It is a well settled principle that where there is coercion, there cannot be consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).

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3 1. Characteristics of Suspect: Age, education level, gender and race of the subject are all factors to be considered in the voluntariness equation. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 ( 1973)). Knowledge of a right to refuse to consent to a search is not necessary in order for the search to be deemed voluntary; however it is a factor that may be considered. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at Acts of Government Agent: For the most part, the courts analysis of defendants character traits has been limited to an acknowledgment that they are a factor in the determination of voluntariness. By and large, courts are willing to find that, at least in the absence of egregious police misconduct or coercion, consent by a suspect was voluntarily given. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 211, (2002). It is a well settled principle that where there is coercion, there cannot be consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). Consent given after officer falsely states that he has a search warrant is not valid, as it is tantamount to telling the subject that he has no choice but to consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, (1968). Police may not use a threat to obtain a warrant when there are no grounds to do so in order to induce submission. United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1994). 3

4 The fact that an officer engaged in trickery or subterfuge to gain consent does not necessarily render defendant s consent involuntary, as it is just one of the factors the court may consider in analyzing validity of consent. People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. 2009). Agents went to the home of a child pornography suspect and, knowing that their statement was untrue, informed the suspect that he may be a victim of identity theft. The court concluded the deceptive language was used by the agents to cause the suspect to believe he was a victim of crime, and it was based on this assumption that he allowed the officers to come in to his home. Agents requested permission to look at suspect s computer. Believing the agents were attempting to help him, suspect turned on his computer and provided the agent with necessary passwords. A resulting search uncovered images of child pornography. Court stated that when agents tactics involve misrepresentations (at least those which do not rise to the level of falsely claiming the agent has a search warrant), the court should analyze the extent to which the deceit directly served to overcome a citizen s reticence or resistance to the search. United States v. Parson, 599 F. Supp. 2d 592, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 4

5 Agents sought consent to search residence for explosives and evidence relating to explosives and bomb making. A reasonable person assessing exchange between agent and person granting consent would conclude that consent extended to the computer. Request that the computer be returned after the FBI made a copy of the hard drive may serve as an indication that search was within scope of consent; defendant did not express an objection to the removal or the copying of the hard drive. Furthermore, the court held that the revocation of consent, which occurred two months after consent was granted, did not operate retroactively to invalidate the agent s actions. In effect, the court held that there was no expectation of privacy in the mirror image copy that the FBI had consent to obtain, and that the agent could continue to search this mirror image even after consent was revoked. United States v. Megahed, 2009 WL (M.D. Fla ). 5

6 United States v. Stierhoff, 477 F. Supp 2d 423 (D. R.I. 2007). 6

7 Computer science grad student gave law enforcement consent to search computer. He agreed to let officers take computer to FBI office for exam. Reasonable to assume he knew it would involve more than a cursory look. United States v. Al Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 423 (2007). Agent asked appellant if he could search his cell phone; appellant was nonverbal but handed agent his phone. Appellant s surrender to agent of his cell phone in response to agent s open ended request implied grant of equally unbridled consent for agent to examine the phone and the information contained therein. Lemons v. State, 298 S.W. 3d 658 (Tx. 2009). In Prinzing, court found that police did not engage in trickery to obtain consent; rather, he had a twofold purpose in his visit. However, police chose to indicate that he wanted to search for illegal credit card activity, chose to impart to defendant that he was a victim, not a suspect, and thus, police chose to limit the scope of the search. People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. 2009). See also, United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp.2d 694, 716 (W.D. Pa. 2008). In Parsons, agents had no objective evidence regarding identity theft, the misrepresentation used to gain suspect s consent. Evidence of child pornography was suppressed: scope of consent limited to information re: ID theft. United States v. Parson, 599 F. Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 7

8 It is well settled that consent to search, in the absence of a search warrant may, in some circumstances be given by a person other than the target of the search. 1 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 539 (4 th Cir. 1978). The theories that allow searches based on third party consent are closely related: common authority and assumption of risk. Common authority is... not to be implied from mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies third party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7. (1974). _ 8

9 People who might have actual authority to consent: Parents Spouses Employers (maybe; not always) Room mates and co tenants Montana is the only state that categorically rejects the theory that a youth can provide legal consent to a search. The court in State v. Schwarz concluded that due to Montana s enhanced right to privacy under Article II, Section 10, consent, as an exception to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed, and as such, a youth under the age of sixteen does not have the authority to waive her parents privacy rights. Allan v. State, 2009 WL (Ala. Crim. App.) (citing State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006). 9

