Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 1 of 6

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1 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 1 of 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS STEVEN WAYNE FISH, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, Case No JAR-JPO v. KRIS KOBACH, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Kansas, et al., Defendants. PLAINTIFFS REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Defendant s response brief discusses Ms. Lehman s purported agency relationship with Defendant Kobach, but ignores the fundamental absence of an attorney-client relationship. This critical failure to establish an underlying privilege renders Defendant s agency argument moot; even if Ms. Lehman were Defendant Kobach s agent (which she is not, Defendant Kobach cannot extend a privilege which he does not hold to the documents on the Privilege Log. I. MS. LEHMAN IS NOT DEFENDANT KOBACH S CLIENT. Plaintiffs Opening Brief established that Ms. Lehman is not Defendant Kobach s client. See Pls. Br. at 5-7. Tellingly, Defendant makes no evidentiary showing that Ms. Lehman was in fact a client. He does not, because he cannot, point to any deposition testimony or affidavit showing that Ms. Lehman retained any attorney in the Secretary of State s Office as her counsel. Nor can he show that Ms. Lehman sought legal advice from any attorney in his Office. Rather, Defendant only attempts to claim that Ms. Lehman is a client in a parenthetical: Commissioner Lehman is clearly an agent (and effectively a client of the attorneys who represent the Office of the Kansas Secretary of State. Resp. Br. at 9. This does not constitute the requisite clear

2 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 2 of 6 showing that communications between Ms. Lehman and Defendant s Office were between a client and an attorney. Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., No MLB-DWB, 2007 WL , at *4-5 (D. Kan. July 25, Notably, Defendants cannot cite any authority that conflates agents as effectively clients because such circular reasoning would render virtually every communication with any agent including employees, accountants, consultants, and any other representatives privileged. And the law is clear that the attorney-client privilege should be construed strictly and applied narrowly. Id. at *5. Nor does Defendant respond to Plaintiffs argument that communications are not privileged merely because the communicator is an attorney. See Pls. Br. at 6-7. Where, as here, Defendant Kobach is both Secretary of State and a licensed attorney, he must show that he communicated as a legal advisor and not as a business advisor in order to meet his burden of establishing a privilege. In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., No. 1:90-CV-805, 1991 WL , at *7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 1991; Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998 ( [t]he mere attendance of an attorney at a meeting does not render everything done or said at that meeting privileged ; see Anaya v. CBS Broad., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 645, 650 (D.N.M ( Channeling work through a lawyer... does not provide a basis for claiming attorney-client privilege. (quoting Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Kan Thus, the mere fact that the communications were written by or to state officials who are also attorneys is not enough to meet Defendant s burden of establishing privilege. Instead, Defendant s claim is an overly aggressive assertion[] of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. Order Governing Disc. at 3, Mar. 8, 2016, 1 Unlike Mr. North, Mr. Kobach never filed an appearance on behalf of Ms. Lehman. Liu Decl. 4, ECF No ; Lehman Dep. 7:10-15, ECF No (Ex. B. 2 As explained in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, relaying day-to-day information about Ms. Lehman s job in a different litigation is not legal advice. Pls. Br. at 10 n.4. 2

