SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL MINUTE ORDER

Transcription

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL MINUTE ORDER DATE: 04/07/2017 TIME: 08:30:00 AM DEPT: C-62 JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Ronald L. Styn CLERK: Kim Mulligan REPORTER/ERM: Stephanie Bryant CSR# BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: A. Riego CASE INIT.DATE: 07/28/2010 CASE TITLE: Herr vs. Apple Inc CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Business Tort EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) APPEARANCES Kevin F Quinn, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Michael I. Rott, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Eric M. Overholt, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Jarrett S. Charo, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Benjamin I. Siminou, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s). Purvi G. Patel, counsel, present for Defendant(s) The Court hears oral argument and CONFIRMS the tentative ruling as follows: The court addresses the evidentiary issues. Defendant Apple, Inc.'s evidentiary objections are all overruled. Plaintiff's evidentiary objections are all overruled. The court then rules as follows. Plaintiff's motion to modify class certification is granted as to Subclass 2 and denied as to Subclass 1. The court previously certified this matter as a class action, dividing the class into two subclasses: 1. Individuals who purchased an iphone 3G, iphone 3GS or an iphone 4 along with a wireless service bundle from defendant either online (using a California billing address) or through a retail store in California, from July 1, 2008 through November Individuals who purchased an iphone 3G, iphone 3GS or an iphone 4 along with a wireless service bundle from defendant either online (using a California billing address) or through a retail store in Page 1

2 California, from December 1, 2009 through the present. The class was divided into these two subclasses based on evidence that, starting in December, 2009, Apple added a disclaimer/disclosure regarding sales tax reimbursement on the sale of bundled iphones. Plaintiff now seeks to modify the class definitions as follows: 1) based on evidence that the disclaimer/disclosure was added by Apple in June, 2009 (not December, 2009), the time period for subclass 1 should commence on July 1, 2008 and run through June, 2009, and the time period for subclass 2 should commence in July, 2009, and 2) because Apple continued to release new iphones after 2009, subclass 2 should be modified to include the iphone 4S, 5, 5C, 5S, 6 and 6 Plus. Plaintiff also presents evidence that, as of November 13, 2014, Apple ceased selling bundled iphones, and Walmart ceased limiting sales-tax reimbursement to the bundled price of the iphone. Thus, Plaintiff also seeks to change the end date of subclass 2 to November 13, Plaintiff's proposed modified subclasses are as follows: 1. Individuals who purchased an iphone (iphone 3 or 3GS) with a wireless-service bundle between July 1, 2008, to June 2009, inclusive, either at an Apple Store in California or on Apple's online store using a California billing address. 2. Individuals who purchased an iphone (3G, 3GS, 4, 4S, 5, 5C, 5S, 6, or 6Plus) with a wireless-service bundle between July 2009 and November 13, 2014, inclusive, either at an Apple Store in California or on Apple's online store using a California billing address. In opposing Apple raises issues in addition to those related to Plaintiff's proposed modifications. In essence, Apple seeks not only denial of this motion, but decertification of this class action. The court addresses both the modifications Plaintiff proposes and the certification issues Apple raises. "The party seeking certification has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members." Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326. As stated in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, Drawing on the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and federal precedent, we have articulated clear requirements for the certification of a class. The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. (Code Civ. Proc., 382; Fireside Bank, at p. 1089, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 861, 155 P.3d 268; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27; City of San Jose, at p. 459, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.) "In turn, the 'community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.' " (Fireside Bank, at p. 1089, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 861, 155 P.3d 268, quoting Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23.) Brinker, 53 Cal.4th 1004, For the reasons set forth below, the court decertifies Subclass 1. Therefore, the court addresses these factors only with respect to Subclass 2. Page 2

