of appeal ode of riminal Procedure, 1973 s.394(2), proviso Prevention of orruption ct, 1947 ss.5(1)(d)/5(2) Pondicherry ssential ommodities (isplay of Stocks, Price and Maintenance of ccounts) Order, 1975 lause 4(9) ssential ommodities ct, 1955 s.7(1)(a)(ii). [para 13, 15-17] 313 Rahim Khan vs. Khurshid hmed and Others (1974) 2 S 660; and Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh IR 1980 S 531, referred to. ode of riminal Procedure, 1973: s.394(2), proviso pplication by legal representatives for leave to continue the appeal on death of accusedappellant llowed. ase Law Reference: (1974) 2 S 660 referred to para 14 IR 1980 S 531 referred to para 14 RIMINL PPLLT JURISITION : riminal ppeal No of rom the Judgment & Order dated of the igh ourt of Judicature at Madras in rl ppeal No. 220 of 1994 & 222 of WIT rl.. No , , , & of R. Venkatarmani,.K.R. Lenin Sekar, ljo, R. Nedumaran, Shivaji M. Jadhav, rvind Kumar, Senthil Jagadeesan, V. Ramasubramanian for the ppellant. P.P. Malhotra, S, M. hatterjee, P.K. ey,. eb Kumar, rvind Kumar Sharma for the Respondent. The following Order of the ourt was delivered O R R 1. ll these appeals involve similar and connected facts. Since, the legal issues that arise for our consideration are also

9 RVINRN v. STT Y Y. SUPRIN. O POLI, MRS SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. similar, we proceed to dispose of all these appeals by this common judgment and order. sentence passed against him. It has been stated that he has served out the sentence awarded to him. 2. efore we delve into the facts of the case, it would be appropriate for us to deal with the miscellaneous applications that have been filed in this ourt and also the statement of the learned counsel for the appellant in riminal ppeal Nos of riminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos to 6394 of 2010 in riminal ppeal Nos of 2003 and riminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos of 2010 in riminal ppeal Nos of 2003 are applications filed by the legal representatives of the accused No. 1 namely, Kumaraguru seeking for substitution of their names in place of the deceased appellant-accused No. 1. uring the pendency of the appeals in this ourt, appellant-accused No. 1 died on 9th pril, The present applications have therefore been filed by his legal representatives seeking for substitution of their names in place of the deceased appellant accused No. 1. In support of the aforesaid prayer, the legal representatives of the deceased appellant-accused No. 1 have relied upon the provisions of Section 394 of the riminal Procedure ode, or the reasons stated in the said applications, the applications are allowed. The names of the applicants who are the legal representatives of the deceased-appellant accused No. 1 are, thus, allowed to be brought on record. The said applications stand disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order. 4. It is pointed out that during the pendency of the appeals in this ourt, accused No. 3 namely, Tamizhselvan who was the owner of shop No. 18 had died. In that view of the matter, so far as the appeals against accused No. 3 are concerned, i.e. riminal ppeal Nos of 2003, they stand abated. The same are dismissed, accordingly. The owner of shop No. 30, Kandasamy, accused No. 3 in the first appeal has not filed any appeal in this ourt against the order of conviction and 5. rief facts, which are necessary to dispose of the present appeals, are that the appellants herein were charged under the provisions of Section 120-, Section 420 read with Section 120, Section 477 read with Section 120 IP and under Section 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of orruption ct, 1947 in SLP... No. 1 of In.. No. 3 of 1985, charges were framed against the appellants herein under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry ssential ommodities (isplay of Stocks, Price and Maintenance of ccounts) Order, 1975 read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the ssential ommodities ct, The case of the prosecution is that the appellants herein, i.e., accused Nos. 1 and 2 prepared the permit for issuance of palmolein oil and the counter foil thereof was retained in the office. oth the aforesaid permits and the counter foil were in the handwriting of accused No. 2 which are also initialed and signed by 1 and 2. Subsequently, however, in the permit it was detected that there was interpolation and forgery in respect of shop No. 30. One of such permits indicates that the palmolein oil was meant to be issued in favour of Shop No. 38. The counter foil retained in the office indicates that it was meant to be issued and was in fact issued in favour of shop No. 38 but in the permit, it was detected later on that the same was converted and interpolated as shop No. 30. elivery of the palmolein oil was also taken on behalf of shop No In view of the aforesaid interpolation and forgery in the said documents, two separate cases were registered under the aforesaid provisions. fter submission of the charge-sheet, trial was conducted and a number of witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 to P.W. 19 were examined and several documents were also placed on record which were marked as xhibits P1 to P ll the accused were examined under Section 313 of the ode of riminal Procedure and on conclusion of the trial, the trial ourt, in Spl... No. 1 of 1985, convicted all the

