In The Supreme Court of the United States

Transcription

1 No. ================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States LOUIS A. BIANCHI, individually and in his official capacity as McHenry County State s Attorney, MICHAEL P. COMBS, individually and in his official capacity as McHenry County Assistant State s Attorney, COUNTY OF McHENRY, and McHENRY COUNTY STATE S ATTORNEY S OFFICE, v. Petitioners, KIRK CHRZANOWSKI, Respondent On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI DONNA KATHRYN KELLY Counsel of Record GEORGE M. HOFFMAN OFFICE OF THE MCHENRY COUNTY STATE S ATTORNEY 2200 North Seminary Avenue Woodstock, Illinois dkkelly@co.mchenry.il.us (815) Telephone Attorneys for Petitioners ================================================================ COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800)

2 i QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. When an assistant state s attorney testified against the State s Attorney pursuant to a subpoena, concerning alleged improper influence by the State s Attorney as to a plea agreement entered into between the assistant state s attorney and a defense attorney, was the assistant state s attorney acting within his job duties such that his speech was not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? 2. Were the contours of any First Amendment protections that might have attached to the assistant state s attorney s testimony sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official would understand that by taking adverse employment action against the assistant state s attorney, the official s actions would be violating the assistant state s attorney s free speech right?

3 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED... i TABLE OF CONTENTS... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... iv OPINIONS BELOW... 1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION... 1 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI- SIONS INVOLVED... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE... 3 REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT... 6 I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO CORRECT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT S MISAPPLICA- TION OF GARCETTI AND TO CLARIFY THAT A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DOES NOT HAVE A FREE SPEECH RIGHT WHEN THE TESTIMONY IS RELATED TO HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES... 8 II. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE RIGHT ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN INFRINGED WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED WHERE THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE DIVID- ED ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IS ACTING PUR- SUANT TO HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AS OPPOSED TO ACTING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN WHEN HE GIVES SWORN TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY CONCLUSION... 18

4 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued Page TABLE OF APPENDICES Appendix A Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Dated and Decided on August 2, App. 1 Appendix B Order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, Dated and Filed on July 6, App. 20 Appendix C Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 8.3 and App. 29 Appendix D First Amended Complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, on April 4, App. 33

5 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)... 6 Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009) Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)... passim Green v. Barrett, 226 F.App x 883 (11th Cir. 2007)... 14, 15 In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531 (1988)... 9 Kiehle v. County of Cortland, 486 F.App x 222 (2d Cir. 2012) Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008) Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008)... 15, 16, 17 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES United States Constitution, Amendment I... passim 28 U.S.C U.S.C U.S.C. 1343(a) U.S.C U.S.C , 4, 5, ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1)... 8

6 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued Page Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6)... 5 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule , 8-9 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule , 8-9

7 1 OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reported at 2013 WL (7th Cir., August 2, 2013) (App. at 1). The Seventh Circuit reversed the July 6, 2012, judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which had dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The District Court s opinion is reported at 2012 WL (App. at 20) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION This Court s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S. 1254(1). The Seventh Circuit s opinion was rendered on August 2, 2013 (App. at 1) CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Constitution of the United States, Amendment I Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

8 Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983 Civil Action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purpose of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 2 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (See App. at for the below rules set forth in their entirety) RULE 8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct A lawyer possessing knowledge not otherwise protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law that another lawyer has committed a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4) shall report such knowledge

9 3 to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation. * * * RULE 8.4 Misconduct (a) A lawyer shall not: * * * (3) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; * * * STATEMENT OF THE CASE Respondent, Kirk Chrzanowski, claims that he was discharged from his employment as an assistant state s attorney in McHenry County, Illinois, in retaliation for his testimony against the State s Attorney of McHenry County (App. at 33-52). The subject matter of Chrzanowski s testimony related to a plea agreement that Chrzanowski had negotiated with an assistant public defender (App. at 53-83). Chrzanowski had been assigned to handle the drug prosecution of Jeremy Reid (App. at 56). During the pendency of the Reid case, Chrzanowski engaged in plea negotiations with Reid s court-appointed counsel, and ultimately the two attorneys presented a fully-negotiated