10 An officer may rely on the consent of a person who seems authorized to consent, regardless of whether or not the person is actually authorized to give consent. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez set forth an objective standard: would all of the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 10

11 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, (1990). See also, United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215 (10 th Cir. 2004). Even if accompanied by young children, a third party s mere presence on the premises to be searched is not sufficient to establish that a man of reasonable caution would believe the person had mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access or control over it for most purposes. Instead, government must offer some additional evidence to support a claim of apparent authority. Officers who encountered woman at front door of defendant s apartment did not know who she was or her relationship to defendant or the premises. One who answers door of an apartment at three o clock in the afternoon could be a repairman, a visitor, or a neighbor watering the plants or feeding the pets. In this case, officers were presented with an ambiguous situation and were under a duty to make a further inquiry as to the woman s authority. United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, (10 th Cir. 2007). Officers did not blindly accept girlfriend s claim of authority over premises to create apparent authority to search. Officers questioned girlfriend and discovered: she had key to apartment She kept possessions in the apartment She lived off and on at apartment she frequently cleaned and did household chores at the apartment. United States v. Goines, 437 F.3d 644, 649 (7 th Cir. 2006). Officers did not rely on unsubstantiated hunch that defendant s girlfriend had joint access to the apartment; before they entered the apartment, she told officers she kept several possessions there and could enter apartment in defendant s absence. United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 21 (1 st Cir. 2005). 11

12 General Principle: In a 5 3 decision, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph held that a co tenant s consent does not suffice for a reasonable search if a potential defendant with self interest in objecting is in fact physically present and objects. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, (2006). The Majority admitted it was drawing a fine line but reasoned that as long as there was no evidence that police removed the potentially objecting tenant from the premises to avoid a possible objection there is practical value in the clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing a co tenant s authority to grant permission when there is no fellow co tenant on hand, and the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupants contrary indication when he expresses it. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. at

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15 United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8 th Cir. 2008). Police uncovered child pornography while executing valid warrant on defendant s business computer. Police asked defendant for consent to search his home computer which he refused. The defendant was arrested and taken to jail. In the meantime, other officers went to the defendant s home and asked defendant s wife for permission to search the home computer, which she eventually granted. The Eighth Circuit noted that Randolph s narrow holding referenced a defendant who was physically present, and therefore was not applicable. As such, defendant s refusal to give consent did not invalidate the later consent granted by his wife a cotenant possessing joint access or control over the computer for most purposes and therefore authorized under Matlock. 15

16 The court found no problem with the fact that officers did not inform the authorized third party (Mrs. Hudspeth) of the prior refusal of her co tenant (Mr. Hudspeth), opining that, the Fourth Amendment s reasonableness requirement did not demand that the officers inform Mrs. Hudspeth of her husband s refusal. This conclusion is supported by Matlock and Rodriguez, where law enforcement officers bypassed the defendants against whom the evidence was sought, although the defendants were present and available to participate in the consent colloquy. The officers instead sought the consent of an authorized cotenant. United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 960 (8 th Cir. 2007). 16

17 Effect of defendant s removal by police: In many instances the defendant will not be physically present and voicing an objection to the search because police have removed him from the scene. In its holding that an officer s knowledge of prior express refusal does not invalidate subsequent consent by an authorized third party, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hudspeth focused on the officer s knowledge, not on his actions. In Hudspeth, the Eighth Circuit strictly construed Randolph stating that Hudspeth was not present because he had been lawfully arrested and jailed based on evidence obtained wholly apart from the evidence sought on the home computer. Thus, this rationale for the narrow holding of Randolph, which repeatedly referenced the defendant s physical presence and immediate objection, is inapplicable here. _ 17

18 In Wilburn, police received tip that defendant Wilburn was a felon in possession of handguns, he had a revoked drivers license, and he lived with Taylor. Police staked out his apartment. They soon got lucky, and saw D. exit his apartment and get in his car which was parked in the rear of the complex. When he drove around the block to the front of the apartment to pick up Taylor, he was arrested for driving with revoked license. After a search of D. And his car turned up no weapons, he was handcuffed and placed in back of car. Unites States v. Wilburn, 473 F. 3d 742, 744 (7 th Cir. 2007). The court noted the facts established that police, did not deliberately remove Wilburn from the area to avoid hearing an objection to the search. United States v. Wilburn, 473 F. 3d at