10 RVINRN v. STT Y Y. SUPRIN. O POLI, MRS accused persons namely 1-3 for an offence under Section 120 IP and sentenced each to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and also convicted them under Section 420 read with Section 120 IP and sentenced each of them to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to undergo one month simple imprisonment. The accused persons were further also convicted under Section 477 read with Section 120 IP and sentenced each to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. Ravichandran, 2 and 1 were also convicted under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of orruption ct, 1947 read with Section 120 IP and sentenced each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Kandasamy 3 was convicted under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of orruption ct, 1947 read with Section 109 IP and sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/ -, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. ll the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 8. With respect to Spl... No. 3 of 1985, accused Nos. 1 and 2 were convicted under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry ssential ommodities (isplay of Stock, Prices and Maintenance of ccounts) Order 1975 read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the ssential ommodities ct, 1955 read with Section 109 of I.P.. and sentenced each to undergo R.I. for 6 months. ccused No. 3 was convicted under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry ssential ommodities (isplay of Stocks, Prices and Maintenance of ccounts) Order 1975 read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of ssential ommodities ct, 1955 and he was sentenced to undergo R.I. for 6 months. 9. ggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the trial ourt, the appellants preferred four separate appeals. Two appeals being.. Nos. 181 and 184 of 1994 were filed by accused No. 1. The other two appeals being SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. Nos. 220 and 222 of 1994 were filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3 jointly. The igh ourt by its judgment and order dated dismissed all the appeals. 10. ggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentences, the appellants before us filed the appeals which were entertained. ll the appeals have been listed for hearing and we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 11. ounsel for the appellants have submitted before us that the judgments are required to be set aside as none of the accused persons could be said to be guilty of the offences alleged against them. It is pointed out that although the aforesaid permit as also the counter foil were prepared by accused No. 2 and were signed by both the accused no. 2 and accused No. 1, yet there is no conclusive proof that the interpolation and forgery was done by both the accused persons. It was also pointed out during the course of arguments by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that so far as accused No. 3 is concerned, he died during the pendency of the present appeals and he did not file any appeal himself before the ourt. So far as accused No. 4 is concerned, counsel appearing on his behalf has drawn our attention to the fact that although he is the brother of 3 there is no evidence to show that he in fact knew that the aforesaid permit which was delivered by him in the office of the ederation was in any manner interpolated or forged. 12. Mr. P.P. Malhotra, the dditional Solicitor eneral of India appearing for the respondent-i tried to contend that it is the concurrent finding of facts of the two ourts below and therefore, the findings should not and cannot be interfered with by this ourt. e also submitted that the findings on record fully prove and establish the guilt of the two accused persons and that there is enough material on record to show that the documents in question were forged at least with the knowledge and consent of the accused persons and therefore, the

11 RVINRN v. STT Y Y. SUPRIN. O POLI, MRS conviction and sentences passed against them are legal and valid SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. any, in proof of circulation of the printed handbills by the returned candidate, or with his consent. 13. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, we have considered the entire record of the case. We have carefully scrutinised the evidence adduced in the present cases. fter going through the same, we are of the considered opinion that there is no evidence on record to indicate any link to prove and establish that the interpolation and forgery was done by any of the accused persons namely, 1, 2 or 4. Only because 4 is the brother of 3 does not in any manner prove and establish that he had knowledge that the permit was interpolated when he had presented it before the office of the ederation. 