1 AKaON LAW REIvmw (Vol. 12:2 v. Virginia."' That theory still has viability but the contemporary view is that it refers to the states' power to regulate use of natural resources within the confines of constitutional guarantees. Hicklin 10 sets forth a standard to guide courts in reviewing cases in the natural resource area when state legislation is challenged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. DONNA N. KEMP U.S. 391 (1877) S. Ct CRIMINAL LAW Death Penalty e Cruel and Unusual Punishment 0 Individualized Sentencing Determination Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct (1978). Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct (1978). N Bell v. Ohio' and Lockett v. Ohio' the United States Supreme Court found the sentencing provisions of the Ohio capital punishment statute 3 to be incompatible with the eighth and fourteenth amendments' which prohibit cruel and unusual punishment.' These two opinions represent the most recent attempt by the Supreme Court to explain what elements must be included in a constitutionally valid capital punishment statute. The two cases, almost identical factually, were reviewed together. In Lockett, the defendant was the driver of the getaway car in an aggravated robbery. While Lockett waited in the car, the owner of the pawn shop being robbed was accidentally killed. It was shown at trial that while defendant Sandra Lockett freely participated in the robbery she had no idea that the pawn shop owner would be shot. Apparently, none of the participants in the robbery planned to kill the owner. However, Lockett, as an accomplice 198 S. Ct (1978) S. Ct (1978). 3 OIo REV. CODE ANN , (Page 1975). 4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), explicitly held that the eighth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment S. Ct. at 2965.
2 Fall REca7T CASES to the crime, was charged with aggravated murder 6 under the Ohio complicity statute which imposes culpability on an accomplice equal to that of the principal offender.' Similarly, in Bell the defendant was charged with aggravated murder as an accomplice.s Bell drove the car used in a kidnapping which resulted in the victim's death. As in Lockett, Bell did not take part in the actual killing, nor was he aware that his partner planned to kill the victim. He was found guilty of aggravated murder by a three judge panel. Subsequently, at the sentencing hearings both defendants were given the death sentence, Bell in front of the three judge panel and Lockett before the trial judge. Lockett was sentenced to die despite information in the pre-sentence reports which revealed no prior convictions for major offenses and a psychologist's report that gave her a favorable prognosis for rehabilitation. The sentences withstood the review of the Ohio Supreme Court, but were reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments which prohibit cruel and unusual punishment.' These two death penalty cases were the first to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in which the defendants were only accomplices to the crimes resulting in their being sentenced to death. This fact was not the sole reason for the Court's declaring the Ohio provisions unconstitutional, but it reinforced the conclusion by the plurality that the sentencing body should be allowed to consider a defendant's "character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently mitigating factor."'" The Lockett and Bell decisions are the latest in a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court in which the Court has attempted to develop guidelines for states to use in enacting valid capital punishment statutes. An early Supreme Court opinion, McGautha v. California," held that juries were able to impose death sentences "unassisted by standards."" This was reassuring 6 She was charged with aggravated murder under the aggravating specifications (1) that the murder was "committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment," for aggravated robbery, and (2) that the murder was "committed... while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery." See Omio REv. CODE ANN (A) (Page 1975). 7Omo REv. CODE ANN (A)(2) (Page 1975). s He was charged under the specification that the murder was "committed... while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping." See Omo RIv. CODE ANN (A) (Page 1975). "Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct (1978). The United States Supreme Court reviewed the judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court on Lockett and Bell and remanded the cases for further proceedings S. Ct. at "1402 U.S. 183 (1971). 1 Id. at 221.
