REPUDIATED ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: HOW MUCH CORROBORATION IS ENOUGH? Jamie L. Wershbale* I. INTRODUCTION

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1 REPUDIATED ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: HOW MUCH CORROBORATION IS ENOUGH? Jamie L. Wershbale* I. INTRODUCTION In Baugh v. State of Florida (Baugh II), 1 the Florida Supreme Court reviewed, de novo, defendant Raymond Baugh s prosecution and conviction for capital sexual battery on a child. 2 At trial, the State presented, as direct evidence, the child victim s out-of-court allegations of sexual abuse, which were repudiated in-court. 3 Circumstantial evidence was offered to corroborate the child s hearsay allegations and to show the victim was pressured to recant. 4 Convicted by a jury, the defendant appealed on the grounds of sufficiency of the evidence. 5 The district court of appeal affirmed the conviction and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. 6 The certified question essentially asked the Florida Supreme Court to define what constitutes proper or adequate corroborative evidence 7 in child sexual abuse * Jamie L. Wershbale, J.D. Candidate May 2009, Florida Coastal School of Law; Bachelor of Science in Public Affairs, Indiana University-Bloomington. 1 Baugh v. State (Baugh II), 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007). 2 Id. at Id. 4 Id. at Id. at Baugh v. State (Baugh I), 862 So. 2d 756, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ( If a child victim of sexual abuse totally repudiates her out-of-court statements at trial, and the prosecution adduces no eyewitness or physical evidence of the abuse, must the trial court grant a judgment of acquittal even in the face of other evidence corroborating the out-of-court statements and the dictates of the Confrontation Clause? ) (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 7 See Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 204 (majority opinion) ( [R]ecanted statements can sustain a sexual battery conviction when other proper corroborating evidence is admitted. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted)); Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 206 (Cantero, J., dissenting) ( [The Florida Supreme Court] ha[s] not, however, explained how much corroboration would be adequate. ); State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756, 761 (Fla. 1995) ( The examining physician s testimony in this case is simply not adequate to supply [proper] corroboration. ).

2 614 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 cases where the victim repudiates the allegations of sexual abuse in-court. 8 The Florida Supreme Court reworded the certified question in the negative and asked whether judgment of acquittal must be granted when the victim recants and there is no eyewitness, physical evidence or corroborative facts. 9 The court then answered the reworded question affirmatively, quashing the decision of the district court. 10 It would appear the Florida Supreme Court altered the substance of the question not as a means of clarification, but rather to evade developing a precedential definition of corroborative evidence based on the arguably weak facts in Baugh I. This note argues for the adoption of a flexible corroboration requirement in child sexual abuse cases. II. BACKGROUND As this case is largely premised on circumstantial evidence and testimony admitted under the Florida tender years 11 hearsay exception, a brief recitation of the facts is crucial to a complete depiction of the issues. There is also a need to discuss the evolution of Florida case law in child sexual abuse prosecutions. A. Recitation of Facts and Evidence Presented A careful reading of both Baugh I and II is necessary to understand the complexities presented by the evidence; however, a summary of the facts will provide context for the reader. The persons involved in this case were the child victim, seven-year-old C.P., her mother, Rachel, and the defendant, Rachel s boyfriend Raymond, who lived in the house 8 See Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 206 (Cantero, J., dissenting) ( The certified question really asks the question left unanswered in Green [State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995)]: how much corroboration is enough? ). 9 Id. at 200 (majority opinion) ( If a child victim of sexual abuse totally repudiates her out-of-court statements at trial, and the prosecution adduces no eyewitness or physical evidence of abuse, must the trial court grant a judgment of acquittal when the other evidence presented by the prosecution does not corroborate the facts alleged in the victim s repudiated statement? ) (emphasis added). 10 Id. 11 FLA. STAT (23) (2007).