3 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 3 of 6 ECF No. 30. II. NEITHER THE AGENCY EXCEPTION NOR THE WORK PRODUCTION DOCTRINE APPLIES TO THE DOCUMENTS ON THE PRIVILEGE LOG. As established in the Opening Brief, an agency analysis is irrelevant where, as here, no attorney-client privilege underlies the purported agency relationship between Defendant Kobach and Ms. Lehman. Defendant has not, because he cannot, show that his client is Ms. Lehman or himself. See Pls. Br. at 8. Even if Ms. Lehman could be considered Defendant Kobach s agent in some context outside of this litigation, she is not an agent with regard to this case. Indeed, the extent of Defendant s overreach is clear when claiming that all 105 county election officials [are] agents of the Secretary of State. Resp. Br. at 4. With such logic, all attorneys in Defendant Kobach s office could claim privilege over every election-related communication with any of 105 officials, which extends well beyond the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege. 3 Defendant s broad invocation of the attorney work product doctrine is similarly unfounded. For example, Defendant admits that many of the documents were drafts of affidavits. Resp. Br. at 12. But even a general counsel s affidavit does not warrant an automatic invocation of privilege or the work product doctrine. See Computer Network Corp. v. Spohler, 95 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D.D.C ( If he signed the affidavit based on facts obtained in communications with other corporate officers in his capacity as Secretary, the fact that he happens to be General Counsel is immaterial, and the basis for the factual information contained 3 The cases Defendant cites in support of his argument that an agent does not destroy the attorney-client privilege all require the existence of an underlying privilege. High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. CIV.A CM, 2012 WL , at *13 n.63 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012 ( [W]hat is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. (citation omitted; Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng rs, No. CIV.A CM, 2011 WL , at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011 ( Memos or s such as the ones at issue do not come within the attorney-client privilege merely because they were sent to or by an attorney. ; Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No JWL-DJW, 2006 WL , at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2006 ( Defendant s blanket claim as to the applicability of the privilege fails to assert let alone establish that the documents are confidential substantive communications that involve requesting or providing legal advice. ; see also Pls. Br. at 10 (distinguishing cases. 3

4 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 4 of 6 in the affidavit is as discoverable as if the affidavit had been signed by a corporate officer who was not an attorney.. In Spohler, the court noted that, given the context of the affidavit at issue to influence the court based on factual representations therein to deny the motion for expedited discovery it appears that the purpose of the conversations with other corporate officials was to obtain facts to represent to the court, and not for the purpose of rendering legal advice to his client. Id. (holding that communications with corporate officers and employees related to the affidavit were not privileged. Here, too, the documents on the Privilege Log were not drafted for Defendant Kobach to render legal advice to his non-existent clients. III. DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE. Plaintiffs Opening Brief established that Defendant waived any claim of privilege because of his (1 tardiness both in even notifying Plaintiffs of privileged documents and in serving a privilege log, and (2 assertion of blanket claims of work product to every document on the Privilege Log. In response, Defendants makes the absurd argument that this Court should not even entertain these waiver arguments given that they are in footnotes. Resp. Br. at 10. Defendants cites United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002, in which the Tenth Circuit declined to address an argument in a footnote because the Court did not direct briefing on this argument, there was no notice that it might consider this issue on appeal, and the Court would only consider the record as it stands. 297 F.3d at In contrast, this is not an appellate record, and Defendant plainly has notice of Plaintiffs waiver argument. Indeed, this Court has specifically informed the parties that this court may deem the privilege waived if a party provides an inadequate privilege log. Order Governing Disc. at Section III of Defendants response brief is baseless; Plaintiffs have not raised any new arguments for the first time in this reply brief. 4

5 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 5 of 6 DATED this 18th day of October, Respectfully submitted, /s/ Stephen Douglas Bonney STEPHEN DOUGLAS BONNEY (#12322 American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas 6701 W 64th St., Suite 210 Overland Park, KS Phone: ( Fax: ( dbonney@aclukansas.org NEIL STEINER* REBECCA WALDMAN* ANNE GRUNER* Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY T: ( F: ( neil.steiner@dechert.com rebecca.waldman@dechert.com anne.gruner@dechert.com DALE HO* R. ORION DANJUMA* SOPHIA LIN LAKIN* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 125 Broad St. New York, NY Phone: ( dale.ho@aclu.org odanjuma@aclu.org slakin@aclu.org ANGELA LIU* Dechert LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Suite 3400 Chicago, Illinois Phone: ( Fax: ( angela.liu@dechert.com Counsel for Plaintiffs * admitted pro hac vice 5

6 Case 2:16-cv JAR-JPO Document 246 Filed 10/18/16 Page 6 of 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 18th day of October, 2016, I electronically filed this Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motion to Compel Production of Documents using the CM/ECF system, which automatically sends notice and a copy of the filing to all counsel of record. /s/ Stephen Douglas Bonney STEPHEN DOUGLAS BONNEY (#12322 Attorney for Plaintiffs 6