No In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Transcription

1 No In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MATT SARACEN, TIM RIGGINS, LANDRY CLARKE, JASON STREET and RAY TATUM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated PLAINTIFFS PETITIONER versus NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION DEFENDANT RESPONDENT. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Team 30 1

2 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the district court from issuing an injunction to enjoin the NBA lockout. 2. Whether the NBA lockout is protected from antitrust scrutiny by the nonstatutory labor exemption. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities.4 Statement.5 Summary of Argument 6 Argument I. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was Given Board Language to Keep Federal Courts Out of the Labor Injunction Business.7 A. The Current NBA Lockout Fits Within Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act s Definition of a Labor Dispute..9 B. The Norris-LaGuardia Applies to this Dispute Even Though the Players Union is Nonexistent...11 C. The Norris-LaGuardia Act Bars This Court from Issuing an Injunction to End the Lockout..13 II. The NBA s Lockout is Shielded From Antitrust Scrutiny Based on the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption 14 A. The NBAPA s Disclaimer of Interest in Representing the NBA Players was not Sufficient to End the Collective Bargaining Relationship and Therefore the Nonstautory Labor Exemption Remained in Effect..15 B. The Owners Lockout Concerns A Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining Because it Affects the Players Right To Work, Their Wages, and The Terms and Conditions of Their Employment 21 C. The Owners Lockout Affects Subjects Bargained for By Both Parties Throughout the Collective Bargaining Negotiations Making Them Products of Bona Fide Arms-Length Bargaining...22 Conclusion.23 3

4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).9 Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).10,11,12 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)...17,18 Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987)..7,8,9 District 29, United Mine Workers v. New Beckley Mining Corp., 895 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1990) Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921)...7,8 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)...15,21,22 Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Pan S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 369 (1960) 7,8 McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.Supp. 871,1358 (D. Minn. 1991) 19,20 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560 (1938) 11,12 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969)...20 Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) 15,16,17 West Gulf Maritime Ass n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721 (5 th Cir. 1985) 13 Statutes: 15 U.S.C U.S.C U.S.C U.S.C ,10,11,13 4

5 STATEMENT 1. This is an action filed by five National Basketball Association (NBA) players (Players) against the NBA. R. at 3. The NBA contains thirty separately owned teams and serves as a multi-employer bargaining unit. R. at The rules and conditions of the NBA are contained within a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated between the NBA Players Association (NBAPA) and the NBA. R. at 3. The most recent CBA was due to expire on October 11, 2011 at 11:59pm after the NBA opted out of an additional two-year extension of the CBA. R. at 3. The NBA and NBAPA had bargained over a new CBA for two years, prior to the deadline. The NBA and NBAPA negotiated up to October 11, to no avail. R. at During negotiating, the NBAPA took a poll of its players to see it a majority wished to disband the NBAPA and pursue individual claims against the league if no CBA was reached. R. at 3. The majority of players voted to support whatever the NBAPA thought was in their best interests. R. at 4. The NBAPA decided to disclaim its interest as a players union and informed the NBA eight hours before the expiration of the CBA. R. at 4. The NBAPA notified the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that it was no longer a labor organization and filed an application to the IRS to be considered a professional organization rather than a players union. R. at 4. Furthermore, the NBAPA amended its bylaws to prevent any members from collective bargaining with the NBA, teams and agents. R. at Upon receiving the disclaimer notice, the NBA filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. R. at 4. The NBA instituted a league-wide lockout after the October 11 expiration of the CBA. R. at 4. The lockout was to become effective on October 12. R. at 4. 5

