SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL. IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974 Case No and. Before:

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1 The Tribunal s Order in respect of sanction is subject to appeal to the High Court (Administrative Court) by the Applicant, the Solicitors Regulation Authority. The Order remains in force pending the High Court s decision on the appeal. SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974 Case No BETWEEN: SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY Applicant and ALASTAIR JAMES THOMAS MAIN Respondent Before: Mr. R. Hegarty (in the chair) Mr P. Lewis Mrs L. McMahon-Hathway Date of Hearing: 23 January 2018 Appearances David Collins, Counsel of Capsticks Solicitors LLP, 1 St George s Road, Wimbledon, London SW19 4DR for the Applicant Peter Cadman, Solicitor Advocate of Russell-Cooke Solicitors, 8 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4BX for the Respondent JUDGMENT

2 2 Allegations 1. The allegations against the Respondent, Alastair James Thomas Main made by the Solicitors Regulation Authority were that: 1.1 By virtue of his convictions* for the events described in the Rule 5 Statement dated 9 August 2017 he: failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice and therefore breached Principle 1 of the SRA Principles 2011; failed to act with integrity and therefore breached Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011; and failed to behave in a way which maintains the trust public places in him and in the provision of legal services and therefore breached Principle 6 of the SRA Principles (* In the Rule 5 Statement the letter s was omitted in the word conviction and has been corrected in this judgment.) Documents 2. The Tribunal reviewed all the documents including: Applicant Rule 5 Statement dated 9 August 2017 with exhibits Applicant s statement of costs as at 9 August 2017 Applicant s statement of costs from 9 August January 2018 Respondent Respondent s Answer to the Rule 5 Statement dated 18 September 2017 drafted by Mr Peter Cadman Respondent s Statement dated 6 December 2017 with 3 references attached (in addition to those in the hearing bundle) from the Metropolitan Police to Mr Peter Cadman dated 18 October 2017 Respondent s Personal Financial Statement dated 16 December 2017 Additional documents considered by the Tribunal: Extract from the Solicitors Handbook 2017 (Gregory Treverton-Jones QC and Andrew Hopper QC), page 31 paragraph 3.9 Section 1(3)(d) of the Legal Services Act 2007 ( LSA ) Section 188 of the LSA Judgment in Tribunal Case No Olujinmi SRA Handbook Section B1 paragraph 5

3 3 Preliminary Issues 3. The Tribunal sought clarification in respect of the Certificate of Conviction. For the Applicant, Mr Collins explained that he relied on the document in the hearing bundle from South West London Magistrates Court headed Offences and results. For the Respondent, Mr Cadman informed the Tribunal that this document had been provided on behalf of the Respondent to the Applicant and that the Respondent accepted the convictions. 4. Mr Collins asked the permission of the Tribunal to amend the Rule 5 Statement at paragraph 3 to correct the last digit of the Respondent s SRA Number from 1 to 3. The Tribunal agreed. Factual Background 5. The Respondent was born in 1981 and admitted to the Roll of Solicitors in October The Respondent held a Practising Certificate free from conditions. 6. On 3 January 2017, the Respondent was tried and convicted of the following offences: On 16 December 2015 at London Rowing Club, Embankment Putney, SW15 1LB he intentionally touched a woman, OB. It was alleged that he touched her bottom and that touching was sexual when she did not consent and he did not reasonably believe that she was consenting. He therefore acted contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act On 16 February 2015 at London Rowing Club, Embankment Putney, SW15 1LB the Respondent assaulted OB by beating. It was alleged that he called OB an Australian Slut and then poured beer over her and the offence was racially aggravated within the terms of section 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act He therefore acted contrary to section 29(1)(c) and (3) of the Crime and Disorder Act On 26 January 2017, a Community Order was made. The Respondent was required to carry out unpaid work for 200 hours within the next 12 months. The work was to be completed by 25 January A Restraining Order was also made for the Respondent in the following terms: YOU ARE HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM (1) contacting [OB] directly or indirectly; (2) entering any premises occupied by [OB] for the time being as her usual place of residence; (3) entering any part of any premises where [OB] is employed for the time being whether that employment is paid, unpaid, full-time, part-time or is self-employed. 9. The Respondent was further ordered to pay the Victim Surcharge of and to pay Prosecution costs of 1, The Respondent was subject to the Notification Requirements of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 from 26 January 2017 for 5 years.

