IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI SUBJECT : SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION IA 7385/2004 IN CS(OS) 1240/2004. Reserved on 24th July, 2008

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI SUBJECT : SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION IA 7385/2004 IN CS(OS) 1240/2004 Reserved on 24th July, 2008 Pronounced on 13th August 2008 HAMDARD NATIONAL FOUNDATION Through Mr. Mohit Lahoty, Advocate... Plaintiff versus ABDUL JALIL Through Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman, Advocate... Defendant Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat: 1. The plaintiffs, in this suit seek a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from infringing their trademark, copyright and for restraining them from passing off their goods as those of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also seek an order for rendition of accounts and delivery up of goods. By this application I.A. 7385/2004, an ad interim injunction to restrain the defendant from using the plaintiff s trademark in the word HAMDARD and the visual mark associated with it, is sought. The court had, by ex parte orders, granted the injunction. This order proposes to dispose of that interim application. 2. The first plaintiff is a charitable institution registered under the Societies Act, 1860, whereas the second plaintiff is a wakf, having its office in Delhi. It is averred that both the plaintiffs are part of the Hamdard Group, which is involved in the practice, and manufacture of Unani medicines. It is averred that they have been using the mark Hamdard Dawakhana since The first plaintiff is the proprietor of the mark Hamdard, and it has been put to use in respect of an entire range of goods and services offered by the Hamdard Group. The plaintiffs trace the establishment of the HAMDARD group to a small clinic, by Hakeem Hafiz Abdul Majeed, in 1906, which acquired considerable reputation resulting in its conversion into a charitable

2 trust, in 1948, through the second plaintiff. The second plaintiff engages itself in a whole range of activities, and uses modern analytical techniques and scientific methods of assessment and quality control of its products to ensure uniform quality and efficacy of its medicines. It is alleged that the to achieve the objectives of the group more effectively, the first plaintiff foundation was formed in The plaintiffs contend that the ownership and proprietorship of the mark HAMDARD is used conspicuously in relation to their products. This mark is widely recognized as the house mark of the HAMDARD group; the plaintiffs are owners of marks such as HAMDARD EYE DESIGN, HAMDARD BALM, HAMDARD MANJAN, HAMDARD HAJLAN, HAMDARD MARHAM, HAMDARD GRIPE WATER and other label as well as device marks. The first plaintiff has permitted the use of its marks, through deeds of assignment, to the second plaintiff. The second plaintiff thus uses and markets its products under the HAMDARD banner, in respect of its ROOH AFZA, SUALIN, SAFI, CINKARA, NAUNIHAL, PACHNOL, GOGHAN BADAM SHIRIN, HOSHINA, HAMDARD GRIPE WATER brands. The plaintiff s EYE DESIGN was first used in 1958, and continued in use, till it was altered in 1968; in its altered form it has been pervasively used by the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs hold 37 registrations of the mark HAMDARD and the eye design, in relation to diverse goods and products. According to the suit averments, the extensive use of the HAMDARD mark and the eye design associate them with the plaintiff s superior quality products, available in and outside the country. It is also claimed that the mark and the design, which is also a mark, are well known and famous trademarks, which have acquired distinctiveness. 4. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant is using the word mark HAMDARD in relation to processing and marketing rice, necessitating the present suit. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants are indulging in misappropriation and misuse of their marks and eye design, amounting to infringement. The plaintiffs, it is averred came across the defendant s mark in 1992in relation to rice, resulting in issuance of a cease and desist notice to the latter on 20th March The plaintiff also claims to have come across an advertisement of the defendant s trademark application in October 2000 for registration of the mark in the Trade Marks Journal for registration of the mark and label, in respect of Class 30. The impugned label marks comprised, inter alia, the marks HAMDARD BRAND DEHRADOONI BASMATI RICE, the HAMDARD logo which is identical to the plaintiffs

