THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT 2012 TERM SEPTEMBER SESSION Appeal of David Stacy

Transcription

1 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT 2012 TERM SEPTEMBER SESSION Appeal of David Stacy APPEAL FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR ASSOCIATION PUBLIC PROTECTION FUND COMMITTEE BRIEF OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT David Stacy Respectfully submitted, Steven M. Latici, Esquire (#1436) Law Office of Steven M. Latici, P.A. PO Box 130 Gilmanton, NH (603)

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3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii FINAL ORDER ON CLAIM DATED APRIL 4, iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED..1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE..2 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.3 ARGUMENT.3 I. Did the Committee commit reversible error by reducing the amount of the claim by the amount of money the claimant failed to recover on the Probate Bond? 3 II. III. IV. Did the Committee commit reversible error by failing to find the amount of money received by Donald Wyatt was $173,849.73, and not the $191, that was found by the Probate Court and proved by the exhibits? 5 Did the Committee commit reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt acted with the requisite intent to support a common law claim of theft for receiving payment for his legal fees?. 6 Did the Committee commit reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt committed the tort of conversion by retaining payment for legal services when he had no legal right to do so? 10 V. Did the Committee commit reversible error by finding that Donald Wyatt was authorized to withdraw money from his IOLTA account for payment of his legal fees pursuant to the fee agreement, when both the Probate Court and the Supreme Court ruled that Donald Wyatt had knowingly engaged in a conflict of interest from the inception of the attorney/client relationship?. 12 CONCLUSION 13 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED...15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.15 i

4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Douglas Case, 156 N.H. 613, 937 A. 2d 891 (2007).11 Evans v. Mason, 64 N.H. 98 (1886)...11 In Re: Estate of McCool, 131 N.H. 340, 553 A.2d 761 (1988)..12, 13, 14 In Re Estate of Watson, 557 N.W. 2d 838 (1990)..13 Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Inc. v. Schier, 109 N.H. 551, 258 A. 2d 351 (1969)..11 Rinden v. Hicks, 119 N.H. 811 (1979)...10 State v. Sylvia, 136 N.H. 428 (1992) 9 State of Nebraska ex rel Special Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court v. Shapiro, 665 N.W. 2d 615 (2003). 13 Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A. 2d Wyatt s Case 159 N.H. 285 (2009) 2, 7 Statutes and Authorities N.H. Probate Court Rule N.H. Probate Court Rule 106, 106-A, and N.H. RSA 464-A: ii

5 Copy of Order dated 4/4/12 attached to hard copies produced to the Court. iii

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7 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Did the Committee commit reversible error by reducing the amount of the claim by the amount of money the claimant failed to recover on the Probate Bond? 2. Did the Committee commit reversible error by failing to find the amount of money received by Donald Wyatt was $173,849.73, and not the $191, that was found by the Probate Court and proved by the exhibits? 3. Did the Committee commit reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt acted with the requisite intent to support a common law claim of theft for receiving payment for his legal fees? 4. Did the Committee commit reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt committed the tort of conversion by retaining payment for legal services when he had no legal right to do so? 5. Did the Committee commit reversible error by finding that Donald Wyatt was authorized to withdraw money from his IOLTA account for payment of his legal fees pursuant to the fee agreement, when both the Probate Court and the Supreme Court ruled that Donald Wyatt had knowingly engaged in a conflict of interest from the inception of the attorney/client relationship? 1

8 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal from the final decision of the Public Protection Fund Committee denying David Stacy s claim for legal fees received by Donald Wyatt while Donald Wyatt was simultaneously representing David Stacy and Michel Brault, the appointed Conservator of the Conservatorship Estate of David Stacy. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The very detailed background facts relevant to this appeal are set forth in Wyatt s Case 159 N.H. 285 (2009) and are incorporated herein by reference, as is the decision of this Court in that case. Additional relevant facts are further set forth in the decision of Judge Patten on the Objections to Inventory and Accounts set forth at Page of the Certified Record ( CR ). Both Judge Patten and this Court found that Donald Wyatt had engaged in a conflict of interest from the inception of his representation of Michel Brault in his capacity as Conservator of the Estate of David Stacy. Judge Patten surcharged Michel Brault a sum in excess of $1,000,000.00, including legal fees paid to Donald Wyatt in the amount of $175,012.82, and expenses paid to Donald Wyatt in the amount of $16,071.00, (CR Pg. 0065). Mr. Wyatt filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in the summer of 2003, two years prior to the date of Judge Patten s decision, (CR Pg. 0320). It is undisputed that the automatic stay was not lifted at the time of Judge Patten s order in July Michel Brault filed for bankruptcy protection in October Judge Patten, in his order of 2005, allowed David Stacy to bring suit on the Probate Bond issued in the Conservatorship case. David Stacy settled that claim for $275, on May 19, 2006, (CR Pg. 0154). David Stacy filed his claim with the Public Protection Fund on November 2