10 4 plea agreement to a judge for entry (App. at 58-67). Pursuant to that negotiated plea agreement, Reid pled guilty to a felony drug offense and was sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections (App. at 66-67). Chrzanowski later testified, pursuant to a subpoena, before a grand jury concerning an allegation that petitioner, Louis Bianchi, the McHenry County State s Attorney, had improperly influenced the negotiated plea deal in the Reid case. Bianchi was indicted by the grand jury, and, on August 21, 2011, Chrzanowski testified in the prosecution s case-inchief in the case of People v. Louis A. Bianchi, McHenry County case number 11 CF 169, concerning the plea negotiations of the Reid case (App. at 53-83). On December 2, 2011, Chrzanowski was questioned by Petitioners, Louis Bianchi and Michael Combs (App. at 4). Chrzanowski was questioned by Combs about his grand jury and trial testimony in the case against Bianchi. Id. Bianchi asked for Chrzanowski s resignation and, when he refused to resign, Bianchi terminated him (App. at 5). Following his discharge, Chrzanowski filed a complaint on January 17, 2012, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, invoking federal jurisdiction, by alleging claims arising under 42 U.S.C and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Chrzanowski also included state law claims in his complaint, which were voluntarily dismissed on

11 5 motion of Chrzanowski, subsequent to his filing of a first amended complaint.) The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Chrzanowski s Section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343(a) and 1331, and, over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), and on April 4, 2012, plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint, again alleging claims under 42 U.S.C and the First Amendment (App. at 33). On April 27, 2012, the defendants again moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). On July 6, 2012, the district court dismissed Chrzanowski s claims, on the grounds that he testified pursuant to his official duties as an assistant state s attorney, such that his speech was not protected by the First Amendment; the court also held, alternatively, that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity because any First Amendment protections afforded to Chrzanowski s testimony were not clearly established (App. at 27-28). Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on August 2, 2012 and that Court had jurisdiction over the district court s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C On August 2, 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that Chrzanowski s testimony was not made pursuant to his official duties as a prosecutor and

12 6 that testimony given pursuant to a subpoena is a clearly-established right protected by the First Amendment (App. at 27-28) REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT The Seventh Circuit s affording of First Amendment protections to a prosecutor s testimony concerning a case that the prosecutor handled is an important question of federal law. The Seventh Circuit s misapplication of this Court s analysis in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), has contributed to a confounding inconsistency in First Amendment jurisprudence. The practical result of the Seventh Circuit s departure from this Court s precedent is that an assistant district attorney in Los Angeles County, California is without First Amendment free speech rights when fulfilling his ethical obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but an assistant state s attorney in McHenry County, Illinois is afforded First Amendment free speech protections when testifying concerning discussions he had, observations he made, and actions he took regarding a plea agreement that he negotiated (App. at 53-83). Review by this Court is necessary on this important federal question in order to rectify the conflict between this Court s decision in Garcetti and that of the Seventh Circuit in the instant case. This Court

13 7 should grant certiorari to clarify whether, and under what circumstances, a public employee is entitled to free speech protection when testifying under oath to matters surrounding his employment duties. Furthermore, the courts of appeals are divided on the issue of whether First Amendment protections are automatically triggered when a public employee provides truthful testimony under oath. The Third and Seventh Circuits have opined that sworn testimony by a government employee is protected free speech, whereas the Second and Eleventh Circuits do not afford First Amendment protection to sworn testimony that is made pursuant to the government employee s official duties. Due to this split in the circuits, it cannot be said that any right to free speech in the context of this case was so clearly established that qualified immunity was inapplicable. The district court correctly concluded that any such right was not clearly established (App. at 27). While the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court s conclusion and found instead that it was a clearly established right, such a holding is contradicted by the circuit split and the Seventh Circuit s own muddled case law (App. at 18-19).