3 2008] Wershbale 615 with C.P. and Rachel. 12 On the night in question Rachel found the defendant in C.P. s locked bedroom wearing only a bath towel and C.P. looking as if she had been caught misbehaving. 13 There were discrepancies between Rachel s trial testimony and what she initially told the detective most significantly, what Rachel saw when the door opened. 14 Rachel was suspicious of the situation and separated her daughter from the defendant. 15 C.P. told Rachel the defendant made her perform fellatio on him. 16 Rachel immediately confronted the defendant with this accusation. 17 The defendant did not deny wrongdoing and responded that he did want C.P. to perform fellatio on him. 18 Rachel called the police, at which time the defendant attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists and arms with razor blades. 19 Soon thereafter, Rachel instituted new house rules involving clothing and invited her female friend, Kristin, to move into the home. 20 The police questioned C.P. on multiple occasions about the fellatio. 21 C.P. stated the defendant used a pornographic photograph to show her how to perform fellatio. 22 She further stated she performed the sex act on the defendant twelve times previously and described ejaculation. 23 However, at trial C.P. completely repudiated any allegations of sexual abuse, explaining she repeated the story to get the defendant in trouble. 24 On the evening C.P. recanted, Kristin overheard Rachel threatening C.P., demanding she tell the truth or she would receive a beating. 25 Kristin testified she questioned the child about changing her 12 Baugh I, 862 So. 2d at Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 208 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 14 Baugh I, 862 So. 2d at Id. 16 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at Baugh I, 862 So.2d at Id. (The defendant stating to Rachel, I want [C.P.] to suck my dick, I want you to watch, and then I want to fuck you after. ). 19 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at Id. at Id. 22 Id. at 207 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 23 Id. (Cantero, J., dissenting) ( [C.P.] said that white stuff came out [and] made her choke... [and was] very bad tasting[,] except not on the occasion in question because her mother had interrupted the sex act). 24 Id. 25 Id. at 209.

4 616 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 story, to which C.P. replied it really did happen but [her mother] wanted her to change her story. 26 An inmate jailed with the defendant testified he overheard the defendant talking to a female visitor about getting the child to recant and discussing a bath towel on the telephone. 27 The only direct evidence offered at trial were C.P. s hearsay allegations. 28 As circumstantial corroborative evidence, the State offered testimony from Rachel, the detective, and the child protection worker with whom C.P. spoke. The State also presented Kristin s and the inmate s testimony as to alleged witness tampering, the defendant s statement after he was confronted with Rachel s accusation of sexual abuse, and the defendant s attempted suicide immediately following the accusation. 29 The defendant did not appeal any specific evidentiary issue, as all hearsay was properly admitted under the appropriate exceptions. 30 The only issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence. 31 B. Evolution of Law: Insufficiency of Child Hearsay Allegations Standing Alone The Florida Supreme Court likened the instant case to Beber v. State of Florida (Beber II) 32 when it answered the reworded certified question. 33 Beber II essentially reaffirmed the holdings of State of Florida v. Moore (Moore IV) 34 and State of Florida v. Green. 35 These three 26 Id. at 201 (majority opinion). 27 Id. at 209 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 28 Id. at 203 (majority opinion) (explaining the hearsay was admitted at trial for impeachment only, but the inconsistent statements should have been admitted substantively as direct evidence). 29 Id. at See id. at Id. at See generally Beber v. State (Beber II), 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004). 33 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 202; see supra text accompanying note State v. Moore (Moore IV), 485 So. 2d 1279, 1281 (Fla. 1986) ( We agree that the risk of convicting an innocent accused is simply too great when the conviction is based entirely on prior inconsistent statements. ).

5 2008] Wershbale 617 cases held that a child victim s hearsay allegations, standing alone, were insufficient to maintain a child sexual abuse conviction. 36 The district court of appeal in Moore III determined the use of prior inconsistent statements as the sole evidence of guilt was an issue of first impression in Florida. 37 However, the district court found the United States v. Orrico 38 holding persuasive. 39 Nonetheless, the district court in Moore III certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, which the court reworded in Moore IV to ask, [i]s a prior inconsistent statement sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction when the prior inconsistent statement is the only substantive evidence of guilt? The court answered this question in the negative. 40 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed reversal of the conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence and approved the district court s adoption of the Orrico holding. 41 Almost ten years later, in Green, a child sexual abuse case, the Florida Supreme Court considered the concerns initially addressed in Moore IV. The district court of appeal certified a question to the Supreme Court, essentially asking the same question as Moore IV, only in the context of child sexual abuse. 42 The Florida Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Moore IV and rendered the holding applicable regardless of which hearsay exception permitted admission of the prior inconsistent statements. 43 The Green court also stated, in dicta, that 35 State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756, 761 (Fla. 1995) ( To convict [the defendant] based solely on the prior inconsistent statements of the [child] victim would indeed create too great a risk of convicting an innocent accused[.] ). 36 Beber II, 887 So. 2d at See Moore IV, 485 So. 2d at 1281; State v. Moore (Moore III), 473 So. 2d 686, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 38 See United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 119 (6th Cir. 1979) ( [T]he Government having offered [prior inconsistent] statements as the sole evidence of a central element of the crime charged, we hold that the Government has failed to sustain its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ). 39 Moore III, 473 So. 2d at Moore IV, 485 So. 2d at 1281 (emphasis omitted). 41 Id. 42 State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1995) ( Is the prior inconsistent statement of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse, even if said on multiple occasions, sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain a conviction? ) (emphasis omitted). 43 Id. at 760.