14. In order to prove that the interpolation and the forgery was done by 1 and 2, the prosecution has led evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 6 who have stated that they knew the handwriting, signatures, initials and mode of writing the figures of 1 and 2. efore we deal with the testimony of P.W. 3 and P.W. 6 on the point of handwriting, signatures, initials of the accused persons, we wish to refer to two judgments of this ourt. In Rahim Khan vs. Khurshid hmed and Others [(1974) 2 S 660], this ourt held as follows: 39. There is also oral evidence identifying the signature of the returned candidate on xhibits P3 and PW 11/1, particularly in the deposition of abib, PW 23. e has not spoken to his familiarity with the handwriting of the appellant. Opinion evidence is hearsay and becomes relevant only if the condition laid down in Section 47 of the vidence ct is first proved. There is some conflict of judicial opinion on this matter, but we need not resolve it here, because, although there is close resemblance between the signature of Rahim Khan on admitted documents and that in xhibits P3 and PW 11/1, we do not wish to hazard a conclusion based on dubious evidence or lay comparison of signatures by ourts. In these circumstances, we have to search for other evidence, if In Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [IR 1980 S 531], this ourt held as under:- 11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law, that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. ut, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. ll other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this ourt are often flaunted. 15. P.W. 6 stated in his examination-in-chief that he knew the accused persons, viz., 1 to 3 and that 2 was working in ivil Supplies Inspector s Office in the rank of U and that he had earlier worked with him in the inance epartment. P.W. 6 has however, nowhere stated in the examination-inchief that the present instance of interpolation or forgery was in the hand of 2. In the cross-examination, P.W. 6 stated that although he had worked along with 2 in the inance epartment, but he was working in a different Section of the epartment. e has clearly stated that he was working in the udget Section called 1 whereas 2 was working in the Motor onveyance Section called 2 Section. It has also been

12 RVINRN v. STT Y Y. SUPRIN. O POLI, MRS 321 [2010] 4 S..R. 322 brought to our notice that in the cross-examination, it was said that the files dealt by 2 and 2 Section in the inance epartment never came to the 1 Section where P.W. 6 was working. Therefore, in our considered opinion the interpolation as also the initials appended thereto have not been proved and established to be in the hand of 2 and In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove and establish that the alleged interpolation and forgery was done by either 1, 2 or s earlier noted by us, riminal ppeal Nos of 2003 stand abated. We allow all the other appeals and set aside the orders of conviction and sentences passed against each of the accused persons. R.P. 18. The bail bonds stand discharged. ppeals allowed. UNION O INI & NR. v..s. SIU (ivil ppeal No of 2005) MR 31, 2010 [MRKNY KTJU N.K. PTNIK, JJ.] Service Law: isability pension Officer joined Indian rmy through Short Service ommission on Injured at high altitude field posting on Released from service on or disability pension period taken into account only from to L: igh ourt has rightly held that for the purposes of qualifying service for disability pension, the entire period of commissioned service rendered by the officer from to has to be taken into account rrears with 8% interest per annum will be paid to the respondent within three months rmed orces Military. rmed orces: rmy Officers and army-men oncern shown by ourt that they should be treated in a better and more humane manner by governmental authorities particularly in respect of their emoluments, pension and other benefits Service Law isability pension. IVIL PPLLT JURISITION : ivil ppeal No of rom the Judgment & Order dated of the igh ourt of Punjab and aryana at handigarh in ivil Writ Petition No of Parag P. Tripathi, S, rti upta, Kunal ahri and nil Katiyar for the ppellants. 322

13 UNION O INI & NR. v..s. SIU SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. Susmita Lal (N.P.) for the Respondent. The following Order of the ourt was delivered by ORR 1. eard Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, learned ddl. Solicitor eneral appearing for the appellants. 2. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent today. 3. This appeal by special leave is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated of the ivision ench of the igh ourt of Punjab & aryana whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent herein (writ petitioner before the igh ourt) has been allowed and the appellants herein (respondents before the igh ourt) have been directed to count the entire period of full pay commissioned service of the respondent from to as qualifying service and calculate his disability pension in accordance with pension scales as on and give him all other benefits l therefrom. 4. The facts in detail have been given in the impugned judgment and order. ence, we are not repeating the same here. 5. The question involved in this appeal is whether the full pay commissioned service rendered by the respondent herein from to is to be counted as qualifying service by the Union of India for the purpose of granting disability pension to the respondent. 