COURT OF APPEALS State of New York

Transcription

1 COURT OF APPEALS State of New York THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, JERMAINE DUNBAR, Appellant, -against- Defendant- Respondent BRIEF BY THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY as AMICUS CURIAE January 24, 2014 STEVEN BANKS STEVEN B. WASSERMAN, Of Counsel THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Criminal Practice 199 Water Street, 6 h Floor New York, New York (212) ANDREW L. DEUTSCH DLA PIPER LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York (212) Reproduced on Recycled Paper

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities i Interest of Amicus Argument POINT I THE PREAMBLE TO THE QUEENS DISTRICT ATTORNEY S CENTRAL BOOKING INTERROGATION PROGRAM SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERMINES THE MIRANDA WARNINGS, BY CONVEYING A MISLEADING, EQUIVOCAL, AND COERCIVE MESSAGE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING AN UNCOUNSELED STATEMENT POINT II THE DECISION IN DUNBAR IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY DISAPPROVING LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES THAT ROB THE MIRANDA WARNINGS OF FULL EFFECTIVENESS. Conclusion i

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES U.S. Const. Amend. V N.Y. Const. Art 1 Sec New York People v. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d 198 (2nd Dept. 2013).. 1,7,9,11,12,13,18,20 People v. Bethea, 104 A.D.3d 198 (1984) People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 (1965) People v. Lopez, 16 N.Y.3d 375 (2011) People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993) United States California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ,11,16,17,20 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) ,18,19,20 United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) ,9 United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984) United States v. Restrepo-Cruz, 547 F.Supp (S.D.N.Y.1982) Pennsylvania Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970) ,6 ii

4 INTEREST OF AMICUS The Legal Aid Society offers this amicus brief in support of affirming the Appellate Division s decision in People v. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d 198 (2d Dept. 2013). Dunbar unanimously disapproved a scripted preamble to the Miranda warnings, formulated by the Queens District Attorney's office, which has been delivered to uncounseled defendants by law enforcement when they are on the verge of being arraigned. Immediately before defendants meet their lawyers and come before the judge, they are offered a one-time, now-or-never opportunity to obtain their prosecutor s assistance in investigating their alibi and other defenses, by fully communicating their side of the story. In setting aside Dunbar s conviction, the Appellate Division held that this preamble undermines the clarity achieved in Miranda, and prevents the Miranda warnings from effectively conveying to suspects their rights in clear and unequivocal terms Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 207; quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at (1966) As the primary defender of indigent criminal defendants in New York City since 1963, The Legal Aid Society has been a principal advocate before this Court in upholding Miranda and other New York Constitutional rights of criminal suspects under

5 custodial questioning. See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 (1965); People v. Bethea, 67 N.Y.2d 384 (1984); People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993); People v. Lopez, 16 N.Y.3d 375 (2011). The Society is very familiar with the issue before this Court, as it has represented the vast majority of defendants who were interrogated under the Queens District Attorney s Central Booking program since its inception in The Society has a particularly strong interest in the issue before the Court. The Queens District Attorney uses the preamble, which is part of the Queens Central Booking interrogation program (QCB) almost exclusively in interrogation of indigent defendants who cannot afford to retain counsel prior to arraignment. Indeed, the Queens District Attorney does not interrogate defendants who have retained counsel where counsel files a notice of appearance before arraignment. But, the Society's notices of appearance and offers to counsel indigent defendants facing pre-arraignment interrogation are uniformly rejected by the Queens District Attorney, who argues in their brief that defendants' right to counsel has not yet attached. This two-tiered system for pre-arraignment interrogation has been a troubling aspect of New York criminal justice for decades. The QCB reprises a remarkably similar program that was implemented in the early 1980s by the U.S. Attorney for the 2

6 Southern District of New York, but was discontinued amid sharp criticism from the Second Circuit for its disproportionate impact on the indigent. A Federal Magistrate described the inequities of pre-arraignment interrogation programs: Where we are dealing with a well heeled defendant who can afford private counsel his private counsel will put a stop to any interview questions by the United States Attorneys in most instances.... Since a private attorney would have a tendency to tell his client not to subject himself to an interview, and since a person who does not have a private attorney does not get an opportunity to be interviewed by a Legal Aid Attorney until the time of his arraignment, which is after the interview and in many instances after incriminating statements have been made, I have the distinct feeling that the type of procedure employed by the United States Attorney's office acts to discriminate in favor of a wealthier defendant. That is my own private view. I must say it is shared by many of my colleagues. Testimony of Magistrate Raby, United States v. Restrepo- Cruz, 547 F.Supp. 1048, 1060 (S.D.N.Y.1982) Two years later, the Second Circuit added its voice to the growing chorus of judges who were troubled by the inequity of the pre-arraignment interrogation program. The Court observed, When a defendant is known to be represented by private counsel the government does not conduct a pre-arraignment interview. In effect, therefore, the practice is invoked only against a defendant who is poor and unrepresented. United States v. 3