9 2, Following a hearing on the merits, the Public Protection Fund Committee issued its order denying Mr. Stacy s claim on April 4, This appeal followed. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Committee committed plain error by reducing the amount of the claim by the amount of money Claimant failed to recover on the suit on the Probate Bond. Donald Wyatt was not protected by the bond and the Committee s reduction of David Stacy s claim was improper. The Committee s finding that the amount of money received by Mr. Wyatt was limited to the legal fees he collected was error when the evidence showed the gross amount of fees and expenses charged was $191, The Committee erroneously concluded that Donald Wyatt did not act with the requisite intent to support a claim of theft when this Court concluded that Mr. Wyatt acted knowingly when he continued with the conflicted representation and collected legal fees during the period of the conflict. The Committee was erroneous in its finding that Claimant did not make out a claim for common law conversion, in light of the fact that Mr. Wyatt has refused to return the fees and has never obtained any court approval of his fees. ARGUMENT I. The Committee committed reversible error by reducing the amount of the claim by the amount of money the Claimant failed to recover on the Probate Bond. The Probate Bond named Michel Brault as the Principal, not Donald Wyatt, (CR Pg. 0153). The Settlement Agreement released Peerless Insurance, Liberty Mutual Insurance and Michel Brault, not Donald Wyatt, (CR Pg. 0154). Claimant was forced to obtain counsel to file suit on the Probate Bond and he incurred substantial legal fees in that endeavor. Claimant made a decision to settle the Bond case rather than pursue the matter through trial and appeal, an 3

10 option that would have generated considerably more in legal fees. There is simply no legal authority for the Committee to claim any sort of offset against the claim for the amount of money that Claimant failed to collect on the suit on the Probate Bond and the Committee cites no authority for its offset. The recovery on the Probate Bond was not a recovery on any lawsuit against Donald Wyatt and does not represent a recovery on an insurance policy that covered Mr. Wyatt. At the time of the suit on the Probate Bond, Donald Wyatt had filed for protection under the bankruptcy statute and had not received a final discharge. The Committee failed to consider this aspect when it concluded that the Public Protection Fund was entitled to an offset. The recovery against the Bond cannot be construed as including any recovery against Mr. Wyatt because the automatic stay was in effect. The Committee cannot claim that Judge Patten s decision is not binding on Mr. Wyatt because of the automatic stay, and then turn around and ignore the automatic stay by applying an offset for a proportionate recovery on the Bond. Even if the Committee is entitled to some sort of offset, the arithmetic used by the Committee is faulty and does not fully account for the total defalcations by Donald Wyatt. Michel Brault borrowed $40, from Claimant s benefactor and that sum was deposited into Donald Wyatt s IOLTA account, however, Judge Patten found and ruled that Michel Brault did not account to the court for those funds and those funds were never accounted for in Mr. Wyatt s account, (See Response to Show Cause Order, CR Pg. 0268; see also Order of Judge Patten, CR Pg. 0073). In addition, as pointed out in the Response to the Show Cause Order, the legal fees paid to Donald Wyatt were not the only losses caused by Mr. Wyatt. The entire fiasco in Texas was directly attributable to Mr. Wyatt. He instigated the proceedings, participated in the 4

