UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Transcription

1 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 1 of 49 FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; TURTLE ISLAND RESTORATION NETWORK; JAPAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS FEDERATION; SAVE THE DUGONG FOUNDATION; ANNA SHIMABUKURO; TAKUMA HIGASHIONNA; YOSHIKAZU MAKISHI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, No D.C. No. 3:03-cv EMC OPINION v. JAMES MATTIS, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 15, 2017 San Francisco, California Filed August 21, 2017 Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Mary H. Murguia, and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Murguia

2 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 2 of 49 2 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS SUMMARY * National Historic Preservation Act / Administrative Procedure Act The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings in an action brought by environmental groups and individuals who challenged a decision by the U.S. Department of Defense to construct a new military base on Okinawa, Japan. Plaintiffs, seeking to protect a local animal population and cultural property from the base s alleged adverse effects, brought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Government s alleged violations of Section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C (e), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Reversing the district court, the panel held that plaintiffs had standing to pursue declaratory relief, limited to whether the Government s evaluation, information gathering, and consultation process pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act Section 402 discharged the Government s obligations under the Act and otherwise satisfied the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Applying Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs claims for declaratory relief did not present a political question that would prevent judicial review. * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

3 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 3 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 3 The panel held that plaintiffs also had Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief and that the claims for injunctive relief did not present a political question implicating any Baker factors. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings so that the district court could address the merits of the claims in the first instance. COUNSEL Sarah Burt (argued) and J. Martin Wagner, Earthjustice, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Mark R. Haag (argued), Peter Kryn Dykema, and Andrew C. Mergen, Attorneys; John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General; Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan C. McKay, Office of General Counsel, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.; Phillip J. Riblett, Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees. Brian R. Turner, San Francisco Field Office, National Trust for Historic Preservation, San Francisco, California; Elizabeth S. Merritt and William J. Cook, National Trust for Historic Preservation, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae National Trust for Historic Preservation.

4 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 4 of 49 4 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS MURGUIA, Circuit Judge: OPINION The U.S. Department of Defense (the Government) approved the location, construction, and specifications for a military base in Okinawa, Japan. Individuals and organizations seek to protect a local animal population and cultural property from the base s alleged adverse effects by bringing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Government s alleged violations of Section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 54 U.S.C (e), 1 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The plaintiffs allege the Government failed to take into account the base s impact on their cultural, aesthetic, economic, and environmental interests. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims for declaratory relief because plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief, and concluding that it could not hear the claim for injunctive relief because resolving that claim involved deciding a political question. We conclude that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their declaratory relief claims and that plaintiffs injunctive relief claim does not present a political question. We therefore affirm the district court s conclusion that plaintiffs claims for declaratory relief do not present a 1 At the time of the district court decisions in this proceeding, NHPA Section 402 was codified at 16 U.S.C. 470a-2. In December 2014, after the district court decision now under appeal, NHPA Section 402 was moved to Title 54 of the U.S. Code, and the specific provision now is found at 54 U.S.C (e). Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. No , 128 Stat. 3094, 3231 (Dec. 19, 2014). All references in this opinion to NHPA Section 402 refer to the same underlying provision as the statute cited in the district court decisions.

5 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 5 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 5 political question; reverse the district court s conclusion that plaintiffs lack standing to seek declaratory relief; and reverse the district court s conclusion that plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief presents a political question. We remand to the district court for further consideration of plaintiffs claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 2 I. Background and Procedural History A. The Okinawa Dugong The dugong is a species of marine mammal resembling a manatee. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hagel, 80 F. Supp. 3d 991, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Okinawa Dugong III). Dugong populations are often small and isolated, and live only in saltwater. See generally 68 Fed. Reg (Dec. 17, 2003). Dugongs have long lifespans, but do not reproduce at a high rate, and because of their exclusively plant-based diet may face difficulty in moving to new locations to find food. See id. at The dugong largely depends on seagrass communities for survival and must stay close to the coastal habitats where seagrass grows. See id. (noting that the dugong s close ties to the shore increase its chances of local extinction ). The same food sources are vulnerable to development on or soil runoff from coastal lands. See, e.g., Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at Hunting and the fragility of the dugong s habitat have taken a toll on its numbers: the United States lists the dugong as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the World Conservation Union considers the 2 We note that the plaintiffs may face challenges in securing relief on the merits.