6 5. On October 12, the plaintiffs filed an antitrust claim seeking to enjoin the NBA s lockout. R. at 4. The district court granted the injunction but the court of appeals reversed. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1. The Norris-LaGuardia Act bars federal courts from issuing injunctions in matters growing out of labor disputes. The NLGA has broad application because Congress was intent on removing federal courts from the economic interplay between capital and labor. Application of the NLGA does not hinge on the existence of a labor, which is apparent through a plain reading of the statute. Additionally, the NLGA applies equally to employers and employees as long as the dispute centers around negotiating terms of an agreement. The NBA and NBPA are involved in a dispute determine the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. Although, the union has decertified, the NLGA still applies because the dispute centers on the negotiation of terms. In order entice the players to negotiate, the NBA has instituted a lockout. A lockout is a protected labor tactic under the NLGA and precludes federal courts from issuing injunctions. 2. The nonstatutory labor exemption protects the NBA lockout from antitrust scrutiny. The lockout satisfies the three elements necessary for invoking the exception. The only element in contention is whether a collective bargaining arrangement still existed between the NBA and the NBAPA. Although the NBAPA disclaimed their representative interest, it did so acting as the representative body for the players. The NSLE was created out of federal labor law to promote ongoing negotiations and keep 6

7 labor disputes out of antitrust courts. A lockout initiated in the course of bargaining is just the type of action the NSLE was meant to protect. ARGUMENT I. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was Given Board Language to Keep Federal Courts Out of the Labor Injunction Business The Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) was promulgated in 1932 to limit the injunctive powers of the federal court when a labor dispute is involved. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Pan S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 369 (1960). The NLGA was promulgated in response to the weak effect that the Clayton Act had on limiting federal courts issuing injunctive relief in matters involving labor disputes. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Speaking on the need to promulgate the NLGA, Representative LaGuardia stated, If the courts had not emasculated and purposely misconstrued the Clayton Act, we would not today be discussing an anti-injunction bill. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 439 (1987)(Citing 75 Cong.Rec (1932)). Therefore, Congress wanted to expand the limited effect that the federal courts had given to the Clayton Act. Duplex at 443. Congress accomplished this expansion by incorporating Section 1 of the NLGA, which states, No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 29 U.S.C A plain reading of Section 1 of the NLGA illustrates Congress s use of broad terms to expand the applicability of the Clayton Act. Marine at 369. Congress wanted to expand the limited scope of the Clayton Act because it was dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of the Clayton Act in its ability to remove federal courts from the labor 7

8 injunctions business. Id at 369. The ineffectiveness of the Clayton Act was typified in Duplex, where the Court narrowly defined the employer-employee relationship to apply only to the primary labor dispute and granted an injunction to limit the effect of a secondary boycott. Id. at 443. The Clayton Act s limited scope frustrated Congress intent to limit the federal courts equitable powers enjoining labor strikes and similar labor tactics, so Congress enacted the NLGA with its broad language. Burlington at 438. The court of appeals was clearly correct with its interpretation of the NLGA s board application to labor disputes. Congress was dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness the Clayton Act in limiting federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes. Congress s dissatisfaction developed from the narrow application given by the federal courts such as the limited scope applied in Duplex. In promulgating the NLGA, Congress s intent was to expand the limited effect of the Clayton Act. The federal courts would no longer have equitable powers in labor disputes, except those specifically set out in the NLGA. Therefore, federal courts would be out of the Labor Injunction Business. With federal courts having limited equitable powers in labor disputes, the NBPA should not be able to run to the courthouse and seek the aid of judges. Rather the dispute should be settled at the negotiating table. The NBPA should approach the NBA and not the courts to decide the terms of the contract. Only through the mutual bargaining of both parties can this dispute end. Conversely, the Petitioner will argue that the scope of the NLGA is narrowly limited to a pro union reading, meaning that the NLGA is a policy promulgated to keep employers from running to the courthouse to enjoin labor strikes. However, Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of the act as advanced by this Court in Marine, which clearly 8