11 proceedings in contravention of a court order, and he perpetuated the proceedings long after the temporary guardianship had been granted to Deborah Stacy. So, if the Committee is entitled to an offset, it must offset the Bond recovery against the totality of losses caused by Donald Wyatt and not just his legal fees. The Committee also miscalculated the percentage of the Bond recovery allegedly attributable to losses caused by Mr. Wyatt. In calculating the percentage of the Bond recovery that was attributable to legal fees charged by Mr. Wyatt, the Committee determined that the total of losses sustained by the Estate was $999,099.00, (CR Pg. 0319). This was incorrect, for it does not take into account the $175, of attorney s fees ordered by Judge Patten, which were never paid, (See Order of Judge Patten, CR Pg. 0078). II. The Committee committed reversible error by failing to find the amount of money received by Donald Wyatt was $173,849.73, and not the $191, that was found by the Probate Court and proved by the exhibits. It is important for this Court to understand that throughout the entire period of the Conservatorship Estate, the Conservator did absolutely nothing except collect a generous fee. All of the administration of the Estate was handled through the law office of Wyatt & Theroux. The decision of Judge Patten is replete with instances of damages caused to the Estate by improper estate administration, which damages were properly surcharged to the Conservator, Michel Brault. Nonetheless, all of the damages were caused by the conduct of Donald Wyatt. The Committee found from the exhibits that the total of fees and expenses paid to Donald Wyatt was $173,849.73, (CR Pg. 0380). It is not clear from the decision whether the Committee simply disallowed the expenses of $16, as found by Judge Patten and reduced the legal fees or whether the Committee found that the legal fees and expenses were actually less than the amount found by Judge Patten. Regardless of what the Committee intended, the number is just 5

12 plain wrong. Using the exhibits relied upon by the Committee, the total of legal fees alone paid to Wyatt & Theroux, exclusive of expenses, is $183, Furthermore, the total of defalcations by Donald Wyatt is far greater than the legal fees he charged the Estate. For instance, as found by Judge Patten and as argued by Claimant s prior attorney in her Response to the Show Cause Order, (CR Pg. 0268) Michel Brault, through his attorney Donald Wyatt, negotiated two loans from Claimant s benefactor in the amounts of $80, and $10, respectively. The first $40, of the loan proceeds were deposited to the IOLTA trust account and nearly all expended in legal fees to Mr. Wyatt and the same applied to the undocumented $10, loan. The other $40,000 of the loan proceeds were never accounted for at all, (CR Pg. 0073). Therefore, not only was the Committee wrong in its analysis of the legal fees charged, but it also appears that Claimant was incorrect in his calculation of legal fees as presented to the Probate Court. III. The Committee committed reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt acted with the requisite intent to support a common law claim of theft for receiving payment for his legal fees. In its decision, the Committee concluded that Claimant failed to prove that Donald Wyatt acted with the requisite intent to support a claim of theft because Mr. Wyatt was legally entitled, pursuant to the fee agreement to withdraw legal fees from his IOLTA account and pay himself, and that it was undisputed that Claimant did no contest the reasonableness or amount of the fees Mr. Wyatt charged. The Committee s analysis of Mr. Wyatt s intent is flawed in several aspects. In the first instance, the ability of Donald Wyatt to pay himself legal fees from funds owned by the Estate of David Stacy is limited by Probate Rules and by the finding of not only the Probate Court, but also this Court regarding Mr. Wyatt s conflict of interest. Donald Wyatt 6

13 knew that he was not entitled to retain any fees, unless his fees were specifically approved by the Probate Court, and he further knew that at the time he took the fees that he would never be successful in obtaining the requisite approval of his fees because of the conflict of interest. Any disinterested lawyer looking at the situation that confronted Donald Wyatt at the inception of his representation of the Conservator, while he was still representing and had represented the Ward would have concluded that his representation was prohibited. The Probate Court found that Donald Wyatt was involved in a conflict of interest from the inception of his representation. This Court, in its decision in Wyatt s Case made the specific finding that Mr. Wyatt s conduct was at a minimum, knowing. The finding that Mr. Wyatt acted knowingly applies to all aspects of his representation of David Stacy and the Conservator, Michael Brault, including his payment of fees to himself. Therefore, the deliberate decision of Donald Wyatt to proceed with his conflicted representation and to pay himself legal fees, despite the conflict, is sufficient evidence of intent to support the definition of theft. The Committee also failed entirely to consider the evidence and argument that Donald Wyatt drew significant fees from completely unauthorized sources. For instance, as set forth in Claimant s post-hearing brief, Mr. Wyatt s authority to pay himself fees in the first instance was confined to payment from the assets of the Estate. As Judge Patten observed in his decision, Probate Court Rules 106, 106-A, 108 and RSA 464-A:27 all impose various requirements on a conservator seeking to borrow money. Michel Brault, through his attorney Donald Wyatt, negotiated several loans on behalf of the Estate; one loan for $52, was negotiated with the David Stacy Irrevocable Trust of From those loan proceeds $19, was paid to Mr. Wyatt for legal services associated with the Texas Guardianship proceedings; $17, was 7