3 Ascertainable Class "A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description." [Citations omitted.] "Ascertainability is achieved 'by defining the class in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts making the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.' " (Bomersheim v. Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1483, [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 832], quoting Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 915, [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 761] (Hicks ).) "Whether a class is ascertainable is determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members" at the remedial stage (Reyes v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1271, , 242 Cal.Rptr. 339 (Reyes ).) Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1290, See also, Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, Class Definition The court finds the Subclass 2 modified class definition sufficient to allow putative class members to identify themselves as having a right to recover based on the description. Apple argues Plaintiff lacks evidence to support a Subclass 2 period commencing prior to November 13, Apple relies on this court's previous ruling that, to prevail on her UCL and CLRA claims Plaintiff must prove that she "could have obtained an iphone for a lower price from another source" [Minute Order dated June 19, 2015]. Apple also relies on the Declaration of Nicholas Haverkamp who states that: "for at least a four-year period prior to November 13, 2014, Walmart charged customers in its California stores sales tax reimbursement for bundled iphone transactions based on the bundled (discounted), not the unbundled (retail), price of the iphone." Apple argues that Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence establishing Walmart engaged in the sale-tax reimbursement practice at issue prior to November 13, However, as Apple acknowledges, the Haverkamp declaration is "inconclusive" and does not state that Walmart began this practice only as of November 10, Rather the Haverkamp declaration states that "for at least a four-year period prior to November 13, 2014." Thus, the Haverkamp declaration leaves open the possibility that Walmart engaged in this practice prior to November 13, Apple offers no evidence to the contrary. The factual issue of when Plaintiff "could have obtained an iphone for a lower price from another source" is a merits issue not properly resolved on motion for class certification. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at Also, and significantly, this issue is subject to common proof. The court finds Plaintiff establishes sufficient basis for a start date of July 1, 2009 for Subclass 2. - Size of the Class The court previously determined that the class was sufficiently numerous. Based on the evidence presented, the size of the class has increased. The court finds the class is sufficiently numerous to allow for class treatment. - Means Available to Identify Class Members Based on evidence previously presented the court finds records maintained by Apple and/or third-party wireless carriers provide sufficient means to identify putative class members. Page 3

4 The court is not persuaded by Apple's arguments as to ascertainability. The fact that the subclasses include multiple iphone models does not defeat class certification. Plaintiff's claims are not premised on any aspect of the actual iphones purchased. Rather, Plaintiff's claims are based on Apple's alleged standard practice of failing to disclose to iphone purchasers that, instead of paying sales tax reimbursement on the lower cost of a bundled iphone, the purchaser would be paying sales tax reimbursement on the higher cost of an unbundled iphone [TAC 2, 3, 33, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 75, 76, 77, 88, 95, 130]. Apple's remaining arguments on the issue of ascertainability are similar to those Apple raises on the issue of commonality and are addressed below. Community of Interest The "community of interest" requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. The certification question is "essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious." A trial court ruling on a certification motion determines "whether... the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants." [Citations omitted.] Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, Predominant common questions of law or fact The court finds Plaintiff establishes that common questions predominate. The "ultimate question" the element of predominance presents is whether "the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants." (Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238, 102 Cal.Rptr. 1, 497 P.2d 225; accord, Sav On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194.) The answer hinges on "whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment." (Sav On, at p. 327, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194.) A court must examine the allegations of the complaint and supporting declarations (ibid.) and consider whether the legal and factual issues they present are such that their resolution in a single class proceeding would be both desirable and feasible. "As a general rule if the defendant's liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages." (Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 761; accord, Knapp v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 932, 941, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 565.) Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at The complaint alleges causes of action for Violation of Unfair Competition Laws for "Unlawful" Business Practice (B&P Code 17200), Violation of Unfair Competition Laws for "Fraudulent" Business Practice (B&P Code 17200), Violation of Unfair Competition Laws for "Unfair" Business Practice (B&P Code 17200) and Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act. All of these causes of action arise out of allegations that Apple failed to disclose to iphone purchasers that, instead of paying sales-tax reimbursement on the lower cost of a bundled iphone, the purchaser would be paying sales-tax Page 4