19 Police arrested defendant of suspicion of drug activity, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of the squad car which was parked next to his home. Police then asked defendant s co tenant girlfriend for consent to search the home, which she granted. Noting there was no evidence presented that officers removed the defendant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding possible objection, which under Randolph would invalidate the co tenant s consent, the court opined the subjective interest of the officer seems less important than the effect upon the potential defendant. Since defendant was removed involuntarily from the place from which he could have made his threshold refusal, the court held that he was physically present. The court also found that the defendant, by his actions refused to grant consent. The girlfriend did not have keys to the home; police had to ask the defendant for his keys which were in his pocket. Defendant did not voluntarily hand over his keys, and he tried to prevent the officer from obtaining possession of the keys. State v. Jackson, 931 A.2d 452, 455 (Del.Super.Ct. 2007). 19

20 The Ninth Circuit s holding in Murphy means that a one time objection by one can permanently disable the other from ever validly consenting to a search of shared premises / property. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Randolph s holding that third party consent to a search is valid [s]o long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection to mean that police can not prevent a co tenant from objecting to a search through arrest, arguably, even a valid arrest. The court builds on this premise and holds [i]f the police cannot prevent a co tenant from objecting to a search through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co tenant and then seek to ignore an objection he has already made. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, (9 th Cir. 2008). When an objection has been made by either tenant prior to the officer s entry, the officer must, in the absence of exigent circumstances, obtain a search warrant. United States v. Jackson, 516 F.3d 1117, ( 9 th Cir. 2008). 20

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22 The Seventh Circuit rejected Ninth Circuit s holding in Murphy, finding that it extended Randolph too far. Objection loses its force when defendant is validly arrested and taken to jail. An objector does not have an absolute veto. Both presence and objection by tenant are required to render co tenant s consent unreasonable. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, (7 th Cir. 2008). The court took note of Randolph s underlying societal expectation theory: A warrantless search of a home based on a co tenant s consent is unreasonable in the face of a present tenants express objection. However, once the tenant leaves, societal expectations shift and the tenant assumes the risk that a co tenant may allow officers to enter, even knowing that the other tenant would object (or continue to object) if present. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d at

23 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4 th Cir. 1978). 23

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26 Locks are critical in determining who is authorized to consent. If one wants to ensure his possessions will be subject to consent search based only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access or control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed. United States v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 26

27 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4 th Cir. 2001). 27

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29 In Trulock v. Freeh,the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the search of Trulock s passwordprotected computer files, authorized by his housemate, was valid under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that Trulock s use of a computer password was analogous to the use of the lock on a footlocker, and as in Block, it shows he affirmatively intended to exclude his housemate from these files. The steps Trulock took to insure his files were inaccessible to his housemate (the creation of a password which he did not reveal) are evidence that he did not assume the risk that the files could be subjected to a search authorized by another. The court in Trulock was not faced with the issue of apparent authority, in that the housemate informed police she did not know Trulock s computer password. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4 th Cir. 2001). 29

30 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4 th Cir. 2001). 30

31 Wife told officers she used the computer only occasionally to play solitaire. After shutting down computer, officers mirrored the hard drive and conducted a forensic analysis of the copy using software that did not reveal the husband s files were password protected. United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4 th Cir. 2007). 31

32 The court took into consideration the following facts in holding that the officers were reasonable in assuming that the wife had authority to consent to a search of the computer: Computer was located in a common area. Computer was on and screen was lit even though husband was not at home. Fraudulent acts committed came from the home computer using accounts established in the wife s name. Computer leased solely in the wife s name. Officers had no indication that files were password protected. United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4 th Cir. 2001). 32

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34 The court noted that an officer presented with ambiguous facts relating to authority has a duty to investigate further before relying on consent. However, in analyzing the totality of circumstances available to the officers, the court found they could have reasonably believed that the defendant s father possessed mutual use and control over the computer and therefore authority to consent to its search. As a result, the officers were under no duty to ask clarifying questions. The court considered the following factors: door to defendant s bedroom was open, giving the officers a clear view of the computer father said he was free to enter the defendant s room, although he knocked if the door was closed father owned the house and lived there father paid the ISP bill father did not say or do anything to indicate his lack of control over the computer at the time he was asked for his consent United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, (10 th Cir. 2007). 34

35 Andrus argued that there is inherent ambiguity whenever police seek to search a household computer and the third party granting consent does not supply information regarding his use of the computer or the presence of passwords. The majority noted that this argument presupposes that password protection of home computer is so common that a reasonable officer should know that the presence of passwords is likely. Andrus did not make this argument directly, nor did he provide any evidence that there is a high incidence of password protection among home computer users. The dissent criticised the majority for failing to take judicial notice that password protection is a standard feature of operating systems. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 721 (10 th Cir. 2007). 35

