Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 1 of 9

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1 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 1 of 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION THE PAINE COLLEGE, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-3503-TWT THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS COMMISSION ON COLLEGES, INC., Defendant. ORDER This action arises out of Paine College s loss of accreditation. It is before the Court on the Plaintiff The Paine College s Motion to Alter or Amend Clerk s Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Motion to Alter or Amend or in the Alternative for Reconsideration of Portions of the Court s Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [Doc. 114]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff The Paine College s Motion to Alter or Amend Clerk s Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Motion to Alter or Amend or in the Alternative for Reconsideration of Portions of the Court s Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [Doc. 114] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 2 of 9 On October 11, 2018, this Court granted the Defendant The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, Inc. s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff The Paine College s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In the Court s Opinion and Order, the Court noted that neither party moved for summary judgment as to Count VI of the Amended Complaint, and declined to address the issue of attorneys fees. 1 In Count VI of the Amended Complaint, Paine College seeks declaratory relief as to the issue of attorneys fees. Specifically, Paine College asks for a declaration that a Southern Association rule regarding attorneys fees is unenforceable. 2 This rule requires an institution that loses a legal action regarding an accreditation decision to pay the Southern Association s attorneys fees. 3 After this Court issued its Opinion and Order, the Clerk of Court entered judgment in favor of the Southern Association and against the Paine College, and dismissed this action. 4 Paine College now moves for this Court to alter or amend the Clerk of Court s judgment, and for this Court to either alter or amend its Opinion and Order, or alternatively, for the Court to reconsider portions of this previous Opinion and Order Opinion and Order [Doc. 109], at 64 n.237. Am. Compl Id See [Doc. 110]; [Doc. 111]. -2-

3 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 3 of 9 First, the Court agrees with Paine College that the Clerk of Court should not have entered final judgment after the Court s summary judgment ruling. In its Opinion and Order, the Court expressly declined to address Count VI, Paine College s request for a declaratory judgment as to attorneys fees, because neither party moved for summary judgment as to this claim. 5 An order such as this, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims in an action, is not a final judgment. 6 A final judgment allowing an appeal on fewer than all claims or parties can only be entered if the district court certifies as final a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 7 The Court did not issue such a certification here. Therefore, the Clerk of Court erroneously entered final judgment despite the pendency of Count VI of the Amended Complaint. The parties next dispute whether the Preliminary Injunction remained in effect after the Court s summary judgment order. Paine College argues that the Preliminary Injunction remains in full force and effect because the Court did not order it dissolved or terminated, and asserts that the Southern Association violated the injunction by informing the Department of Education that the injunction had been dissolved. 8 The Southern Association argues that the entry 5 Opinion and Order [Doc. 109], at 64 n Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007). 7 8 Id. Pl. s Mot. for Reconsideration, at

4 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 4 of 9 of judgment on all federal claims in its favor means that the injunction is no longer in place. 9 The Court disagrees. The Court s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Southern Association as to all claims but Count VI did not implicitly dissolve the Preliminary Injunction, and the parties cannot infer that the ruling had such an effect. The Consent Order Granting Preliminary Injunction provides that [t]his Order shall remain in full force and effect and binding upon the parties, pending further Order of this Court. 10 Absent an order by this Court terminating or dissolving the Preliminary Injunction, it remains in full force and effect and binding upon both parties. Therefore, the Court s Opinion and Order granting summary judgment to the Southern Association as to all of the claims except Count VI did not dissolve, terminate, or otherwise modify the Preliminary Injunction. The Preliminary Injunction is still in full force and effect. However, the Court nonetheless concludes that Count VI of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal district courts have limited jurisdiction. A federal court may raise the issue of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own initiative at any stage of litigation. 11 Relevant here, district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions Def. s Br. in Opp n to Pl.s Mot. for Reconsideration, at 10. [Doc. 5], at 3. Cooksey v. Waters, 435 F. App x 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2011). -4-