6 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 6 of 49 6 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS dugong vulnerable, and Japan considers the dugong critically endangered. Id. at 995. Okinawa is the largest of the Ryukyu Islands in Japan. See Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Okinawa Dugong II). Okinawa has a culture and local mythology distinct in some ways from the Japanese mainland. See id. The dugong is significant within traditional Okinawan culture, and continues to hold special significance for at least some Okinawans. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 995. At present, the Okinawa dugong population is the northernmost dugong population in the world. The population is small perhaps as few as 50 in number, according to a 1997 estimate by the Mammalogical Study of Japan and located in the waters to the east of Okinawa. Id. at 995. Because of its significance in Okinawan culture, the Japanese government has designated the Okinawan dugong population for protection under Japan s Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties. See Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at Under Japanese law, therefore, the dugong is a natural monument or cultural property. Id. The designation of the Okinawa dugong in this fashion provides the legal hook for the challenge at the heart of this appeal. Plaintiffs-appellants are individuals and organizations, including the Center for Biological Diversity, the Turtle Island Restoration Network, the Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation, and the Save the Dugong Foundation (collectively, CBD). Among the plaintiffs-appellants are three individual Japanese citizens and four international environmental organizations. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 995. The individual plaintiffs reside in Japan, and either live on Okinawa or guide dugong tours. Id. The

7 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 7 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 7 organizations have members who allege aesthetic and environmental interests in the Okinawa dugong. Id. B. Diplomatic Framework for Okinawan Territory The Government s interests in Okinawa include a longstanding security relationship with the Government of Japan. The United States military has maintained a presence on Okinawa from the close of World War II up to the present day. Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at The military has several bases in Okinawa. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at Today, as throughout our Nation s history, there is significant variation in the ownership status of U.S. military sites around the world. United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014). The Government s operation of military bases in Japan involves complex and long standing treaty arrangements. NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993). From 1945 to 1972, the United States administered Okinawa, while Japan retained residual sovereignty. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 995. In 1972, after years of negotiations, Japan and the United States entered into a new arrangement, restoring full Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa. See The Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447 (the Okinawa Reversion Treaty); Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at ; Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at Under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, the United States ceased to administer Okinawa and the island chains, which became a prefecture of Japan, but the United States retained the use of facilities and areas in Okinawa. Okinawa Reversion Treaty, arts. I, 1, III, 23 U.S.T. 447; see Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at The United States continued to use Okinawan territory pursuant to two

8 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 8 of 49 8 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS additional agreements: the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T (Security Treaty) and the Agreement Under Article VI of the [Security Treaty] Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T (Status of Forces Agreement). See Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at The Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement set up a bilateral Security Consultative Committee (Consultative Committee) consisting of two principals from each of the two nations: Japan s Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and the United States Secretaries of State and Defense. Id. at The Consultative Committee provides the forum for the two countries to consult when deciding what areas and facilities the United States will use for the defense purposes of the Security Treaty. Id. Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement also establishes a Joint Committee separate from the Consultative Committee with one representative from each nation. The functions of the two committees appear broadly similar. In effect, this diplomatic framework is an agreement by the United States to provide security to Japan in exchange for the space to do so. To that end, Article III of the Status of Forces Agreement provides that within the facilities and areas granted for use of the United States, the United States may take all measures necessary for the establishment, operation, safeguarding, and control of assigned facilities. This includes authority for the United States to control which individuals may access bases or facilities. One longstanding base is Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS-Futenma), which supports Marine air operations. Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C MHP, 2005