3 AKRON LAw REvE[w [V'ol. 12:2 to the states which had enacted discretionary capital punishment statutes. Furman v. Georgia 13 destroyed that security. Furman held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment, were violated because the state statute permitted the jury undirected discretion in the imposition of the death penalty. Since Furman was a five to four decision with each justice writing a separate opinion, the rationale of Furman was very unclear to many states that were forced to rely on it.' " Most states did agree that the Court had effectively overruled their decision in McGautha, and discretion in sentencing could no longer be tolerated. As a result, the provisions for capital punishment in thirty-nine out of forty states were invalidated. 5 A number of new capital punishment statutes were enacted in an attempt to eliminate the discretion that was renounced in Furman as unconstitutional. Some of these statutes made the death sentence mandatory for certain crimes, eliminating all discretion from the sentencing process. Other states preserved some discretion by creating guidelines to be used in the determination of sentence.' These statutes evidenced the uncertainty left by the Furman opinion.' Is 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 14 Id. Justice Douglas found that statutes under which blacks had a conviction/execution rate of 88.4%, while that of whites was only 79.8%, were "not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishment." (Douglas, J., concurring). Id. at 250 & 257. Justice Stewart concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." (Stewart, J., concurring). Id. at 310. Justice White called for "more narrowly defined categories" for capital crime. (White, J., concurring). Id. at 310. Justices Brennan and Marshall went further, finding capital punishment unconstitutional per se. 25 For an analysis of the decision in McGautha and its effect, see Note, 1 AM. J. CIuM. L. 109 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 282 (1971); Note, 50 N.C.L. REv. 118 (1971); Comment, Capital Sentencing - Effect of McGautha and Furman, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 619 (1972). 26 Nine state legislatures have passed statutes which required mandatory death sentences: Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Of the states which preserved some discretion, the legislatures of Texas, Georgia, and California had created statutes which required that one of a number of aggravating circumstances had to be shown before a death sentence could result. Eight other state legislatures had enacted statutes which allowed the showing of mitigating circumstances as well as requiring proof of aggravating circumstances: Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah. For a complete discussion of the makeup of these statutes, see Note, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (1974). For a complete discussion of the Ohio statute, see Lehman and Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio's New Criminal Code, 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 15 (1974). 17 For a complete discussion on the opinion, see Comment, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1972), discussing the aspects of punishment; Note, 22 DEPAuL L. REv. 481 (1972), examining the various legal approaches advanced for and against the death penalty; Comment, The Constitutionality of Ohio's Death Penalty, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 617 (1971), discussing Ohio's statutory mitigating factors and the adequacy of Ohio's appellate review; Comment, The Response to Furman: Can Legislators Breathe Life Back Into Death, 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 172 (1974), explaining the variety of opinions in Furman.
4 Fall, REcENT CASES Four years later the Supreme Court responded to the uncertainty when it ruled on the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 8 Proffit v. Florida,'" Jurek v. Texas," 0 Woodson v. North Carolina,"' and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana. 2 " The Court, stating in Gregg that "each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis"'" and that "capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional as cruel and unusual,"" upheld the death penalty under the Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes, and rejected as unconstitutional the mandatory capital punishment statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana. It became clear that many states had misinterpreted Furman. It was not until Gregg that the Court explained that Furman mandates that discretion afforded a sentencing body "must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action, ' 25 but not that all discretion be eliminated. In its most notable opinion written in "the Gregg series 2 the Court upheld the Georgia capital punishment statute in Gregg v. Georgia. In response to Furman the Georgia legislature had narrowed the classes of murders for which death may be imposed by creating ten aggravating circumstances." The statute additionally provided discretion for the sentencing body. In the pre-sentence report required for each defendant found guilty of a capital offense, the Georgia procedure requires that the sentencing authority must consider any "additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment," including prior record or lack thereof." In examining the evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment, the jury is required to consider the circumstances of the crime and of the criminal before it recommends a sentence." Discretion is given to the jury but it is limited by "clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application." 0 The Court approved the Georgia provisions for appellate review as necessary "check[s] against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death U.S. 153 (1976) U.S. 242 (1976) U.S. 262 (1976) U.S. 280 (1976) U.S. 325 (1976) U.S. 153, Id. at Id. at Brief for Petitioner at 16, 98 S. Ct (1978). 27 GA. CODE ANN (1978). 28 Id. at , U.S. 153, Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974).
