ENTRANCE FOR EXECUTIVES

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1 ENTRANCE FOR EXECUTIVES WORKSHOP, 22 ND 23 RD APRIL ROOM TEATRO NCAS INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES SETTLEMENTS AND REMEDIES IMPOSED BY NCAS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ( ) Mr. Mario Siragusa I. Introduction The panel I have the honour and pleasure to introduce focuses on crucial enforcement powers granted to national competition authorities ( NCAs ) in the framework of the so-called modernization of EU competition law, namely, (i) the power to negotiate with the undertaking(s) involved in an investigation in order to close it through negotiated procedures (such as commitment and settlement decisions) and (ii) the power to impose structural and/or behavioural remedies. With respect to the decision-making powers granted to NCAs, a major step has been made as you all know by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 ( Regulation 1/2003 ). 1 Such Regulation has introduced a new legislative framework for the enforcement of EU competition rules, based on their full direct applicability both in the EU and at the national level. The decision-making powers granted by Regulation 1/2003 allow the EU Commission and NCAs to continue developing and enforcing an effective competition policy throughout the EU. It is not an overstatement to say that NCAs have gained in recent years a key role in the EU competition law landscape as primary enforcers of competition rules. Focus has progressively shifted from the EU Commission (and, accordingly, from a centralized public enforcement) to NCAs, as established by the principle of subsidiarity. 1 ( ) This outline partially reflects a presentation given by Mr. Mario Siragusa during the 10 th Annual Conference of the Global Competition Law Centre ( GCLC ): The Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003: Procedural convergence and other outstanding issues to increase Coherence and Effectiveness, held in Brussels on November 6-7, The presentation was further developed and updated in a paper by Mr. Mario Siragusa and Mr. Alessandro Bardanzellu: Power to issue positive decisions; power to adopt commitment decisions and to impose fines for non compliance with commitments; power to adopt remedies, structural or behavioral, included in the volume 10 Years of Regulation 1/2003: Challenges and Reform - GCLC Annual Conference Series, edited by Massimo Merola, Nicolas Petit and José Rivas, Bruylant, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, , pp

2 In fact, the role of NCAs as enforcers of EU competition rules has been greatly enhanced, 2 also through the mentioned power to adopt commitment decisions and impose remedies (either structural or behavioral). These instruments are intended not only to ensure an effective antitrust enforcement, but also to favor a uniform application of competition rules at both the EU and national level, thereby promoting convergence. Moreover, in order to strengthen its enforcement policy against cartels, in 2008 the EU Commission adopted a Notice providing for the possibility to close cartel proceedings through settlements. 3 Commitment decisions and settlements in cartel proceedings share a common rationale, i.e. allowing competition authorities to better allocate their internal resources and avoid full-fledged investigations/proceedings in certain cases, thus benefiting from efficiencies in both expense and time that can be deployed elsewhere. From this standpoint, commitment decisions and settlements are both negotiated remedies (in fact, doctrine often identifies them both as settlement procedures 4 ). However, the two instruments do not overlap, because their scope of application is different: settlement only applies to cartel cases, while commitment decisions (as Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 reminds us) are not apt for serious competition law infringements. The pervasive decision-making powers of Regulation 1/2003 have not been fully exploited to date. Member States have traditionally enjoyed a wide discretion in the implementation of these legal powers. It follows that national differences still exist in Member States competition law systems. These procedural and substantive divergences still impair the achievement of a fully coherent competition law system within the EU. II. Commitment Decisions Art. 9 and Art. 5 of Regulation 1/2003 grant the EU Commission and NCAs, respectively, the power to accept commitments offered by undertakings subject to an Art. 101 or Art. 102 TFEU investigation, to make them binding and to close proceedings without ascertaining any infringements. 2 See, e.g., Recital 6 ( [i]n order to ensure that the Community competition rules are applied effectively, the competition authorities of the Member States should be associated more closely with their application. To this end, they should be empowered to apply Community law ) and Recital 7 of Regulation 1/2003 ( [n]ational courts have an essential part to play in applying the Community competition rules. When deciding disputes between private individuals, they protect the subjective rights under Community law, for example by awarding damages to the victims of infringements. The role of the national courts here complements that of the competition authorities of the Member States. They should therefore be allowed to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in full ). 3 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, OJ C 167, , pp W.P.J. Wils, The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement Objectives and Principles, in World Competition, 2008 (31), n. 3, p. 5. 2

