Richard J. Engelhardt appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Respondent did not appear, despite proper notice of the hearing.

Transcription

1 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY Disciplinary Review Board Docket NO. ORB IN THE MATTER OF RALPH A. GONZALEZ AN ATTORNEY AT LAW Decision of the Disciplinary Review Board Argued: October 19, 1994 Decided: July 7, 1995 Richard J. Engelhardt appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Respondent did not appear, despite proper notice of the hearing. To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. This matter was before the Board on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), based upon respondent's guilty plea to the disorderly persons offense of obstructing the administration of law, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in on September 23, 1993, respondent was pulled over by a police officer for speeding on county road 670. Respondent handed the officer a valid vehicle registration and insurance card, along with a driver's license bearing the name Juan B. Ramirez. Respondent told the officer that he was an attorney and that he was returning from the courthouse in Cape May County. He also stated that the car was registered in the name of his cousin, Susan Gonzalez. The police

2 officer examined the insurance card, which listed "Ralph A. & Susan M. Gonzalez" as the insured. The officer noticed the initials "RAG ESQ" on the car's license plate and the initials "RAG" on the gold ring respondent was wearing. After various inquiries about such coincidences, respondent confessed that the license he produced was not his, but his cousin's. Respondent admitted to the police officer that he had been using his cousin's license for several weeks, since he was afraid of losing his driving privileges due to the amount of points on his license. Respondent entered a guilty plea to obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-l. In addition, respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of speeding (driving at the rate of sixty-three miles per hour in a fifty-mile per hour zone). The OAE has requested the imposition of a reprimand. * * * Upon review of the full record, the Board has determined to grant the OAE's motion for final discipline. Respondent's criminal conviction reflects adversely on his "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. " RPC a. 4 ( b). Respondent misrepresented his identity to a police officer, in violation of RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Though respondent's illegal 2

3 \. activity was not related to the practice of law, any misbehavior, whether private or professional, that reveals an absence of the good character and integrity essential for an attorney, constitutes a basis for discipline. In re LaDuca, 62 N.J. 133, 140 (1979). The existence of a criminal conviction is conclusive proof of respondent's guilt in disciplinary proceedings. B 1:20-6(c) (1) (now B 1:20-13 (c) (1)); In re Goldberg," 105 N.J. 278, 280 (1987); In re Tuso, 104 N.J. 59, 61 {1986); In re Rosen, 88 N.J. 1, 3 ( 1981). Therefore, no independent examination of the underlying facts is necessary to ascertain respondent's guilt. In re Bricker, 90 N.J. 6, 10 (1982). The sole issue that remains is the quantum of discipline to be imposed. B 1:20-6(c) (2) (ii) (now B 1:20-13 {c) (2)); In re Infinite, 94 N.J. 50, 56 {1983). In its brief and at oral argument before the Board, the OAE recommended that the Board impose a reprimand, analogyzing respondent's conduct to lying to a client or lying to a court. The OAE relied on the Court's pronouncement in In re Kasdan that "intentionally misrepresenting the status of lawsuits warrants public reprimand." 115 N.J. 472, 488 (1989) (citing In re Dreier, 94 N.J. 396 (1983); In re Rosenthal, 90 N.J. 12 (1982); In re Ackerman, 63 N.J. 242 (1973); In re Bloom, 60 N.J. 113 (1972)). In addition, the OAE referred to decisions which imposed public reprimands for making misrepresentations to a court. See In re Mazeau, 122 N.J. 244 (1991); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472 (1990); In re Silber, 100 N.J. 517 (1985); In re McDonald, 99 N.J. 78 (1985); In re Turner, 83 N.J. 536 (1980). It is also clear, 3

4 however, that an attorney who makes false statements to a court may receive harsher discipline than a public reprimand. See, ~, In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397 (1986) (attorney suspended for three years for knowingly making false certification to court) ; In re Rospond, 87 N.J. 572 (1980) (two-year suspension for pleading guilty to two counts of false-swearing); In re Silverman, 80 N.J. 489 (1979) (eighteen-month suspension for filing false answers on behalf of client). Respondent's conduct more closely parallels cases involving a specific intent to mislead a police officer, which warrants a three-month suspension from the practice of law. In In re Poreda, 139 N.J. 435 (1995), an attorney received a three-month suspension for presenting a forged insurance identification card to a police officer and to a court, in violation of RPC 8.4(b), (c) and (d). Similarly, in In re Devin, 138 N.J. 46 (1994), an attorney received a three-month suspension for making misrepresentations to a police officer and to a client, and for failing to keep a client reasonably informed. Though the Court has imposed a six-month suspension where an attorney's misconduct included lying to the Attorney General's Office during the course of an official investigation, the harsher discipline in that case was predicated on additional serious misconduct, i.e., removal of marijuana and PCP from the evidence room of the Prosecutor's office, continuing a social relationship with informants, and providing helpful information to such informants for their defense of the criminal case against them. In re Farr, 115 N.J. 231 (1989). 4

5 In light of the foregoing, the Board has unanimously determined to impose a three-month suspension. not participate. Three members did The Board has also determined to require respondent to reimburse the Ethics Financial Conuni ttee for appropriate administrative costs. Dated: 5