5 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 5 of 9 arising under federal law. 12 A necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act without jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings. 13 Thus, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking. 14 Generally, a case arises under federal law only if federal law creates the cause of action. 15 The Southern Association argues that Count VI arises under state law, and that the Court should decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over this claim due to the dismissal of Paine College s federal claims. Paine College argues in turn that the Court arguably has federal question jurisdiction over Count VI under 20 U.S.C. 1099b(f) because Count VI is based on due process issues under the Higher Education Act. 16 However, nowhere in Count VI does Paine College allege that this attorneys fees provision denies it due process in violation of the Higher Education Act. Instead, Paine College makes general allegations that this provision discriminates against small, U.S.C University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) Id. Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996). Pl. s Reply Br., at 3 n

6 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 6 of 9 private, religiously sponsored colleges and HBCUs, 17 that it creates a draconian, unreasonable and unfair burden for this class of colleges which has the effect of making it difficult, if not impossible, for these colleges to litigate and enforce their state and federal rights, 18 and that such discrimination... shows an unlawful pattern of conduct by SACSCOC which it uses to rid itself of small, private, religiously sponsored colleges and HBCU s such as Paine College. 19 Paine College asserts no more than vague allegations of discrimination and a general reference to federal rights. These allegations fail to establish that Count VI arises under the Higher Education Act or any other federal law. Therefore, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Count VI because that claim does not arise under federal law. Furthermore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 20 Such a decision is within the discretion of the district court. 21 The Court declines to continue exercising supplemental 1992) Am. Compl Id Id Cooksey, 435 F. App x at Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 954 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. -6-

7 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 7 of 9 jurisdiction over Count VI due to the dismissal of Paine College s federal claims on the merits. Therefore, Count VI is dismissed without prejudice. Finally, Paine College moves to alter or amend the Court s summary judgment order, or, in the alternative, reconsider its ruling. 22 Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts upon motion to alter or amend a judgment. 23 The decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 24 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically authorize motions for reconsideration. Nevertheless, such motions are common in practice. Local Rule 7.2 provides that motions for reconsideration are not to be filed as a matter of routine practice, but only when absolutely necessary. 25 A party may move for reconsideration only when one of the following has occurred: an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, [or] the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. 26 Further, a party may not employ a motion for Pl.s Mot. for Reconsideration, at 14. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 59(e). 24 Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., 763 F.2d 1237, (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d 862, 866 (11th Cir. 1984)). 25 N.D. Ga. Local R. 7.2E. 26 Godby v. Electrolux Corp., No. 1:93-CV-0353-ODE, 1994 WL , at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 25, 1994). -7-

8 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 8 of 9 reconsideration as a vehicle to present new arguments or evidence that should have been raised earlier, introduce novel legal theories, or repackage familiar arguments to test whether the Court will change its mind. 27 Paine College argues that the Court erroneously concluded that Dr. Luckey s purported conflict of interest caused it no injury. 28 However, the Court rejected this exact argument in its Opinion and Order, and Paine College fails to show that this conclusion was clear error. Therefore, Paine College s motion to reconsider the Court s summary judgment order is denied. For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff The Paine College s Motion to Alter or Amend Clerk s Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Motion to Alter or Amend or in the Alternative for Reconsideration of Portions of the Court s Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [Doc. 114] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count VI of the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court directs the Clerk of 27 Brogdon v. National Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2000); see also Godby, 1994 WL , at *1 ( A motion for reconsideration should not be used to reiterate arguments that have previously been made... [It is an improper use of] the motion to reconsider to ask the Court to rethink what the Court [has] already thought through-rightly or wrongly. ) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.1983)) (alterations in original); In re Hollowell, 242 B.R. 541, (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999) ( Motions for reconsideration should not be used to relitigate issues already decided or as a substitute for appeal... Such motions also should not be used to raise arguments which were or could have been raised before judgment was issued. ). 28 Pl.s Mot. for Reconsideration, at

9 Case 1:16-cv TWT Document 118 Filed 02/08/19 Page 9 of 9 Court to reenter final judgment in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff. Paine College has 30 days from entry of final judgment to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court orders that the Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 5] remain in effect during those 30 days, and if Paine College appeals, during the pendency of that appeal. SO ORDERED, this 8 day of February, /s/thomas W. Thrash THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. United States District Judge -9-