6. The respondent herein was an officer in the Indian rmy who was given a short service commission on short service commission is given for 5 years and can be extended by another 5 years only. e was posted at a high altitude field area and while on duty on , he met with an accident and suffered severe injuries. s a result of the accident, respondent's right arm had to be amputated. e also suffered a compound fracture of the femur (thigh bone) and fracture of the mandible (jaw bone). e was released from service of rmy on or his disability pension, the period taken into account by the rmy authorities was only from to ggrieved by the said decision of the rmy authorities, the respondent filed a writ petition before the igh ourt which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order. ence, the appellants are in appeal before us. 7. We have gone through the impugned judgment and order and we are in full agreement with the ivision ench of the igh ourt that for the purposes of qualifying service for disability pension the entire period of commissioned service rendered by the respondent from to has to be taken into account. ccordingly, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the igh ourt. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to the costs. rrears with 8% interest per annum will be paid to the respondent within three months. 8. efore parting with this case, we regret to say that the army officers and army men in our country are being treated in a shabby manner by the government. In this case, the respondent, who was posted at a high altitude field area and met with an accident during discharge of his duties, was granted a meager pension as stated in nnexure-p3 to this appeal. This is a pittance (about Rs. 1000/- per month plus..). If this is the manner in which the army personnel are treated, it can only be said that it is extremely unfortunate. The army personnel are bravely defending the country even at the cost of their lives and we feel that they should be treated in a better and more humane manner by the governmental authorities, particularly, in respect of their emoluments, pension and other benefits. R.P. ppeal dismissed.

14 [2010] 4 S..R SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. M/S MRUTI LN OL & POWRS LT. v. LOK NIM & NR. (Interlocutory pplication No. 3 of 2009 (In SLP() No of 2006) MR 31, 2010 [K.. LKRISNN, JI., J.M. PNL N R..S. UN, JJ.] petition for special leave to appeal filed by the petitioner before the Supreme ourt, interim order staying the construction was vacated. Since the petitioner had installed the machineries and the coal washery was set up but as supply of coal was not started, the petitioner filed the instant application seeking a direction to the SL to start supply of coal and issue Transit Passes/ elivery Orders through the washery of the petitioner. Partly allowing the application, the ourt Interim Orders: Interlocutory application or issuance of interim directions to South astern oal ield Ltd. (SL) to start supply of coal and issue Transit Passes/elivery Orders through washery of petitioner on behalf of linked and other customers based on instructions/requests from them llowed It is clarified that grant of this interim relief will be subject of the result of the title suit pending in the igh ourt It is also clarified that if the issue of title is decided in favour of SL, it would be open to the said company to lease the land to the petitioner or to take other steps in accordance with law oal oal washery. lease deed dated for a period of 99 years was executed in favour of the petitioner-ompany by the State overnment through the State Industrial evelopment orporation, with regard to certain lands to enable the petitioner to set up a coal washery thereon. Subsequently, M/s. South astern oal ield Ltd. (SL) claiming title to the said land, filed a suit. writ petition was also filed before the igh ourt to prevent the petitioner from setting up the coal washery on the ground that the land allotted was the forest land. The igh ourt passed an interim order in the writ petition allowing the petitioner to continue the construction of the building but restraining it from installing the machineries. In the 325 L: 1. The building constructed and the machineries installed have remained unused since long causing great financial loss to the petitioner-company. It is relevant to notice that as on date, there is no order subsisting, which restrains the petitioner from operating the washery in question. The assertion made by the petitioner that it has received all necessary approvals for running the washery including the approval from the Ministry of nvironment, lectricity epartment, ommercial Tax epartment, licence under the actories ct etc. is not disputed by any of the respondents. [Para 8] [333--] 2. M/s SL is hereby directed to start supply of coal and issue Transit Passes/elivery Orders through the washery of the petitioner on behalf of linked and other customers based on instructions/requests from them. It is clarified that the grant of this interim relief will be subject to the result of ivil Suit No. 1- of 2008 pending in the igh ourt. It is also clarified that if the issue of title is held in favour of M/s SL, it would be open to the said company to lease the land to the petitioner-company or to take other steps with reference to the said land in accordance with law. [Para 9] [333-, ] T.N. odavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 5 S 28, cited.