3 registered trademark HAMDARD EYE design as well as the trading style of the defendant, HAMDARD industries. The plaintiff lodged its notice of opposition premising their objection under Sections 9, 11, 12, 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act. The Assistant Registrar, it is alleged, has allowed the plaintiffs objections and refused to register the defendant s marks, by order dated 23rd July, 2004 The plaintiffs are relying on the said order; they also rely on the registration certificates issued in their favour, as well as comparison of the two marks, to say that the defendant s impugned marks amount to infringement of their marks; besides, it is claimed that the plaintiff s trademarks have acquired such distinctiveness reputation and goodwill as to be called famous marks; the defendants use of these marks is dishonest. Though in relation to rice, the defendants use of the marks is likely to result in injurious association, to the plaintiff, and members of the general public would be deceived into believing that their (defendants) products are those of the plaintiffs. The use of mark and logo, similar, if not identical to the plaintiff, is bound to confuse and deceive the consumer into believing that the goods are of the plaintiff. 5. Mr. Mohit Lahoty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, at the very outset sought to dispel the contention that the plaintiffs have acquiesced in the defendants use of the word mark as well as the eye device. Relying on Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines, (1994) 2 SCC 448 and Hindustan Pencils v. India Stationery, AIR 1990 Del 19, he contended that for the defense of acquiescence to succeed, the defendant must show that not only has there been a delay on the part of the plaintiff, but also that there was some positive act of encouragement on behalf of its behalf, which should have let the defendant into a false sense of security. In this case, counsel pointed out that steps were taken to oppose the defendants application for registration and cease and desist notices were also sent. Counsel further pointed out that a mere delay in bringing an action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in cases involving trademark infringement. In this regard he placed reliance on Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia, 2004 (28) PTC 121 (SC). Further he submitted that this was a classic case of passing off as it satisfied all three elements; existence of reputation, possibility of deception and likelihood of damages. 6. Learned counsel argued that to arrive at a determination of deceptive similarity, the Court would consider the nature of the mark-whether it is a composite mark, which includes both words and labels; the degree of resemblances both visual and phonetic; the nature and character of goods;

4 the class of purchasers and any other surrounding circumstances. Reliance was placed on Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals, (2001) 5 SCC 73 and Laximkant Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, 2002 (24) PTC 1 (SC). It was also argued that in an action for passing off, the plaintiff is not required to establish the fraudulent intention on the part of the defendant nor is the former required to prove actual confusion amongst the customers. This position of law, learned counsel argued, found support in Ciba-Geigy Limited v. Surinder Singh, 1998 PTC (18) 545. Counsel also relied on Bata India v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1985 All 242 and Alfred Dunhill v. Kartar Singh, 1999 (19) PTC 294 to argue the Court should keep in mind the ordinary customer shopping in places where both the plaintiffs and defendants goods are available for purchase and the usual conditions under which such purchase would be made, to determine the deceptive similarity among the goods. Counsel further submitted even a disclaimer would not reduce the deceptive similarity among the marks. He pointed out that the plaintiffs had registered their mark under Class 30 in all goods, which includes rice. Therefore, there was possibility that the plaintiffs could use the mark in relation to rice and rice products too. Lastly, it was urged that the trade channels of products of the plaintiff and defendants overlapped, since the plaintiffs were also selling food products under brands such as ROOH AFZA and other such goods. In such circumstances, where there was a likelihood of goods being available under the same roof, the possibility of confusion and deception was real. 7. The defendants submit the mark Hamdard, which means Dusaro ke dard se sarokar, is a common dictionary term incapable of being appropriated by any entity. They submit that the defendants have been using a trade label which comprises of may other distinctive features, including Dehraduni Basmati Rice, the name of their firm along with the address, which is quite distinctive from that of the plaintiffs mark. It is further submitted that the goods of the plaintiffs and the defendants are completely different and that the plaintiffs have not produced even a single document that they have dealt with rice or intend to do any business in rice. Therefore, they submit that no deceptive similarity can arise between the two marks as they are used in relation to completely different products. 8. It is further averred by the defendants that they have bonafide adopted the mark since 1989 with respect to its goods and that mark has become distinctive with their brand of basmati rice. They claim entitlement to protection under section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereafter the