3 Commitments, which, as said, typically allow competition authorities to save resources and time for (more serious) infringements that may require the imposition of a pecuniary fine, play a relevant role in the enforcement practice of NCAs. It is difficult to find updated data concerning the effective incidence of commitment decisions at the national level. In the Staff Working Document Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, the EU Commission noted that, from May 2004 to December 2013, commitment decisions adopted by NCAs accounted for 23% of all envisaged decisions submitted by the NCAs to the EU Commission, pursuant to Art. 11(4) of Regulation 1/ This shows a widespread use of this legal tool. In the field of commitments several differences still exist at the national level, which impair full convergence. I want to focus my analysis on five main issues: (i) power to adopt commitment decisions; (ii) when commitment decisions are appropriate; (iii) substantial assessment of commitments offered by undertakings; (iv) procedures governing the adoption of commitment decisions; and (v) sanctions for noncompliance with commitments. (i) Power to adopt commitment decisions Currently, all NCAs have the discretional power (i.e., they are not obliged) to accept commitments voluntarily offered by undertakings. This represents a clear example of convergence. 6 (ii) When it is appropriate to adopt commitment decisions Both at the EU and national level, full convergence still does not exist as to when (i.e., in which cases) the adoption of a commitment decision would be appropriate. Pursuant to Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, commitment decisions are not appropriate in case of serious infringements, i.e., when the EU Commission deems it opportune to impose a fine. In these cases, the deterrent effect (i.e., the need to punish the undertaking s conduct) prevails over the possibility to accept commitments and speedily close proceedings. At the national level, the principle set forth in Recital 13 has been generally recognized. In particular, in the majority of jurisdictions, most of the serious competition law infringements are a priori excluded from the scope of application of commitment decisions. 7 5 See the Commission Staff Working Document Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 230 final, 196. Pursuant to Art. 11(4) of Regulation 1/2003, No later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption Regulation, the competition authorities of the Member States shall inform the Commission. 6 Commitment decisions constitute a prime example of procedural convergence based on inspiration from the EU model and the cross-fertilisation of ideas supported by multilateral cooperation : see the Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 230 final, See the Decision-Making Powers Report adopted by the ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, October , p. 29, available online at 3

4 However, to date, with the exception of cartels (i.e., Art. 101 TFEU hard-core restrictions), full convergence does not still exist as to what constitutes serious infringements. More specifically, some jurisdictions merely recall the principle set forth in Recital 13 and generally exclude the applicability of commitments when a prohibition decision (e.g., Spain) or the imposition of a fine (e.g., France, Germany and Denmark) is deemed appropriate. Other jurisdictions explicitly exclude from commitment decisions also: (i) the most serious abuses of dominant position (e.g., Bulgaria, France and the UK); (ii) infringements that already produced effects (e.g., Czech Republic, Spain); (iii) infringements whose aim is to restrict competition (e.g., the Netherlands). 8 Clearly identifying what cases could be (at least in principle) closed through commitment decisions would ensure convergence at the national level and avoid exploitative or contradictory uses of commitments. In fact: o As noted, currently, most NCAs are granted broad discretion in identifying cases in which the adoption of a commitment decision is appropriate. This legal uncertainty can potentially lead to an exploitation of the commitment procedure by competition authorities, which may force, under the threat of a heavy fine, concerned undertakings to offer commitments even in cases where no clear or serious (prima facie) competition law violation had occurred. Therefore, in these cases, commitments would be an undertaking s only choice to avoid the risk of a fine, rather than constituting a direct up-front remedy to resolve the alleged anticompetitive concerns; o Pursuant to Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, the dichotomy commitment visà-vis heavy fine should be avoided in principle. In fact, proceedings where an undertaking is potentially exposed to a fine (i.e., proceedings in connection with serious antitrust violations), are not candidates ex lege for a commitment decision. Conversely, commitments constitute a valid legal tool only when they meet the preliminary concerns of the competition authorities and render no longer opportune any further action. (iii) Substantial assessment of commitments offered by undertakings The substantial assessment of commitments offered by undertakings also raises some convergence issues. In general, as laid down in Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, commitments should be accepted if they meet the prima facie competition concerns raised by competition authorities. However, there is no certainty as to the criteria which should be used, in practice, when assessing a commitment s ability to meet competition concerns. This lack of guidance can easily lead to divergences between national approaches. o For instance, in Italy, the Regional Administrative Court ( TAR Lazio ) adopted a rather stringent (and innovative) approach to assessing commitments offered by an undertaking subject to Art. 102 TFEU proceedings, and held that commitments could not be accepted in connection with a conduct 8 See the Decision-Making Powers Report adopted by the ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, cited above, p