14 8 I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO CORRECT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT S MISAPPLICA- TION OF GARCETTI AND TO CLARIFY THAT A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DOES NOT HAVE A FREE SPEECH RIGHT WHEN THE TESTIMONY IS RELATED TO HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the analysis in Garcetti when it rejected the district court s conclusion that Chrzanowski s testimony was without First Amendment protection (App. at 1, et seq.). Specifically, the district court had determined that Chrzanowski s testimony was part of his official duties and responsibilities as an assistant state s attorney because an assistant state s attorney [is] obligated to pursue all criminal offenses, even those allegedly perpetrated by his supervisors.... (App. at 24), citing to 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2010). The district court had also concluded that it was part of [Chrzanowski s] responsibilities to see that the actions of his fellow prosecutors, including Bianchi, were consistent with applicable ethics rules and the appropriate administration of justice (App. at 24-25). The Seventh Circuit erroneously characterized the district court s focus on Chrzanowski s general professional obligations as misguided (App. at 13). Furthermore, the court of appeals ignored altogether the mandatory ethical obligations applicable to Illinois-licensed attorneys set forth in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. See Illinois Rules of

15 9 Professional Conduct, Rules 8.3(a) & 8.4 (2010); In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 541 (1988) (Illinois lawyers have an obligation to report knowledge of alleged conduct by an attorney involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit did acknowledge this Court s holding in Garcetti that [w]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421 (App. at 6). The analysis, however, that the Seventh Circuit employed in attempting to distinguish Garcetti is fatally flawed. 1 Specifically, the Court of Appeals erred when it rejected the notion that Chrzanowski s testimony was made pursuant to his official duties and opined that his official duties as a prosecutor could not be so inclusive as to encompass the proper administration of justice (App. at 8-12). Essentially, the Seventh Circuit found that Chrzanowski was paid simply to prosecute crimes (App. at 10-11), whereas the district court described the duties of a prosecutor as being the service of the 1 During oral argument in this cause, Judge Easterbrook characterized Garcetti as follows: [t]hat s the distinction between Garcetti and the rest of the world. Garcetti says that things you do on the job are not covered by the First Amendment, and things you do off the job are, even if it s the same person. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, , Oral Argument, 4/5/2013,

16 10 people of his county in the proper administration of justice (App. at 24). In rejecting the district court s description of a prosecutor s function, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on Justice Souter s dissent in Garcetti, as well as the majority s comments in addressing that dissent. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (App. at 8, 10). In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit sans a page number citation claimed that the Garcetti Court expressly rejected the argument that job descriptions such as those at issue here (e.g. a general obligation to ensure sound administration of public institutions) could place otherwise protected speech outside the ambit of the First Amendment 2 (App. at 10). This statement is a mischaracterization of this Court s opinion. Toward the end of the Garcetti opinion, this Court addressed dissenting Justice Souter s suggestion not an argument that employers can restrict employees rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424, referring to post, at 1965, n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). There is no allegation in Chrzanowski that an employergenerated job description is at issue and, thus, the 2 The language which the Seventh Circuit included in this sentence without a page citation a general obligation to ensure sound administration does not appear in the majority s opinion. Thus, contrary to the Seventh Circuit s conclusion, there is no indication that the majority in Garcetti disapproved of the use of this type of job description for certain public sector jobs.

17 11 Seventh Circuit mischaracterized the majority s comments in this regard (App. at 10). Indeed, the role of a prosecutor in the criminal justice system is common knowledge amongst the public, such that it is self-evident that a prosecutor should adhere to applicable ethical rules and serve the people of his county in the proper administration of justice. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that there was no difficulty in reaching a determination of the duties of this particular public sector job (App. at 11). However, by reducing the description of a prosecutor s job duties to an excessively narrow description the prosecution of crimes the Seventh Circuit s analysis leads to a vastly different conclusion than this Court s result in Garcetti (App. at 10). In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, who was an assistant district attorney in Los Angeles County, alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated when he suffered adverse employment actions following his authorship of a disposition memorandum which emphasized police misconduct on the part of an affiant of a search warrant. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. This Court held that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protections for the speech included in the disposition memorandum, which Ceballos had prepared pursuant to his official duties as a prosecutor. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at However, if the Seventh Circuit s Chrzanowski analysis were to be applied to the Garcetti case it would change the outcome in Garcetti, for the reasoning would be as follows: Ceballos was not