7 Foley, 735 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984) The Court declared: Were it necessary to our decision here, we might well be required to hold that any benefits accruing to the prosecutor from the interview are outweighed by the need to protect uncounseled defendants' constitutional and legal rights. Foley, 735 F.2d at 48 (dictum) In another decision, the Court recognized that the pre-arraignment interrogation program undermines defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel: We remain troubled by the practice, not only because of its inherent compulsion implicating a defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights but, perhaps more importantly, because of its potentially adverse impact on the Sixth Amendment rights of indigent suspects. United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984) Because of its disproportionate impact on the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, pre-arraignment interrogation should be conducted in a manner that is above reproach. But this cannot be said of the QCB - an opening gambit that subverts Miranda's principle of clarity in order to induce uncounseled statements. Having witnessed its effects on thousands of indigent clients over seven years, the Society is convinced that the QCB is inherently misleading, equivocal and coercive. 4

8 POINT I THE PREAMBLE TO THE QUEENS DISTRICT ATTORNEY S CENTRAL BOOKING INTERROGATION PROGRAM SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERMINES THE MIRANDA WARNINGS, BY CONVEYING A MISLEADING, EQUIVOCAL, AND COERCIVE MESSAGE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING AN UNCOUNSELED STATEMENT The crux of the Miranda warnings that anything you say may be used against you loses all clarity when it is accompanied by a law enforcement officer s offer to assist in presenting one s defense, and a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it opportunity to obtain an investigation by the District Attorney himself. At a minimum, the offer distracts the typical indigent defendant from the reality that the adversary process is underway, and the person offering this assistance is his adversary not his advocate. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denounced the very same Miranda-undermining message in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970). There, the Philadelphia police had systematically informed defendants that their statements may be used for or against them at trial. Pennsylvania held that this practice was constitutionally deficient because injecting the word for to the warning acts as a subtle inducement to speak, helps neutralize the suspect s awareness of the hostile 5

9 environment, and vitiates the intended impact of the warning. Singleton, 439 Pa. at 190, 191. The QCB preamble, which informs defendants that cooperation will assist their defense, is very much like the addition of the word "for" to the warning in Singleton. First, it acts as a subtle inducement to speak. The purpose of the Miranda warning is to present the situation neutrally to the defendant and allow him to decide whether to speak before meeting with legal counsel. The preamble, however, helps neutralize the suspect s awareness of the hostile environment, making it appear that the law enforcement officer is a friend, not an adversary. As a result, the QCB improperly vitiates the intended impact of the [Miranda] warning. Singleton, at 191 a) The preamble neutralizes the suspect s awareness of the hostile environment The 2009 version of the preamble informed Jermaine Dunbar and many other defendants that the ensuing interview would be their last opportunity or only opportunity before arraignment to obtain an investigation by their prosecutor of their alibi, their version of what happened, or any matter relating to their defense. This artfully phrased offer is misleading, as the Court in Dunbar found: It is not reasonable to expect an individual with no legal training to appreciate the subtle distinction that there may be other opportunities to tell 6

10 his or her story after arraignment. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 214 Indeed, none of them are told that that opportunity will arise before arraignment, just down the hall and in a matter of minutes, when they can convey everything they need to say to their own lawyer, who usually has reviewed their file and is waiting for them to be produced in the pre-arraignment area. Our extensive review of QCB interviews shows that the offer of assistance is usually an illusory and coercive inducement to surrender Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. This amicus brief is accompanied by DVDs of actual interrogations of our Queens County clients which occurred shortly before they were permitted to meet with Legal Aid counsel. For instance, F.D. 1 was given the preamble, and relied on the Queens D.A. s offer of assistance, but clearly did not understand who he was speaking to or the practical implications of speaking. He confessed to taking a bracelet from a woman who was waiting for a bus, in order to exchange it for drugs. Notwithstanding the Miranda warnings he had also received, his words repeatedly reflect a belief that his questioner was his advocate, or some sort of free-lance advocate for leniency: 1 Initials are utilized to preserve privacy. Citations are to the case numbers and related tapes of QCB pre-arraignment interviews that Appellant served on the defense at arraignment pursuant to CPL (1)(a) 7