4 4 11. On 16 January 2017, the Applicant wrote to the Respondent and raised the allegations with him. 12. Mr Cadman acted as the Respondent s representative and provided a response to the allegations on 16 February Mr Cadman made further submissions on behalf of the Respondent on 19 May On 2 June 2017, an Authorised Officer of the Applicant decided to refer the Respondent s conduct to the Tribunal. Witnesses 14. There were no witnesses. Findings of fact and law 15. The Applicant was required to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. The Tribunal had due regard to the Respondent s rights to a fair trial and to respect for his private and family life under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 16. Allegation By virtue of his convictions for the events described in the Rule 5 Statement dated 9 August 2017 he: failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice and therefore breached Principle 1 of the SRA Principles 2011; failed to act with integrity and therefore breached Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011; and failed to behave in a way which maintains the trust public places in him and in the provision of legal services and therefore breached Principle 6 of the SRA Principles For the Applicant, Mr Collins submitted that the underlying facts of this case were not in dispute. (These are set out in the Factual Background above.) The criminal trial had attracted significant media interest. The Respondent accepted that he had breached Principle 2 and Principle 6 but disputed breaching Principle 1; whether he had breached Principle 1 was a matter for the Tribunal. As set out in the Rule 5 Statement, the Applicant maintained that by virtue of the convictions the Respondent failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. The obligation upon a solicitor to uphold the rule of law required them to refrain from criminal behaviour in both their private and their professional life. Mr Collins clarified for the Tribunal that he was not instructed to go so far as to say that any breach of the law by any solicitor was a breach of Principle 1 but that if there were serious criminal actions as in this case, Principle 1 would be engaged. It was a matter for the judgement of the Tribunal what constituted serious criminal actions but he suggested that the racially aggravated and sexual nature of the assaults in this case were serious.

5 For the Respondent, Mr Cadman submitted that the Principle referred not to a breach of the law but to failure to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. It was not asserted by the Applicant that the Respondent had failed to uphold the administration of justice. Mr Cadman suggested that in order to do so one would have to commit an offence such as perjury or backdating a statement for the court or making a false statement for the court. However he asserted that the Applicant always prosecuted on the basis of a breach of Principle 1 if a Respondent had been convicted of a criminal offence Upon retiring to consider the allegations, the Tribunal considered the evidence and the submissions for the Applicant and for the Respondent. Rule 15(2) of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2007 provided: A conviction for a criminal offence may be proved by the production of a certified copy of the certificate of conviction relating to the offence and proof of a conviction shall constitute evidence that the person in question was guilty of the offence. The findings of fact upon which that conviction was based shall be admissible as conclusive proof of those facts save in exceptional circumstances. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent did not dispute the fact of his convictions. The Respondent denied that his convictions constituted a breach of Principle 1 of the SRA Code of Conduct The Tribunal had careful regard to the wording of the Principle. It was not alleged that the Respondent had failed to uphold the proper administration of justice. The Tribunal noted particularly that Principle 1 did not refer to breaking the law which the Respondent had done. The Tribunal considered that the position was clearer where for example a solicitor submitted a witness statement to the court which he knew to be false; this would constitute a failure to uphold the rule of law and frustrate the administration of justice. The Solicitors Handbook 2017 edition (Gregory Treverton-Jones QC and Andrew Hopper QC) at paragraph 3.9 addressed Principle 1. It included: Somehow, along the way, the solicitor s duty to the court has become rephrased as a duty to uphold the rule of law and the administration of justice. Upholding the administration of justice could be said to equate to a duty to the court, though the latter is a specific duty and one of the professional principles set out in section 1(3)(d) of the LSA 2007, reinforced by section 188 of that Act. Upholding the rule of law may be said to be more controversial, and possibly a mistake. Upholding the rule of law is not the same as upholding the law or complying with the law (as it occasionally seems to be suggested in proceedings before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal; see for example SRA v Olujinmi 1 ). The rule of law is a constitutional principle (see section 1.1(b) of the LSA 2007) the basic concept of which is: SDT