14 paid to the Texas attorney, A. Rodman Johnson; and $12, was used to pay the expenses of flying to Texas repeatedly, (CR Pg. 0073). Michel Brault, acting through Donald Wyatt, also negotiated two loans from Claimant s benefactor in the amounts of $80, and $10, (undocumented as to the $10, loan). Of that, $50, from the loan proceeds was paid to Donald Wyatt in the form of fees without Brault s control or knowledge, (CR Pg. 0073). Judge Patten further found that the remaining $40, of the $80, loan proceeds were simply never accounted for at all and the reasonable inference from the evidence is that sum was simply taken by Mr. Wyatt and not reported. As found by Judge Patten, $49,647.88, representing sale proceeds from David Stacy s personal residence, were deposited to Donald Wyatt s trust account and those fees were withdrawn by Mr. Wyatt and used to pay his legal fees, (CR Pg. 0066). The personal residence was never conveyed to the Estate and, at the time of the sale of the property, title remained in David Stacy and therefore, the money belonged to Mr. Stacy and not the Estate. Further, at the time Donald Wyatt paid himself the $49,647.88, he knew that he was not entitled to charge for or collect the fee. The evidence before the Committee reasonably demonstrates that Donald Wyatt knew his representation was conflicted from the inception of his representation and he was not entitled to even collect a fee, let alone retain the fees. The evidence before the Committee was that Donald Wyatt acted knowingly. Mr. Wyatt negotiated loans on behalf of the Estate that were not authorized and did not comply with Probate Court Rules or New Hampshire laws and then used those loan proceeds to pay himself. He deliberately negotiated loans from David Stacy s Irrevocable Trust that was not part of the Conservatorship Estate and used those funds to pay himself legal fees. He charged for his legal work in Texas in direct contravention of a court 8

15 order disallowing his participation in the case, he never advised the Texas court that he was charging for his services, he did not obtain approval of either his fees or the fees charged by local counsel in Texas, and he did not obtain approval of his expenses for the Texas guardianship hearings. All of the above is ample evidence to demonstrate Mr. Wyatt s intent to commit the crime of theft. This Court has previously ruled that unauthorized use of client funds to pay personal expenses of the attorney, or to disburse those funds to other clients, amounts to theft by unauthorized taking, State v. Sylvia, 136 N.H. 428 (1992). The Committee distinguishes the instant case from Sylvia by holding that Donald Wyatt was authorized to withdraw earned fees from his trust account. The Committee s reliance on the fee agreement as authority to withdraw the fees is flawed. The authority to withdraw the fees must be measured against the clear conflict of interest and this Court s finding that Mr. Wyatt acted knowingly in engaging in the conflict of interest. In addition, the Committee overlooks, or disregards entirely, the fact that a significant portion of the fees withdrawn from the trust account were from funds from which Mr. Wyatt had no authority to access at all. To the extent Mr. Wyatt had authority to withdraw fees from his trust account, that authority was limited to funds that belonged to the Conservatorship Estate. Sale proceeds from the sale of real estate and funds that were borrowed without authority, or funds that were withdrawn from David Stacy s trust, were never assets of the Conservatorship and therefore, the authority to withdraw justification for the Committee s findings cannot stand. 9