5 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:2 penalty."'" Effective appellate review eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by an aberrant jury. It was also suggested by the plurality in Gregg that the concerns of Furman "are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding."" 2 It is not conclusive that a bifurcated proceeding is necesary to have a valid capital punishment statute, 3 ' however, it is clear that one distinction between the statutes upheld and those struck down in "the Gregg series" is that the latter did not provide for a separate sentencing hearing. " Attempting to examine "each distinct system on an individual basis" the Court looked as closely at the Florida sentencing procedure as they did at that of Georgia. Florida had created a statute allowing for eight aggravating circumstances and seven mitigating circumstances. 3 " Under the statute, the sentencing authority, in that case the judge, 6 is required to review and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. These eight aggravating factors were found to be specific enough to eliminate the possible imposition of "freakish"' 7 death sentences. So too, the mitigating factors which, inter alia, allow the judge to consider the defendant's age, prior history of criminal activity, and degree of involvement in the murder, were found to ensure that the defendant's character and individual record will be considered in assigning the "unique and irreversible penalty of death," 3 8 assuring that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Furthermore, it was found that the Florida system of appellate review was a sufficient check to ensure that aberrant decisions did not result in unwarranted death sentences." 9 The Court later upheld the Texas capital punishment statute in Jurek v. Texas." That statute required the imposition of the death penalty upon those convicted of "capital murder"'" if the jury finds at a subsequent sen U.S. 153, Id. at 195. "a 402 U.S. at 220. "4 The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 63, 73 n.71 (1976). 35 FLA. STAT. ANN (5) & (6) (West Supp. 1978). 36 The Supreme Court "has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital case can perform an important societal function," Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968), but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is "constitutionally required." See 428 U.S. 242, U.S. at s 428 U.S. 280, U.S. 153, U.S. 262 (1976). 41 "Capital murder" is defined as malice aforethought under any of five specified conditions. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN (Vernon 1974).
6 Fall, RECENT CASES" tencing hearing that three conditions are met. 2 The capital murder can only be found under five specific offenses 3 which are "narrowly defined and particularly brutal offenses."" In measuring the statute against the standards advanced in Gregg, the Court concluded that the second of the three mitigating circumstances allowed the directed and limited discretion sought by Furman. Asking "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society," the second mitigating consideration was not explicit as to what it allowed." 5 After examining the interpretation given to this language in the Texas courts, the Court concluded that this mitigating consideration had given defendants the freedom to bring in whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances they could produce. This was found to be a valid procedure to guide and focus the jury's "objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death."" 6 This Court also noted the importance of the Texas review procedures. " ' Woodson v. North Carolina" 8 and Roberts v. Louisiana" decided the constitutional validity of capital punishment statutes requiring mandatory death sentences for certain crimes. Responding to Furman, the North Carolina and Louisiana legislatures had taken all discretion away from the jury but failed to eliminate the possibility of arbitrary and capricious death sentences. Three constitutional infirmities were cited as applicable to both statutes. First, the Court noted that "even in first-degree murder cases juries with sentencing discretion do not impose the death penalty with any degree of frequency."" 0 That juries have been unwilling to return death sentences on first degree murder cases in one hundred percent of the cases, suggests that mandatory death sentences are not acceptable by society's contemporary standards of decency as reflected by the juries. In light of the hesitancy of 4 2 The questions the jury must answer are these: (1) whether the defendant acted deliberately and with reasonable expectation that a death would result, (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society, and (3) whether the conduct of the defendant was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. The death penalty is imposed if and only if all three are answered affirmatively. TEx. CODE OF CRIM. PRos. ANN. art (Vernon Supp ). 4 3 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN (Vernon 1974), allows a finding of capital murder in five situations U.S. 262, It has been suggested that such a prediction is nearly impossible for experts to make and even more difficult for a jury. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HIv. L. Rav. 63, 71 (1976) U.S. 262, id. at U.S U.S See 428 U.S. 280, 295 (citing H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).
7 AxRoN LAw REvEw [Vol 12:2 sentencing juries in the past to return death penalties in over twenty percent of the cases,"' it appears that requiring mandatory death sentences would only force juries to become more reluctant to find guilt at trial, effectively causing arbitrary and capricious sentencing. 5 2 Finally, the Court rejected mandatory sentencing because it fails "to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death." 5 " In Lockett and Bell, the Court has struck down the Ohio statute as not allowing enough discretion to the sentencing body. Prior to the Furman decision, the Ohio statute provided death as a punishment under specific crimes unless the jury recommended mercy." In 1972 a bill was passed by the Ohio House of Representatives which proposed modifications of this statute. 5 In its original form the bill provided a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determination of the death penalty. In mitigation the sentencing body was allowed to consider any circumstances "tending to mitigate the offense, though failing to establish a defense." 5 While the bill was being examined by the Judiciary Committee of the Ohio Senate, the Furman decision was announced. Uncertain about the rationale of Furman, the Ohio Senate decided to limit the factors to be considered in mitigation so as not to create too much discretion. The statute reviewed by the Court in the Lockett and Bell decisions resulted. 5 " This resulting statute under which Lockett and Bell were sentenced was reviewed by the plurality in terms of the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffit, and Jurek.1 The Ohio statute, listing seven specific aggravating circumstances and allowing three mitigating circumstances, 5 9 is very similar to the approved statutes in Gregg" 0 and Prof!it. 4 ' Additionally though, Georgia allowed the U.S. 280, 295 n Juries would find it convenient in their duty to eliminate the possibility of a death sentence by refusing to find guilt at the trial determination. Without guidelines or standards the elimination would be arbitrary and unfair. See 428 U.S. at Id. 54 Omo REV. CODE ANN (Page 1954). 5 5 Sub. H.B. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly, Oio REv. CODE ANN See Lehman and Norris, supra note Sub. H.B. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly, Omo REv. CODE ANN (b) (3). 57 Omo REV. CODE ANN (Page 1975). 58 The Court also addressed a few other challenges made by Lockett but would not admit that any represented a valid reason to set aside her sentence. See 98 S. Ct. at In Bell's case the Court would not reach any of Bell's contentions other than the question of constitutionality and the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See 98 S. Ct. at Omo REv. CODE ANN (Page 1975). so GA. CODE ANN , (1978). 61 FLA. STAT. ANN (West Supp. 1978).