9 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 9 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 9 WL , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005) (Okinawa Dugong I); see Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 996. MCAS-Futenma is located in Ginowan City, a site of growing urban development on Okinawa. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 996. The growth and resulting change in surrounding conditions since the base was first established has led Japanese officials to express concern about the effect of the base on the health and safety of Japanese citizens. Id. American officials have agreed the base s current location poses challenges, and the two nations have engaged in efforts to relocate MCAS-Futenma since at least Id. The two countries efforts have focused primarily on moving the Okinawa base to a less densely populated area. Relocating MCAS-Futenma to a new site has taken a great deal of time and effort. See, e.g., Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at In 2006, the Consultative Committee released the United States Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (the Roadmap) a bilateral executive agreement between the two nations that agreed on a plan of action for, among other things, relocation of MCAS-Futenma. Id. at The Roadmap sets forth that Japan will build a replacement military base, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), near Camp Schwab, a military base already located adjacent to Oura and Henoko Bays. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 996. Officials from the two nations selected the site after considering other potential base sites, including a sea-based location. See Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at Critical to the design of the FRF is a V-shaped set of runways built on top of landfill and extending into what are now the waters of the Oura and Henoko Bays. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 996, 996 n.4. The runways are approximately 1600 meters long, with additional space for

10 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 10 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS overrun. Id. at 996. After the 2006 Roadmap, no serious construction work occurred for the next seven years. Id. at 997. The FRF Project continued to be the subject of active diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States. Id. This included attention to the environmental impact of the base on eastern Okinawa. In Japan, government officials prepared a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) in 2009, and issued a final EIS in Id. The Japanese EIS included attention to potential impacts on the dugong from the runways and other FRF construction. Id. The Japanese EIS concluded that there would be no adverse effects on the Okinawa dugong from the FRF. C. Prior Decisions CBD filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense and the Secretary of Defense in his official capacity in September CBD filed its suit after it became clear that the likely site of the FRF might have effects on the Okinawa dugong, but prior to Japan and the United States entering into the 2006 Roadmap. In its complaint, CBD alleged that the FRF was a serious threat to the Okinawa dugong. CBD rested its claims on Section 402 of the NHPA and the APA. NHPA Section 402 requires that United States agency officials take into account the effect of any Government undertaking [p]rior to the approval of any undertaking outside the United States that may directly and adversely affect recognized cultural heritage sites or properties, for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effect. 54 U.S.C (e). CBD alleged that the Government had failed to take into account the effect the FRF might have on the Okinawa dugong, violating NHPA Section 402. The Government first argued that NHPA Section 402 does not provide a cognizable basis for relief. The Government moved to dismiss on the basis that the dugong

11 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 11 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 11 was not property implicated by NHPA Section 402 and that the protected status of the dugong under Japanese law was not equivalent to being on the United States National Register. See Okinawa Dugong I, 2005 WL at *6. The district court concluded that the NHPA could apply to the Government s design and construction of the FRF. Id. at *18. The district court found that Japan s cultural property protection law was equivalent to the United States National Register, implicating NHPA Section 402, and that the dugong was a property the NHPA protects. Id. at *7 12. The district court also held that the NHPA applied extraterritorially because the statute on its face explicitly demonstrate[d] Congress s intent that it apply abroad where a federal undertaking promises to have direct or adverse effects on protected foreign properties. Id. at *18. The district court also ruled that relocation of MCAS-Futenma could be an undertaking for NHPA purposes, but that factual disputes precluded ruling on that question or on determining whether Japan s role made the action unreviewable under the act of state doctrine. See id. at *8, *10 11, * The parties had to develop the case further to allow for a conclusion on whether the FRF would actually have the potential to affect the dugong adversely and whether the Secretary of Defense had in fact discharged his NHPA Section 402 obligations. Id. at * After this decision, Japan and the United States announced the Roadmap, and CBD filed a second amended complaint. After development of the record, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In 2008, the district court ruled in favor of CBD on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at The district court held that the individual plaintiffs and most of the organizations had

12 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 12 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS standing. Id. at The district court also dismissed a number of other threshold jurisdictional arguments from the Government, including arguments based on the lack of a final agency action under the APA, a failure of ripeness, the act of state doctrine, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 s requirement to join necessary and indispensable parties (here, Japan). Id. at The Government did not raise the political question doctrine at that time. The district court then held that NHPA Section 402 applied to the Government because the FRF was a federal undertaking within the meaning of the statute and the undertaking might have adverse effects on the dugong. Id. at Having reached this conclusion, the district court interpreted the requirements of NHPA Section 402, which was an issue of first impression. Id. at The district court concluded that satisfying NHPA Section 402 s process must include, at a minimum: (1) identification of protected property, (2) generation, collection, consideration, and weighing of information pertaining to how the undertaking will affect the historic property, (3) a determination as to whether there will be adverse effects or no adverse effects, and (4) if necessary, development and evaluation of alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse effects. The person charged with responsibility for this basic process is the person with jurisdiction over the undertaking, and compliance with the process must occur before the undertaking is approved. In addition, a federal agency does not complete the take