6 6 that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the courts. 2 These are primarily obligations of the state, not of individuals. Section 1(3)(d) of the LSA 2007 stated: (3) The professional principles are (d) that persons who exercise before any court a right of audience, or conduct litigation in relation to proceedings in any court, by virtue of being authorised persons should comply with their duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice Section 188 of the LSA 2007 Duties of advocates and litigators stated: (1) This section applies to a person who (a) (b) exercises before any court a right of audience, or conducts litigation in relation to proceedings in any court, by virtue of being an authorised person in relation to the activity in question. (2) A person to whom this section applies has a duty to the court in question to act with independence in the interests of justice. (3) That duty, and the duty to comply with relevant conduct rules imposed on the person by section 176(1), override any obligations which the person may have (otherwise than under the criminal law) if they are inconsistent with them. (4) Relevant conduct rules are the conduct rules of the relevant authorising body which relate to the exercise of a right of audience or the conduct of litigation. (5) The relevant authorising body is (a) the approved regulator by which the person is authorised to exercise the right of audience or conduct the litigation, or 2 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, Penguin Books 2010

7 7 (b) where the person is authorised to exercise the right of audience or conduct the litigation by the Board in its capacity as a licensing authority, the Board The Tribunal resumed the hearing and invited the advocates to address it upon the meaning of Principle 1 having provided them with copies of the above extracts Mr Collins submitted that the while the contents of the Handbook were not binding and the Tribunal was right to consider it and it was for the Tribunal to decide if there had been a breach of Principle 1. The Applicant submitted that the Principle was engaged by the nature of the convictions. He also referred the Tribunal to the SRA Handbook paragraph 5 which stated: In relation to activities which fall outside practice, whether undertaken as a lawyer or in some other business or private capacity, Principles 1, 2 and 6 apply to you if you are a solicitor, REL or RFL. Mr Collins emphasised that Principle 1 expressly applied to the actions of solicitors both within and outside their practice which the Tribunal might think supported the Applicant s case. The Tribunal directed Mr Collins attention to paragraph 28 of the Olujinmi judgment: The Tribunal had found allegation 1.1(a) proved. This related to a failure to provide a breath test to the police. This was quite different from the case of SRA v Dudley [ ] to which the Respondent had referred the Tribunal. That case related to a drink-driving offence. Mr Collins submitted that he could not look into the mind of that particular division of the Tribunal Mr Cadman referred to paragraph 29 of the Tribunal judgment in Olujinmi which stated: The aggravating factors were that the Respondent s conduct had been deliberate in failing to give a breath test and had resulted in a criminal offence. The Respondent ought reasonably to have known that his conduct was in material breach of his obligation to protect the reputation of the legal profession which included behaving in a way to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. The point was that the state obliged an individual to provide a breath test and the Respondent in Olujinmi did not do so. Mr Cadman submitted that in order to breach Principle 1, the Respondent needed to have failed to uphold both the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. However if the Tribunal took the view that the two elements could not be severed the fact remained that what the Respondent had done was not a breach of the rule of law but a breach of the law. He had been asked to attend the police station and voluntarily did so; there was a long period until he was summonsed and then he attended; he disputed the interpretation of his motivation but he accepted that he had been convicted and he had complied with the Community Order.