11 F.D. (to ADA): Who is you, my lawyer? ADA: No I m F.D. (interrupting): Legal Aid? ADA: An assistant district attorney with the Queens District Attorney s office. F.D.: Oh, oh. 2 Even after the D.A. had clarified that she was a prosecutor, F.D. still asked, What is THEY gonna do to me? F.D. s confusion is remarkably similar to the confusion evidenced by Respondent Dunbar: After I finish talking to y all, who am I going to talk to, the D.A.? Dunbar video, 12:10 F.D. offered the prosecutor mitigating facts to obtain leniency on the robbery charge; facts that with the assistance of counsel might have reduced the charge from robbery to grand larceny, and the sentence from prison to probation: I should be going home for something like that.. I didn t have to hit her, punch her, snatch her, or try to strangle her for her bracelet... none of that. 3 This client had a need and a right to the assistance of counsel in his effort to reduce his exposure to incarceration probably by diversion into a drug program. But for the average culpable defendant, who has no grasp of the fine distinctions between robbery and larceny, a prosecutor s last chance offer of assistance is a lifeline that will inevitably be grasped, 2 People v. F.D., Queens SCI 1479/09, May 4, 2009, 10:01:40. 3 F.D, 10:06:37. 8

12 regardless of concomitant disclosure that he also has a right to consult with a lawyer. F.D. obviously had little or nothing to gain from this onetime opportunity for an investigation of a simple chainsnatch. The only reason he confessed to the prosecutor was to make a pitch for leniency, but it is not the prosecutor s role to extend leniency at this stage. As the Appellate Division in Dunbar observed: Most, if not all, of the practice's claimed advantages would appear to be equally available immediately after arraignment, when a defendant would have the benefit of advice from his attorney and would be less vulnerable to psychological manipulation by the prosecutor. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 214; quoting Foley, 735 F.2d at 48. Other QCB interrogations raise questions about the bona fides of the D.A. s offer to investigate. For instance, our client W.S., employed as a bouncer in a bar, was charged with assaulting a patron, whom he said was threatening to shoot him. Rather than obtaining from W.S. the names and addresses of the witnesses who might support his justification defense, the interrogator focused on probing for mens rea and seeking out aggravating details of the alleged assault. The assistant D.A. asked him whether he hit the victim with a closed fist, whether 9

13 he himself was intoxicated, and whether he had any martial arts or other special training. 4 The assault charge against W.S. was eventually rejected by a grand jury that heard his witnesses no thanks to the relentlessly adversarial and deceptive QCB interview to which he was subjected. b) The preamble vitiates the intended impact of the warning While the benefits of making uncounseled prearraignment statements tend to be illusory, the risks to the defendant are real. For instance, T.K., 5 who had the same interrogator as Jermaine Dunbar, accepted that interrogator s offer to investigate his defense to the armed robbery of his former employer, and his sister s estranged boyfriend. The interrogator had been informed by police that T.K. committed the stickup to collect unpaid wages and to avenge the mistreatment of his sister. As T.K. tearfully presented his non-defense to a gunpoint robbery, and his interrogator offered him Kleenex, she knew that there would be no investigation, and that what he actually needed was a lawyer s advice, because deadly force may not be used to collect a debt or to exact retribution. See 4 People v. W.S., Queens Ind. 2008QN055794, Oct. 17, 2008, 18:17:48 ff 5 People v. T.K., Queens SCI 383/10, Oct. 30, 2009, 09:41:59. 10

14 People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91, 97 (2012). As a consequence of the assistant D.A. s exploiting his lack of legal knowledge and support, T.K. s prosecution was greatly facilitated, and the ability of his later-assigned counsel to obtain a better plea bargain was reduced. The case of T.K. also supports the correctness of Dunbar s reasoning: the D.A. s offer of assistance plainly undermines Miranda's required warning. When anything you say will be used against you in court is combined with an offer of assistance in putting forward a defense, the warning becomes muddled and ambiguous.... Such a suggestion is contrary to the very purpose of the warning that anything a suspect says can be used against him or her, namely, to 'make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.' Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 208; citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. Interview after interview demonstrates that unsophisticated criminal suspects have the same reflexive response to a prosecutor s offer of assistance: Just like Respondents Dunbar and Polhill, they immediately start talking or show a willingness to speak even before the Miranda warnings are delivered. For instance, the moment that 17-year-old S.S. was 11