8 Fall, 1978] RECENT CASES jury to consider "any aggravating or mitigating circumstances" 6 and similarly Florida, although only listing the mitigating factors, had been found by the Court to allow consideration of any mitigating factor. 63 In Ohio, after a finding of guilt at trial under one of the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty was precluded by statute when, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character and condition of the offender, one or more of the following was established by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it. (2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation. (3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. 6 " The Ohio statute was attacked for its lack of "individualized sentencing determination" 5 and the Court asserted that in criminal cases this concept has long been accepted in this country." In the earlier opinion of Williams v. New York, 67 it was held that the sentencing judge's "possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics is [h]ighly relevant, if not essential, [to the] selection of an appropriate sentence... "Is The Court has maintained this policy in a progression of cases, 69 the most recent of which is the Woodson" 0 decision. In that decision the majority concluded: [In] capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, Trop v. Dulles," 1 requires consideration of the U.S. 280, Although the Florida statute contained a list of mitigating factors, six members of the Court assumed, in approving the statute, that the range of mitigating factors listed in the statute was not exclusive. See the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, 428 U.S. at 250; and the concurring opinions of Justice White joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at OHlo REv. CODE ANN (B) (Page 1975). 65 The term was used by the Court in 'The Gregg series" to refer to the need for courts to consider the character and record of individual offenders and the circumstances of their particular offenses when determining sentence. 428 U.S. at S. Ct. at U.S. 241, (1948). 68 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1948); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at (1971). TO 428 U.S. 280 (1976) U.S. 86 (1957).
9 AKRON LAW RE [Vol..w12:2 character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. 7 The consideration of "any mitigating" factor was found by the Court to be the critical redeeming quality of the accepted statutes. In its construction of the language of the Ohio statute the Court found this quality to be lacking. In making this conclusion the Court looked to Ohio's highest court to examine the meaning that had been given to the statute. ' According to the majority, consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character and condition of the offender are only relevant if "[they] shed some light on one of the three mitigating factors." 7 Effectively, the Ohio statute did not allow the trial court to consider the defendant's lack of past criminal record or remote degree of involvement as mitigating factors in and of themselves. The impact of this defect was especially clear under the unique facts of the cases. Lockett and Bell were sentenced to die as accomplices in crimes resulting in murder. Neither defendant directly took part in the murder or even intended murder as a result. It is enlightening to examine the opinions of the various justices. Justice Marshall affirmed his prior opinion that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. 75 Justice White and Justice Blackmun could not accept a death sentence for a mere accomplice." 6 Justice Rehnquist feared that allowing the jury to consider any mitigating factor proffered would allow too much discretion to come into the determination returning the capital punishment statutes to pre-furman status. 7 Under the unique facts of the cases, Justices Marshall and White found the Ohio statute to violate the principle of proportionality embodied in the eighth amendment. 78 Since the two defendants here were only drivers of the vehicles used to accomplish the crimes, the two justices could not reconcile findings by the Ohio courts that either defendant possessed a purpose to kill or that either had the specific intent. Additionally, rejecting the possibility of any deterrent value, the sentences were thought "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime The inability of the Court to agree in their death penalty opinions has U.S. 280, S. Ct. at Id. 75 ld. at Id. at 2969; id. at Id. at Id. at 2973 & The plurality found it unnecessary to consider disproportionality. Id. at 2967 n Id. at 2984.