15 MRUTI LN OL & POWRS LT. v. LOK NIM & NR. ase Law Reference: (2006) 5 S 28 cited para 2 IVIL PPLLT JURISITION : Interlocutory pplication Nos. 3 of IN SLP (ivil) No of rom the Judgment & Order dated of the igh ourt of hhattisgarh at ilaspur in WP () No of Mukul Rohtagi, Ranjit Kumar, Vikas Singh, jit Kumar Sinha, Saurav Kirpal, yush garwal, (for Suresh. Shroff & o.), nurag Sharma, Sanjeev K.hardwaj, (for R.. Kaushik), mbhoj Kumar Sinha, shwarya Sinha, Swetabh Sinha for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the ourt was delivered by J.M. PNL, J. 1. y filing this Interlocutory pplication, M/s. Maruti lean oal & Power Limited which has established a coal washery of 10 M.T.Y. capacity on Khasra Nos.850/30, 850/24, 850/31, 850/28, 850/27 and 850/32 of Village Ratija, istrict Korba leased by the State of hhattisgarh through hhattisgarh State Industrial evelopment orporation ( SI for short), has prayed to direct M/s. South astern oal ield Limited ( SL for short) to start supply of coal immediately and issue Transit Passes/elivery Orders through the washery of the petitioner on behalf of linked and other customers on instructions/requests from all such customers/ purchasers of coal. 2. In order to understand the scope and ambit of the prayer made by the petitioner, it would be relevant to notice certain facts. M/s. Maruti lean oal & Power Limited is a company registered under the provisions of the ompanies ct. It applied for the allotment of about 15 hectares (37.91 acres) of land of village Nawagaon Khurd (now Ratija), istrict Korba, ( the land for short) for setting up a oal eneficiation Plant with a SUPRM OURT RPORTS [2010] 4 S..R. capacity to wash 10 million tons of coal per annum. The land demanded was adjacent to already existing two coal washeries one of which was set up by ST-LI in which one ryan oal eneficiation Pvt. Ltd. has 26% holdings and another oal Washery set up belongs to ryan itself. The officials of the Revenue, orest and Industry epartments of the State conducted a thorough inspection of the land demanded by the petitioner. fter being satisfied that the land demanded was not forest land and requirements of environmental laws were complied with by the petitioner, the officials recommended to the State to allot the land to the petitioner. Pursuant to the said recommendation, a lease deed dated ecember 5, 2002 for a period of 99 years was executed in favour of the petitioner by the State of hhattisgarh through SI. The purpose for which the lease deed was executed was to enable the petitioner to set up a coal washery. Pursuant to the said lease deed, the petitioner was put in possession of the land. owever, subsequently, SL claimed title to the land and alleged that the land did not belong to the State overnment and, therefore, could not have been leased by the State to the petitioner. In March/pril 2003, one Mr..L. Wadhera, a public spirited citizen instituted WP () No.1264/2003 before the igh ourt of hhattisgarh at ilaspur to prevent the petitioner from setting up its coal washery on the land allotted to it by the State overnment on the ground that the land allotted were forest land. The igh ourt, by an ex parte order dated pril 24, 2003, directed the petitioner to maintain status quo regarding the land allotted to it and not to cut trees standing on the land till further orders. In view of the dispute pertaining to the title of the land between SL and the State overnment, the Union of India, vide letter dated May 7, 2003 sent through the Ministry of oal, gave the petitioner two options (1) to wait until title issue is decided; or (2) to proceed on the assumption that the title vests in SL and on that basis, to request the SL to allot the land to the petitioner. It was also mentioned in the said letter