8 In respect of allegation 1.1.1, the Tribunal had regard to the submissions made for the Applicant and for the Respondent in respect of the meaning of Principle 1. It also took into account the part of the SRA Handbook to which its attention had been drawn and agreed that Principle 1 could extend to activities falling outside a solicitor s practice. It had also had regard to the Solicitor s Handbook and to the authorities to which it referred. The Tribunal determined that the origins of Principle 1 went back to a solicitor s duty to the court and the Tribunal did not consider that this principle was designed to cover non-compliance with the law, rather than upholding the rule of law AND (emphasis added) the administration of justice. The Tribunal considered the earlier Tribunal case of Olujinmi. It was not in any way bound by that decision which was based on totally different facts but this Tribunal agreed with that earlier division when it distinguished the Olujinmi case from that of Dudley. In the former there had been a failure to uphold the rule of law and the administration of justice by way of the failure to provide a breath test whereas in the latter there had been a breach of the law by way of driving with excess alcohol. The Tribunal considered that the Respondent in the current case had breached the law by way of the conduct which resulted in his convictions but that he had not behaved in a way which failed to uphold the rule of law and the administration of justice. The Tribunal found breach of Principle 1 not proved and therefore found that allegation was not proved on the evidence to the required standard In respect of allegation and 1.1.3, having considered the evidence, the Tribunal determined that that by virtue of his convictions the Respondent had failed to act with integrity and therefore breached Principle 2 (allegation 1.1.2) and that he had failed to behave in a way which maintained the trust the public placed in him and in the provision of legal services and he therefore breached Principle 6 (allegation 1.1.3). Accordingly the Tribunal found both allegations and proved on the evidence to the required standard; indeed both the allegations were admitted. Previous Disciplinary Matters 17. None. Mitigation 18. Mr Cadman submitted that the Respondent had been convicted in January 2017 in respect of events which had occurred in December He had been a man of good character before that date. Mr Cadman referred the Tribunal to an from the Metropolitan Police dated 18 October 2017 responding to an from Mr Cadman. The import of the response was that an active risk management system assessment had been carried out in respect of the Respondent on 26 September 2017 and he had been assessed at the lowest risk category. The Respondent was not considered to be at risk of committing a further sexual assault. He had been charged in the summer of 2016 and had admitted the facts. The only dispute was about the sexual and racial aggravation aspect of the charges. The District Judge had made a finding against him in that respect. The Respondent maintained his factual position but accepted the Judge s decision. He had appealed against the length of the community penalty. The Community Order was completed within four months of the date of sentence which Mr Cadman submitted showed the Respondent s approach to the matter. Mr Cadman also referred the Tribunal to the testimonials submitted for the Respondent which

9 9 included references from two former female work colleagues and stated that what had occurred was out of character. The case had been subject to media coverage from the first day as was reflected from pages 25 to 87 of the hearing bundle. The media coverage was a fact but Mr Cadman submitted it should not be treated as an aggravating feature and that the Tribunal should deal with the matter based on what the Respondent had done in December 2015 and what should happen as a result. The Tribunal s role was not to punish the Respondent; the Criminal Courts took on that role. The Tribunal s obligation to protect the public was not therefore engaged by this case as there was no risk of repetition and no risk to the public. Mr Cadman acknowledged that the reputation of the profession was engaged; this was a matter where a solicitor had behaved in a way that led to criminal convictions, a community penalty and media coverage. However the Respondent had engaged with the Applicant; he self-reported to the Applicant that he had been charged and Mr Cadman s firm had kept the Applicant informed at all stages of the case. The Respondent had been convicted over a year ago and the matter had taken a year to come to the Tribunal. The Respondent did not cause that delay. The criminal process had been delayed because the Respondent had pleaded not guilty and a trial had taken place. Because the media coverage included the name of the Respondent s employers he had been dismissed summarily without notice when he returned to work the day following the trial. He had received excellent reports during his employment and had been headhunted for that job. The Respondent had not worked as a solicitor since his convictions. He had sought help from a recruitment agency whose view was that it was very unlikely that he could obtain employment in the area of law to which he wished to return while the Tribunal proceedings were on-going as no employer would take the risk because of the media coverage. The Respondent was awaiting the outcome of this proceeding before returning to the recruitment agency. 19. In respect of sanction, Mr Cadman submitted that there was nothing in the Tribunal s Guidance Note on Sanctions which could assist although it referred to criminal convictions. Mr Cadman understood that it was the approach of regulatory Tribunals to consider possible sanctions from the least serious upwards but he would approach the issue the other way. He suggested that the protection of the reputation of the profession did not require interference in the Respondent s right to practise. Because of the 12 month delay between the date of conviction and this hearing the Respondent had effectively already been subject to a 12 month suspension. Mr Cadman asked the Tribunal to accept that if the public knew all about the Respondent, the events and his career before those events, what happened subsequently and the fact that he had not previously been before the Tribunal, together with the reaction of his former female work colleagues and the low risk of repetition of the conduct, the public would not expect such a sanction. Having regard to a fine, the Respondent had already spent what small savings he had on defending the criminal charge and paying the penalties imposed. Mr Cadman suggested that the Tribunal could properly consider a reprimand. Mr Cadman had been unable to find a comparable Tribunal case where the only issue was the reputation of the profession in the eyes of the public knowing all the facts of the case. 20. The Tribunal invited submissions in respect of the compatibility of the Respondent practising as a member of the profession while he was on the Sex Offenders Register. Mr Cadman responded that this was the reason for the Respondent having appealed against the length of the Community Order. A penalty of 12 months duration