10 Fall. 1978] REcENT CASES caused many inconsistencies in the line of cases and statutes reviewed in the last ten years. Now, after the Gregg series and this latest opinion, it appears that the Court has achieved some success in their attempt to develop standards for many anxious courts and legislators. Although two justices 80 asserted that they cannot accept capital punishment in any form, the Court has firmly established that the death penalty is a viable means of punishment. 8 ' After the uncertainty of Furman, the Court attempted to define what it required of capital punishment statutes when it granted certiorari for Gregg and its companion cases. In Gregg v. Georgia it was intimated by the Court that the Georgia system was the correct response to Furman, yet the Court stood firm in requiring individual examination of each distinct system. 8 " Rejecting the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes in Woodson and Roberts, the Court helped to identify what is acceptable by explaining what is unacceptable. The unacceptability of mandatory death sentences, even under specifically defined crimes, was clearly established. A chief reason cited for the failure of the two systems was their inability to allow "individualized sentencing determination." The question then becomes, what will "individualized sentencing determination" require? Woodson suggests that it requires "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant." 8 3 In Gregg, Proffit, and Jurek, the Court found it critical that the capital punishment system had allowed consideration of any relevant mitigating factor before they accepted them. Now the Court has rejected the Ohio statute because it will not allow consideration of mitigating factors outside those listed in the statute. Reflecting on the lesson of Woodson, the plurality in Lockett and Bell concluded: [t]hat the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." The Court has also found it important to require an adequate system 80 In 'The Gregg series" Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan established that they will not accept capital punishment in any form. 428 U.S. at 227, 231, 260, 277, 305 & U.S. 153, "A system could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur." 428 U.S. at 195 n U.S. 280, S. Ct. at 2965.
11 AKRON LAW REVIEw (Vol. 12:2 of appellate review. This Court expressed approval of the Georgia provision for appellate review as a safeguard against aberrant jury decisions. "If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death." 85 Similarly the Court praised Florida and Texas systems for protecting against unfair sentences with successful appellate review. The Florida Supreme Court had notably vacated eight of twenty-one death sentences under their statute 6 and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had only affirmed two death sentences which it had reviewed since Furman." ' The burden is now upon the Ohio legislature to enact a new capital punishment statute. As the earlier analysis has suggested,' to be constitutional the Ohio statute will have to provide specifically enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances which can be weighed by the judge and jury. Where the invalidated statute provides for this it may only be necessary to alter the statute to an extent to allow for consideration of additional mitigating factors that are deemed relevant to the individual defendant. This appears especially important where the Court cited the lack of individual consideration as the crucial deficiency in the statute. However, a successful statute is not the only component of an acceptable capital punishment system. Ohio must equally provide for effective appellate review. It appears from the Gregg series that an effective appellate review procedure provides a safeguard against arbitrary and capricious sentences and standards for distinguishing those cases in which the death penalty should be imposed from those in which it should not. The burden is on the judiciary as well as the legislature. For other states which have statutes that have not been tested, Ohio's experience serves as a guideline for what elements a valid statute should contain. While there is still no absolute formula to a successful capital punishment statute, the major requirements have been made apparent by the Court. JAMES C. ELLERHORST U.S. 280, e 428 U.S U.S See text supra at 000
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Cite as: U. S. (1998) 1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Logical and Consistent? An Analysis of Supreme Court Opinions Regarding the Death Penalty Matthew B. Robinson and Kathleen M. Simon* Volume 3 - No. 1 Spring 2006 * Matthew B. Robinson and Kathleen M. Simon
DePaul Law Review Volume 30 Issue 3 Spring 1981 Article 9 Constitutional Procedure for the Impostition of the Death Penalty - Godfrey v. Georgia Lennine Occhino Follow this and additional works at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review
Page 1 of 37 U.S. Supreme Court GREGG v. GEORGIA, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 428 U.S. 153 GREGG v. GEORGIA CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA No. 74-6257. Argued March 31, 1976 Decided July 2, 1976 Petitioner