9 states that the NLGA is to be given a broad scope. The NLGA is to be given a broad scope because Congress s true intentions were to keep courts from deciding labor disputes, which the Clayton Act failed to do. Congress wanted the disputes to be settled at the negotiating table and allow the economies of a free market decide the terms of a contract. Congress was intent on keeping judicial oversight limited in labor disputes. Therefore, the NBA and NBPA should be free from judicial intervention and allowed to freely negotiate the terms of the new collective bargaining agreement. A. The Current NBA Lockout Fits Within Section 13 of the Norris- LaGuardia Act s Definition of a Labor Dispute With the broad language aimed at limiting the scope of the federal court s equitable powers to grant injunctions in labor disputes, the NLGA applies equally to employers and employees. Burlington at 439. The NLGA was Congress s attempt to prevent the injunctions of the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957). Therefore, to determine the applicability of the NLGA, the dispositive inquiry is whether or not there is a labor dispute between labor and capital and not which party is seeking the injunction. District 29, United Mine Workers v. New Beckley Mining Corp., 895 F.2d 942, (4th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court should look to the NLGA to define labor dispute, specifically Section 13(a), which states, A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees. 9

10 29 U.S.C. 113(a). Additionally, the court should apply Section 13(c), which further defines a labor dispute, which includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions or employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 29 U.S.C. 113(c). Persons engaged in the same industry include owners of sport teams and the teams players. Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 672 (8th Cir. 2011). In Brady, the National Football League and the its thirty-two separately-owned clubs decided to institute a lockout after the collective bargaining agreement lapsed. Id. at 663. In response to the League s labor tactic, the players union, who represented the individual players, decided to disband and individually litigate the issue. Id. at 663. The individual players sought to enjoin the League and the clubs from instigating the lockout, as the lockout would constitute a group boycott and price fixing in violation of the 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 663. The court in Brady held that even though the union had disbanded, the NLGA forbade the court from issuing an injunction prohibiting the lockout. Id. at 682. The courts were barred from enjoining the lockout because the dispute involved labor and capital negotiating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the NLGA barred the courts from involvement. Id. at 674. Applying the plain meaning of the NLGA, this Court should uphold the court of appeal s decision that the NLGA encompasses the current dispute. This dispute grows out of labor because it involves labor and capital. The NBA and its collective clubs represent the capital and the individual players are the labor. Additionally, the NBA and 10

11 the players are involved in the same trade or industry. Both are in the industry of providing professional basketball for fans in their respective cities, just as the NFL and its players are responsible for supplying fans with professional football. Additionally, this dispute involves an association of employers, the NBA and a collection of teams, and individual employees, the players who are representing other players similarly situated. Both the NBA and its players are currently involved in negotiating the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. As in Brady, the union has decertified and the players argue that they are no longer at the negotiating table, which is a sham. This move by the players is an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the court. As in Brady, the dispute remains in full force, as the NBA continues to negotiate a new contract. Therefore, the NLGA applies to the current dispute and this Court should uphold the court of appeal s decision. B. The Norris-LaGuardia Applies to this Dispute Even Though the Players Union is Nonexistent Because Section 13(c) states that the disputants do not have to be in an employeremployee relationship, a labor dispute can still arise even if a union is not present. Brady at 671. Additionally, Section 13(a)(1) states that a labor dispute can involve one or more employees or associations of employees and does not add the requirement that the employees be unionized employees. Id. at 671. Thus, the clear intention of Congress in executing the NLGA was not to require that a union be present in the labor dispute, but that the dispute involves persons interested in affecting the terms of employment. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560 (1938). In New Negro Alliance, the question presented to this Court was whether or not the NLGA restricted the district court from issuing an injunction when an employer-employee relationship did not 11

12 exist. Id. at 553. This Court held that the applicability of the NLGA does not depend on whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, but that the parties have an interest in resolving labor terms. Id. at A plain reading of the NLGA does not require the involvement of a union in the dispute for the NLGA to be applicable. Section 13(a)(1) clearly states that the dispute can involve an association of employers and individual employees or more than one employee. The text states nothing the form of requiring a union employee be involved in a labor dispute. Rather it states an employee, which is exactly what this dispute involves. The NBPA has decertified and therefore, the players are left to negotiate on their own. Additionally, Section 13(c) states that the disputants do not have to be in an employer-employee relationship. Rather as this Court stated in New Negro Alliance, the dispositive inquiry is whether or not the disputants are interested in the terms of employment. Clearly, both the NBA and the individual players have an interest in negotiating the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the NLGA applies to the current negotiations between the NBA and individual players and bars injunctive relief. Conversely, Petitioner will argue that in order to be under the umbrella of the NLGA, a union must be present in the dispute. Petitioner s contention is that even though the NLGA has been given a broad application to labor disputes, disputes still requires the presence of a union. Additionally, Petitioner narrowly reads the decision in New Negro Alliance because Petitioner believes that even though the lawsuit did not involve a union, a union still had a fight in the dispute. However, Petitioner misapplies the holding of New Negro Alliance because the crux of the decision was that a party has 12