18 12 paid to investigate inaccuracies in a search warrant affidavit at the request of defense counsel, he was not paid to document the officer s alleged misrepresentations in a memorandum, and he was not paid to testify about those purported falsehoods as a defense witness at a suppression hearing; rather, he was simply paid to prosecute crimes. Thus, under the Seventh Circuit s analysis, Ceballos s speech in his disposition memorandum would receive First Amendment protections a result contrary to this Court s conclusion. Just as this Court found that Ceballos did not act as a private citizen when he wrote his disposition memorandum regarding a pending case, so too, Chrzanowski did not act as a private citizen when he testified at the prosecution of his employer concerning a case for which Chrzanowski was vested with the primary responsibility. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. As demonstrated by the transcript of the prosecution of Louis Bianchi, Chrzanowski s testimony concerned a plea deal on the Jeremy Reid case a plea deal that Chrzanowski negotiated with an assistant public defender (App. 53, et seq.). Chrzanowski s testimony was centered on his communications with the public defender on the Reid case, his discussions with Louis Bianchi about the Reid case, his discussions with his supervisor concerning the Reid case, and his discussions with the arresting officer on the Reid case (App. 53, et seq.). Thus, the content of Chrzanowski s testimony clearly arose out of his duties as an assistant state s attorney in McHenry County.

19 13 As noted by the district court, Chrzanowski s speech was unprotected regardless of whether he was testifying under subpoena, since his duty to cooperate with a criminal prosecution (regardless of the subject of that prosecution) emanated from his duties as a prosecutor and his ethical obligation as an attorney (App. at 27). As this Court held in Garcetti, Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at Furthermore, the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. Accordingly, this Court should grant review to correct the Seventh Circuit s misapplication of Garcetti and to clarify the restrictions on First Amendment protections when a public employee makes a statement pursuant to his official duties.

20 14 II. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE RIGHT ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN INFRINGED WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED WHERE THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IS ACTING PURSUANT TO HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AS OPPOSED TO ACT- ING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN WHEN HE GIVES SWORN TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY. This Court should grant review on this issue of significant constitutional import, since the courts of appeals are divided as to whether First Amendment protections are automatically triggered when a public employee provides truthful testimony under oath. The Third Circuit is in parity with the Seventh Circuit, in that it has held that when a government employee testifies truthfully he is acting as a citizen. Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); accord, Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2009). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit have held that, when a public employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, it is speech unprotected by the First Amendment, irrespective of whether the statements occur during sworn testimony. Green v. Barrett, 226 F.App x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007); Kiehle v. County of Cortland, 486 F.App x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012). In Green, the chief jailer of a county jail testified at a court hearing concerning cell door lock issues and other security deficiencies of the jail. A day later, the

21 15 sheriff fired her. Green, 226 F.App x at 884. The Eleventh Circuit found that the sheriff s firing of Green did not violate her First Amendment right to free speech, because she testified concerning the unsafe conditions of the jail, in her official capacity as chief jailer. Id. at 886. The court went on to further find that, even assuming her speech was protected, this was not clearly established by this Court s precedent, nor the Eleventh Circuit s precedent at the time the sheriff fired Green. Id. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on Green s Section 1983 claim. Id. at 887. So too, in the instant case did the district court properly find that it cannot be said that the right was so clearly established that defendants cannot avail themselves of qualified immunity (App. at 27). That any First Amendment protections which attached to Chrzanowski s speech were not clearly established at the time he testified is made evident by the Seventh Circuit s own precedent, upon which the district court relied. In Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, (7th Cir. 2008), a case factually analogous to the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Interim Administrator of the Illinois Gaming Board was speaking pursuant to her official duties when she testified before the Illinois House Gaming Committee regarding misconduct by the Governor of the State of Illinois and another official. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court s judgment dismissing

22 16 Tamayo s First Amendment claim. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at In Chrzanowski, the district court relied heavily upon Tamayo in reaching its determination that his testimony was not the speech of a private citizen, but rather, that of a public official (App. at 25). The district court noted that the Seventh Circuit had emphasized that Tamayo had a duty to see that the law was administered properly, Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1091, and that Tamayo s responsibility encompassed a duty to bring alleged wrongdoing within her agency to the attention of the relevant public authorities. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1091 (App. at 25). While the district court quoted the Seventh Circuit s language in Tamayo accurately, the Seventh Circuit in Chrzanowski retreated from its words in an attempt to distinguish Tamayo, by stating its holding did not rest on these broad and general characterizations of Tamayo s duties (App. at 18). Irrespective of the fact that the broad and general characterizations were the court s own words, the Seventh Circuit explained its Tamayo decision by stating that Tamayo could not avail herself of First Amendment protections because she as a practical matter, was expected to engage in such speech in the regular course of her employment (App. at 18). While the Chrzanowski Court claimed that [t]estifying before the House Gaming Committee was an important part of the job of a high-ranking official like Tamayo, the Seventh Circuit did not provide any citation from Tamayo to support such a conclusion (App. at 18). Indeed, there