5 that already produced its (allegedly) anticompetitive effects, unless such commitments could retroactively remove these effects. 9 However, on appeal, the judgment was annulled by the Supreme Administrative Court ( Consiglio di Stato ), which adopted a different (and, probably, more traditional ) approach. The Court clarified that the commitments ability to cure the anticompetitive effects already produced by the contested conduct was not an essential requirement, the lack of which prevents the Italian Competition Authority ( ICA ) from accepting the commitments and closing the investigation without ascertaining any infringement. 10 With respect to the criteria governing the assessment of commitments, a higher degree of convergence could in principle be ensured by the cooperation within the European Competition Network ( ECN ). The aim should be to avoid possible divergences in the outcome of competition procedures which are conducted by different NCAs. Such divergences are particularly negative with respect to enforcement tools, such as commitment decisions. o The recent Booking case is a clear example of the above. 11 The case arose from parallel investigations in the online hotel booking sector initiated by a number of NCAs, concerning specifically the use by online travel agents (among which Booking.com) of the so-called price parity clauses (or best price clauses) in arrangements with hotels. As a result of these national investigations, commitments submitted by Booking.com were accepted by the ICA, the French Autorité de la concurrence and the Swedish Konkurrensverket, respectively. These NCAs thereby closed proceedings by making binding an identical set of commitments on Booking.com. o However, with respect to parallel proceedings initiated in Germany, the Bundeskartellamt chose to adopt an independent position, refusing to accept the same commitments. In December 2015, the Bundeskartellamt issued a prohibition decision, finding that the best price clauses affecting arrangements with hotels in Germany applied by Booking.com violated Art. 101 TFEU and thus were null and void. 12 The possibility for the NCAs to adopt divergent approaches with respect to identical commitments offered by undertakings involved in parallel proceedings, as in the 9 See the judgment of the TAR Lazio No. 3964/2011, Conto TV v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. 10 See the judgment of the Consiglio di Stato No. 4773/2014, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Conto TV. 11 See decisions of adopted, respectively, by the ICA ( the French Competition Authority ( and the Swedish Competition Authority ( 12 See press release: html?nn=

6 Booking case, also stems from the non-binding functioning of the ECN. 13 Accordingly, another possible way to achieve a higher degree of convergence among NCAs enforcement activities could be enhancing the cooperation within the ECN. (iv) Procedures governing the adoption of commitment decisions Regulation 1/2003 does not govern the procedures for the adoption of commitment decisions, which are typically devolved to the national regimes. In most jurisdictions, similarly to the EU system, there is no procedural time limit for offering commitments (see, e.g., Germany, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, where an application for commitments can be filed until an infringement decision has been adopted). Other EU Member States introduced specific time-frames in which to present commitments. For instance, in France, commitments can be offered only before the adoption of the Statement of Objections ( SO ), while in Slovenia they can be offered only before the expiry of the deadline for submitting a reply to the SO. In Greece, a proposal for commitment cannot be made at a late stage of the procedure. In the Czech Republic, a commitment proposal may be presented only after the adoption of the SO. In Italy, Art. 14-ter of Law No. 287/90 requires companies to offer commitments within three months from the notification of the decision opening the investigation. 14 More convergence would be desirable in connection with procedural time limits for offering commitments set forth at the national level. This is even more true in cases where an undertaking is subject to parallel investigations in more than one national jurisdictions (e.g., in Italy, where you can offer commitments in the early stage of the investigation only, and in Germany, where commitments can be presented in any phase of the proceedings). (v) Sanctions for non-compliance with commitments In case of non-compliance with commitments, Art. 23(2)(c) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that the EU Commission (and the NCAs) may impose a fine on the undertaking(s) concerned. This fine can run up to 10% of the undertaking s total turnover in the preceding business year. Pursuant to Art. 24(1)(c) of Regulation 1/2003, it is also possible to impose periodic penalty payments (not exceeding 5% of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year) to compel undertakings to comply with commitments made binding by an Art. 9 decision. To date, however, this provision has never been applied at the EU level. 13 See Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, , pp , particularly, point 13: [t]he authorities dealing with a case in parallel action will endeavour to coordinate their action to the extent possible (emphasis added). 14 However, the Italian courts clarified that the 3-month deadline did not have a preclusive or mandatory nature and could be departed from based on a case-by-case analysis (see the judgment of the Consiglio di Stato No. 4773/2014, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Conto TV). Moreover, the ICA, in its guidelines on the application of Art. 14-ter of Law No. 287/90 clarified that, in exceptional cases, and on the basis of a justified and timely request of a party, commitments offered after the expiry of the three-month deadline could still be accepted. 6

7 Convergence in connection with the powers granted to NCAs to ensure compliance with commitments has not been fully achieved at the national level. There are still some NCAs (namely, the Estonian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian and UK authorities) that have no power to impose fines for non-compliance with commitments. Such divergence shows that some NCAs are better equipped than others, and are fully empowered to ensure enforcement of and compliance with commitments. III. Settlement Decisions The settlement procedure has been introduced in 2008 by the above-mentioned Settlement Notice. In particular, when (one or more) undertakings involved in a cartel investigation is convinced that the EU Commission has built a strong case around the existence of an Art. 101(1) TFEU hard-core violation, they can admit their participation in the infringement and accept liability for it. If and once a common understanding is reached by the EU Commission and the settling undertakings, the latter receive a 10% fine reduction. The rationale behind settlement is to increase procedural economies by handling certain cases in a simplified and expeditious manner, thus allowing the EU Commission to allocate its resources more efficiently, to better tackle other cases which call for deeper investigation. At the EU level, settlements have gained an important role: since the first use of the settlement procedure in 2010 (in the DRAM case) and as of today, the EU Commission has closed proceedings with settlements in 19 investigations, i.e. in about half of the decisions adopted. Moreover, through settlements, the average duration of a cartel case initiated by the EU Commission has decreased from 5 years to 3 years (and is getting shorter). o The successful outcome of settlements proves that the initial concerns on whether the 10% discount was enough to encourage undertakings to settle, especially comparing the EU system with the US one (where the reductions range from 30% to 50%), were ultimately unfounded. o Settlements are typically suitable in cartel proceedings where one or more undertakings have applied for leniency, and, thus, have admitted their participation in an Art. 101(1) TFEU infringement. However, there is no formal link between settlements and leniency, i.e., settlements can be applicable in proceedings initiated ex officio by the Commission. To date, this has happened in the Power Exchanges case only, which was in fact closed by the Commission through settlement, even though no involved undertakings had applied for leniency. 15 At the national level, the picture is (again) quite fragmented. Some Member States simply do not provide for the possibility to settle in cartel cases (e.g. Finland and Italy). Some other jurisdictions, although lacking official guidelines, allow for an informal settlement of a cartel case (e.g., Austria, Cyprus, Lithuania). Finally, some NCAs are formally provided with settlement powers similar to those granted to the EU Commission (see, e.g., Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and 15 See Commission s decision of March 5, 2014, case AT Power Exchanges. 7