16 IV. The Committee committed reversible error by ruling that David Stacy failed to prove that Donald Wyatt committed the tort of conversion by retaining payment for legal services when he had no legal right to do so. The Committee ruled that the act of conversion is an intentional tort and in order to prove the tort of conversion, it was incumbent on Claimant to prove that Donald Wyatt was substantially certain that such conduct would wrongfully deprive the conservatorship of possession of that property, (Decision, Pg. 21). It is hard to see how the Committee concludes that Donald Wyatt was not substantially certain that his conduct in receiving unauthorized and illegal legal fees and then expending those fees would not wrongfully deprive the conservatorship estate of its property. The Committee s ruling injects two concepts into the tort of conversion that is simply not supported by the case law of the past century and a half. The Committee s holding mandates that in order to prove the tort of conversion, that the property owner needs to prove some level of bad faith intent on the part of the person possessing the property and that he must prove such intent beyond the standard of more probable than not. The essence of an action for conversion is the proof of wrongful deprivation of property or retention of property over goods which is inconsistent with the rights of the person entitled to immediate possession, Rinden v. Hicks, 119 N.H. 811 (1979). The intent of the actor at the time he acquires the goods of another is immaterial to the tort of conversion. When the neighbor s cow wanders into the yard of another and that person places the cow in the barn, no conversion has occurred; but when the owner shows up and demands the cow and the person refuses to return the cow, the act of conversion is complete. Acts which of themselves imply an assertion of title or a right of dominion over another s property may be a conversion although the 10

17 defendant has honestly mistaken his rights, Evans v. Mason, 64 N.H. 98 (1886). The fact that a person in possession of property of another sells the property in good faith believing he has a right to do so does not prevent such conduct from constituting conversion, Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Inc. v. Schier, 109 N.H. 551, 258 A. 2d 351 (1969). Not only is Donald Wyatt s intent at the time he came into possession of the fees immaterial, but the fact that Mr. Wyatt no longer had the fees at the time of the Supreme Court ruling in his case is likewise completely immaterial to the determination of whether he converted the fees to his own use. Demand was made by David Stacy in the probate case for the return of the fees and Mr. Wyatt refused; Mr. Wyatt had no legal right to the fees at the time he took them, at the time demand was made, at the time the Probate Court rendered its decision, and at the time this Court rendered its decision in the disciplinary matter. Donald Wyatt argued that because there is no finding of fraud on his part and, therefore, no finding of intent that the Committee could not find that his retention of the legal fees constituted conversion. A party can be liable for conversion without having a hostile intent or desire to do any harm, Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A. 2d This Court has recently ruled that applying client funds to the payment of legal bills without permission is an act of conversion, Douglas Case, 156 N.H. 613, 937 A. 2d 891 (2007). Donald Wyatt argued that he did not commit the tort of conversion because there was no fraud on his part and there was no finding of bad faith. The Committee appears to have accepted that argument by ruling that Donald Wyatt did not commit conversion because at the time he paid himself out of the client trust account in this case, he was acting with permission of the duly authorized conservator, (Decision at Pg. 22). Both Donald Wyatt and the Committee miss the point. Intent at the time 11

18 the property is taken is not the critical element of conversion. What matters here is his retention of the fees when he knows that he is not entitled to retain the fees. Donald Wyatt knew that he was engaged in a conflict of interest from the inception of his representation. This Court found that he acted knowingly when he engaged in a conflict of interest. Mr. Wyatt did not obtain approval of his fees from the Harris County Probate Court and he charged fees for his work in Texas, in direct contravention of the order of the Harris County Probate Court barring his representation. He took fees from his trust account from funds that were not part of the Conservatorship Estate. He never obtained, and at this date still has not obtained, any approval from the Carroll County Probate Court, as required by Probate Court Rule 88. Regardless of whether or not the order of the Probate Court directing Mr. Wyatt to return the fees is enforceable against him, the fact remains that he retained the fees without any approval from the Probate Court. Retention without authority is conversion, plain and simple. His retention of the legal fees without court approval, and after demand for the return of the fees, is an intentional and deliberate act inconsistent with David Stacy s right to the return of his money. The Committee acknowledged at the hearing that an attorney in New Hampshire who pays himself legal fees in a probate matter prior to obtaining court approval of those fees does so at his peril. V. The Committee committed reversible error by finding that Donald Wyatt was authorized to withdraw money from his IOLTA account for payment of his legal fees pursuant to the fee agreement, when both the Probate Court and the Supreme Court ruled that Donald Wyatt had knowingly engaged in a conflict of interest from the inception of the attorney/client relationship. The Committee has failed to correctly apply the law as set forth in the case of In Re: Estate of McCool, 131 N.H. 340, 553 A.2d 761 (1988). There, this Court stated we hold that an 12