13 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 13 of 49 Id. at CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 13 into account process on its own, in isolation, but engages the host nation and other relevant private organizations and individuals in a cooperative partnership. The district court concluded that the Government had failed to comply with NHPA Section 402 because the record contains no evidence that a single official from [the Government] with responsibility for the FRF has considered or assessed the available information on the dugong or the effects of the FRF. Id. at This, in turn, was a violation of the APA, because it was agency action unreasonably delayed and unlawfully withheld. Id. at 1112 (citing 5 U.S.C. 706(1)). The district court ordered the Government to comply with NHPA Section 402. Id. The district court then ordered the case held in abeyance until the information necessary for evaluating the effects of the FRF on the dugong is generated, and until defendants take the information into account for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating adverse effects to the dugong. Id. The district court ordered the Government to submit additional information and documentation within 90 days, describing [1] what additional information is necessary to evaluate the impacts of the FRF on the dugong; [2] from what sources, including relevant individuals, organizations, and government agencies, the information will be derived; [3] what is currently known or anticipated regarding the nature and scope of Japan s environmental assessment and whether that assessment will be sufficient for meeting defendants obligations under the

14 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 14 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS NHPA; and [4] identifying the DOD official or officials with authorization and responsibility for reviewing and considering the information for purposes of mitigation. Id. The district court did not issue an appealable final order. Eventually, in February 2012, without motion from either party, the district court administratively closed the case, citing reported obstacles in FRF construction. The district court instructed the parties to reopen the proceeding via letter when the FRF Project s likely outcome was more certain. After the district court s 2008 decision in Okinawa Dugong II and the parties attempts to comply with the district court s order, the U.S. Department of Navy engaged in an analysis pursuant to NHPA Section 402. Among other steps, the Navy (1) commissioned an independent study on the potential effects of the FRF on the Okinawa dugong, (2) engaged with the Government of Japan, (3) reviewed multiple biological, environmental, and historical studies relating to the impact of the project on the dugong, (4) reviewed Japan s EIS, including comments, (5) reviewed CBD s litigation materials, including the declaration of CBD s expert, and (6) consulted with sixteen experts in diverse disciplines, including some recommended by CBD. The Navy in a draft report also suggested a number of mitigation measures to the Government of Japan to avoid possible adverse impacts to the Okinawa dugong. The Navy also identified mitigation measures to consider during operations of the base. The Government released its final report, the U.S. Marine Corps Recommended Findings (Marine Corps Findings), in April In its report, the U.S. Navy concluded that the FRF would have no adverse

15 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 15 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 15 impact on the Okinawa dugong population. The parties continue to dispute whether the Government actually discharged its NHPA Section 402 obligations. The Government subsequently filed a notice of completion of the NHPA process for the FRF. The Government submitted the Marine Corps Findings to CBD, but did not provide the district court or CBD with an administrative record or underlying documentation. In the interim, during 2013, the FRF construction project had gained significant momentum. Okinawa Dugong III, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 997. The momentum included productive negotiations between the Government of Japan and the Governor of the Okinawa Prefecture. Id. CBD subsequently filed a supplemental complaint that alleged that limited construction work was underway, a fact to which both parties agreed as of Since 2015, the FRF has had setbacks. Construction stopped in late 2015, before restarting, reflecting local political disputes relating to the FRF. Though construction appears to be ongoing at this time, there is no reason to think completion of the base is imminent. D. Instant Federal Court Proceeding 1. Claims for Relief In its first supplemental complaint, CBD brought a single claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, with several subparts. CBD stated that the Government s failure to consult CBD as interested parties and failure to provide information to the public or seek public comment constituted violations of the take into account requirement of NHPA Section 402. CBD also alleged that failing to follow the