13 a labor interest, an interest in the negotiating of terms. Truly the Petitioner does not argue that the players are not interested in negotiating the terms of a new contract. C. The Norris-LaGuardia Act Bars This Court from Issuing an Injunction to End the Lockout As the League used in Brady, a lockout is a refusal by an employer to furnish available work to its regular employees. Id. at 674. A lockout is a tool used by an employer for the purpose of either resisting the employees demands or gaining a concession. Id. at 674. This tool fits within the framework of Section 4(a) of the NLGA, which states, No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment. 29 U.S.C. 104(a). Section 4(a) forbids courts to enjoin work stoppages in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute. West Gulf Maritime Ass n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 726 (5 th Cir. 1985). Although Section 4(a) affords less protection to employers, Congress did not strip employers of all power. Brady at 678. Just as a union can employ a strike to induce bargaining for a new contract, an employer can institute a lockout. A lockout is a labor dispute tool aimed at refusing to remain in any relation of employment. The NBA and its collective club owners are curtailing their involvement with the players because of the cessation of the collective bargaining agreement. Their goal is to gain concession by the players and bring the players back to the negotiating table. Pursuant to Section 4(a), the court cannot issue an 13

14 injunction to restrain this labor dispute tactic. As in Brady, the NLGA precludes this Court from issuing an injunction. In the alternative, Petitioner argues that Section 4(a) only protects the actions of a union. Section 4 extends to those labor negotiating tactics, such as strikes, employed by unions. The Petitioner misconstrues Section 4 as being pro-labor statute. However, this Court has continued to give a broad application of this statute to all matters in a labor dispute. The statute applies even-handed to both the capital and labor. Because the statute applies to both capital and labor, the statute protects tools employed by the capital to entice negotiation between capital and labor. These tools include lockouts. Therefore, the NLGA bars this Court from issuing an injunction, which restricts the NBA from instituting a lockout. II. The NBA s Lockout is Shielded From Antitrust Scrutiny Based on the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads: Every contract, combination in the form or otherwise, or conspiracy in the restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. 1. The respondent concedes that initiating a league-wide lockout is in violation of the Sherman Act. The respondent, however, contends that the lockout was implemented in the course of collective bargaining and is therefore shielded from antitrust liability by the nonstatutory labor exemption (NSLE). The NSLE exempts certain anti-competitive union-employer activities from antitrust liability to promote ongoing negotiations and remove instability and uncertainty from the bargaining process. In order to qualify for the NSLE, an agreement must satisfy 14

15 three elements: First, the restraint of trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; Second, the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and; Third, the agreement is a product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). This brief will first demonstrate that the NBAPA s disclaimer of interest was insufficient to completely extinguish the collective bargaining relationship with the NBA. Additionally, it will explain how the NSLE was borne out of federal labor policy and meant to promote continued and unimpeded bargaining. Second, it will establish that the NBA s lockout affects mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. And lastly, it will illustrate how the CBA was within bona fide arms-length bargaining between the NBA and NBAPA. Based on these the satisfaction of these three elements, the conclusion will explain that the NSLE was meant to apply to situations just like this. A. The NBAPA s Disclaimer of Interest in Representing the NBA Players was not Sufficient to End the Collective Bargaining Relationship and Therefore the Nonstautory Labor Exemption Remained in Effect. An existing collective bargaining agreement is not always necessary to invoke the NSLE if the parties continue to negotiate and use economic tools to bring about legitimate compromise. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989). In Powell, nine NFL players and the NFL Players Association argued that the NFL s maintenance of a Right of First Refusal/Compensation policy, contained in a 1982 collective bargaining agreement, was an unlawful restraint on free trade once the agreement expired. Id. at More specifically, the players argued that once the 1982 agreement expired, the NSLE no longer applied and the agreement became subject to antitrust liability. Id. at The Powell court opined that the end of a collective 15