19 attorney who violates our rules of professional conduct by engaging in clear conflicts of interest of whose existence he either knew or should have known may receive (emphasis added) neither executor nor legal fees for services he render an estate, McCool at 351. That holding stands for the very clear proposition that a lawyer engaged in a conflict of interest is not authorized to receive the fee. Therefore, he cannot lawfully withdraw the fee from his trust account. If Donald Wyatt had no lawful authority to even withdraw the fee and transfer it to his operating account, the Committee s entire justification for its ruling completely falls apart. Other courts citing the McCool decision have used similar language in describing the attorney s right to legal fees during a period of conflict. An attorney who performs work despite a conflict of interest is generally prohibited from recovering (emphasis added) any fees for the work, In Re Estate of Watson, 557 N.W. 2d 838 (1990); State of Nebraska ex rel Special Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court v. Shapiro, 665 N.W. 2d 615 (2003) holding an attorney engaged in a conflict of interest has no right to a fee. CONCLUSION The conclusion by the Committee that Claimant failed to meet his burden of proof that Donald Wyatt committed theft or conversion of the legal fees he charged to the Conservatorship Estate is based on the Committee s misapplication of the holding of In Re: Estate of McCool; its failure to follow the ruling of the Probate Court and this Court that the conflict of interest existed from the inception of the representation and was knowing; its failure to consider that Donald Wyatt took fees from funds he had no legal right to access, regardless of his beliefs; and, its erroneous application of the law of conversion. The Committee s reliance on the legal services contract between Donald Wyatt and the Conservator, Michel Brault, is misplaced; that contract 13

20 must be viewed in light of the circumstances at the time, which includes the fact that a conflict of interest existed from the inception of the representation. The right to charge for and receive a fee is governed not just by the terms of the contract but by the New Hampshire Professional Conduct Code and the ruling in the McCool case. Donald Wyatt had no legal right to take the fees and he is charged with that knowledge at the time he took the fees. That is sufficient evidence of intent to support the common law crime of theft. Add in the fact that he never obtained approval of his fees from the Carroll County Probate or the Harris County Probate Court, and the fact that he drew his fees from sources he was not authorized to access, there is overwhelming evidence to support a finding of theft. The Committee s divergence into the realm of intentional torts to find support for its finding that David Stacy failed to prove some bad faith intent on the part of Donald Wyatt at the time he took the fees is a very strained interpretation of the law of conversion and is totally inconsistent with this Court s prior rulings on the subject. The tort of conversion is complete when Mr. Wyatt exercises dominion and control over the property of David Stacy and is certainly complete when he refuses to return the property. Intent at the time of the taking simply does not factor into the analysis at all. There is no legal authority for the Committee to claim an offset against the bond recovery and, even if there is the ratio, the Committee ignored the totality of defalcations committed by Donald Wyatt, which includes the failure to account for $40, of David Stacy s money deposited into Mr. Wyatt s trust account. The conclusion by the Committee that the defalcations by Mr. Wyatt are limited to $173, is simply unsupported by the evidence. 14

21 The decision of the Committee should be reversed with an order directing the Committee to award David Stacy the maximum recovery allowed in the amount of $150, Respectfully submitted, David Stacy, By his Attorney, Law Office of Steven M. Latici, P.A. Dated: Steven M. Latici, Esquire (#1436) PO Box 130 Gilmanton, NH (603) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 16(10), Petitioner requests fifteen (15) minutes to present oral argument by Attorney Steven M. Latici. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Steven M. Latici, certify that on this day I caused two copies of the within Claimant s/appellant s Brief to be forwarded, via first class mail, to Thomas Quarles, Jr., Esquire, for interested party, NH Bar Association, for interested party, and Donald Wyatt, accused. Dated: Steven M. Latici, Esquire 15