5 Act ) as they are honest concurrent users. Further they allege that the suit suffers from acquiescence, delay, laches, estoppel and waiver. It is claimed that the delay of twelve years from the issue of legal notices in 1992 is sufficient to bar the suit. Further, for the said period the plaintiffs have allowed to the defendants to continue with their label, which amounts to acquiescence in law. 9. Mr. Suman, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants contended that this is a case where the plaintiffs and the defendants are engaged in the business of non-competing/ dissimilar goods and therefore, no question of deceptive similarity arises. He also argued, relying on Veerumal v. Needle Industries, 2001 PTC 889 (Del) (DB) and Hindustan Pencils Private Limited v. Universal Trading Company, 2000 PTC 561 (DB), that though delay itself may not constitute a defence in a suit for infringement, if the defendant is allowed to expend money for a considerable amount of time in setting up a business, he cannot be now asked to stop the business. Counsel pointed out in this regard that the time period of twelve years was considerable and that the plaintiffs action amounted to acquiescence in law. He drew the attention of the Court to the documents produced to show that sales figures of the defendants run into about 25 crores rupees between the year 1990 and Reliance was also placed on the judgment reported as Relaxo Rubber Limited v. Aman Cable Company, 1998 PTC (18) 759 to argue that in cases where the plaintiffs and the defendants goods belong to different classes there can be no deceptive similarity and therefore, unlikelihood of confusion in the minds of the public. Similarly, counsel relied on Roshan Lal Oil Mills v. Assam Company, 1996 PTC (16) to support his argument on dissimilar goods and lack of deceptive similarity. 10. Before a discussion on the substantive law, the question of delay and latches will have to be dealt with. The Supreme Court in Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia, 2004 (28) PTC 121 (SC) has now settled the question of delay in bringing an action for infringement of trademark. It categorically held that Division Bench in that case was entirely wrong in vacating the injunction merely on the ground of delay and latches. Both cases relied on by the defendants in this case were decided prior to the decision in Midas Hygiene. Moreover, both those case cannot be considered binding decisions relating to question of delay in relation to an action for infringement. While Hindustan Pencils (supra) dealt with delay in relation to rectification proceedings before the Registrar, the Court in Veerumal (supra) had found

6 that the registered mark was not is use for a considerable period, thereby losing its distinctiveness. It held: Though delay by itself would not be a defense but if there was a non-user for a long period of time the mark would lose its distinctiveness or the mark is then permitted to die for non-user. The Bombay High Court observed ``It is well settled that lapse of time may bring about a change in the state of things in such a manner that to grant injunction in favor of the plaintiff's would be harsh and it may cause irreparable damage or harm to the rights of the defendants.'` Thus the Bombay High Court was of the view that non-use of trademark does have a bearing in action for infringement specially at the interlocutory stage and equities would have to be balanced in such a situation. 11. This Court, in Hindustan Pencils v. India Stationery Products, 1989 PTC 61, extensively discussed the question of acquiescence. The Court after considering a number of cases, both Indian and English, approvingly quoted the following passage from Kerly on Trademark: The classic case of acquiescence proper is where the proprietor, knowing of his rights and knowing that the infringer is ignorant of them, does something to encourage the infringer's misapprehension, with the result that the infringe acts upon his mistaken belief and so worsens his position. It seems clear that something legs than that is needed to offer a defense, but how much less is not clear. The current tendency is to hold that a defense of acquiescence or laces may be set up whenever it is unconscionable for the plaintiff to deny anything that he (consciously or unconsciously) has allowed or encore aged the defendant to believe. Mere failure to without some positive act of encouragement is not in general enough to give a defense. A defendant who infringes knowing of the plaintiffs mark can hardly complain if he is later sued upon it, nor is a defendant who starts to infringe without searching the Register of Trade Marks in any better position than if he had searched and so learned of the plaintiffs mark. Acts of the proprietor done in ignorance of the infringement, or even done without his own registration in mind, will not amount to acquiescence. The Court also observed that: It may, however, be stated that it will be for the defendant in such cases to prove acquiescence by the plaintiff. Acquiescence cannot be inferred merely by reason of the fact that the plaintiff has not taken any action against the infringement of, its rights. 12. It is relevant to extract the relevant provisions of the Act: Section 2 (1)(h): deceptively similar - A mark shall be deemed to be deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles that other mark as to be