16 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 16 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS NHPA requirements violated the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), (2)(D). Finally, CBD alleged that the Government s conclusion that the construction and operation of the FRF will have no adverse effect on the Okinawa dugong was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, within the meaning of the APA. In its prayer for relief, CBD asked for (1) a judgment declaring several violations of NHPA Section 402 and of the APA; (2) an order setting aside the Marine Corps Findings; (3) an order barring the Government from proceeding with the FRF project, including derivative procedural steps like permitting and construction approval, until the Government complies with section 402 of the NHPA ; and (4) costs and fees. We will refer to the request for a declaratory judgment and an order setting aside the Marine Corps Findings as CBD s claims for declaratory relief and the request for an order enjoining construction work as CBD s claim for injunctive relief. 2. Motion to Dismiss and District Court Order In September 2014, the Government moved to dismiss. At that point, the Government took the position that all of CBD s claims presented political questions, depriving the district court of jurisdiction. In February 2015, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, but did so on slightly different grounds than the Government request[ed]. The district court concluded that CBD s requested injunctive relief presented nonjusticiable political questions. Specifically, the district court ruled that for the district court to stop construction of a U.S. military facility overseas that has been approved by both the American and Japanese governments, and which is being

17 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 17 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 17 built by the Japanese on their own sovereign soil, runs afoul of the political question doctrine. On CBD s claims for declaratory relief, however, the district court declined to dismiss based on the political question doctrine, noting that these claims arise in the context of a political case but do not present a non-justiciable political question. The district court then concluded that even though the political question doctrine did not bar the claims for declaratory relief, CBD lacked standing to bring them because of [t]he inability of this Court to fashion any injunctive or otherwise coercive relief to protect the dugong. The district court concluded specifically that CBD could not show that a favorable judicial decision was likely to redress its injuries. The district court, having resolved both the injunctive and declaratory claims, dismissed the suit with prejudice. CBD timely appealed. 3 II. Standard of Review We review de novo whether CBD has Article III standing, Jewel v. Nat l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2011), and the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 The National Trust for Historic Preservation also moved for leave to participate as an amicus, which we granted.

18 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 18 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS III. Order of Analysis The district court dismissed CBD s claim for injunctive relief on political question grounds, and CBD s claims for declaratory relief for lack of standing. 4 Lack of standing deprives this court of Article III jurisdiction, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env t, 523 U.S. 83, (1998), and the presence of a political question likewise deprives this court of jurisdiction. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007). Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). We analyze separately CBD s standing for its declaratory and injunctive relief claims because a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). Likewise, the political question doctrine requires analysis on a claim-byclaim basis. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 547 (9th Cir. 2005) ( It is incumbent upon us to examine each of the claims with particularity. ). We therefore have four discrete threshold issues before us: standing for declaratory relief, standing for injunctive relief, whether declaratory relief presents a political question, and whether injunctive relief presents a political question. 4 The Government s actual compliance with NHPA Section 402 is not at issue on appeal because the Government did not move the district court for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 56. See infra, Part V.

19 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 19 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 19 The district court recognized the need to engage in a fresh analysis of standing, and not to rely on the facts as they stood at the outset of the litigation. See Quinn v. Anvil Corp., 620 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court, however, took a roundabout path to the standing question. Rather than confronting standing first, the district court, as noted above, discussed the political question doctrine for declaratory relief (finding no political question), then the political question doctrine for injunctive relief (finding the injunctive relief claim barred for presence of a political question), and then finally standing for declaratory relief (finding no standing for declaratory relief). We take a different approach. No GWEN All. of Lane Cty., Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988) ( When both standing and political question issues are before the court, the court should determine the question of standing first. ). We begin with standing for declaratory relief. IV. Discussion of Declaratory Relief A. Standing CBD alleges a procedural injury based on the NHPA, relying on the APA. 5 Three elements form the irreducible 5 CBD brings claims based on the NHPA. NHPA is a procedural statute requiring government agencies to stop, look, and listen before proceeding with agency action. Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 610 (9th Cir. 2010). The default approach with procedural statutes of this variety is to recognize no private right of action, and to require a plaintiff to proceed under the APA. 5 U.S.C. 702; see San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, (9th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs who bring a cause of