16 bargaining agreement does not necessarily destroy the NSLE. Id. at While refusing to name a specific point in time when the NSLE might expire, the Powell court pointed out that it is Congress s intention that labor disputes be governed by the National Labor Relations Board and not by antitrust courts. Id. at The court held that as long as an ongoing collective bargaining relationship exists, the NSLE remains in effect. Id. at In the present case, the NBA and NBAPA continued their negotiations right up to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. The NBAPA s decision to disclaim its representative authority was simply used for bargaining leverage in the course of ongoing negotiations. The disclaimer and subsequent lockout were not sufficient to extinguish the parties ongoing bargaining relationship. As the Powell court explained, the NSLE is meant to shield these types of collective bargaining maneuvers to be governed by the NLRB and not the antitrust courts. The Players, in the present case, argue that the NSLE expired upon the NBAPA s disclaimer of interest, unlike the players in Powell who focused on the expiration of the CBA. It is clear, however, that Powell was mainly concerned with whether an ongoing bargaining relationship still exists beyond the apparent end of one. Similar to the situation in Powell, it appeared as if the collective bargaining relationship was terminated in the present case. The NBAPA s disclaimer of interest, however, came just eight hours before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Prior to the disclaimer notice, the NBAPA and NBA had bargained for two years over a new CBA. The NBAPA s actions to disclaim interest appear insufficient to completely extinguish a twoyear bargaining relationship with the NBA. 16

17 The bargaining relationship continues and the NSLE applies if there are any claims pending with the NLRB. Id. at The Powell court held that allowing the players to file an antitrust claim would be subversive to congressional policy. Id. The Powell court laid forth several options that either team could use upon reaching a stalemate: continued bargaining, use of economic force and to filing a claim with the NLRB. Id. The court held that if there is a possibility the issue could be commenced before the NLRB then the bargaining relationship continues until final resolution. Id. On October 12, the day after the disclaimer and expiration of the CBA, the NBA filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB. The NBA alleged that the NBAPA s disclaimer was merely a sham used as an economic tool in the bargaining process. The Powell court explicitly listed filing a claim with the NLRB as an option in a labor dispute. According to Powell, since the claim remains unsettled, the bargaining relationship between the parties still exists and the exemption applies to the lockout. The NSLE continues to apply as long as antitrust intervention would hamper the ongoing collective bargaining negotiations. Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). In Brown, the NFL Players Union and the Team Owners bargained over a wage issue until they reached impasse. Id. at 233. Upon reaching impasse, the owners unilaterally imposed their last offer and the players subsequently filed an antitrust lawsuit. Id. The court held that impasses are often temporary and indistinguishable from bargaining tactics. Id. at 245. Furthermore, employers risk antitrust liability if they believe the impasse had not been reached or unfair labor charges if they stall negotiations. Id. at 246. This frustrates the purpose of the exemption, which is to promote continued bargaining and negotiation. Id. at 241. The court reasoned that it is 17