10 10 automatically resulted in a requirement that the Respondent comply with the notification requirements of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for a period of five years. The purpose of the appeal had been to persuade the Crown Court to reduce that period to 11 months, three weeks and five days but the appeal was unsuccessful. The requirement did not reflect the Magistrates Court having taken a view that the Respondent presented a risk for five years. 21. Mr Collins submitted that the case of Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v GDC & Fleischmann [2005] EWHC 87 (Admin) held that where a registered professional had been convicted of a serious criminal offence and was still serving their sentence, normally the Tribunal should not allow them to practise unrestricted until the sentence had concluded. It was a matter for the Tribunal to determine whether the case was sufficiently serious to engage the Fleischmann principle and whether the period that the Respondent was obliged to remain on the Sex Offenders Register was engaged in this case. Mr Cadman clarified for the Tribunal that the Respondent was only subject to notification requirements by virtue of signing the Register. The Tribunal pointed out that he was also subject to restrictions in respect of the complainant but noted that no Sexual Harm Prevention Order had been put in place. Mr Cadman commented that it was open to the District Judge to have made such an order if she had thought it appropriate but she had not done so. Sanction 22. The Tribunal had regard to its Guidance Note on Sanctions, to the mitigation which had been offered and to the testimonials submitted for the Respondent. Having regard to the seriousness of the misconduct, the Tribunal determined that the Respondent had been fully culpable for what had occurred. The fact that he was intoxicated did not reduce his culpability, indeed in a criminal court it would be regarded as an aggravating factor. The Respondent had direct control of, and responsibility for the circumstances giving rise to the misconduct. His actions were spontaneous rather than planned. His level of experience as a solicitor was irrelevant to what had occurred. There had certainly been harm caused to the person who was subjected to the assault. The Tribunal could infer that there was a considerable level of harm from the admitted facts; she had been assaulted verbally, physically and sexually and racially. The Tribunal also had to take into account the adverse impact of the misconduct on the legal profession arising out of the resultant publicity. The Respondent had departed to a considerable extent from the complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness expected of a solicitor, with the consequent harm to the reputation of the profession. The extent of that harm might reasonably have been foreseen by the Respondent. There were aggravating factors present. The misconduct involved the commission of a criminal offence and the offence had been found to have a racial and sexual element which exacerbated the seriousness of the misconduct. It was deliberate and repeated in that the Respondent continued his assault, pursuing the complainant into the women s cloakroom to do so. The Respondent ought reasonably to have known that the conduct complained of was in material breach of his obligations to protect the public and the reputation of the legal profession. In terms of mitigating factors, the Respondent voluntarily notified the Applicant when he was charged and the Applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the matter thereafter by his solicitors. The Tribunal noted that this was an isolated episode in a previously