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39 Search Incident to Arrest: From Gant to Cell Phones; Inventory; PC based Vehicle Searches Jan ,

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41 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel involved a warrantless search of defendant s home, incident to his arrest there, for the fruits of a burglary. Officers searched entire three bedroom home, including the attic, garage and workshop. 41

42 Chimel gives us the traditional search incident to arrest doctrine. The Court stated that the person of an arrestee, as well as the area into which an arrestee might reach, may be searched so as to deprive him of weapons by which he could resist arrest or escape and also to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence. The twin rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence do not support a search of any room other than the one in which an arrest occurs, nor does it support the search of closed or concealed areas in the room in which the arrest occurred. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 42

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44 In United States v. Robinson, the Court addressed the question of whether police could open closed containers located on an arrestees person. The Court held that pursuant to the full custodial arrest, the warrantless search of defendant s person, inspection of crumpled cigarette package found on his person and the seizure of heroin capsules found in the package were permissible, notwithstanding that the officer did not indicate any subjective fear of the defendant, nor did he suspect the defendant was armed. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). Only needed a showing that search was pursuant to a legal custodial arrest ; "It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search... United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The Court distinguished the search incident to a lawful custodial arrest from a Terry stop which is limited in scope to a frisk of the outer layer of clothing for weapons. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). This case established the bright line rule that an officer can search an arrestee s person and open any containers thereon automatically, incident to a lawful arrest. 44

45 Edwards was lawfully arrested for attempting to break into post office. He was taken to the local jail and placed in a cell. The next morning, Edwards was given a change of clothes and the clothing he had been wearing since the time of arrest was taken from him and held as evidence. It is... plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of the arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974). Once accused is lawfully arrested and in custody, effects in his possession that were subject to search at time of arrest may be lawfully seized and searched without a warrant, even though substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest, administrative procedures, etc. and the time that the property was taken for use as evidence. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974). 45

46 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 46

47 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, (1977). 47

48 FN distinguishing Edwards: Unlike searches of the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee s immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondent s privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they were under arrest. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16, n

49 Courts have upheld delayed warrantless searches of wallets, (United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9 th Cir. 1980)); purses, (People v. Decker, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1247, 1252 (1986)); address books, (United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, (7 th Cir. 1983)); and pagers (United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). 49

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51 United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4 th Cir. 2009). United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). As part of a drug investigation, police arrested Finley and seized the cell phone from his pocket. Agents took Finley to another location where they were conducting a search warrant. While interviewing Finley, one of the agents searched through the phone s call records and text messages, which referred to drug use and trafficking. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Chadwick was inapplicable to the Finley search; the cell phone was on his person at the time of the arrest, whereas Chadwick concerned the search of property not immediately associated with [his] person. The court in Finley also noted that, despite the fact that police had moved Finley, the search of the cell phone was still substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and therefore was permissible. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 n.7. (5th Cir. 2007). See also, United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, (D. Ariz. 2008); United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp 2d 1085, (D. Minn. 2008); United States v. Mercado Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, (D. Kan. 2007). In these cases, the defendants were arrested for drug related activity when their electronic devices were searched. The courts noted that the devices may have been used to communicate with others involved in the illegal activity, therefore, there was a reasonable probability that evidence of the arrestee s crime would be stored on the device. United States v. Oritz, 84 F.3d 977 (7 th Cir. 1996).

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53 People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008). Diaz was arrested after participating in a controlled buy of narcotics. At the time of arrest, Diaz had on his person a small amount of marijuana and a cell phone. The phone was not seized at the time of arrest, but an hour or so later after he was taken to the police station. During Diaz s interrogation, which occurs approximately thirty minutes after arriving at the station, the officer accesses the phone s text message folder and retrieves an incriminating message ( ). When confronted with this information Diaz confessed. 52

54 People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008), aff d, No. S166600, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011). Relying on Chadwick, Diaz argued that the warrantless search of his cell phone 90 minutes after his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment s requirement that a warrant must be obtained for delayed searches of possessions within an arrestees immediate control. A cell phone, Diaz contended, should not be classified as an item closely associated with the person of an arrestee, because they are no more likely to be inside a person s pocket than inside a briefcase, backpack, or purse, or on a car seat or table, or plugged into a power source, or stashed inside any manner of separate bags or carrying containers. People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 216 (Ct. App. 2008), aff d, No. S166600, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011). 53