23 17 is no indication from the Tamayo decision itself that Jeannette Tamayo had ever testified before the House Gaming Committee previous to her testimony for which she was allegedly fired, let alone any support for the statement that it was an important part of her job to testify. Based on the Seventh Circuit s own precedent in Tamayo, as well as the circuit-split, it cannot be said that the right at issue here was clearly established at the time Chrzanowski was terminated. The right, assuming it existed, was not so particularized that it would have been known to the State s Attorney or the assistant state s attorney. That is, it cannot be said that [t]he contours of the right... [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). As the courts of appeals are now divided on the proper application of the holding in Garcetti to sworn testimony, this case warrants the Court s review

24 18 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, DONNA KATHRYN KELLY Counsel of Record GEORGE M. HOFFMAN OFFICE OF THE MCHENRY COUNTY STATE S ATTORNEY 2200 North Seminary Avenue Woodstock, Illinois dkkelly@co.mchenry.il.us (815) Telephone Attorneys for Petitioners

25 App. 1 APPENDIX A In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No KIRK CHRZANOWSKI, LOUIS A. BIANCHI, et al., v. Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendants-Appellees Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 12 C Philip G. Reinhard, Judge ARGUED APRIL 5, 2013 DECIDED AUGUST 2, Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and WOOD, Circuit Judges. WOOD, Circuit Judge. From January 2006 until he lost his job in December 2011, Kirk Chrzanowski was an assistant state s attorney in the McHenry County State s Attorney s Office. Problems arose for Chrzanowski in early 2011, when a special prosecutor began investigating suspected wrongdoing by Chrzanowski s boss, McHenry County State s Attorney Louis Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced the handling of cases involving his relatives

26 App. 2 and political allies. Under command of a subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before the grand jury, and later, after receiving another subpoena, he testified at Bianchi s trial. A few months after the trial, Chrzanowski was called into Bianchi s office, interrogated about his testimony by Bianchi and another prosecutor, Michael Combs, and fired. Chrzanowski believes that this was in retaliation for his truthful testimony. He filed suit a month later, alleging that Bianchi and Combs violated his rights under the First Amendment and various state statutes. The defendants moved to dismiss Chrzanowski s 1983 claims, arguing that the First Amendment s protections do not apply to any of his testimony because his statements were given pursuant to [his] official duties as a public employee. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The district court agreed, holding that Chrzanowski had not presented a valid constitutional claim; in the alternative, the court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since any First Amendment protections that might have attached to his testimony were not clearly established at the time. We reverse. I Our analysis relies on the facts contained in Chrzanowski s complaint, which at this stage we accept as true and construe in Chrzanowski s favor. Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2009).

27 App. 3 Chrzanowksi [sic] began working in the McHenry County State s Attorney s Office as an assistant state s attorney in January Initially he was assigned to the Office s misdemeanor division, but eventually he assumed responsibility for prosecuting more serious drug offenses and other felonies. He received positive performance reviews and raises in 2006, 2007, 2008 (twice), 2009 and In early 2011, Chrzanowksi [sic] received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury. He complied and gave sworn testimony concerning allegations that Bianchi had improperly influenced a negotiated plea in a case for which Chrzanowski was principally responsible. On February 24, 2011, the grand jury returned an indictment against Bianchi on charges of official misconduct in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(b). Chrzanowski was listed as a potential trial witness on April 6, 2011, and he received a trial subpoena two months later. He testified in the prosecution s casein-chief on August 1, From the outset, Bianchi and his allies were concerned by Chrzanowski s cooperation with the investigation. Upon learning of the grand jury subpoena, Ron Salgado, the chief investigator in the McHenry County State s Attorney s Office (and a friend and political ally of Bianchi), tried to speak with Chrzanowski. Chrzanowski avoided his calls. Terry Ekl, Bianchi s defense counsel, also tried to contact Chrzanowski after the special prosecutor identified Chrzanowski as a potential trial witness, but again Chrzanowski ignored requests to discuss the Bianchi