6 618 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 inconsistent statements admitted under Florida s tender years hearsay exception 44 may be offered as substantive evidence when other proper corroborating evidence is admitted. 45 Nine years after Green, the Florida Supreme Court granted review of Beber I, holding the district court of appeal erroneously concluded that [the Florida Supreme Court] receded from Green and Moore [IV] in [Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. v. M.B.]. 46 Beber II reaffirmed the holding that inconsistent out-of-court statements alone are insufficient to uphold a criminal conviction. 47 However, the Beber II court implied that, while the holding in M.B. does not translate to criminal proceedings, child hearsay statements admitted under section (23), Florida Statutes, also known as the tender years hearsay exception, are admissible as substantive evidence given proper or adequate corroboration and no violation of the defendant s Sixth Amendment rights. 48 After Beber II, Florida case law was clear that a conviction cannot survive a sufficiency of the evidence appeal if it is premised solely on uncorroborated prior inconsistent statements. 49 However, case law did not explicitly state what constitutes proper or adequate corroboration to sustain a criminal conviction when the child victim repudiates prior allegations of sexual abuse FLA. STAT (23) (1989). 45 Green, 667 So. 2d at Beber v. State (Beber II), 887 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 2004) (citing Beber v. State (Beber I), 853 So. 2d 576, (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). The Beber II court then proceeded to explain the Florida Supreme Court s holding in M.B. Id. ( [I]n the context of a child dependency proceeding[,]... the Court held that a child s prior outof-court statements are admissible as substantive evidence under section (23) even if inconsistent with the child s in-court testimony, so long as the out-of-court statements satisfy the reliability safeguards established in the statute and refined in subsequent case law. (citing Dep t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. M.B., 701 So. 2d 1155, 1162 (Fla. 1997))). 47 See id. at Id. at See generally Baugh v. State (Baugh II), 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007). 50 Id. at 206 (Cantero, J. dissenting).

7 2008] Wershbale 619 III. BAUGH V. STATE OF FLORIDA A. Majority: A Pyramid of Assumptions In instances where the only direct evidence 51 of sexual abuse is the child victim s hearsay statements, the Florida Supreme Court has not yet articulated a standard beyond proper or adequate corroboration. 52 In Baugh I, the district court of appeal certified a question which sought clarification as to when a judgment of acquittal must be granted, given corroborating evidence, in a child sexual abuse case where the victim has recanted. 53 The certified question also referenced the Confrontation Clause. 54 However, Baugh II did not consider the Confrontation Clause because the victim s hearsay statements were properly admitted 55 and, although the statements were only introduced for impeachment purposes, they should have been offered substantively. 56 Further, the victim was subject to cross-examination at trial. 57 The district court of appeal noted the factual evidence in Baugh I gave the court pause, but it ultimately determined that although each individual corroborating event in itself would not uphold the conviction, the aggregate of the facts was sufficient to uphold the conviction because of all the inferences that the jury could draw from the sum total of the evidence. 58 The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with this proposition. 59 In coming to its determination, the Florida Supreme Court 51 Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956) ( Direct evidence is that to which the witness testifies of his own knowledge as to the facts at issue. ). 52 See State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756, 761 (Fla. 1995). 53 See Baugh II, supra note U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. CONST. art. I, 16(a). See United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 118 (6th Cir. 1979) ( [In 1970, the United States Supreme Court] established that the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence does not necessarily violate the Confrontation Clause.... ). 55 Baugh v. State (Baugh I), 862 So. 2d 756, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting FLA. STAT (23)(a)(1) ( [T]he trial court did an exemplary job... to determine whether the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide[d] sufficient safeguards of reliability. ) (second alteration in original)). 56 Id. at Orrico, 599 F.2d at Baugh I, 862 So. 2d at Baugh v. State (Baugh II), 961 So. 2d 198, 203 (Fla. 2007).