15 offered assistance, he began rapidly nodding his head and issuing denials of involvement in a string of armed robberies, before receiving the Miranda warnings. 6 By the time the prosecutor delivered a rapid-fire, cadenced rendition of the Miranda warnings, he was rapidly assenting to each warning in a singsong voice, as if the warnings were merely a boilerplate formality that precedes the main event a golden opportunity to reveal one's defense to the prosecution. 6 People v. S.S., Queens Ind. 1689/10, Dec. 23, 2009, 14:52:37. 7 People v. J.J., Queens Ind. 2009QN32727, Jun. 15, 2009, 12:17: The same behavior pattern is observable in the interrogation of robbery suspect J.J. His downward gaze instantly turned to animated eye contact when he was told if you have an alibi, give me as much information as you can. J.J. nods throughout the preamble. After the preamble, the D.A. gets up and walks away from him across the room as she recites the Miranda warnings, thereby signaling that they are not that important. J.J. thereupon reverts to the downward gaze as he issues a flat response to each warning. 7 The Miranda warnings are not the central event in these interviews. Indeed they are intentionally reduced to a formality, overshadowed by the advantage of having the prosecutor himself investigate the defendant s alibi or evaluate the defendant s justification for the alleged actions.

16 The Court in Dunbar found it significant that this opportunity is to speak not merely with a police detective, but with an ADA the one person who can [at the pre-arraignment] stage plausibly assert authority to grant favorable treatment to an uncounseled defendant Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 198. Thus, these uncounseled defendants grasped a lifeline that was extended by the authority presiding over their fate. To obtain that desperately needed assistance, they did what they thought the legal system required of them, which was to relinquish their right to silence and counsel. c) A now-or-never offer of assistance is coercive The Court in Dunbar properly criticized the 2009 preamble for suggesting that foregoing the opportunity to talk may permanently prejudice the defense: The preamble suggests that invoking that right will bear adverse and irrevocable, consequences. Such a suggestion conveys that suspects have a right to remain silent only in the most technical sense. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 208. By advising suspects with the urgent words [i]f there is something you need us to investigate about this case you have to tell us now so we can look into it (emphasis added), the preamble affirmatively states that neither the prosecution nor the defense will investigate their alibi or 13

17 their version of events if they decline to speak immediately, without counsel. The coerciveness of a now-or-never offer is wellillustrated by the interrogation of M.T, 8 who was pressured by the D.A. to disclose his whereabouts at the time of a robbery that had occurred in the preceding year. At first, his interrogator assured him: If you were not there and you have the name of somebody that can verify you were not there, this interview can only help you. But a minute later, the interrogator threatened, If you do not want to give us the alibi, I guess you were there... this is my last chance to try and help you. I m just gonna throw you back in the cell and you re gonna go into the system. And, you know, you ve got some priors here, Mr. [M.T]. The false urgency and empty threat in the M.T. interrogation confirms that Dunbar reached the correct result. The preamble coerces defendants by presenting them with a false choice: they can either seize a fleeting opportunity for a thorough investigation of their alibi, or be thrown back into a system that by implication will not assure a thorough investigation. 8 People v. M.T., Queens SCI 186/2009, Aug. 26, 2008, 18:32:46. 14

18 In urging reversal of Dunbar, the D.A. argues that Appellate Division erred in ruling that QCB is invariably subversive of the Miranda warnings. The D.A. maintains that all Miranda violations are case-specific, and must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. However it is impossible to adequately address the chronic Constitutional infirmities of thousands of QCB interrogations case-by-case. As anyone familiar with criminal practice in New York City knows, only a small fraction of the QCB interviews will receive individual pre-trial or appellate review, because such review is usually preempted by pre-hearing plea agreements, and by waivers of appeal that are usually exacted as a condition of those agreements. Indeed, the most egregious QCB interviews are the most likely to induce pleas, and thereby evade pre-trial and appellate review. For all practical purposes, this appeal is the only judicial review that most QCB interviewees will receive on the constitutionality of their interrogations. With the exception of W.S., which was rejected by a grand jury, all other cases discussed herein were resolved by pleas and waivers of appeal before a pre-trial Huntley hearing convened. 15