28 App. 4 investigation. On cross-examination at Bianchi s trial, Ekl pointedly brought up Chrzanowski s refusal to discuss the case before the trial: Q: And you didn t feel that you owed your boss any obligation to talk to his lawyer before this trial, right? A: My only obligation is to tell the truth here, sir. Over the same period, Bianchi began placing memoranda and notes in Chrzanowski s personnel file; these notes bore little relation to Chrzanowski s work performance. For instance, on June 6, 2011, Bianchi placed a negative report in Chrzanowski s file because Chrzanowski failed to introduce Bianchi to two college females who were interning in the office. He never would have thought of introducing me to them had I not stopped him and made a point of it, Bianchi wrote. Chrzanowski was unaware of these additions to his personnel file and did not have an opportunity to contest them. On December 2, 2011, Chrzanowski was summoned from his regular courtroom duties to Bianchi s office. There, Bianchi and Combs confronted and interrogated Chrzanowski about his grand jury and trial testimony. They presented him with transcripts of the proceedings and eventually Bianchi asked for Chrzanowski s resignation. When Chrzanowski refused, Bianchi told him, You re terminated. Get out. Chrzanowski alleges that he was fir[ed] in

29 App. 5 retaliation for his truthful testimony against... Bianchi. Chrzanowski responded to these events by filing suit in federal court, asserting claims against Bianchi and Combs pursuant to 42 U.S.C and state law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, arguing that Chrzanowski failed to state a valid First Amendment claim and that his state counts should be dismissed once the federal claim disappeared. Relying heavily on this court s decision in Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008), the district court concluded that, when testifying against Bianchi, Chrzanowski was a public employee... speak[ing] pursuant to [his] official duties, and not a private citizen [speaking] on a matter of public concern. The First Amendment offers no protection to expressions [public] employees make pursuant to their professional duties, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426, and accordingly, the district court dismissed the 1983 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the court held that if the conclusion that there was no constitutional violation is incorrect, it cannot be said that the right was so clearly established that defendants cannot avail themselves of qualified immunity. The court then granted Chrzanowski s request voluntarily to dismiss the remaining state law claims. This appeal followed.

30 App. 6 II In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. 547 U.S. at 421. In that case, a deputy district attorney alleged that supervisors had penalized him for writing an internal disposition memorandum that highlighted police misconduct in a pending criminal prosecution. Id. at 420. The plaintiff also asserted that he was punished for speaking out about the case in other settings: for instance, discussing the matter with his supervisors, testifying truthfully at a hearing in which the defendant challenged the validity of a search warrant, and delivering a speech about the case at a bar meeting. The Court limited its opinion to the question whether the memorandum warranted First Amendment protection. The dispositive fact, it explained, was that writing such disposition memoranda was exactly what the plaintiff was employed to do in his capacity as a calendar deputy. Id. at 421. The Court highlighted the fact that the parties... [did] not dispute that Ceballos wrote his disposition memo pursuant to his employment duties. Id. at 424. Disciplinary action on the basis of such speech does not offend the First Amendment because [r]estricting employee speech that owes its existence to a public employee s professional responsibilities does not

31 App. 7 infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. Id. at Although the Garcetti Court chose not to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate, id. at 424, it did provide guidance on the subject. Public employee speech does not lose First Amendment protection because it concerns the subject matter of the employee s job. Id. at 421. To the contrary, the Court reaffirmed that public employees are often the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions on matters of public concern, and that it remains essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968)). Likewise, public employees speech is not subject to restriction simply because it occurs inside the office, since [m]any citizens do much of their talking inside their respective workplaces. Id. at In other words, speech does not owe[ ] its existence to a public employee s professional responsibilities within the meaning of Garcetti simply because public employment provides a factual predicate for the expressive activity; rather, Garcetti governs speech that is made pursuant to official duties in the sense that it is government employees work product that has been commissioned or created by the employer. Id. at 422 (citing Rosenberger v.