55 United States v. Gerardo Rodriguez Salgado, LEXSEE 2010 US Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ga. 2010). 54

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57 United States v. LaSalle, 2007 WL (D. Hawai i). The Government argued that the search of the cell phones was a valid warrantless search as an incident to the Defendant s arrest. Citing Edwards, the government contended that a search is incident to arrest as long as it occurs before the administrative processes relating to arrest and custody have been completing. The court, however, rejected this argument. On the other hand, courts have upheld delayed warrantless searches of of wallets, (United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9 th Cir. 1980)); purses, (People v. Decker, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1247, 1252 (1986)); address books, (United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, (7 th Cir. 1983)); and pagers (United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).

58 United States v. Wall IV, 2008 WL (S.D. Fla 2008). 57

59 United States v. McGhee, 2009 WL (D. Neb.) 58

60 United States v. McGhee, 2009 WL (D. Neb.) citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 59

61 United States v. McGhee, 2009 WL (D. Neb.). The court held that the officers were not justified in conducting a warrantless search of the defendant s cell phone incident to his arrest. The court noted that McGhee did have the cell phone within his immediate control (the officer took it from his person) an area which can be searched incident to arrest under Chimel. However, if Chimel s twin justifications for the SIA exception are absent, the rule doesn t apply. United States v. McGhee, 2009 WL , at *3 (D. Neb.) citing United States v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009). In analyzing Chimel s rationale underlying the search incident to arrest exception, the McGhee court found (1) the cell phone did not present a risk of harm to the officers, and (2) no evidence suggested the cell phone contained destructible evidence. As a result, officers were not justified in conducting a warrantless search of defendant s cell phone as incident to his arrest. United States v. McGhee, 2009 WL , at *4(D. Neb.). 60

62 United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2009). Defendant was pulled over for speeding. Upon approaching the automobile, the officer noticed a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Defendant was arrested when a subsequent check revealed he was driving with a suspended license. At the time of arrest, the officer seized a cell phone from defendant s pocket and conducted a search of its contents. The court noted that where a defendant is arrested for drug related activity, police may be justified in searching the cell phone for evidence of this crime, even if the presence of such evidence is improbable. The court found that the search of the defendant s cell phone had nothing to do with the preservation of evidence related to the crime of arrest (driving with a suspended license) or with officer safety, and as such, the search was not justified under the twin rationales of Chimel. Officer was, according to the court, searching the cell phone for information relating to the smell of marijuana, not seeking to preserve evidence that Defendant was driving with a suspended license. United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 61

63 United States v. Park, 2007 WL (2007). The court found that, unlike in Finley where the search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest, the search of Park s phone was not. The court placed great significance on its classification of cell phones, holding that for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, these devices should be considered possessions within an arrestee s immediate control and not part of the person. 62

64 Smith arrested on drug related charges after responding to a call to his cell phone by police informant attempting to set up a buy. During arrest, police found cell on defendant s person. Police seized phone, put defendant in police car, then searched phone for evidence. The Court discussed Finley noting that the defendant in that case, unlike the defendant in the case at bar, conceded that a cell phone was analogous to a closed container for the purpose of Fourth Amendment analysis. For this reason, the Supreme Court found that the Finley analysis was not entirely applicable. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2009). 63

65 After holding that cell phones are not closed containers for the purpose of 4/A analysis, the court discussed how cell phones should be classified under the 4 th Amendment, noting that due to their nature cell phones defy easy categorization. The court focused on one s expectation of privacy, stating that an address book one might carry on one s person would carry a lower expectation of privacy during a search incident to arrest, while laptop computers are entitled to higher expectations of privacy. The court found that although cell phones cannot be equated with laptop computers, their ability to store large amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain. Because of this, police must obtain a warrant before intruding into the phones contents. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2009). 64

66 In Belton, officer pulled over a speeding vehicle, and after asking to see the driver s license and registration discovered that neither the driver nor the other three passengers owned the vehicle or were related to the owner. Officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw envelope on floor marked Supergold. Officer ordered the four men out of the car and placed them under arrest. The officer patted down each of the men and split them up so they would not be able to physically touch each other. Officer picked up Supergold envelope and found it contained marijuana. He then searched each of the four former occupants of the automobile as well as the passenger compartment of the car where, on the back seat, he found a jacket belonging to Belton. He unzipped one of the pockets of the jacket and discovered cocaine. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, (1981). 65

67 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981). Container is defined as any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, n.4 (1981). 66

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69 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct (2009). 68