19 POINT II THE DECISION IN DUNBAR IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY DISAPPROVING LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES THAT ROB THE MIRANDA WARNINGS OF FULL EFFECTIVENESS. The touchstone of Miranda is that a suspect must be given warnings about the consequences of uncounseled statements, and the right to have counsel, which are fully effective to apprise the suspect of his or her rights. Dunbar correctly applies this requirement of full effectiveness. The Appellate Division s holding is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court and other rulings that suppress suspect statements, given as a result of prosecutorial or police systems that were intended to, and had the likely effect of, weakening Miranda protections. While the exact warning and waiver language formulated in Miranda is not talismanic, California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981), the Supreme Court has never deviated from Miranda s requirement that these warnings or a fully effective equivalent must be given before a subsequent statement may be admitted. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989). The effectiveness of warnings that alert an accused to his or her rights is the central concern of Miranda. Thus, the right to remain silent must be conveyed in clear and 16

20 unequivocal terms because such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. Id. at 468 (emphasis added). The required warning that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court, makes the accused aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. Id. at 469. Informing the accused of her or his right to have counsel present during interrogation is indispensable to the constitutional protection because [t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Id. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), upon which the Dunbar court placed greatest reliance, is directly relevant. Seibert addressed a law enforcement interrogation technique designed to weaken the protections of the Miranda warnings, much like the QCB program. Prosecutors in Seibert used a system of question-first : they would first elicit a statement from an accused, then read the accused the Miranda warnings and obtain a waiver, and finally re-interrogate the suspect to obtain a reaffirmation of the earlier statement. The post-warning statement would then be introduced against the accused at trial. 17

21 The issue in Seibert was whether, under this system, the warnings could function effectively, as Miranda requires. 542 U.S. at The Supreme Court plurality concluded that the warnings would not be effective. First, it concluded that the questionfirst procedure was intentionally designed to circumvent Miranda protections, stating that the reason for questionfirst s popularity among prosecutors is as obvious as its manifest purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the outset. Id. at 613. Dunbar likewise found that the Queens County D.A. s preference was not an isolated utterance by a law enforcement officer, but a systematic practice developed by the District Attorney s office, Dunbar, 108 A.D.3d at 211, with all the weighty authority that a prepared statement by an assistant district attorney can carry. The risks are great that suspects, having been first primed by the one-time offer to help, will not understand the recital of rights nor the consequences of a waiver. Id. Second, the QCB preamble nullifies the effectiveness of the warnings in the same way that question-first did in Seibert. The Supreme Court found that by hearing warnings just after 18

22 making a confession, a suspect would hardly think that he had a genuine right to remain silent.... A more likely reaction... would be perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at that point, bewilderment being an unpromising frame of mind for knowledgeable decision. 542 U.S. at 613. The suspect, having first spoken, would infer that subsequent silence [would be] of no avail. Id. The procedure was thus likely to mislead, id. at 614, and a warning is unlikely to be effective in the question-first sequence. Id. at 613 n. 5. The plurality found the procedure to be a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings. Id. at 616. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, also found that the interrogation technique was designed to circumvent Miranda, and to undermine[] the Miranda warning and obscure its meaning. Justice Kennedy characterized question-first as a deliberate police technique that obscure[s] both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when finally given. Id. at 621. He emphasized that [t]he Miranda rule would be frustrated were we to allow police to undermine its meaning and effect. Id. at 622. The Appellate Division correctly concluded that the QCB program undermines and obscures the Miranda warnings in the same way as question-first did. It stated that the preamble turns 19

23 the Miranda warnings from clear and unequivocal terms to a message that is muddled and ambiguous. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 207. The preamble misleadingly suggests that suspects will have only one opportunity to help themselves, and tell or investigate their side of the story. Id. at It suggests that investigators will assist the suspect, which is contrary to the very purpose of the warning. Id. at 208. While the Miranda warnings are given, they cannot function effectively under the Queens preamble system. Dunbar, at (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at ). Finally, Dunbar confirms what is shown above from a selection of pre-arraignment interviews the Queens D.A. s preamble system actually confuses suspects as to their rights and conceals the consequences of waiving those rights. As the Appellate Division found, Dunbar s own interview evince[d] confusion, where he twice asked how the interview was helping him and when he next would speak with the D.A. 108 A.D.3d at 211. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the Appellate Division in Dunbar. When the warnings are combined with the preamble, it cannot be said with assurance 20

24 that the suspects clearly understood their rights. People v. Dunbar, 104 A.D.3d at 198 Jan. 24, 2014 Steven B. Wasserman Of Counsel, Steven Banks The Legal Aid Society Criminal Defense Practice 199 Water Street 6th floor New York, NY FAX To: District Attorney, Queens Co. Appeals Bureau Donna Aldea, Esq Queens Boulevard Kew Gardens NY Lynn W.L. Fahey Leila Hull, Of Counsel; Appellate Advocates 2 Rector St. 10th floor New York, NY