5 reimbursement on the higher cost of an unbundled iphone [TAC 2, 3, 33, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 75, 76, 77, 88, 95, 130]. The evidence before the court is that all putative class members were subject to the same practice. In the certification context, common issues may be present when a defendant's tortious acts, "allegedly are the same with regard to each plaintiff." Sav-On, 34 Cal.4th at 331 citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1107; Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355, 362. Plaintiff's theories and the evidence Plaintiff relies upon to establish liability are virtually identical as to all putative class members. Specifically, resolution of the issue of whether Apple was required to disclose to iphone purchasers that, instead of paying sales tax-reimbursement on the lower cost of a bundled iphone, the purchaser would be paying sales tax-reimbursement on the higher cost of an unbundled iphone are the same as to all putative class members. Similarly, resolution of the issue of whether the average consumer would find it material that he or she would be charged sales-tax reimbursement on the unbundled price of the iphone purchased (i.e., more than what would be charged on the bundled price of an iphone) is common to all putative class members. And, resolution of the issues of whether and when Apple provided a disclaimer/disclosure and whether the disclaimer/disclosure provided by Apple is/was sufficient is common to all putative class members. When issues such as these are susceptible to common proof, a finding of commonality is appropriate. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at The court finds common issues of law and fact predominate over individual issues. The court is not persuaded by the arguments Apple raises on commonality. Although Apple again raises issues of reliance and causation, once the undisclosed information is deemed material, reliance is presumed. With respect to UCL claims, In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 explains, a presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance arises wherever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material. [Citations.] A misrepresentation is judged to be 'material' if 'a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question' [citations], and as such materiality is generally a question of fact unless the 'fact misrepresented is so obviously unimportant that the jury could not reasonably find that a reasonable man would have been influenced by it.' [Citation.]" (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.(1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903.) In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th at 327. Causation under the CLRA is also an issue common to the class. "Causation as to each class member is commonly proved more likely than not by materiality. That showing will undoubtedly be conclusive as to most of the class. The fact a defendant may be able to defeat the showing of causation as to a few individual class members does not transform the common question into a multitude of individual ones; plaintiffs satisfy their burden of showing causation as to each by showing materiality as to all." (Blackie v. Barrack (9th Cir. 1975) 524 F.2d 891, 907, fn. 22.) Thus, "[i]t is sufficient for our present purposes to hold that if the trial court finds material misrepresentations were made to the class members, at least an inference of reliance would arise as to the entire class." (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 814 [94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964]; see also Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 355, 363 [134 Cal.Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750]; Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (2000) 332 N.J.Super. 31 [752 A.2d 807, 817] [finding causation in N-Pay case provable on classwide basis].) Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1282, See Page 5

6 also, In re Vioxx Class Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 116, 129. To the extent Apple again raises issues of materiality, the issue of whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the increased sales-tax reimbursement in deciding whether and where to purchase an iphone, is a merits-based question not properly resolved on a motion for class certification. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at These issues are also common to the class and do not defeat certification. Apple relies on differences in the language of the disclaimers/disclosures. However, the evidence Apple submits shows that the language of the sign advertisements, pricing web pages and in-store signs was virtually identical. While the language of the receipts varied, receipts, by definition, could only be read by a customer after the sale has taken place. Thus, the language on the receipts could have no effect on the reliance/causation analysis. Regardless, the court finds Plaintiff establishes the variations in the language of the pre-sale materials and receipts as minor and insufficient to defeat a finding of commonality. Apple also relies on evidence that Plaintiff did not see the disclaimers/disclosures. However, it is not necessary for Plaintiff to establish whether she or any of the putative class members read the disclaimers/disclosures. Under the authorities above, if Plaintiff is able to establish the materiality of the nondisclosures, reliance and causation are presumed. The issues Apple raises with respect to Plaintiff's knowledge of the applicable sales tax rate, and whether Plaintiff reviewed her receipts do not preclude a finding of commonality. Irrespective of whether Plaintiff or members of the class knew the applicable sales tax rate, and irrespective of whether they reviewed their receipts, as alleged, all members of the class who purchased an iphone in a bundled transaction were charged a sales-tax reimbursement on the price of an unbundled iphone. Issues relating to what consumers may or may not have done pre-purchase, and whether it was reasonable for a consumer to not check their receipt and to not inquire regarding the difference in sales-tax reimbursement immediately after the transaction, go to the merits of Plaintiff's claims and are not properly resolved on a motion for class certification. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at These issues are also common to the class and do not defeat certification. - Class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class The court finds Plaintiff's claims are typical of Subclass 2. "[I]t has never been the law in California that the class representative must have identical interests with the class members. The only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated. [Citation.]" B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 citing Classen v. Weller (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46. See also, Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 815. As discussed above, the court is not persuaded by Apple's arguments based on the fact that the subclasses include purchasers of multiple iphone models. Plaintiff's claims are not premised on any aspect of the actual iphones purchased. Rather, Plaintiff's claims are based on Apple's alleged standard practice of failing to disclose to iphone purchasers that, instead of paying sales-tax reimbursement on the lower cost of a bundled iphone, the purchaser would be paying sales- tax reimbursement on the higher cost of an unbundled iphone [TAC 2, 3, 33, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 75, 76, 77, 88, 95, 130]. To the extent Apple again relies on differences in the language of the Page 6