7 likely to deceive or cause confusion; xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx Section 29. Infringement of registered trade marks (1) A Registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark. (2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of - a)its identity with the registered trade mark and the similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or (b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or (c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity of the goods on services covered by such registered trade mark is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. (3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2), the court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. (4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which - (a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and (b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered; and (c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark. (5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of his business concern dealing in goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered. (6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses a registered mark, if, in particular, he - (a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof; (c) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the market, or stocks them for those purposes under the registered trade mark, or offers or supplies services under the registered trade mark; (d) uses the registered trade mark on business papers or in advertising. (7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who applies such registered trade mark to a material intended to be used for labeling or packaging goods, as a business paper, or for advertising goods or services, provided such person, when he applied the mark, knew or had reason to believe that the application of the mark was not duly authorized by the proprietor or a licensee. (8) A registered trade mark is infringed by any

8 advertising of that trade mark if such advertising- a)takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters; or b)is detrimental to its distinctive character; or c)is against the reputation of the trade mark. (9) Where the distinctive elements of a registered trade mark consist of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken use of those words as well as by their visual representation and reference in this section to the use of a mark shall construed accordingly. 13. Section 29 of the Act, differs a great deal from Sections 29 and 30 of the Trademarks and Merchandise Act, It elaborately lists the circumstances under which infringement of registered trademarks can be inferred. Section 29(1) deals with a situation wherein the defendant uses a mark, that is identical or deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, in respect of the same goods or services, and in such manner that it is likely that such use is taken as being an use as a trademark. Therefore, in order to fall within section 29(1), the defendant s use of the mark must be so that it is likely that the public assumes that the said mark is used as a trademark. Section 29(2) deals with three situations; one where the defendants mark is identical to that of the plaintiff and in respect of similar goods. Two, where the marks are similar and in respect of goods which are identical or similar. Three, the marks as well as the goods are identical. However, to constitute infringement mere satisfaction of one of the three would be insufficient; the plaintiff has to establish that such use by the defendant is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public or is likely to have an association with the registered mark. Section 29(3) states that where both the mark and the goods in respect of the marks are identical, then the court shall presume that such use by the defendant is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. For the present purposes Section 29 (4) is relevant; it deals with cases where the marks are identical or similar but the goods with respect to the marks are dissimilar. For applicability of this provision, the registered mark must have a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trademark. 14. As to what is the appropriate standard to adjudge infringement of a registered trademark is no longer open to debate; the issue has been settled now for almost four decades. The standard to be adopted in such cases is that of likelihood of confusion and not actual deception and actual damage. The Court, in such cases is to determine the likelihood of confusion and deceptive similarity in order to arrive at a prima facie finding of