32 App. 8 Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). In assessing whether a public employee is speaking as an employee or as a citizen, the Court emphasized that [t]he proper inquiry must be a practical one. Id. at 424. The dissenting Justices voiced concern that public employers might begin defining [employees ] job responsibilities expansively in an effort to remove protected speech from the First Amendment s purview (e.g., investing [employees] with a general obligation to ensure sound administration of public institutions), id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting), but the majority forcefully rejected the suggestion that employers can restrict employees rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions. Id. at 424. Instead, the Court explained that we must ask whether the speech is part of the employee s daily professional activities. Id. at 422; see also Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (O Scannlain, J., specially concurring) ( [W]hen public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right. ) (emphasis added). In Fairley v. Fermaint, 471 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2006) (Fairley I), rehearing denied 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2007) (Fairley II), we had occasion to consider how Garcetti applies to testimony that state employees give in lawsuits filed by third parties, as contrasted with statements made as part of their duties at

33 App. 9 work. There, we held that [a]ssistance to prisoners and their lawyers in litigation is not part of a guard s official duties. Fairley I, 471 F.3d at 829; Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, (7th Cir. 2009) (Fairley III). Indeed, we thought this principle so well established that we denied qualified immunity to the defendants, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Fairley II, 482 F.3d at In language that applies equally to this case, we observed in Fairley III that [e]ven if offering (adverse) testimony is a job duty, courts rather than employers are entitled to supervise the process. A government cannot tell its employees what to say in court, see 18 U.S.C. 1512, nor can it prevent them from testifying against it. 578 F.3d at 525. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the speech at issue in Chrzanowski s complaint. III Chrzanowski alleges that he was interrogated and dismissed in retaliation for his truthful [grand jury and trial] testimony. The district court concluded that his testimony was part of his official duties and responsibilities as an assistant state s attorney because an assistant state s attorney [is] obligated to pursue all criminal offenses, even those allegedly perpetrated by his supervisors. See 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) ( The duty of each State s attorney shall be... to commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in

34 App. 10 the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned. ). Since it was part of [Chrzanowski s] job to serve the people of McHenry County in the proper administration of justice..., it was part of those duties as a prosecutor that obligated [him] to cooperate in the pursuit of any criminal charges involving his supervisors, including testifying as a material witness if necessary. In relevant respects, the district court found this case to be a replica of Garcetti: there can be no question..., after Gacretti [sic], that [Chrzanowski] was acting and speaking in his role as prosecutor as opposed to a private citizen when he testified. This conclusion follows only if one places dispositive weight on an excessively broad job description[ ] without assessing, as a practical matter, what task[s] [Chrzanowski] was paid to perform in the course of his daily professional activities. Id. at 422. This is precisely what the Garcetti Court instructed us not to do when evaluating employee-speech claims. Indeed, the Court expressly rejected the argument that job descriptions such as those at issue here (e.g., a general obligation to ensure sound administration of public institutions) could place otherwise protected speech outside the ambit of the First Amendment. Instead, we must ask whether the public employee spoke because that is part of what [the public employee] was employed to do. Id. at 421. So what is an assistant state s attorney assigned to a felony trial courtroom employed to do? Prosecute felonies. In the course of that work, Chrzanowski

35 App. 11 presumably engaged in a wide range of expressive activity: the work of a prosecutor entails making opening and closing statements to juries, filing reports with supervisors, perhaps speaking to reporters after a high-profile verdict. It is even possible that in the course of his employment Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury as an investigating witness, though Illinois courts have emphasized that this practice could be subject to abuse and is not encouraged. People v. Bissonnette, 313 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974). But appearing as an investigating witness is a far cry from giving eyewitness testimony under subpoena regarding potential criminal wrongdoing that Chrzanowski happened to observe while on the job. The McHenry County State s Attorney s Office does not pay Chrzanowski to witness crimes and then testify about them; it pays him to prosecute crimes. And when there is a potential conflict of interest, as with an investigation into wrongdoing by other members of the McHenry County State s Attorney s Office, those prosecutorial responsibilities are assigned to a special prosecutor with a healthy measure of independence. See 55 ILCS 5/ Although there may be cases where a judge will have an imperfect understanding of the precise duties associated with a public sector job when all he or she knows is a job title, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 719 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), thus requiring further development of the factual record before a determination can be made, this case presents no such difficulty.