7 disclaimers/disclosures, as set forth above these differences do not defeat certification. Apple also argues that Plaintiff's alleged injury is not the same as or similar to that of other class members. However, the complaint is premised on class members being charged sales-tax reimbursement on the unbundled price. Thus, each putative class members' injury is calculated in the same fashion the difference between the sales-tax reimbursement on a bundled phone purchase and an unbundled phone purchase. As to subclass 2, the court finds Plaintiff's claims are substantially similar to those of the putative class members. Plaintiff purchased two bundled iphones, after July, 2009, and was charged a sales-tax reimbursement on the unbundled price of those iphones. Addressing another issue Apple raises, considering Plaintiffs' proposed modified class definition of Subclass 2, set forth above, Plaintiff is a member of the subclass [Subclass (2)] she seeks to represent. Apple also raises the issue of Plaintiff's ability to represent members of Subclass 1. Apple submits evidence that Plaintiff purchased her first iphone in January 2012, a date after July, 2009, when Apple added a disclaimer/disclosure regarding sales tax reimbursement on the sale of bundled iphones. In light of this evidence, the court previously found that Plaintiff's claims are not typical of Subclass 1 ("Individuals who purchased an iphone (iphone 3 or 3GS) with a wireless-service bundle between July 1, 2008, to June 2009, inclusive, either at an Apple Store in California or on Apple's online store using a California billing address"). The court continued the hearing on this motion to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to file supplemental papers on this issue. The court reviews Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Modify Class Certification and Apple's response. Plaintiff advances three arguments to establish Plaintiff's claims as typical of the class. Plaintiff argues that the claims of the "no disclosure" subclass (Subclass 1) are lesser-included claims of the "vague disclosure" subclass (Subclass 2). The court is not persuaded by this argument because it ignores the significance of the difference between the Subclass 1 claim based on the absence of a disclosure and the Subclass 2 claim based on an inadequate ("vague") disclaimer/disclosure. Plaintiff also relies on Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 89. Medrazo is distinguishable because the relevant circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's purchase of a Honda motorcycle were identical to the circumstances surround putative class members' purchase of Suzuki and Yamaha motorcycles none of the motorcycles had the required hanger tag disclosing the dealer-added costs. Thus, the fact that Honda provided the (deficient) hangar tags and Suzuki and Yamaha did not provide any hangar tags did not preclude a finding of typicality. The end result was the same none of the motorcycles had the requisite hanger tag disclosure. In contrast, purchasers of iphones prior to June, 2009 received no disclosure whereas purchases after June, 2009 received a disclaimer/disclosure. Medrazo, 166 Cal.App.4th at 99. The court finds the difference between no disclaimer/disclosure prior to June, 2009 and a ("vague") disclaimer/disclosure after June 2009, precludes a finding that Plaintiff's claims are typical of Subclass 1 (the "no disclosure" subclass). Plaintiff's final argument is that Plaintiff is a better representative of Subclass 1 than no representative at all. Plaintiff fails to provide any authority to support this argument. Significantly, this argument is contrary to California law. " 'The cases uniformly hold that a plaintiff seeking to maintain a class action must be a member of the class he claims to represent. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 874 [127 Cal.Rptr. 110, 544 P.2d 1310].) The class representative must be situated similarly to class members. (*664 Classen v. Weller (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46 [192 Cal.Rptr. 914].) "It is the fact that the class plaintiff's claims are typical and his representation of the class adequate which gives legitimacy to permitting him to bind class members who have notice of the action. [Citations.]" (Trotsky v. Los Page 7

8 Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 134, 146 [121 Cal.Rptr. 637].) Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, For the reasons set forth above, the court finds Plaintiff's claims are not typical of Subclass 1. Plaintiff does not request leave to amend to name an additional class representative. Under these circumstances, the court finds decertification of Subclass 1 appropriate. The court decertifies Subclass 1. - Class representatives who can adequately represent the class The court finds that Plaintiff establishes that she can adequately represent Subclass 2. "Adequacy of representation depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney is qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and the plaintiff's interests are not antagonistic to the interests of the class." [Citations omitted.] McGhee v. Bank of America (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450. As discussed above, Plaintiff's interests are co-extensive with those of the class. Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same sales tax reimbursement paid by members of the putative class. Based on Plaintiff's and Plaintiff's counsel's declarations, the court finds that Plaintiff can adequately represent the class and that Plaintiff's counsel is qualified to conduct the proposed litigation. Apple raises issues with respect to the evidence establishing Plaintiff's adequacy to represent the class. Given the procedural context of this motion, the absence of a declaration from Plaintiff on the issue of adequacy of representation is not dispositive. The issue of adequacy is reserved for motions for class certification/decertification. It was not until Apple sought decertification in its opposition papers that the Plaintiff's adequacy as a class representative became an issue. The court finds Plaintiff's counsel's declaration, reply declaration and the cited to deposition testimony of Plaintiff, sufficient to establish Plaintiff as an adequate class representative. Superiority of Class Action The court finds class treatment superior. By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation." (Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (2d Cir. 1968) 391 F.2d 555, 560.) Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469. See also, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, [Class certification is superior to individual litigation when certification allows many plaintiffs' claims to be adjudicated in a single proceeding, thereby saving time, conserving judicial resources and limiting duplication of effort.] Plaintiff sufficiently establish the benefit to class certification in this case. Each putative class members' individual claim is relatively small and, individual members may not have the ability or means to obtain redress. Any class member choosing to pursue litigation would bring a virtually identical action as other Page 8

9 class members arising out of the sales-tax reimbursement paid. Such duplicative actions are not conducive to judicial economy and efficiency. Plaintiff's B&P Code is specifically aimed at avoiding the alleged unjust enrichment of Apple. As stated in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, "consumer class actions and representative UCL actions serve important roles in the enforcement of consumers' rights. [They] make it economically feasible to sue when individual claims are too small to justify the expense of litigation, and thereby encourage attorneys to undertake private enforcement actions. Through the UCL a plaintiff may obtain restitution and/or injunctive relief against unfair or unlawful practices in order to protect the public and restore to the parties in interest money or property taken by means of unfair competition. These actions supplement the efforts of law enforcement and regulatory agencies. This court has repeatedly recognized the importance of these private enforcement efforts." (Id. at p. 126, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 999 P.2d 718, fn. omitted.) In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th at 313. In light of the common issues regarding the sales-tax reimbursement paid, the court finds Plaintiff establishes "by a preponderance of evidence that the class action proceeding is superior to alternate means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation." Sav-On, 34 Cal.4th at 332. Class Certification For the foregoing reasons, the court eliminates the two subclasses and modifies the class definition as follows: Individuals who purchased an iphone (3G, 3GS, 4, 4S, 5, 5C, 5S, 6, or 6Plus) with a wireless-service bundle between July 2009 and November 13, 2014, inclusive, either at an Apple Store in California or on Apple's online store using a California billing address. The Minute Order will be the final order of the court, and the parties shall not submit any further order on this motion. IT IS SO ORDERED. Judge Ronald L. Styn Page 9