8 Slovakia), while including sometimes peculiar aspects (for instance, in the UK settlements are possible also in Art. 102 TFEU cases). Some divergences also exist with respect to the amount of the fine reduction. In fact, while the EU Commission is bound to the statutory 10% discount, some NCAs are granted more discretion. For example, early resolution agreements in the UK have involved fine reductions of up to 35%. In France, settling parties have been granted reductions up to 90% of the envisaged fine, although the recent Notice concerning Antitrust Settlement Procedure, published in February 2014, contemplates a lower (but still quite generous) reduction of up to 25%. In Slovakia, fine reductions can run up to 30% of the fine. The lack of convergence in settlements at the national level may give rise to the same concerns raised by, e.g., the Booking case vis-à-vis the power to adopt commitment decisions. In fact, it is possible that transnational cartel cases be treated in a different manner by two or more NCAs involved. o The risk of divergence is even higher with respect to the so-called hybrid decisions (i.e., cases in which not all the undertakings involved in a cartel agree to settle), where there is a much bigger potential for different outcomes of NCAs parallel investigations, to the detriment of legal certainty. IV. Remedies Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003 entitles the EU Commission (and, in principle, NCAs) to impose, in the context of a prohibition decision, any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. As clearly stated in Art. 7, in imposing remedies, the EU Commission must comply with the principle of proportionality, in order to avoid imposing remedies which go beyond what is required to terminate an infringement and restore competitive conditions in the affected market. To this end, Art. 7 and Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003 establish a sort of hierarchy between behavioural and structural remedies. In particular, structural remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of the undertaking. 16 The stringent proportionality test reduces the scope of applicability of structural remedies under Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003. Scholars generally agree with this approach, since a measure entailing a permanent change in the structure of an undertaking is far more intrusive than a measure merely regulating its behavioural 16 See Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003. The same provision is included in Art. 7, pursuant to which structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. 8

9 conduct. Structural remedies are in fact considered an extrema ratio compared to behavioural ones. In fact, to date, the EU Commission has imposed behavioural remedies only (while it has accepted commitments encompassing structural measures). 17 Again, in the EU, there is not a full degree of convergence with respect to the powers to impose remedies in prohibition decisions granted to NCAs. In particular, according to the relevant national legislations, the large majority of NCAs are explicitly entitled to impose both behavioural and structural remedies. In addition, similar to Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003, in some jurisdictions (e.g., Bulgaria, Spain, Malta), structural remedies may only be imposed where there is no behavioural remedy which would have an equivalent effect or where such behavioural remedy would be more onerous for the undertaking. Even though, as just noted, the large majority of national systems are convergent with Regulation 1/2003, there are still a few NCAs which are allowed to adopt behavioural remedies only (e.g., the Danish and Lithuanian authorities) or are not at all granted with the power to impose remedies (i.e., the Finnish and Polish authorities). Finally, in some national jurisdictions, the power to impose remedies is not clearly spelled out. This is for instance the case in Italy, where Art. 15(1) of Law No. 287/90 only empowers the ICA to order the undertakings concerned to bring the infringement to an end within a certain term. However, in practice, the ICA has exercised the prerogatives granted by Art. 15(1) above also to impose (behavioural and structural) remedies. The overview above reveals a lack of convergence in (some of) the EU Member States national systems. Full convergence at the national level would, in fact, strengthen legal certainty for undertakings, again by limiting the risk of different treatment in case of parallel investigations in different jurisdictions (e.g., in case of abuse of dominance proceedings, dominant undertakings may be currently exposed to structural remedies in some countries only). 18 Accordingly, in those jurisdictions where full convergence with the EU system has not yet been achieved, national legislative provisions granting the NCAs the same power to impose remedies conferred to the EU Commission by Regulation 1/2003 would be desirable, also with the aim to limit the NCAs discretion. In any event, lacking an explicit and clear legislative framework, NCAs should exercise their power to impose behavioural and structural remedies (when granted) in an EU-oriented manner. In this respect, the role of national courts in the judicial review of NCAs decisions is also crucial to enhancing coherence and effectiveness within the EU. o In particular, Italy constitutes a significant example of how national courts can shape the NCAs use of remedies and increase convergence. As already noted, the ICA has no explicit power to impose remedies. However, the ICA has 17 This approach is different from remedies adopted in the context of merger control proceedings, where structural remedies are normally considered the most effective tool to ensure that a proposed concentration does not substantially lessen competition. 18 See the ECN Recommendation on the Power to Impose Structural Remedies, December 2013, 7, available online at 9