18 necessary to focus on the exemption s rationale rather than specific language that runs contrary to it. Id. at 243. The court also reasoned that the dispute had taken place during and immediately after the collective bargaining relationship and that it grew directly out of that relationship. Id. at 250. The court noted that the NSLE would not always apply if there has been a sufficient time and distance from the collective bargaining process. Id. Furthermore, the Brown court ruled that the NSLE is not restricted to employerunion agreements in collective bargaining. Id. at 243. Such a restriction, the court reasoned, would fail to encompass court-approved unilateral actions such as lockouts that can be used as tools in the bargaining process. Id. at 244. The court ruled that both parties consent to an agreement is unnecessary to invoke the NSLE because no one would expect an opposing party to consent to such measures as a lockout. Id. at In the present case, the NBA initiated a lockout as a bargaining tactic in a labor dispute. Similar to the NFL in Brown, the NBA made its strategic move once negotiations with the players had stalled. In fact, the NBAPA made its own strategic move when it disclaimed representation on the day of the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Both the NBA and the NBAPA invoked these tactics to leverage their bargaining position. These strategies, like those in Brown, should be free from antitrust liability because they promote continued bargaining and negotiation. The NSLE s rationale is to protect the same sort of ongoing bargaining that occurred in the present case. Although the lockout was unilaterally imposed by the NBA, it is still protected under the NSLE as a recognized tool in labor disputes. The petitioner may argue that the Brown decision is not applicable to the present case because it dealt with an impasse and not a union disclaimer. Although an impasse is 18

19 a legally recognized issue in collective bargaining, Brown s reasoning has a broader application. Looking at the exemptions rationale, as the Brown court directed, it is clear that its application is based on the particular facts of each case rather than impasse alone. The Brown court s decision did not hinge on the term impasse but rather on the facts of the specific conduct at hand. The existence of a collective bargaining relationship for purposes of the NSLE depends on whether the majority of the union supports a single unit for bargaining purposes. McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 884 (D. Minn. 1991). The McNeil court held that NLRB decertification and judicial determination are not solely determinative of whether a collective bargaining unit still exists. Id. Rather, the determination hinges on whether the majority of employees still support a union as their representative in collective bargaining negotiations. Id. The McNeil court ruled that the triggering event destroying the NSLE is when the collective bargaining relationship between the players union and employers ceases to exist. Id. In the present case, the NBAPA took polls before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement to see if a majority of players wanted to disband the union. The majority of players did not directly vote to disband the union. Instead, the majority of players voted to endorse whatever decision the NBAPA thought was the best. Essentially, the players turned to their union and asked it to act as their agent in choosing a new course of action. Although the NBAPA chose to disclaim interest, it did so on behalf of the players acting as their representative. This is the type of action that McNeil addressed. By placing their interests in the hands of the NBAPA, the players continued to endorse a union to bargain on their behalf. The disclaimer was a strategic move 19

20 implemented by the NBAPA. Under McNeil, the Players were still using the NBAPA to bargain and therefore the collective bargaining relationship still existed. The Players may argue that regardless of how the disclaimer decision was reached, it is a disclaimer nonetheless. It is true that the McNeil decision was not based on temporal restrictions but rather on the relationship between the bargaining parties. What McNeil established, however, was that the word disclaimer is insufficient, by itself, to extinguish the bargaining relationship. If the NBAPA continued to serve as the players representative beyond the disclaimer notice then the NSLE still applied. In the present case, the NBAPA bargained for two years up until the day of the CBA expiration. It does not appear that the NBAPA s disclaimer alone was enough to completely extinguish the parties multiyear bargaining relationship. An Employer risks unfair labor charges if it refuses to collectively bargain with a union. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969). There are no specific requirements to successfully establish union representation. Id. A union entity must simply offer convincing evidence that the majority of employees support it as their representative. Id. Upon a satisfactory showing of this evidence, the employer must engage in collective bargaining or risk unfair labor liability. Id. The Players argue that a disclaimer of interest is not simply a bargaining tactic because by doing so, they abandon certain labor rights. Specifically, they argue that after dissolution, the NBA can impose unilateral conditions that do not violate antitrust laws. With this murky standard for union recognition, however, the NBA faces both antitrust and unfair labor liability if they misinterpret the union s status. This uncertainty over the union s status could lead to stalled negotiations. In the present case, a majority of players 20

