Share of LGU in National Taxes o. Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 366 SCRA 201 (2000)

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1 VI. General Welfare Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil 486 US v Pompeya, 31 Phil 245 US v Salaveria, 39 Phil 102 City of Manila v. Oallugna, GR 15350, 30 Sep 1960 People v Gabriel, 43 Phil 641 Pelino v. Ichon, 69 Phil 81 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators v Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 182 Rivera v Campbell, 34 Phil 348 Dela Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 Balacuit v CFI 163 SCRA 182 Magtajas v Pryce Property Corp. 234 SCRA 255 Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No , Sept 11, Chua Huat vs. CA, 199 SCRA 1 (1991) Tatel vs Mun. of Virac 207 SCRA 157 (1992) Bayan vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 227 (April 25, 2006) VII. Nuisance a. Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs. CA, 199 SCRA 595 b. Technology Developers, Inc Vs. CA, 201 SCRA (1991) c. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, 251 SCRA 421 (1995) VIII. Power to Generate and Apply Resources a. Medina v City of Baguio, 91 Phil 864 b. Basco v. Phil Amusement and Gaming Corp, GR No (May 14, c. 1991). d. Phil Petroleum Corp vs. Mun. of Pililia, Rizal, 198 SCRA 82 (1991) e. Floro Cement Corp vs. Gorospe 200 SCRA 480 f. Tuzon and Mapagu vs. CA, GR (Aug 21, 1992) Franchises g. PLDT vs. City of Davao (Aug. 2001) h. City Government of Q.C. vs. Bayantel (March 2006) i. FELS Enregy vs. Prov. Of Batangas (Feb. 2007) j. Digitel vs. Prov. Of Pangasinan (Feb 2007) Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax k. Sec of Finance vs. Ilarde & Cipriano Cabaluna GR (May 9, 2005) l. Benguet Crop vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals 210 SCRA 579 ( 1992) m. National Development Co. vs. Cebu City 215 SCRA n. Prov. of Tarlac vs. Judge ALcantara GRA No (Dec 23, 1992) Share of LGU in National Taxes o. Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 366 SCRA 201 (2000) IX. Eminent Domain a. Beluso vs. Panay G.R. No July 20, 1998 b. Binan vs. Garcia G.R. No December 22, 1989 c. JIL vs. City of Pasig G.R. No August 9, 2005 d. Masikip vs. City of Pasig G.R. No , January 23, 2006 e. Mecauayan vs. IAC G.R. No January 29, 1988 f. Moday vs. CA G.R. No February 20, 1997

2 g. Paranaque vs VM Realty G.R. No July 20, 1998 h. Sindalan vs. CA G.R. No March 22, 2007 i. Yusay vs. Mandaluyong City G.R. No April 6, 2011 Notes: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefore, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S.) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow

3 the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra). FABIE VS CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila, enacted September 21, 1909, is an amendment of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted June 13, 1908 relating to the issuance of permits for the erection of buildings. Section 107 so amended reads as follows: SEC Issuance of permits. When the application plans, and specifications conform to the requirements of this title and of title eleven hereof, the engineer shall issue a permit for the erection of the building and shall approve such plans and specifications in writing: Provided, That the building shall about or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved. One copy of all approved plans and specifications shall be returned to the owner or his agent and one copy shall be retained by the engineer. The plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the property in question. The permit was denied by the city authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved." Appellees contention: that this provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law. HELD: In accord with the rule laid down in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U. S., ), quoted at some length in the opinion in the case of U. S. vs. Toribio, to justify the State in the exercise of it police powers on behalf of the public, it must appear; First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrary interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, is determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. It is very clear that the ordinance, if it be held to be reasonable, prescribes a rule in the interest of the public of the city of Manila generally, as distinguished from the interest of individuals or of a particular class. In determining its validity, therefore, the only questions which need be considered, are whether its provisions are or are not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purposes, and whether they are or are not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings within

4 the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably necessary to secure the end in view. To this we may add the following citation from the opinion in the case of Commonwelth vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84) which to our minds well states the principle in this regard on which the validity of the of the ordinance in question must be sustained: We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the rights of the community.... Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, without special condemnation of costs. US VS POMPEYA FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiablemotive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance. Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed HELD: Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill? The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the

5 community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. Theamendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government? In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community. The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby. Is there a cause of action? The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law. U.S. v. Salaveria Malcolm as ponente: (applying present Admin Code provision) It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

CHAPTER 4 POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. Power of eminent domain in general. Definition and nature of eminent domain of LGUs

CHAPTER 4 POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Power of eminent domain in general Definition and nature of eminent domain of LGUs BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R. No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) FIRST DIVISION While