10 imposed both behavioural and structural remedies to undertakings in prohibition decisions. 19 The Italian administrative courts endorsed this practice, recognizing that the power to impose remedies in the context of infringement decisions is inherent to the role played by the ICA in the enforcement of competition rules at the national level. 20 o However, the lack of a provision explicitly granting the ICA the power to impose remedies also results in the absence of any explicit proportionality criterion in the choice of the remedy to be adopted. This led the ICA to impose structural remedies in prohibition decisions, without any assessment under the proportionality principle. 21 However, in these cases, on appeal, the Italian administrative courts did not endorse the ICA s approach and annulled the decisions at stake. 22 As noted above, in these cases, the judicial review of the national administrative courts was therefore able to increase coherence between the EU and national systems in connection with the imposition of remedies in infringement decisions. V. Conclusive Remarks Convergence among Member States in EU competition law enforcement policies has been significantly improved in the modernization of EU competition law. In particular, the powers Regulation 1/2003 granted to NCAs in deciding cases remain crucial to ensuring an effective enforcement of competition policy throughout the EU. However, mostly from a procedural standpoint, convergence between Member States has not been fully achieved. In fact, as we have seen, a general application of the legal tools and powers introduced by Regulation 1/2003 is counter-balanced by sometimes divergent national procedures and regulations, resulting in potentially ambiguous and non-coherent scenarios. Divergence in procedures and competition law enforcement reduces legal certainty and often increases legal costs for undertakings, thus having a highly detrimental impact on business activities of companies operating within the EU. In light of this, as stated by the EU Commission in its Communication on the Ten Years of Enforcement of Regulation 1/2003, 23 the major challenge for the future is the achievement of further convergence in antitrust enforcement. The active role of EU Member States both alone and in the forum of the ECN will be decisive, especially in recognizing that a uniform application of EU and national competition 19 See, ex multis, ICA decisions of July 29, 2004, No , case I559, Mercato del calcestruzzo and of April 26, 2006, No , case I603, Gas tecnici industriali e medicali See, e.g., the judgment of the TAR Lazio No.1542/2008, Mercato dello zolfo grezzo. See ICA decisions of June 14, 2006, No , case I641, Rifornimenti aeroportuali, and of April 26, 2006, No , case I603, Gas tecnici industriali e medicali. 22 See, e.g., the judgment of the TAR Lazio No. 1733/2007, Rifornimenti aeroportuali; and the judgment of the Consiglio di Stato No. 1006/2008, Gas tecnici. 23 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM(2014) 453 final. 10

11 law from both a substantive and procedural standpoint will contribute to the economic growth and stability of the Union. A greater convergence would contribute to strengthening an already effective enforcement system within the EU, under the direction and supervision of the EU Commission. Moreover, such result would be highly advisable in the context of the EU 28: it is obvious that the risks of a lack of harmonization are amplified in a wider Europe. Conclusively and I would say, positively a strong and recent signal of the growing crucial role of NCAs may be found in the public consultation launched by the EU Commission in November Through such initiative, the EU Commission aimed at promoting a general debate on the means to boost enforcement powers of the NCAs. Interestingly, one of the points under consultation was indeed whether NCAs have an adequate competition toolbox to detect and tackle infringements. The EU Commission is in fact conscious that, although NCAs have acquired a key role in enforcing competition law in the EU, there is still room for improvement. 25 I am confidend that the outcome of this public consultation will contribute to increase convergence at the national level. Thank you very much for your attention. I will now leave the floor to my colleagues See See press release: 11