8 620 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 reiterated the holding in Green, that recanted statements can sustain a sexual battery conviction [only] when other proper corroborating evidence is admitted. 60 The Florida Supreme Court held the circumstantial evidence 61 offered by the State did not, either in part or in sum, corroborate the repudiated out-of-court statements and, as such, there was no need to consider the adequacy of the corroborative evidence. 62 The court analogized the instant case to Beber II and applied the same holding. 63 The Florida Supreme Court further stated, in a criminal proceeding when the prosecution fails to meet [its] burden, the case should not be submitted to the jury, and a judgment of acquittal should be granted. 64 If a conviction is appealed, the evidence is sufficient to uphold the conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 65 After reviewing the defendant s record on appeal, the majority held the corroborative evidence insufficient to sustain the sexual battery conviction because the offered evidence only created a strong suspicion of guilt and require[d] pyramiding of assumptions or impermissibly stacked inferences. 66 B. Dissent: Cumulative Corroborative Support In Baugh II, the dissent disagreed with the majority s rewording of the certified question because the district court would not have certified such an obvious question and as reworded it does not accurately 60 Id. at 204 (quoting State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756, 761 (Fla. 1995)). 61 Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956) ( Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimate facts in dispute existed or did not exist. ). 62 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at See id. The Beber II court reaffirmed the holdings of Green and Moore. Beber v. State (Beber II), 887 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 2004) ( [T]he child s hearsay statements, standing alone, are insufficient to sustain [the defendant s] conviction of capital sexual battery. ). 64 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 204 (quoting Williams v. State, 560 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). 65 Id. at 204 (citing Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999)). 66 Id. at 205 (citations omitted).

9 2008] Wershbale 621 describe the evidence presented. 67 Both the dissent and the majority defined corroborative evidence as evidence that strengthens what other evidence shows. 68 However, unlike the majority, the dissent determined the child victim s recanted statements were sufficiently supported by the corroborative evidence to uphold the defendant s conviction for sexual battery. 69 The dissent argued the majority incorrectly t[ook] a divide-and-conquer approach, 70 whereas the proper approach was to view the evidence cumulatively. 71 The dissent pointed out that when a trial court rules on a motion for judgment of acquittal, it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and any issues of credibility must [also] be resolved in favor of the State. 72 Further, the dissent argued the majority should not overturn a jury verdict in a case in which the evidence was sufficient to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal. 73 Ultimately, the dissent held where corroborating evidence strongly supports the child s original accusations of sexual abuse and also points towards forced recantation, [the trial court] should leave to the jury the responsibility for evaluating witness credibility and arriving at the truth. 74 IV. COMMENTARY In recent years, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed question[s] certified to be of great public importance because the questions 67 Id. at 206 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 68 Id. at 204 (majority opinion), 208 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 69 Id. at 208 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 70 Id. at Id. at 207 ( [T]he proper question here is whether the circumstantial evidence corroborates the victim s recanted statements so that all the evidence, considered together, suffices to convict the defendant. ). 72 Id.; see, e.g., Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002) ( The credibility and probative force of conflicting testimony should not be determined on a motion for judgment of acquittal. (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974))); Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177, 182 (Fla. 1998) ( The fact that the evidence is contradictory does not warrant a judgment of acquittal since the weight of the evidence and the witnesses credibility are questions solely for the jury. (citing Davis v. State, 425 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983))). 73 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 210 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 74 Id. at

10 622 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 either deal[t] with an extremely narrow principle of law 75 or address[ed] a narrow question based on the unique facts of [the] case. 76 It appears neither of these rationales was readily applicable to the question originally certified in Baugh I. Therefore, the court was fairly obligated to consider the certified question. Because the Florida Supreme Court was not able to summarily dismiss the certified question, it would appear the court chose to reword, and thereby alter, the substance of the question posed. 77 The court likely reworded the question in order to avoid making a difficult threshold determination as to the degree of corroboration required in child sexual abuse cases where the victim recants. As Baugh II is factually a close call, it would seem the court elected to reword the certified question rather than create precedent on arguably ambiguous facts that would likely be misinterpreted by lower courts statewide. Because child sexual abuse is often based on hearsay and circumstantial evidence, 78 it is appropriate to require corroboration in cases where inconsistent statements of sexual abuse are offered. However, due to the nature of the crime, child sexual abuse frequently lacks physical corroboration 79 and victims are either reluctant to testify 80 or are under pressure to change their stories. 81 Because prosecution of 75 State v. Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1999) (certifying a question based on the application of a medical necessity defense in a prosecution for personal cultivation of marijuana). 76 State v. Brooks, 788 So. 2d 247, 247 (Fla. 2001) (certifying a question as to employment of a reasonable mistake defense regarding the age of the victim in a prosecution for commission of lewd and lascivious act). 77 Baugh II, 961 So. 2d at 205 (Cantero, J., dissenting). 78 Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 952 (Colo. 1990); State v. Swan, 790 P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1990). 79 Judy Yun, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1983) ( [C]onvicting [perpetrators of sexual abuse] is exceptionally difficult[ ] due to the lack of witnesses and corroborative physical evidence, and to the reluctance or inability of the victim to testify against the defendant. ). 80 Id. 81 John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross- Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC L.J. 801, 834 (1987) ( [P]owerful forces may work to convince the child to change the facts or to recant. Such forces are particularly strong in intrafamilial abuse cases.... Tremendous opportunity exists to instill fear,