9 infringement keeping in mind the following considerations: (i) the broad and essential features of the of competing marks will have to be viewed, (ii) the marks will have to be considered as a whole in their respective contexts, (iii) the similarities rather than dissimilarities will have to be taken note of and (iv) the marks must be judged from the point of view of unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. 15. The above standard has been established and applied in Ruston and Hornsby v. Zamindara Engineering Co, (1969) 2 SCC 727, Parle Products v. JP and Co., AIR 1972 SC 1359, Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449, Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals, (2001) 5 SCC 73 and Heinz Italia v. Dabur India (2007) 6 SCC Now coming to the argument of the plaintiff s marks being famous and therefore, deserving a greater degree of protection, it would be appropriate to deal with this aspect at some length. In Honda Motors Co. Ltd. v. Charanjit Singh and Ors., 101 (2002) DLT 359 this court restrained the defendants from using the trademark HONDA in respect of pressure cookers after taking note of number of decisions on the subject. In Bata India Limited v. Pyare Lal and Co., AIR 1985 All 242, the defendant who used the mark ``Bata Foam'` on the mattresses, sofa cushions and other articles was injuncted from user of the mark on the ground that the name Bata was well-known in the market and the user of such a name was not only likely to cause deception in the mind of ordinary customer but could also cause injury to the plaintiff-company and the fact that the plaintiff was not producing foam was not enough to hold that there could not be passing off action in respect of the user of the name 'Bata' to the products marketed by the defendant. 17. Ciba-Geigy Ltd. and Anr. v. Surinder Singh and Ors., 1998 PTC (18) 545 was a case where the plaintiff was using the mark CIBA, CIBACA in relation to goods different than those of the defendant s. The defendant was using the trade mark CIBACA in relation to filters for motor vehicles. The case of the defendant was that the goods in question were entirely different and as such there was no question of any deception being cause in the minds of the public, when trade mark CIBACA was used in relation to altogether different goods. While coming to the conclusion that the defendant had adopted the mark CIBACA deliberately with the intention of creating confusion in the minds of the public so as to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff, the Court granted injunction restraining the defendants from

10 using the plaintiff s trade mark by the defendants for altogether different goods, as the use of the trade mark CIBACA by the defendant was held not to be honest. 18. In Sunder Parmanand Lalwani and Ors. v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1969 Bombay the marks were not in relation to similar goods; the plaintiff s mark Caltex pertained to petroleum products, whereas the applicant/ defendants trade was in relation to watches. The court held that though the goods were different, there was a likelihood of injurious association of the defendant s mark in relation to the plaintiff s trade. In Lego System Aktieselskab and Anr. v. Lego M. Lemelstrich Ltd., Fleet Street Reports (1983); the plaintiff was using the trade mark Lego in respect of toys, whereas defendant started using the trade mark LEGO in relation to irrigation equipment. Even though the trade mark LEGO was being used for different products, the Court granted injunction against the defendant holding that the plaintiff had established high reputation for the mark Lego which extended beyond the field of toys and construction kits and the mark Lego had acquired distinctiveness as the products of the plaintiff. 19. In The Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. The Dunlop Lubricant Co., 1899 (16) RPC 12, the plaintiff was using the trade mark DUNLOP in respect of tyres whereas the defendant was using the same in respect of oil and lubricants. On a suit for passing off action filed by the plaintiff, defendant was restrained from using the mark DUNLOP for its products and for its business name. M/s. Banga Watch Company v. M/s. N.V. Philiphs and Anr., AIR 1983 P and H 418 was a case where the plaintiff M/s. N.V. Philliphs was using the trade mark PHILLIPHS, which had become a household mark and had acquired enviable reputation in India and throughout the world dealing in electrical and electronic goods. The defendant was using the trade mark PHILLIPHS in respect of watches and clocks. The court granted the injunction claimed. The Canadian position 20. In the recent decision, Mattel, Inc. v Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected opposition to use and registration of Baribie in relation to a restaurant. While doing so, it was reasoned that the mere fact that a mark was famous did not entitle its owner to the monopoly in relation to unrelated products and services; the court insisted on certain objective markers, which the famous mark had to