20 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 20 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS constitutional minimum of standing to file suit in federal court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. CBD bears the burden to establish the elements of standing, which, when challenged in a motion to dismiss, are judged based on the allegations in its complaint. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014). 1. Injury-in-Fact A plaintiff shows a procedural injury-in-fact when a procedural requirement has not been met, so long as the plaintiff also asserts a concrete interest that is threatened by the failure to comply with that requirement. City of action under another provision of NHPA, Section 106, must do so under the APA. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 417 F.3d at The relevant provision of NHPA for this appeal, Section 402, requires that Prior to the approval of any undertaking outside the United States that may directly and adversely affect a property that is on the World Heritage List or on the applicable country s equivalent of the National Register, the head of a Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over the undertaking shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on the property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effect. 54 U.S.C (e). Nothing in NHPA Section 402 suggests the creation of any separate private right of action. NHPA s procedural character therefore requires that CBD file suit under the APA. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 417 F.3d at (noting default presumption of no private right of action outside the APA).

21 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 21 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 21 Sausalito v. O Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, (9th Cir. 2003)). Congress cannot create an injury-in-fact or relax the injury-in-fact requirement. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at ; see also Sausalito, 386 F.3d at A concrete interest implicated by a procedural requirement may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values and does not need to be an economic harm. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). Here, CBD alleges concrete aesthetic interests in the enjoyment of the Okinawa dugong. Two of the individual named plaintiffs also allege concrete economic interests through their tourism business. CBD also points to a procedural requirement, NHPA Section 402, and alleges the Government did not satisfy this requirement. The threat to CBD s interests by the Government s failure to satisfy the procedural requirement is clear because the requirement directly relates to the effect of the undertaking on the property within the meaning of NHPA Section U.S.C (e). CBD therefore satisfies the first element of Article III standing. See Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183) (finding injury-in-fact requirement met where plaintiffs pointed to use of affected area and activity that will lessen enjoyment of use). 2. Causation The next requirement of standing is whether the injury in question is fairly traceable to the conduct of the Government. The conduct of the Government for purposes of CBD s challenge is the Government s failure to take into account the effects of the FRF project on the dugong prior

22 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 22 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS to the approval of a federal undertaking. A claim of procedural injury affects the standing analysis, and can relax some requirements. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, (2007). Where, as here, claims rest on a procedural injury, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed. California ex rel. Imperial Cty. Air Pollution Control Dist. v. U.S. Dep t of the Interior, 767 F.3d 781, 790 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001)). Causation in a NHPA case involves the take-intoaccount process for a federal undertaking. When analyzing the relevant undertaking in this case, we adopt the following description by the district court: DOD does not violate the NHPA by virtue of its bilateral participation in the design, site selection, construction and operation of a military facility that threatens a protected property. The NHPA violation arises instead from DOD s failure to take into account information relevant for making a determination as to whether the military facility will adversely affect the dugong and if so, how those effects may be avoided or mitigated. In other words, the challenged activity is not the undertaking itself, but the process by which the effects of the undertaking are considered and assessed. Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (emphasis added). In other words, we focus on causation by reference to the required NHPA process. CBD is not challenging entry into the 2006 Roadmap, or any specific approval, but whether the Government conducted the required take-into-

23 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 23 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 23 account process. When, as of 2008, CBD was asking the Government to engage in the take-into-account process, its standing to challenge agency inaction was clear. At this stage in the litigation, the question is whether the action the Government took the process detailed in and leading up to the Marine Corps Findings satisfied NHPA Section 402 and APA standards for agency action. The relationship between causation and adverse effects remains intact, and the inquiry remains focused clearly on the process and not the result. CBD has shown causation and satisfied the second irreducible element of Article III standing. 3. Redressability The final standing question is whether CBD can establish redressability. It was on this ground that the district court in the decision under appeal concluded that CBD lacked standing to bring its claims. The plaintiff must show it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. Plaintiffs alleging procedural injury can often establish redress[a]bility with little difficulty, because they need to show only that the relief requested that the agency follow the correct procedures may influence the agency s ultimate decision of whether to take or refrain from taking a certain action. Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, (9th Cir. 2008). In a project with many moving pieces, as well as several stops and starts, the details of the base s construction and operation are susceptible to potential alteration and modification by the take-into-account process. Indeed, the take-into-account process of NHPA Section 402 envisions the process goal to be avoiding or mitigating any adverse

24 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 24 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS effect, 54 U.S.C (e), which implies that an undertaking will still be carried out. The Government, having concluded in the Marine Corps Findings that no adverse effects are forthcoming, opposes standing based on the idea that no mitigation efforts are possible. The Government, for instance, notes practical obstacles to changing flight paths, storm water management plans, or nighttime illumination. But this does not defeat standing, given the allegations in the operative complaint. If the Government has reached its conclusions about effects and mitigation after a sound NHPA Section 402 process, then it has complied with NHPA Section 402; the claim fails not for lack of standing but on the merits. If the Government has not followed NHPA Section 402, then these arguments are unavailing, because the underlying determinations about effects and mitigation lack validity. In concluding CBD lacked standing, the district court relied heavily on our decision in Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d In Salmon Spawning, the State Department sought to enter into a treaty with Canada regarding fisheries in the waters off the Pacific Northwest (Fisheries Treaty). Id. at The State Department s action triggered a consultation requirement under the ESA, whereby the State Department had to request advice from either the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) or the Fish and Wildlife Service on the likelihood of the action threatening endangered species with extinction. Id. The United States would not implement the Fisheries Treaty unless the federal government had discharged relevant consultation requirements under domestic statutory law. See id. That consultation requirement required the NMFS to issue a biological opinion (BiOp), which in relevant part concluded that the Fisheries Treaty would not jeopardize any

25 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 25 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 25 endangered species. See id. at The plaintiffs challenged the BiOp as arbitrary and capricious and claimed that implementation of the Fisheries Treaty was unlawful without a legally adequate consultation. Id. at The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. See Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, No. C RSM, 2006 WL , at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2006), aff d in part, rev d in part and remanded, 545 F.3d In Salmon Spawning, we characterized the claim as a challenge to the biological foundation for the Treaty. 545 F.3d at We concluded that if the groups were successful in establishing that NMFS failed to comply with the procedural requirements of ESA 7 in deciding whether the United States entrance into the Treaty would jeopardize listed species, the procedurally flawed consultation and defective BiOp could theoretically be set aside. Id. at But we immediately noted that a court could not set aside the next, and more significant, link in the chain the United States entrance into the Treaty. While the United States and Canada can decide to withdraw from the Treaty, that is a decision committed to the Executive Branch, and we may not order the State Department to withdraw from it. Id. On that basis, we concluded that the plaintiffs could not show redressability, even under the relaxed showing necessary for a procedural injury, because [t]he agency action that the BiOp authorized was the United States entrance into the Treaty and the court had no power to disturb the entrance into the Fisheries Treaty. Id. at Salmon Spawning suggests that to the extent CBD seeks declaratory relief aimed at challenging the 2006 Roadmap, or the decision to initiate the FRF Project, CBD lacks standing. Indeed, perhaps for this reason, the Government

26 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 26 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS treats CBD s challenge in this case as akin to the effort to invalidate the Fisheries Treaty in Salmon Spawning. As noted above, however, CBD s claim concerns the take-intoaccount process of NHPA Section 402, Okinawa Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1095, and CBD does not seek to invalidate any specific decision. Instead, CBD is seeking a declaration that the Government did not take into account the effects of the FRF project on the dugong, as the Government was required to do under NHPA Section 402. Further, the district court overlooked a more limited challenge by the Salmon Spawning plaintiffs that we did sustain: a claim that the NMFS was obligated to reinitiate its analysis and consultation in light of new data. We concluded that Article III standing was satisfied, including redressability, because the fact that it is uncertain whether reinitiation will ultimately benefit the groups (for example, by resulting in a jeopardy determination) does not undermine their standing. The asserted injury is not too tenuously connected to the agencies failure to reinitiate consultation. And a court order requiring the agencies to reinitiate consultation would remedy the harm asserted. Unlike the other claims, this claim is a forward-looking allegation whose remedy rests in the hands of federal officials and does not hinge on upsetting the Treaty. Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1229 (citation omitted). Here, CBD s claim is similarly forward-looking and does not hinge on upsetting the 2006 Roadmap or the FRF Project. It is merely seeking that the Government discharge

27 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 27 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 27 a statutory procedural requirement. If the Government has failed to do so, then the court can remedy the defect by ordering the Government to comply with its statutory obligations. Mayfield v. United States also does not provide a basis to defeat CBD s standing here. 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff in Mayfield sought declaratory relief that aspects of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 599 F.3d at 966. Mayfield is distinguishable for three reasons. First, Mayfield s claim was not procedural in nature, meaning that the redressability analysis in his case was not characteristic of procedural injuries. CBD s claims, as discussed, are procedural. Second, Mayfield s relief was limited to declaratory relief because of a settlement. Id. at 968 ( The parties agreed that the sole relief that Mayfield could seek or that the court could award with regard to this claim would be a declaratory judgment. ). We concluded, [T]he only relief that would redress this alleged Fourth Amendment violation is an injunction requiring the government to return or destroy such materials, which was not within the scope of what Mayfield could seek. Id. at 972. CBD has not bargained away its right to seek injunctive relief, and for procedural injuries the lack of injunctive relief is not fatal to standing for declaratory relief. See Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). Finally, in Mayfield, the likelihood of redress seemed minimal because there was no indication that the Government would return the materials of its own volition, as it is under no legal obligation to do so, and has stated in its brief that it does not intend to take such action. 599 F.3d at 972. But while the redress sought in Mayfield related to information the Government had no legal obligation to delete or return, here the redress relates to a

28 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 28 of CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS legal requirement binding on the government, NHPA Section 402. A declaratory judgment finding that the Marine Corps Findings do not satisfy NHPA Section 402 would impose a legal obligation on the Government because a procedural requirement would stand unfulfilled. Unlike Mayfield, where a ruling would be of no direct consequence to the plaintiff, here CBD s claims for declaratory relief, challenging the NHPA Section 402 process, are something a legally adequate NHPA Section 402 process could address. CBD in its complaint alleges that the Government would discharge its obligations under NHPA Section 402 by taking steps that include: a. Producing, gathering, and adequately considering the necessary information for taking into account all the effects of the FRF on the Okinawa dugong and for determining whether mitigation or avoidance measures are necessary and possible; b. Making this information and other documentation relevant to the section 402 take into account process available to the public; and c. Consulting with all interested parties, including Plaintiffs, and inviting public participation in the section 402 process. CBD alleges the Government has not taken these steps. An adequate process will benefit CBD, even for an ongoing project. CBD therefore has standing to pursue these claims.

29 Case: , 08/21/2017, ID: , DktEntry: 49-1, Page 29 of 49 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. MATTIS 29 Further, the relevant controversy has not yet concluded. The Government asserts that the Japanese government has completed its environmental analysis and finalized its stormwater management design, and is in the process of constructing the FRF. But the FRF project has seen stops, starts, and modifications throughout its history. We cannot assume that the project is finalized and that a new NHPA Section 402 analysis if required would not lead to changes, minor or major, to the details of the construction of the FRF. We especially cannot assume that it would affect details of the operation of the FRF, once completed. As we noted in a case involving a different provision of NHPA, we should not pre-judge the outcome of any consultations that may take place. Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). At this point... it is impossible for us to know with any degree of certainty just what the end result of the NHPA process would be, and under those circumstances we avoid shortcutting the process which has been committed in the first instance to the responsible federal agency. Id. (quoting Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents & Assocs., Inc. v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, (5th Cir. 1991)) (noting the need to consider a range of outcomes and not merely a binary between no change or a completely altered approach). 4. Conclusion We conclude that CBD 6 has standing to pursue declaratory relief, limited to whether the Government s evaluation, information gathering, and consultation process 6 CBD and other organizational plaintiffs derive their standing from their members, and those members allege similar interests to the individual plaintiffs, meaning standing is satisfied for all plaintiffs. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181.