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71 The Supreme Court s decision in Gant, significantly limits a police officer s ability to conduct a search incident to arrest when the person arrested was in a vehicle. Gant does not affect an officer s ability to search the person being arrested, rather, it sets forth the permissible scope of the search of the area surrounding the arrestee in situations where the arrestee was a recent occupant of a vehicle. Restated, Gant holds that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. In Gant, neither the possibility of arrestee s access nor the likelihood of discovering offense related evidence authorized the search. There were five officers and three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the search of Gant s car; Gant was clearly not within reaching distance of his vehicle. No evidentiary basis for the search; Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car. 70

72 While a motorist s privacy interest in his automobile is less substantial than in his home; it is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection. Belton searches authorize police to search not only the passenger compartment, but also every purse, briefcase or container located in the passenger compartment, even if there is no basis for believing that evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle. Belton, in effect, gives police unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person s private effects the concern at the very core of the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009). 71

73 Belton articulated the scope of a search of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants. The Court fashioned a rule, "easily applied, and predictably enforced"; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); in order to provide clear guidance to police officers "who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." New York v. Belton, supra, 458, quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Belton established this standard based upon a generalization that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car. State v. Badgett, 512 A.2d 160, 168 (Conn. 1986). Belton was an attempt to eliminate on the scene confusion of police officers with respect to the scope of their right to search an automobile; the competing interests of law enforcement and personal privacy are better served if precise rules of police conduct are established which may be routinely followed in certain situations. State v. Badgett, 512 A.2d 160, 168 (Conn. 1986). Courts are at odds as to what is required in order for a search incident to arrest to comport with Belton, for example, how close in time must the arrest and the search must be? Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct 1710, 1720 (2009). 72

74 Search commencing five minutes after arrestee was removed from the scene upheld. United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, (9th Cir. 1999). United States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8 th Cir. 1996). Search that continued after arrestee removed from the scene upheld. United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994). Search commencing after arrestee was removed from scene held to be invalid. United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631 (10 th Cir. 1992). Defendant was no longer at the scene when search of his truck began; he was handcuffed and sitting in the back seat of a patrol car. There was obviously no threat that he might reach in his vehicle and grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Thus, the rationale for a search incident to arrest had evaporated. Search was not contemporaneous it was remote in time and in place in that defendant and his truck were not in the same location. United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634, 635 (10 th Cir. 1992). The rationale underlying the Belton rule is that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). It follows, therefore, that a warrantless search incident to arrest is not valid if it is "remote in time or place from the arrest," Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964), such that "no exigency exists." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). Search that continued after arrestee removed from the scene held to be invalid. State v. Badgett, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986). Although Belton appears to have removed the necessity for factual analysis in each case of the actual likelihood that a person arrested may be able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence contained in the passenger compartment of his vehicle, we construe it to allow a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest only while the arrestee remains at the scene of the arrest at the time the search is conducted. State v. Badgett, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986). 73

75 Issues of spatial proximity: Belton not applicable when arrestee was approached by police after he had exited vehicle and reached his residence. United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9 th Cir. 2008). Belton applicable when arrestee was apprehended 50 feet from vehicle. Rainey V. Commonwealth, 197 S.W. 3d 89, (Ky. 2006). Belton applicable when arrestee was apprehended inside an auto repair shop, and his car was parked outside. Black v. State, 810 N.E. 2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004). 74

76 Michigan v. Long permits an officer to search a vehicle s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). United States v. Ross authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which evidence might be found in cases where there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, (1982). These exceptions together ensure that officers may search an automobile when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle s recent occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would provide no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009). 75

77 76

78 United States v. Reynolds, 2009 WL (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 77

79 United States v. Hodges, No RDR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62760, (D. Kan. 2010). 78

80 79

81 WY v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 80

82 81

83 United States v. Johns, 499 U.S. 478 (1985). 82

84 Ajan v. United States, 2009 WL (E.D. Tenn.) (slip copy) Even if the vehicle search were not permitted incident to Ajan s arrest, the discovery of pills on his person provided probable cause to search the car for contraband. Whether or not the occupant of a car is arrested, warrantless searches of vehicles are permitted if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. Ajan v. United States, 2009 WL at *9 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 83

85 84

86 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (containers w/in vehicle). Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (arrestee s bag and containers therein). 85

87 86

88 87

89 88

90 U.S. v. Flores, 122 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D. N.Y. 2000). U.S. v. Wall, 2008 WL (S.D. Fla 2008). (unreported) 89

91 90

92 91