11 satisfy if the claim for monopoly were to be granted. These included: (1) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which they have become known (2) the length of time the trade-marks and trade-names have been in use (3) the nature of the wares, services or business (4) the nature of the trade (5) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them (6) other surrounding circumstances While the relevant issue is likelihood of confusion and not actual confusion, the lack of actual confusion is a factor which the courts have found of significance when determining the likelihood of confusion. An adverse inference may be drawn when concurrent use on the evidence is extensive, yet no evidence of confusion has been given by the opponent. A similar reasoning persuaded the Canadian Supreme Court to deny protection in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Lt e, [2006] 1 S.C.R The VEUVE CLICQUOT trade-mark is a famous mark in relation to champagne. The brand of Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin also appeared on a range of promotional items, not offered for sale in Canada, including fashion wares for women and men. It was acknowledged as undoubtedly a famous trade-mark that deserved wide protection not only from free-riders but from those who, without any intention of free-riding, nevertheless use in their own business distinguishing marks that create confusion or depreciate the value of the goodwill. The appellant sought to prevent the respondents group of six women s wear shops in Quebec and eastern Ontario from using the trade-name Cliquot and the respondents own registered trade-marks Cliquot and Cliquot Un monde part, and to have these trade-marks expunged from the Register. The Canadian Supreme Court refused protection, and dismissed the appeal. The US Position 21. The leading authority in the United States was the Supreme Court decision in Moseley, Victor s Little Secret, Petitioners v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc 537 US 418 (2003). V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed a suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to ``the dilution of famous marks'` under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defined ``dilution'` as ``the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.'` The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence

12 established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved. The US Supreme Court reversed these concurrent findings, holding that the standard contemplated by the amendment to the Lanham Act was not likelihood of dilution but actual dilution. It was held that: This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution. This conclusion is fortified by the definition of the term dilution itself. That definition provides: The term dilution means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception The contrast between the initial reference to an actual lessening of the capacity of the mark, and the later reference to a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception in the second caveat confirms the conclusion that actual dilution must be established. Of course, that does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. To the extent that language in the Fourth Circuit s opinion in the Ringling Bros. case suggests otherwise, see 170 F.3d, at , we disagree. We do agree, however, with that court s conclusion that, at least where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user s mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA. For even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate referring to the greatest snow on earth, it by no means follows that they will associate the greatest show on earth with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus. Blurring is not a necessary consequence of mental association. (Nor, for that matter, is tarnishing. ) 22. The consequence of the Supreme Court judgment was a swift Congressional intervention; by amendment to the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, (effective October 6, 2006), the standard of likelihood of dilution was affirmed; the amendment provided inter alia, that: the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or

13 absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. 23. The above discussion shows that the standard for deciding what amounts to infringement of trademarks in relation to goods and products, which are dissimilar, is much the same; it is likelihood of deception. The standards in such cases, in Canada however, are case sensitive. The court considers a variety of factors, besides the famous mark doctrine. The US standard, which was similar to the Canadian one (actual damage, rather than likelihood of damage) has now been changed, with effect from 6th October, In the present case, the plaintiffs have produced the two competing marks. Besides, the plaintiffs have produced registration certificates, and renewals in relation to the marks, being Ex. P-1/11 to Ex. P-1/29, in various Classes of the Trademarks Act. These include original registrations, some secured more than 50 years ago, as well as renewals. They also rely on a copy of the order of the Assistant Registrar, Trademarks, rejecting the defendants application for registration of the HAMDARD mark for its products; the order is produced as EX. P-2. In an affidavit, affirmed on its behalf, the plaintiffs assert that their sales grew from Rs. 21,05,56,210/- in 1985 to Rs. 34,94,20,680/- in The plaintiff has also produced a large number of invoices and bills in support of its claim for sale of its products, which not only include medical and pharmaceutical related goods, but also food products. 25. The defendants position is that they have been using the mark since 1989 the plaintiff was aware of this, issued a cease and desist notice, and did not choose to take any action. Now, more than 15 years later, it cannot seek to disturb the its well entrenched business. The defendant claims distinctiveness in relation to its products for the last 15 years; according to it, its sales too have climbed; for the last three years, the sales were about Rs. 2 crores, annually. It is also contended that the goods of the plaintiff are unrelated, and therefore, there is no likelihood of confusion or deception. 26. It is no doubt an undeniable fact that the plaintiff was aware about the defendants activity, and had even issued a cease and desist notice, in However, this factor, to support the argument of latches or acquiescence, is insubstantial, because of the holding of the Supreme Court in Midas Hygene. When the court considers, in an infringement suit, the issue of delay, in