21 voted in favor of letting the NBAPA act in their best interests. This election could appear to be affirming union representation even though the union chose to disclaim interest. The election puts the NBA in a precarious situation to the advantage of the players. The NSLE was created to remove this sort of uncertainty from the bargaining relationship to promote the furtherance of bargaining. A common theme throughout all the cited cases is the policy reasons for the creation of the NSLE. The NSLE has been accepted to promote continued negotiations and to prevent uncertainty and instability from entering the bargaining process. Furthermore, courts have a preference for labor disputes to be settled by the NLRB rather than antitrust courts, as it is better apt to handle the niceties of labor law. This policy would be ineffective if a union could extinguish a multiyear bargaining relationship simply by disclaiming interest the day the agreement is due to expire. With this freedom, unions could introduce just the sort uncertainty into the bargaining process that the NSLE was created to prevent. B. The Owners Lockout Concerns A Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining Because it Affects the Players Right To Work, Their Wages, and The Terms and Conditions of Their Employment. A mandatory subject of collective bargaining is determined by its practical effect on the parties involved. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976). The Mackey court cited 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, which states that mandatory subjects of collective bargaining pertain to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Id. In Mackey, the court examined whether the NSLE applied to the Rozelle Rule which dealt with NFL free agency. Id. at On its face, the Rozelle Rule did not fall under a mandatory subject as set forth in 21

22 the NLRA. The court, however, held that the free agency restrictions affected players salaries and therefore was indirectly a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Id. at 615. Although the NBA s lockout is does not directly fall under the NLRA s definition of a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, it affects several issues which do. The lockout affects the players ability to work and earn wages among other terms and conditions of employment. Like the Rozelle Rule in Mackey, the lockout indirectly affects the mandatory subjects in the purview of 8(d) of the NLRA. Furthermore, the lockout was implemented specifically to affect these mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. C. The Owners Lockout Affects Subjects Bargained for By Both Parties Throughout the Collective Bargaining Negotiations Making Them Products of Bona Fide Arms-Length Bargaining. To qualify as a product of bona fide arms-length collective bargaining, both management and labor must have equal bargaining power over the agreement in question. Mackey, 543 F.3d at In Mackey, the court found that the players stood in an unequal bargaining position with the NFL concerning the Rozelle Rule. Id. The court reasoned that the Rozelle Rule remained relatively unchanged since the NFL first introduced it in Id. Ultimately, the court held that the Rozelle Rule was unilaterally imposed by the NFL and failed to be a product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. Id. In the present case, the owners and the NBAPA negotiated over a new collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining is just that, both sides bargain over an agreement. Unlike the negotiations in Mackey, there is nothing in the record to reflect 22

23 that this collective bargaining was overly one-sided. Both sides negotiated up to the expiration of the agreement and now both have implemented economic strategies. CONCLUSION The NLGA bars this Court from issuing an injunction enjoining the NBA from instituting the lockout. The NLGA provides a shelter from judicial oversight when the dispute grows out a discrepancy between capital and labor. A discrepancy between the NBA and the NBPA arose when the NBA decided not to keep the former CBA. The NBA wants to negotiate the terms and conditions of the new CBA. In order to entice the cooperation of the players, which were formerly represented by the NBPA, the NBA instituted a lockout. This lockout is a protected labor tactic under the NLGA, specifically under Section 4(a). Therefore, this Court should remain free from the economic interplays of a free market by refusing to issue an injunction and allow the NBA and players to negotiate a new contract. The NSLE shields the NBA lockout from antitrust liability. The lockout was initiated just one day after the collective bargaining agreement expired. Although the NBAPA had issued a disclaimer notice eight hours before the CBA s expiration, it continued to act as the players representative. There was not sufficient time and distance to show that the collective bargaining relationship had ended. The NBA, like the players, simply sought to implement a recognized economic tool to leverage their bargaining position. Furthermore, the a majority of the players voted to give the NBAPA the authority to do what it thought was in the players best interests, demonstrating that the NBAPA continued to act on their behalf. 23

24 The NSLE was created out of federal labor law and case precedent in an effort to promote bargaining and keep labor disputes out of antitrust courts. Uncertainty and instability in the bargaining process causes negotiations to stall for fear of liability. The NSLE helps keeps this uncertainty out of the bargaining process and in turn, encourages resolution. Based on the specific facts of the case and the policy behind the NSLE, it is apparent that the NBA s lockout should be shielded from antitrust liability. 24