Nova Law Review Volume 27, Issue 3 2003 Article 5 Ring v. Arizona: How Did This Happen, and Where Do We Go Gary Scott Turner Copyright c 2003 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 26 Issue 3 Spring 1995 Article 6 1995 Simmons v. South Carolina: Safeguarding a Capital Defendant's Right to Fair Sentencing Mark Zaug Follow this and additional
Cite as: U. S. (1998) 1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 23 Issue 3 Spring 1992 Illinois Judicial Conference Symposium Article 9 1992 Victim Impact Evidence, Arbitrariness, and the Death Penalty: The Supreme Court
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ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF RACE IN THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM Brett Chapman, Doctor of Philosophy, 2009 Dissertation Directed by: Dr. Raymond Paternoster Department
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Santa Clara Law Review Volume 39 Number 4 Article 10 1-1-1999 The Death Penalty is Cruel and Unusual Punishment for the Crime of Rape - Even the Rape of a Child Pallie Zambrano Follow this and additional
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Barry University From the SelectedWorks of Serena Marie Kurtz March 29, 2011 A Deadly Bias: First-Time Offenders and Felony Murder Serena Marie Kurtz, Barry University Available at: https://works.bepress.com/serena_kurtz/2/
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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL: AN ARGUMENT FOR A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE ENMUND/TISON CULPABILITY FACTORS IN CAPITAL FELONY MURDER CASES INTRODUCTION [D]eath is different. 1 When used to punish,
Volume 33 Issue 2 Article 4 1988 Redefining a Culpable Mental State for Non- Triggermen Facing the Death Penalty James J. Holman Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
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Journal of Legislation Volume 22 Issue 1 Article 4 1-1-1996 Harris v. Alabama: Is the Death Penalty in America Entering a Fourth Phase;Note Abe Muallem Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Indiana Law Journal Volume 70 Issue 4 Article 2 Fall 1995 The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings William J. Bowers Northeastern University Follow this and additional
FIU Law Review Volume 2 Number 1 Article 12 Winter 2007 Evaluating Florida s Capital Sentencing Scheme Through the Aggregate Protection and Safeguards Found in the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM VOLUME II: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES Howard Gillman Mark A. Graber Keith E. Whittington Supplementary Material Chapter 11: The Contemporary Era Criminal Justice/Punishments/Capital
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685 So.2d 1063 Page 1 STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony WILSON. STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick Dewayne BETHLEY. Nos. 96-KA-1392, 96-KA-2076. Dec. 13, 1996. Dec. 30, 1996. 685 So.2d 1063, 96-1392 (La. 12/13/96)
DePaul Law Review Volume 32 Issue 4 Summer 1983 Article 3 The Two-Murder Rule in Illinois - A Potential Return to Arbitrary Imposition of the Death Penalty Joel H. Swift Follow this and additional works
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 73 Number 3 Article 6 3-1-1995 When Life Means Life: Juries, Parole, and Capital Sentencing John Christopher Johnson Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
TAB 01: NC Death Penalty: History & Overview The Death Penalty in North Carolina: History and Overview Jeff Welty April 2012, revised April 2017 This paper provides a brief history of the death penalty
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Results and Criteria of BGA/NFOIC survey State Response Time Appeals Expedited Review Fees Sanctions Total Points Percent Grade By grade Out of 4 Out of 2 Out of 2 Out of 4 Out of 4 Out of 16 Out of 100
1st DRAFT to: The Chief Justice Justice Brennan Just tee White Ju s t ~co.,_ ~11 all Ju st~~ 1~ ~m un Ju&tic0 L Justl0) & ce 1ens Justice O'Connor ~.qu i st From: Justice Powell Circulated:(EC ' ~9 SUPREME
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1 State 1 Is expungement or sealing permitted for juvenile records? 2 Does state law contain a vacatur provision that could apply to victims of human trafficking? Does the vacatur provision apply to juvenile
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Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 10 Spring 4-1-2001 APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY 120 S. CT. 2348 (2000) Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
University of Virginia From the SelectedWorks of Kristen Nugent November, 2009 Proportionality and Prosecutorial Discretion: Challenges to the Constitutionality of Georgia s Death Penalty Laws and Procedures
St. John's Law Review Volume 77 Issue 1 Volume 77, Winter 2003, Number 1 Article 5 February 2012 Kinder, Gentler, and More Capricious: The Death Penalty After Atkins v. Virginia John F. Romano Follow this
The chart below is a summary of the relevant portions of state animal cruelty laws that provide for court-ordered evaluation, counseling, treatment, prevention, and/or educational programs. The full text