11 2008] Wershbale 623 child sexual abuse presents such unique problems, 82 it seems a flexible, common sense standard, 83 which considers the totality of indirect corroborative evidence, would be the most appropriate standard in cases legally analogous to Baugh I and II. Further, in such cases a significant issue of witness credibility exists. Credibility is within the province of the jury and when indirect corroboration is presented to support hearsay allegations, the jury should resolve any conflicts in testimony based on the inconsistent hearsay statements, the witnesses testimony, and the sum of the corroborative evidence offered. 84 It seems the best way to approach repudiated allegations of child sexual abuse is to adopt a particularized corroboration requirement appropriate to the problems presented by child sexual abuse prosecutions. 85 In child sexual abuse cases based on hearsay, courts in other states often relax the standard by accepting more indirect forms of corroboration. 86 The Alaskan courts hold, in child sexual abuse cases similar to Baugh I and II, corroborating evidence is required to support prior allegations, but corroborating evidence need not take any specific form, and it need not independently establish the crime. 87 Further, Alaska s rule governing corroboration is a flexible one,... grounded in common sense: corroborating evidence is sufficient [when] it inguilt, and ambivalence, and it is not surprising that many children recant or refuse to testify consistently with their prior statements. ). 82 See Swan, 790 P.2d at See Henry v. State, 861 P.2d 582, 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 84 Fernandez v. State, 805 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding unsworn hearsay, recanted in court, falls within the province of the fact-finder to assess the probative force of each particular piece of evidence in its effort to determine if a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ). 85 See Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 952 (Colo. 1990) ( [U]sually[,] the only evidence available directly implicating the attacker is the child s hearsay statements. ); Swan, 790 P.2d at 615 ( In most cases of child sexual abuse [ ] there is no direct physical or testimonialevidence [sic].... [P]hysical corroboration is rare because the sex offenses committed against children tend to be nonviolent offenses.... Physical corroboration may also be unavailable because most children do not resist.... ). 86 Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 802 (1993). 87 Henry, 861 P.2d at 568 (citing Thompson v. State, 769 P.2d 997, 1000 (Alaska App. 1989); Bodine v. State, 737 P.2d 1072, (Alaska App. 1987)).

12 624 Florida Coastal Law Review [Vol. IX:613 duces a rational belief in the truthfulness of a witness testimony. 88 And to be sufficient, corroborating evidence need not relate directly to the unlawful act charged in the indictment. 89 The State of Washington s corroboration requirement takes a similar approach by finding indirect corroborative evidence sufficient. 90 In Colorado, the corroboration requirement in child sexual abuse cases is analogous to a relevancy standard. 91 Corroborative evidence is defined as any evidence, direct or by proof of surrounding facts and circumstances, that tends to establish the act described by the child in the statement occurred. 92 In Florida, many of the problems inherent in child sexual abuse prosecutions can be mitigated by adopting a flexible corroboration requirement similar to those in the aforementioned states. VI. CONCLUSION By altering the certified question in Baugh II, the Florida Supreme Court evaded defining proper or adequate corroboration in child sexual abuse cases where the victim repudiates. Child sexual abuse prosecutions present unique concerns and, as such, a cumulative approach should be utilized. When there are conflicting substantive statements, and substantial indirect corroborative evidence, judgment of acquittal is improper and the case should go to the jury for a resolution of the issues based on witness credibility. When the Florida Supreme Court is next presented with a child sexual abuse case legally analogous to Baugh II, the court should adopt a flexible corroboration requirement, permitting the finder of fact in child sexual abuse prosecutions to consider both indirect and cumulative corroborative evidence of sexual abuse. 88 Id. at 587 (quoting Bodine, 737 P.2d at 1075) (alteration in original). 89 Thompson, 769 P.2d at 1000 (citing Bodine, 737 P.2d at ). 90 Swan, 790 P.2d at 615 ( [T]he corroboration requirement must reasonably be held to include indirect evidence of abuse. ); State v. Jones, 772 P.2d 496, 500 (Wash. 1989) ( [E]vidence that is only indirectly corroborative must be deemed sufficient in many cases. ). 91 Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 952 (Colo. 1990). 92 Id.