14 relation to the defendant s argument about being in business for long, the relative inaction of the plaintiff, is not seen as a disabling factor for grant of ad-interim relief. The exception to this could be where the defendant can establish prior use of the mark, before the plaintiff s use. Such, however is not the case here. 27. The plaintiff no doubt has averred to the HAMDARD marks being famous in nature. Yet, apart from sales figures, and the relative antiquity, nothing more has been shown. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no separate famous marks registry, to protect claims. However, Indian courts have, in several instances, recognized and given protection to such claims. The recent trends in Canada, and pre-2006 decisions in the United States have shown that the mere advertence to existence of a famous mark, by itself is insufficient to guarantee an injunctive relief. Court, particularly in Canada, have insisted on the plaintiff establishing injurious association, in the case of dissimilar goods. 28. As analyzed in the previous part of this judgment, plaintiffs can successfully secure relief on the ground of deceptive similarity of the impugned mark, even in relation to dissimilar goods. The courts inquiry in such cases too has to be the same, i.e whether the impugned mark so resembles the plaintiffs mark as to deceive the consumer into believing that the goods or products (though dissimilar) originate from the plaintiff. In this case, the points of resemblance are prominent: one, the HAMDARD word mark; and, two, the distinctive eye design, of the plaintiff, which also appears in the defendant s mark, in a prominent manner. The defendant has been using the mark since Apart from stating that the word HAMDARD is common, it has not justified why it hit upon the idea of using the word. This factor is also of some significance, as, if the explanation was a cogent one, or pointed to some generic origin, in relation to the defendant s goods, that could have supported its position. The word mark HAMDARD is arbitrary in relation to Basmati rice, which is traded by the defendant. In this contextual background, the plaintiffs complaint that its trademark was copied, and is sought to be appropriated by the defendant cannot be brushed aside. 29. The goods are to some extent dissimilar; yet there is likelihood of confusion or deception, on account of overlapping trade channels. The plaintiff s argument that both its goods and those of the defendant can be purchased from the same traders, cannot be brushed aside. If this is taken

15 together with the fact that the plaintiff s HAMDARD brand is also host to an entire range of food products such as soft drink concentrates and recipes, like ROOH AFZA, etc, which are sold commonly across the country, even in grocery or small departmental and utility stores, which also sell foodgrains, the plaintiff s apprehensions are not fanciful. In these circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has been able to establish, prima facie, that though the goods are dissimilar, the degree of resemblance, and nature of products is such that the defendants goods are likely to be confused with that of those of the plaintiffs, and the latter is likely to suffer from such injurious association. 30. As far as balance of convenience is concerned, the record shows that the plaintiff no doubt did not take steps after the cease and desist notice was issued on its behalf in 1992, yet, it challenged the defendants attempt to secure registration, culminating in the order of rejection of the latter s application in 2004 In Midas Hygene, the Supreme Court held that: The law on the subject is well settled. In cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest. On an overall consideration of all factors, the court is of the opinion that the balance of convenience in this case lies in granting the ad interim injunction. The defendant took a calculated risk in using the HAMDARD word and eye mark; indeed its use of the eye mark points to an attempt to free ride on the plaintiff s reputation. Unless injuncted, the plaintiff would continue to suffer commercially. 31. In view of the above reasons, the application has to succeed. IA 7385/2004 is hereby allowed; the order dated is confirmed and shall bind the parties till disposal of the suit. The parties shall bear their respective costs. (S. RAVINDRA BHAT) JUDGE

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