11 11 unblemished career. Having regard to the extent of the Respondent s insight into his misconduct, he still maintained that what he had done was not sexually or racially motivated and he had displayed considerable remorse although the Tribunal considered that this related rather more to his own position than to the impact on the other person. However he accepted that he had been convicted of two criminal offences and had completed his Community Order. He had also cooperated fully with the Applicant. 23. Having regard to sanction, the Tribunal took into account that the Respondent had already been punished by the Criminal Courts and that its role in this matter was to consider the protection of the public and the maintenance of the reputation of the profession. Breaches of 2 of the 3 Principles alleged had been admitted and found proved against him. The position of the complainant had been protected by means of an order of the Criminal Court and the police had assessed that there was a low risk of any repetition of the misconduct. The Tribunal did not consider that protection of the general public was an on-going issue. In terms of maintaining the reputation of the profession, the Tribunal felt this matter was far too serious for either no order or a reprimand and was also too serious for a fine. The conduct merited some interference with the Respondent s ability to practise. Public confidence in the legal profession demanded no lesser sanction than suspension but the Tribunal did not consider that the protection of the reputation of the legal profession justified striking off the Roll. The Tribunal considered whether it was necessary and/or appropriate for a fixed period of suspension to coincide exactly with the requirement for the Respondent to remain on the Sex Offenders Register. The Tribunal had in mind that the Respondent had appealed unsuccessfully against the length of his Community Order which in turn automatically generated the period of his registration however it felt that in all the circumstances a period of suspension which would have to be for around 4 years would be longer than was merited; there was no evidence that the Respondent continued to present any kind of risk to the general public and the Criminal Court had not chosen to impose any additional restriction orders upon him aside from that in respect of the complainant. The Respondent had effectively been unable to practise from the date of his summary dismissal from his last position as a solicitor which occurred on 4 January 2017, the day following his conviction. He had taken a lower paid job outside the legal profession in order to contribute to the support of his young family. The Tribunal determined that it would be appropriate to suspend the Respondent until the expiry of a two-year period from the date he had ceased to practise, that is up to and including 4 January Costs 24. Mr Collins applied for costs in the sum of 4,780. He submitted that the aspect of the allegation which had not been found proved, had not involved significant additional costs in the prosecution. Mr Cadman submitted that this was probably as straightforward a case as had been brought before the Tribunal. It was a conviction case. The Respondent had self-reported and then his solicitors had kept the Applicant informed throughout the matter. It was the Respondent who provided the Applicant with the Certificate of Conviction which was before the Tribunal. Accordingly Mr Cadman submitted that costs in the amount applied for, were excessive. He acknowledged that costs should fall on the Respondent but submitted that he had raised with the Applicant from the very early days of the matter that the allegation in

12 12 respect of Principle 1 should not have been proceeded with on the facts and that taking that aspect of the allegation forward involved additional time both in terms of submissions and for the Tribunal. The Respondent had not worked as a solicitor since his dismissal which had occurred as soon as his employers saw their name in the press reports and he might not be able to seek further work in the profession dependent on the Tribunal s decision about sanction. Mr Cadman submitted that costs should only fall on the Respondent in respect of the aspects of the allegation which had been proved. He also submitted that there was an issue about the 1, which the Applicant claimed as at 9 August 2017 relating to costs incurred before the proceedings were issued in the Tribunal. Mr Cadman reminded that Tribunal that someone had spent time copying pages 25 to 86 of the bundle which comprised press reports of the criminal proceedings. (He had earlier pointed out that the pages had not been trimmed to remove other irrelevant press reports.) The Tribunal had before it the Respondent s Personal Financial Statement and Mr Cadman asked the Tribunal to take into account his financial circumstances. The Tribunal reviewed both the cost schedules and considered that generally there had been significant duplication of work between Capsticks and the Applicant. Mr Cadman and the Respondent had supplied the Applicant with most of the information that it needed including the Certificate of Conviction. There appeared to be a great deal of copying of media coverage from the Internet which the Tribunal considered excessive. The Tribunal considered that the time which would have needed to prepare and submit the case to the Tribunal for issue of proceedings would have amounted to no more than 4 hours (at 130 per hour for the Applicant) totalling 520. In respect of costs incurred from 9 August 2017 to 23 January 2018, the Tribunal considered that the amount claimed for Capsticks to prepare and present the matter for hearing claimed at 2,420 should be reduced to 1,300 plus VAT of 260 that is approximately 10 hours work. The Tribunal therefore made an order for costs in favour of the Applicant in the amount of 2,080. The Tribunal reviewed the Respondent s financial position and bearing in mind that the Applicant was often open to making an arrangement about terms for payment of costs and that the Tribunal had assessed costs in a considerably reduced amount for other reasons, it was not appropriate to make any further reduction by reference to the Respondent s means or because one aspect of the allegation was not found proved. Statement of Full Order 25. The Tribunal Ordered that the Respondent, Alastair James Thomas Main, solicitor, be suspended from practice as a solicitor for the period up to and including 4 January 2019 to commence on the 23 January 2018 and it further Ordered that he do pay the costs of and incidental to this application and enquiry fixed in the sum of 2, Dated this 30 th day of January 2018 On behalf of the Tribunal R. Hegarty Chairman