36 App. 12 To be sure, Chrzanowski was called as a witness to discuss his employment with the McHenry County State s Attorney s Office, and his testimony focused exclusively on allegation[s] that... Bianchi had improperly influenced and/or arranged a negotiated plea in a case for which [Chrzanowski] was principally responsible. But the fact that his testimony concern[ed] the subject matter of [his] employment does not mean that Chrzanowski s speech owe[d] its existence to his official responsibilities as the Garcetti Court used the phrase. 547 U.S. at 421. His speech was no different from that of a schoolteacher who writes a newspaper editorial criticizing the School Board and superintendant, Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, or of an assistant district attorney who speaks with her co-workers about potential corruption within the District Attorney s office, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). See also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (affirming that the statements or complaints... at issue in cases like Pickering and Connick [were] made outside the duties of employment. ). Like Chrzanowski, the plaintiffs in both of these cases were disciplined for sharing information learned and opinions formed in the course of their public employment. Chrzanowski worked in the criminal justice system and his speech occurred in the course of judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, when he spoke out about potential or actual wrongdoing on the part of his supervisors, he too was speaking outside the duties of employment.

37 App. 13 IV The Fairley line of cases provides an independent reason why Chrzanowski s case is not governed by Garcetti: the speech for which Chrzanowski was penalized was given under subpoena, both before the grand jury and at trial, in an action filed by a third party. The district court found this fact irrelevant, because [t]he subpoena was merely a procedural mechanism to obtain his presence at the grand jury and trial and did not detract from his overarching duty to cooperate in the criminal prosecution as an assistant state s attorney and public employee. As we already have explained, this focus on Chrzanowski s general professional obligations is misguided; we are to look only at whether particular speech is made pursuant to official duties (and, thus, not as a citizen ) in a more limited sense. When a public employee gives testimony pursuant to a subpoena, fulfilling the general obligation of [every] citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972), he speaks as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. See also Fairley III, 578 F.3d at Careful attention to the reasoning behind Garcetti shows why this is so. Typical public employee speech cases require a balanc[ing] between the interests of the [public employee] and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at The general public also shares an

38 App. 14 important interest in the government employee s ability to speak freely, since public employees contribute to civil discussion by adding their wellinformed views. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419; id. at 420 ( The interest at stake is as much the public s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee s own right to disseminate it. ) (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam)). Public employee speech made pursuant to official duties has a different character, the Garcetti Court explained. First, restrictions on such speech do not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. Id. at 422. Someone hired to be the governor s spokesperson is paid to articulate and disseminate the governor s views, not to offer her own opinions on the topics of the day. Second, restrictions on such speech in no way undermine the potential societal value of employee speech, since employees retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse. Id. Finally, a contrary approach to such speech would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating oversight of communications between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of official business, and would displace[ ]... managerial discretion. Id. at 423. This reasoning is not applicable to situations in which a public employee prosecutor, police officer, or anyone else is compelled to give testimony pursuant to a subpoena. First, the individual person has a

39 App. 15 strong interest in complying with the demands of a subpoena: apart from whatever desire a public employee might have to assist in the administration of justice, failure to comply with a subpoena can result in lengthy incarceration. See, e.g., Kim Murphy, Two Freed in Anarchist Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at A8 ( [t]wo activists... held for more than five months, mostly in solitary confinement[,] to pressure them to testify about suspected anarchists ); Jesse McKinley, 8-Month Jail Term Ends as Maker of Video Turns Over a Copy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A9 (freelance journalist held for 224 days for refusing to turn over a videotape of demonstration). It would be strange to have a constitutional rule that prohibits the State from conditioning public employment on a basis that restricts an employee s right to speak freely, Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, yet allows the State to condition public employment on an employee s willingness to impede the judicial process by remaining mute. Indeed, as we held in Fairley III, a government has no right to tell its employees what to say in court. 578 F.3d at 525. The public also has a substantial interest in hearing such speech. Indeed, the extraordinary power to jail those who refuse to cooperate with grand juries is rooted in the longstanding principle that the public... has a right to every man s evidence. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). Public-employee speech often provides society with information that is essential for democratic self-governance: