IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE 05 TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2014 BEFORE:

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1 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE 05 TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2014 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY WRIT PETITION No.8280 OF 2013 (LA-KIADB) BETWEEN: Mrs. Mary John, Aged about 71 years, Daughter of Late K.P.Paul, Wife of Late Dr. John Thomas, Residing at Flat No.004, Hebron Apartments, No.57, Benson Cross Road, Benson Town, Bangalore PETITIONER (By Shri. P.N. Rajeswara, Advocate ) AND: 1. The State of Karnataka Represented by its Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, M.S.Building, Bangalore

2 2 2. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board, No.14/3, 2 nd Floor, R.P.Building, Nrupathunga Road, Bangalore , Represented by its Executive Officer and Executive Member. 3. The Special Deputy Commissioner, K.I.A.D.B., No.14/3, 2 nd Floor, R.P.Building, Nrupathunga Road, Bangalore The Special Land Acquisition Officer, (Bangalore International Airport), Nrupathunga Road, Bangalore RESPONDENTS (By Shri. Basavaraj V Sabarad, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 Shri. D. Nagaraj, Additional Government Advocate for Respondent No.1) ***** This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to direct the respondent Authorities to frame an award as contemplated under Section 29(3) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 by determining the market value as on the date of this petition in respect of 4 acres of land in Sy.No.74/302 of Bandi Kodigenahalli Village, Jala Hobli, Yelhanka Taluk, Bangalore District, held by

3 3 the petitioner and acquired as per final notification dated vide Annexure-A. This petition, having been heard and reserved on and coming on for Pronouncement of Orders this day, the Court delivered the following:- O R D E R The petitioner claims that she was the owner of 4 acres of land bearing Sy.no.74/302 of Bandi Kodigenahalli. The same having been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (Hereinafter referred to as the KIAD Act, for brevity, the petitioner had unsuccessfully challenged those proceedings in WP /2011. It is alleged that the same was unauthorizedly withdrawn by the counsel engaged by her in that case. It is also the petitioner s case that to her shock, she had also learnt that the compensation amount due to her in respect of the above land had been drawn by some other, impersonating her. In respect of the said incident, a criminal case is said to be pending. It is the petitioner s case that a large amount of Rs.1.24 Crore and

4 4 Rs.44 Lakh had been allowed to be drawn in her name, with the active connivance of the concerned officials. The petitioner is hence before this court seeking a direction to the respondents to pay the compensation amount justly due to her. 2. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) that the acquisition proceedings in question were in respect of an extent of acres of land acquired in Bandi Kodigenahalli, Yelehanka Taluk, Bangalore North. A writ petition filed earlier by the petitioner, as admitted, did not contain any complaint of the nature now stated. The same was withdrawn. It is stated that one Mary John is said to have lodged a complaint with the Lokayuktha, to state that compensation payable in respect of her land measuring 4 acres has been paid to an impostor and that the said complaint is the subject matter of investigation. In the light

5 5 of the admitted payment of compensation, the present petition is not maintainable. It is further stated that the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, has passed an Order in Case No.RRT/2/CR/305-A/95-96 dated , in a case registered under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Hereinafter referred to as the KLR Act, for brevity) ordering deletion of the names of Byranna, son of Kempanna and Mary John, wife of K.P.Paul, in respect of Survey No.74/302 (8 acres) of Bandi Kodigenahalli Village. It was also ordered to continue the name of the Government in the records in respect of this land, holding that the aforesaid persons were claiming under bogus grants. The Special Deputy Commissioner had also ordered for recovery of the compensation amounts already paid. The said order is not questioned by anyone including the petitioner. It is contended that in view of the orders passed by the Competent Authority under Section 136(3) of KLR Act, the claim of the

6 6 petitioner is false and untenable. Hence, the question of passing an award, as requested in the writ petition, does not arise. It is further contended that the Registrar, Lokayukta, had sought for a Report in this regard and the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) has already submitted a Report on And that steps have also been initiated for recovery of the amount from the recipients of the compensation in respect of Survey No.74/302, to an extent of 8 acres, namely, Shri. Byranna, son of Kempanna and Smt.Mary John, wife of K.P.Paul, that is the petitioner herein. The petitioner, instead of complying with the requirements of the notice, has filed this writ petition and hence seeks dismissal of the same. It is further pointed out that the petitioner had filed a writ petition before this court in WP 15030/2009, questioning the Order dated passed under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. The said petition having been dismissed, the petitioner has no subsisting right to file the present petition. The fact of having

7 7 approached this court earlier is deliberately suppressed and hence, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this petition. 3. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder to meet the contentions of the respondent. The petitioner has sought to trace her title to the property, apart from furnishing the sequence of events in so far as the pending criminal proceedings are concerned. It is contended that if it is necessary to determine the petitioner s title to the property in order to accept her claim for compensation, it would be necessary that there be an award and the matter referred to the Civil court as required under Section 29(3) of the KIAD Act. The petitioner, in any event, cannot be denied her right to claim the compensation, when it is evident that the amount has been admittedly paid to an impostor. While it is true that the compensation payable should reach the true owner of the land and if by mistake or fraudulent design, it has been paid to the wrong person, it ought not to deprive the true owner of the just benefit. On the establishment of the

8 8 identity of the true owner, he need not await the recovery of the amount from the person, who may have illegally received it. The point for consideration in the admitted circumstances, in the present case on hand, however, is that the petitioner s claim to the land is now under a cloud, would it then be possible to have the same determined on a reference to the civil court under Section 30 of the LA Act? To answer the question, we may first note the tenor or Sections 30 and 31 of the LA Act, which are extracted hereunder :- 30. Dispute as to apportionment When the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. 31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.-

9 9 (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub- section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.

10 10 (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Collector may, with the sanction of the[ appropriate Government] instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land- revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing subsection shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof. Assuming that the matter is referred to the civil court for determination of the dispute as to the title of the petitioner, it would be possible for that court to examine the title deed, if any, under which the petitioner claims as against the rival title set up by any other and to decide in favour of one or the other. But if it is a case where the claimant is required to establish title itself, the

11 11 proceedings cannot be allowed to take on the colour of a suit for declaration of title as against the State Government, and especially if it involves the claims of others, who are not parties before the Land Acquisition Officer. In the instant case, the writ petition filed by the present petitioner in WP 15030/2009 and connected petitions involved several other parties. The said petition were disposed of while negating the petitioner s title thus : 20. While liberty is reserved to the State Government and revenue functionaries for taking such action as is warranted in accordance with law, the impugned order dated passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari. It is made clear that it does not confer any title on the writ petitioner much less the land which is subject matter of proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner and not only the writ petitioner is declined of the land in question as the government is the owner of the land, the present proceedings by itself cannot

12 12 bestow such ownership on the writ petitioner and even if the question of ownership arises, it should be resolved before the Civil Court. It is open to the State and revenue officials to defend the action taken if any or to contest the claim of the plaintiff on the material available before the Court and in accordance with law. It is needless to state that when the matter goes either before the revenue official or before the Civil Court, the statutory provisions governing the respective proceedings obviously bind the parties and there cannot be any binding either on the writ petitioner or respondents - private parties or the State. The civil court would hardly be in a position to find the title of the petitioner in view of the above observations. The petitioner is thus left with little alternative, but to establish her title by recourse to independent proceedings against the State and others, if the law so permits. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has placed reliance on several authorities to insist that the petitioner shall not

13 13 be driven to file an independent suit and the question of her title could be resolved in the reference. 4. The several authorities cited would not advance the case of the petitioner, as is elaborated hereunder : a. In the case of Secretary, Cantonment Committee, Barrackpore v. Satish Chandra Sen, AIR 1931 Privy Council 1: The appeal arose out of certain land acquisition proceedings. The Government notified for acquisition a plot comprising some 5¼ bighas of land with a house upon it situated at Barrackpore Cantonment. The respondent was in possession of the same. The Collector valued the buildings and computed the statutory addition for compulsory acquisition he awarded to the respondent and this part of his award was not in dispute. The Collector valued the land separately, but refused to award any part of this to the respondent on the ground that the land being cantonment land, was the property of the Government. The respondent claimed a reference in the ordinary course. The matter coming before the

14 14 Special Land Acquisition Judge, it was held that the respondent was entitled to the value of the land also and a decree came to be passed in his favour. The State appealed to the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed, and the matter was before the Privy Council. It was held thus: The question seems to have been dealt with in India as if the matter were one of apportionment between two contending claimants, the sole criterion being which of the two had made out the better claim to a particular part of the compensation. Their Lordships however have no doubt that, when Government are acquiring immovable property of a public purpose under Act 1 of 1894, it is for the person claiming compensation to establish his title to it affirmatively. The difficulty in the present case arises mainly from the fact that the acquired property is admittedly within the Barrackpore Cantonment, and the tenure of such property is in many cases of a somewhat anomalous character. It seems clear that much, at all events, of the land comprised in this cantonment, and probably in other cantonments in different parts of India, was originally acquired by Government for military purposes, but that

15 15 private individuals were allowed to erect houses upon various plots. After addressing the manner in which the respondent was asserting his claim, it was held thus : Their Lordships hold that the fair inference from these facts, taken in connection with the rules of 1836, is that much, and possibly most, of the land in this cantonment was and is the property of Government; that houses were erected upon it by the licence of Government, the buildings being recognized as the property of the persons by whom they were erected, and the land remaining in the ownership of Government, but that they may nevertheless have been within the cantonment limits some land which was never acquired by Government, and of which the ownership was always in private hands. If it lay upon the appellant to prove the acquisition of the particular plot which is the subject of this appeal, there can be no doubt that he has failed to do so. Both Courts in India have come to this conclusion, and, considering that this disposes of Government s claim to the land, they have, as their

16 16 Lordships think, assumed that it must be the property of the respondent. Their Lordships are unable to concur in this assumption. In their opinion the respondent, in order to succeed in his claim to compensation for the land, must prove his title to it in the ordinary way. The plot in question may have been privately owned, and may have passed from such owners to the respondent, but there is in their Lordships opinion no ground for assuming this: it must be a matter of proof by the respondent, and it is upon this that the respondent s claim to the compensation money must stand or fall. The title vouched by the respondent is remarkable for the meagerness of its written record. There is a mortgage dated in 1889 which covers a somewhat indeterminate fraction of the property. This is implemented by a certificate of purchase by the respondent of the same fraction at a Court sale in January 1899, presumably under a decree passed on the mortgage. Then there is a second sale certificate of August 1899, under which one Jogesh Chandra Sen, who may have been a coparcener of the respondent, purchased another fraction of the property, and a third sale certificate under which the respondent purchased the interest of his mortgagor in apparently the larger part of the property. It is impossible to make out from

17 17 these documents any title at all to the whole of the 5¼ bighas which the Government has now acquired, but this does not appear to have been noticed in the Indian Courts, and their Lordships do not desire to found their judgment in any way upon this deficiency. In addition to these documents there is the deposition of the respondent, who says that he has been in possession since 1900, but has no title-deeds, and had never seen any of prior date to his mortgage. It is said that the recitals in this deed carry back the possession to 1871, but their Lordships doubt if these recitals are evidence as against the appellant : see per Lord Buckmaster in Banga Chandra Dhur v. Jagat Kishore (1) (at p. 254 of 43 I.A). It is admitted that the sale certificates passed nothing but the right, title and interest of the judgmentdebtor, whatever it was, and the mortgage without anterior title-deeds is of no more determinate value. Their Lordships think therefore that the title of the respondent must be taken to be a purely possessory one and whether dating from 1900 or from 1871 seems to be immaterial as it is clear from the map referred to above that the property had been included in the cantonment, at all events, from 1851.

18 18 No Government assessment has ever been paid by the respondent, nor apparently has the land ever been assessed. No evidence was offered that it was lakeraj land and so exempted from assessment, though this appears to have been the respondents contention before the Special Judge. Nor is there any suggestion that the land has been entered in the land registers as private property, though under the provisions of Part 4, Sections 38 to 44, Bengal Land Registration Act 7 of 1876, such registration is compulsory. Their Lordships would have expected that the respondent, who is an attorney, when taking a mortgage of the property in 1889 would have made some inquiry as to registration, and would, if he believed that the land was the property of his mortgagor, have taken steps to register his mortgage, as he was entitled to do under S. 44 of the Act, or would at least have seen to the registration of his title, when he bought at the Court sales. It is to be noted that the provisions of S.38 apply not only to estates, i.e., land paying Government revenue, but to revenue-free property or any interest therein; and S. 42 covers the case of any person succeeding to any proprietary right in an estate or revenue-free property, whether by purchase, inheritance, gift or otherwise. In fact the only entry in the Government registers, so far as is disclosed by the record of this case, is that in the mauzawari register

19 19 already referred to. Their Lordships recognize that such an entry is no proof of title, but it is at least of considerable significance in the absence of all other records. Under these circumstances their Lordships are unable to hold that possession of the land with the house standing upon it from 1900, or even from 1871, if that can be assumed, is any proof of title to the land. It is in every way consistent with a mere cantonment tenure which has never been denied by Government, but which would carry with it no property in the land. Indeed the facts that no assessment is levied, and that no private title has been registered, suggests this as the more probable origin of the respondent s possession. x x x On the whole therefore their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the respondent has not established his title to the land as apart from the buildings, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the decrees of the Special Land Acquisition Judge and of the High Court should be set aside and the award of the Collector restored. The respondent must pay the costs of the appellant throughout.

20 20 In the instant case, when the grant under which the petitioner claims having been set at naught, though the same was questioned before this court, the cloud on the title of the petitioner having been left undisturbed, the question of examination of the title of the petitioner by the reference court, would hardly arise. b. In the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar and another (2003) 3 SCC 128 : The facts were as follows : According to the appellant, the said land was gairmajrua malik land. It was as part of the zamindari estate. Before vesting of zamindari, the land was settled by the ex-landlord in the name of one Deo Narain Prasad by means of a registered deed of settlement dated It was a raiyati settlement. The appellant purchased the land from the said Deo Narain Prasad through a registered deed of sale dated The appellant has developed the land and kept it under cultivation raising the crops. Her name was mutated in the revenue records by the Circle Officer. A correction slip was issued to her in her name. The

21 21 State realized revenue from her from the very date of vesting i.e. from 1955 till The rent receipts were exhibited on record. On , the Circle Officer issued a notice under Section 3 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (Bihar Act 15 of 1956) calling upon the appellant to explain why she should not be treated as an encroacher on the land and why her encroachment should not be removed. The notice was issued on the premise that consequent upon vesting of zamindaris, the said land had stood vested in the State of Bihar and was, therefore, public land within the meaning of clause (3) of Section 2 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court registered as Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 366 of 1979 (R), laying challenge to the initiation of such proceedings. The counsel for the State made appearance, though a written counter-affidavit was not filed. The High Court after hearing both the parties, upheld the plea of the appellant that the said land was gairmajrua malik and not gairmajrua aam land and by virtue of the registered deed of transfer in favour of Deo

22 22 Narain Prasad, the predecessor-in-title of the appellant, the appellant was justified in claiming that she was raiyat of the land in question and, therefore, could be ejected therefrom only in accordance with the provisions of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act. Inasmuch as such ejectment is permissible only on specified grounds, none of which existed in the present case, the notice issued to the appellant was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The High Court by an order dated allowed the writ petition and directed the proceedings initiated against the appellant under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 to be quashed. In the year 1981, proceedings under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 proposing to annul the settlement of the land in question in favour of Deo Narain Prasad were initiated. The proceedings were founded on the premise that the said settlement was done with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act. An inquiry was held. Once again the appellant filed a writ petition seeking quashing of these

23 23 proceedings. The petition was registered as CWJC No.1663 of 1981 (R) and disposed of by the High Court by an order dated During the pendency of these proceedings, notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on as already stated. It appears that the Collector was reluctant to make an award in favour of the appellant determining the quantum of compensation and directing its release to the appellant. On the Collector (Additional Collector, exercising power of Collector) passed an order holding that the land had vested in the State and hence no award directing payment of compensation to the appellant was called for. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court registered as CWJC No.147 of 1985 (R). By an order dated , the High Court after hearing the learned counsel for the State, directed the writ petition to be allowed. A mandamus was issued to the Collector to prepare the award in the name of the appellant. The High Court went on to observe if there be any dispute thereafter, the matter be referred to the civil

24 24 court under Sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for adjudication of any claim in accordance with law. The order dated passed by the Additional Collector, Lohardaga was directed to be quashed. On , the Collector (Land Acquisition) prepared an award in the name of Smt. Sharda Devi directing the amount of compensation as determined by him to be paid of Smt. Sharda Devi, the appellant. On , much after the expiry of six weeks the time appointed for seeking a reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act, the Circle Officer, Kuru filed an application before the Collector seeking a reference to the civil court. It was stated in the application that a dispute existed in between the Circle Officer, Kuru Anchal (on behalf of the State of Bihar) and Smt. Sharda Devi as to title over the acquired land, which dispute may be referred for adjudication to the civil court under Section 30 of the Act. The dispute as to whether the title to the land vests in the appellant, so as to entitle her to payment of compensation or whether the appellant s title had stood already extinguished in

25 25 view of the land having vested in the State was referred under Section 30 of the Act to the decision of the court. The reference was numbered as LA Misc. Case No.42 of 1986 before the civil court. By an order dated , the civil court directed the reference to be rejected. During the course of its order, the learned Special Subordinate Judge, Ranchi, which is the reference court, opined that Smt. Sharda Devi was an occupancy raiyat of the land in question and, therefore, the award prepared in her name was just and legal. By an order dated , the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant [CWJC No.1663 of 1981 (R)] laying challenge to the proceedings initiated under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The result of this decision of the High Court is that the effort of the State seeking annulment of settlement and cancellation of the jamabandi entries standing in the name of the appellant failed. The appellant was held to have acquired the status of raiyat in respect of the land in question.

26 26 Against the judgment dated passed by the learned Special Subordinate Judge, the State Government preferred an appeal to the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, by his judgment dated affirmed the judgment of the Special Subordinate Judge and directed the appeal to be dismissed. The State filed a letters patent appeal, which came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench framed five questions of law and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench to answer the questions. One of the questions framed by the Division Bench was: Whether the reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was maintainable at the instance of the State of Bihar? The questions of law framed, including the question referred to hereinabove, were answered against the appellant. As a consequence, the letters patent appeal filed by the State was allowed and the case was remanded to the learned Single Judge for decision of the case in the light of the observations made by

27 27 the Full Bench. Feeling aggrieved by the order of remand, the appellant was before the Apex Court. The question before the court was When the State proceeds to acquire land on an assumption that it belongs to a particular person, could the award be called into question by the State seeking a reference under Section 30 of the Act on the premise that the land did not belong to the person from whom it was purportedly acquired and was a land owned by the State having vested in it, consequent upon abolition of proprietary rights, much before acquisition? In appreciating the controversy, the apex court examined the Scheme of the LA Act. On a comparative study of Section 18 and Section 30 of the LA Act it was held thus : 23. xxx Under Section 18 the subject-matter of reference can be a dispute as to any one or more of the following: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii) as to the amount or the quantum of the compensation, (iii) as to the persons

28 28 to whom the compensation is payable, (iv) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under Section 30 the subject matter of dispute can be: (i) the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, (ii) the persons to whom the amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable. Though the expression employed in Section 18 is 'the amount of compensation' while the expression employed in Section 30 is 'the amount of compensation or any part thereof', this distinction in legislative drafting is immaterial and insignificant and a dispute as to entitlement or apportionment of part of the compensation would also be covered by Section 18 of the Act on the principle that the whole includes a part too. Thus, at the first blush, it seems that Section 30 overlaps Section 18 in part; but as will be seen shortly hereinafter, it is not so. And applying the principles laid down in the case of Dr G.H.Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 and on an in depth analysis of the provisions of the Act, the difference between reference under Section 18 and the one under Section 30 was summarized thus :

29 29 By reference to locus Under Section 18(1) a reference can be made by Collector only upon an application in writing having been made by (i) any person interested (ii) who has not accepted the award (iii) making application in writing, to the Collector, requiring a reference by the Collector to the Court (iv) for determination of any one of the four disputes (specified in the provision), and (v) stating the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. For reference under Section 30 no application in writing is required. The prayer may be made orally or in writing or the reference may be made suo motu by the Collector without any one having invited the attention of the Collector for making the reference. By reference to the disputes referable Under Section 18(1) there are four types of disputes which can be referred to Civil Court for determination. They are the disputes: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii) as to the amount of the compensation, (iii) as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable, or (iv) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under Section 30 the only disputes which are referable are : (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) a

30 30 dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable. A dispute as to the measurement of the land or as to the quantum of compensation or a dispute of a nature not falling within Section 30, can neither be referred by the Collector under Section 30 of the Act nor would the Civil Court acquire jurisdiction to enter into and determine the same. By reference to nature of power Under Section 18 of the Act the Collector does not have power to withhold the reference. Once a written application has been made satisfying the requirements of Section 18, the Collector shall make a reference. The Collector has no discretion in the matter; whether the dispute has any merit or not is to be left for the determination of the Court. Under Section 30 the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. The Collector has discretion in the matter. Looking to the nature of the dispute raised, the person who is raising the dispute, the delay in inviting the attention of the Court, and so on - are such illustrative factors which may enter into the consideration by the Collector while exercising the discretion. If the Collector makes the reference it may be decided by the Court subject to its forming an opinion that the dispute

31 31 was capable of reference and determination under Section 30 of the Act. In case the Collector refuses to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act, the person adversely affected by withholding of the reference or refusal to make the reference shall be at liberty to pursue such other remedy as may be available to him under the law such as filing a writ petition or a civil suit. By reference to limitation Under Section 18 the written application requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court shall be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award or within six weeks of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. There is no such limitation prescribed under Section 30 of the Act. The Collector may at any time, not bound by the period of limitation, exercise his power to make the reference. The expression 'the person present or represented' before the Collector at the time when he made his award would include within its meaning a person who shall be deemed to be present or represented before the Collector at the time when the

32 32 award is made. No one can extend the period of limitation by taking advantage of his own wrong. Though no limitation is provided for making a reference under Section 30 of the Act, needless to say, where no period of limitation for exercise of any statutory power is prescribed the power can nevertheless be exercised only within a reasonable period; what is a reasonable period in a given case shall depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The question framed was answered thus : 36. To sum up the State is not a 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression 'parties to the litigation' carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by State cannot be subject matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in proceedings before the Collector (as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act). If it was a government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would

33 33 not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the Civil Court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction and the Civil Court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the Civil Court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so. 37. However, we would like to clarify our decision by sounding two notes of caution. Firstly, the quashing of the proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act would not debar the State from pursuing such other legal remedy before such other forum as may be available to the State Government and on the merits and the maintainability thereof, we express no opinion herein. In the instant case, not only was the award made is the subject matter of criminal proceedings, the grant under which the petitioner claimed, having been held to be bogus, it is

34 34 presumptuous on the part of the petitioner that a second award should now be made favouring the petitioner and for the State to thereafter seek a reference under Section 30 to the civil court. The same is impermissible as laid down in the above decision. c. In the case of Dr. G.H. Grant vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237 : The facts of the case were as follows : Dr. Gregor Hugh Grant hereinafter called 'Dr. Grant'--was the proprietor of the Dumka Estate in the District of Santhal Parganas in the State of Bihar. By a notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published on June 8, 1949 the Government of Bihar notified for acquisition a larger area of land out of the estate of Dr. Grant for establishing "an agricultural farm." The Collector made on March 25, 1952 awards setting out the true area of the land notified for acquisition, compensation which in his opinion should' be allowed for the land and apportionment of the compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. The awards were filed in

35 35 the Collector's office on the same day. In respect of Plot No. 142, Rs were awarded by the Collector as compensation in equal shares to Dr. Grant and the members of the village community, who had also made a claim for compensation. In respect of Plot No. 68, the Collector awarded Rs as compensation. In respect of acquisition of an area admeasuring acres consisting of several plots, the Collector awarded Rs.1,64, as compensation and directed apportionment in the manner set out in the award. On May 5, 1952 Dr. Grant applied to the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act that the three matters be referred for determination by the Court of the amount of compensation payable to the owners. Similar applications were filed in respect of Plot Nos. 68 & 142 by the members of the village community. In consequence of a notification issued under Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 30 of 1950 the Dumka Estate vested on May 22, 1952 in the State of Bihar. In exercise of the power under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the

36 36 Government of Bihar took over possession on August 21, 1952 of the Lands notified for acquisition. On October 15, 1952 the Government Pleader submitted a petition before the Collector claiming that the compensation money awarded to Dr. Grant had since the publication of the notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Act become payable to the State Government, and the dispute between Dr. Grant and the State Government regarding the right to payment may be referred to the Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector made on November 5, 1952 three references to the District Court, Santhal Parganas. Two out of those references were made in exercise of powers under Sections 30 & 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the third under Section 30. The District Judge by his order dated April 9, 1954 held that the State of Bihar had no interest in the property notified for acquisition when the award was filed before the Collector under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the State could, lay no claim to the compensation money awarded. The District Judge

37 37 upheld the apportionment of compensation between Dr. Grant and the village community and enhanced the valuation of the land and directed that compensation at the enhanced rate be awarded. Against the order of the District Judge in the references, three appeals Nos. 401 of 1953, 297 of 1954 and 298 of 1954 were preferred by the State to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The High Court held that title of the owner to the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act could not be extinguished under that Act till possession was taken under Section 16 of the Act, and that since the title of Dr. Grant in the land acquired stood statutorily vested in the State by virtue of the notification issued under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, he was not entitled to receive the compensation money. In the view of the High Court, title to the compensation money had vested in the State Government before possession was obtained by the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, and that it was open to the Collector, on a dispute raised by the State

38 38 about the right to receive the compensation money, to make a reference to the Court under Section 30 of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that : (1) the Collector had no authority to refer the matter under Section 30 after he had apportioned the amount of compensation under Section 11 (2) since title to compensation is derived solely from and on the date of the award, the notification under Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act did not deprive Dr. Grant of his right to receive compensation, and (3) the State Government was not "a person interested" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, and could not apply for a reference under Section 30. It was held thus by the Apex Court: The dispute between the State of Bihar and Dr. Grant has been expressly referred by the Collector to the Court for decision. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the title of Dr. Grant to the land notified for acquisition became vested in the State, and therefore the right to compensation for the land acquired devolved upon the State. A dispute between Dr. Grant and the State as to their conflicting claims to the compensation

39 39 money was clearly a dispute which could be referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court and was in fact referred to the Court. We are unable to agree with counsel for Dr. Grant that the reference made by the Collector under Section 30 was incompetent, because the State was not interested in the compensation money on the date when the award was made. The right of the State of Bihar has undoubtedly arisen after the award was made, but once the title which was originally vested in Dr. Grant stood statutorily transferred to the State, it was open to the State to claim a reference, not because the State was a person interested in the compensation money before the date of the award, but because of the right which has arisen since the award was made. The principles laid down in the above case have been elucidated by the apex court itself in Sharada Devi s case, supra, thus : (i) There are two provisions in the Act under which the Collector can make a reference to the Court, namely, Section 18 and Section 30. The powers under the two sections are distinct and may be invoked in

40 40 contingencies which do not overlap. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation who is present either personally or through a representative or on whom notice is issued under Section 12(2), must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector to refer the matter to the Court under Section 18 within the time prescribed thereunder. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable and apply to the Court for a reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him since the award. For a reference under Section 30, no period of limitation is prescribed. (SCR pp.583 E-584 A) (ii) It is not predicated of the exercise of the power to make a reference under Section 30 that the Collector has not apportioned the compensation money by his award. (SCR p.584 D). (iii) The award made by the Collector under Section 11 is not the source of the right to compensation. An award is strictly speaking only an offer made by the Government to the person interested in the land notified

41 41 for acquisition; the person interested is not bound to accept it and the Government can also withdraw the acquisition u/s 48. It is only when possession of the land has been taken by the Government u/s 16 that the right of the owner of the land is extinguished. Therefore the appellant's contention that title to compensation is derived solely from and on the date of the award could not be accepted. (SCR pp.584 H-585 C) (iv) The liability of the Government u/s 31 to pay compensation to the person entitled thereto under the award does not imply that only the persons to whom compensation is directed to be paid under the award may raise a dispute u/s 30. The scheme of apportionment by the Collector under Section 11 is conclusive only between the Collector and the persons interested and not among the persons interested. Payment of compensation u/s 31 to the persons declared in the award to be entitled thereto discharges the State of its liability to pay compensation leaving it open to the claimant to compensation to agitate his right in a reference u/s 30 or by a separate suit. (SCR p.586 B-F) (v) Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act the title of the appellant to the land noticed for acquisition became vested in the State and therefore the right to compensation for the land acquired devolved upon the

42 42 State. A dispute then arose between the State Government and the appellant "as to the persons to whom" compensation was payable. The State had no right to the compensation payable for the land under a title existing before the date of the award of the Collector and no application could be made by it as a person interested within the meaning of Section 18. But a dispute between the appellant and the State as to their conflicting claims to the compensation money was clearly a dispute which could be referred u/s 30 of the Act to the Court. There is nothing in Section 30 which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of the land has since the award, devolved. (SCR pp. 584 G; 586 A, G, H) The Court proceeded to follow and apply the above principles, in deciding Sharda Devi. The above decision in Dr.Grant s case which incidentally has been relied upon in a decision of a learned single judge of this court, in the case of Keshava Murthy v. the State of Karnataka ILR 2005 Kar 4772, would hardly support the case of the

43 43 petitioner. In so far as the decision in Keshava murthy s case is concerned, which is sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is noticed that the order as reported is rendered in a Review Petition and in the absence of complete facts and the reasoning of the judge whose order was under review (and which has been set aside (sic)) it would be difficult to subscribe to the view expressed therein. The petitioner is not entitled to any reliefs in the present petition. The petition is dismissed. Sd/- JUDGE Nv* / KS*