IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA GULBARGA BENCH PRESENT THE HON BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI AND THE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE B.

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1 1 R BETWEEN: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA GULBARGA BENCH DATED THIS THE 2 ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2014 PRESENT THE HON BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI AND THE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE B. SREENIVASE GOWDA WRIT PETITION No /2014 (GM-RES) Smt. Sangeeta, W/o Satish, Aged 22 years, Yakoob Maniyar Colony, Near Head Post Office, Gulbarga Petitioner (By Sri Chandrashekara K. Senior Counsel for Sri Prashanth M. Biradar & Venkatesh C. Mallabadi, Advocates) AND: 1. State of Karnataka By Prl. Secretary, Home, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Gulbarga. 3. Senior Superintendent, Central Prision, Bijapur. 4. Senior Superintendent, Central Prision, Bijapur.... Respondents (By Sri Manvendra Reddy, Govt. Advocate)

2 2 This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari by quashing the order bearing No. REV/DCG/MAG/835/ /1849 dated which is produced at Annexure A and B passed by respondent No.2 and all consequential action including confirmation by the respondent No.1 in order bearing No.HD 285 SST 2014 dated (Annexure F ) as illegal and void abintio and consequently. This Writ Petition coming on for Orders this day, ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI J., made the following: ORDER The petitioner is the wife of Sri Satish, who is detained in the Central Prison, Bijapur pursuant to the impugned order passed by the second respondent in exercise of power conferred by Section 3(1) of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 (herein after referred to as Goondas Act ). The detenu is subsequently shifted to the Central Prison in Gulbarga. 2. Sri Chandrashekhar K., learned counsel appearing for Sri Venkatesh C Mallabadi for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is bad, as no opportunity is afforded to the detenu to give representation to the State Government

3 3 against the order of detention. In support of his submissions, he read out the provisions contained in Section 8(1) of the Goondas Act, which is extracted herein below: 8 (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. 3. Sri Chandrashekhar submits that the preventive detention is violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: 22 (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 4. He submits that there was no compelling necessity to pass an order of detention, as the detenu was already in judicial custody. He submits that the impugned order is

4 4 vitiated, as the pre-condition prescribed under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Goondas Act is not present in the instant case. Section 3(1) and (2) of the Goondas Act read as follows: 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug-offender or gambler or goonda or immoral traffic offender or slum-grabber that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such persons be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the sub-section. 5. He relies on another Division Bench judgment, dated passed in WP (HC) No.101/2013, wherein the order of detention was quashed, as it was passed without giving proper reasons and particularly for passing the order of

5 5 detention in respect of a person who was already in judicial custody and when there was no likelihood of his getting the bail within the period of detention. 6. He submits that some of the documents supporting the detention order are in English. As the detenu knows only Kannada, the Kannada translated version of the documents ought to have been furnished to the detenu. He also complains that some of the copies of the supporting documents were not legible. 7. He submits that the impugned order is not reflective of application of mind. In as many as three criminal cases, he has already been acquitted. The non-consideration of the order of acquittal vitiates the decision-making process. He also complains of non-consideration of some bail applications and of the bail orders granted by the competent courts. 8. He submits that the impugned order is passed in a slip-shod manner. Although the detenu was in the prison at Gulbarga, he is asked to submit his representation through the Superintendent of Police, Central Prison, Bangalore. He

6 6 also submits that the grounds of detention are at variance with the impugned detention order. 9. The learned counsel sought to draw support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of NUTAN J. PATEL (Ms) V. S. V. PRASAD AND ANOTHER reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 269, wherein it is held that if the detenu is not informed of his right to make a representation to the concerned authority, the order of detention becomes unsustainable. 10. He also relies on the judgment of this Court, dated passed in WP (HC) No.50/2007 wherein the detention orders were quashed on the short ground of the detenu not being informed of his right to make a representation to the State Government. He submits that the said view is reiterated in the subsequent cases Division Bench s judgments dated in WP (HC) No.20/2014 and dated in WP (HC) No.159/2014. He read out the portion below head note A from the Hon ble Supreme Court s decision in the case of KUNDANBHAI DULABHAI

7 7 SHAIKH v. DISTT.MAGISTRATE, AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2998, which is as follows: It is not correct to say on ground of non-specification of authorities in Art.22 (5) to whom representation is to be made that right to make representation against preventive detention is not Constitutional right. It will be seen that right to represent has been given not only by Article 22(5) of the Constitution but also by Section 8 of the Act. The right provided under the Act has, therefore, to be treated as an extension of the constitutional right already available to a detenu under Article 22 (5). The legislature has, in fact, given effect to the constitutional right by providing in Section 8 of the Act that the detenu shall have the right of making a representation to the appropriate government. 11. He also relies upon the Apex Court judgment in the case of KAMLESHKUMAR ISHWARDAS PATEL V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 643. Para 49 read out by him as follows: 49. At this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General that some of the detenus have been indulging in illicit smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances on a large scale and are involved in other anti-national activities which are very harmful to the

8 8 national economy. He has urged that having regard to the nature of the activities of the detenus the cases do not justify interference with the orders of detention made against them. We are not unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities in which the detenus are alleged to be involved. But while discharging our constitutional obligation to enforce the fundamental rights of the people, more especially the right to personal liberty, we cannot allow ourselves to be influenced by these considerations. It has been said that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The Framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court. Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. We would, in this context, reiterate what was said earlier by this Court while rejecting a similar submission: (SCC para 4) Maybe that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained

9 9 under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus. 12. He relies on the Hon ble Supreme Court s judgment in the case of REKHA V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU THRUOGH SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER reported in (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596. He read out the portion below head note B, which is as follows: Where a detention order is served on a person already in jail, there should be a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed.

10 He brings to the notice the Hon ble Supreme Court s judgment in the case of MEHRUNISSA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in LAWS (SC) for advancing the submission that the detenu is entitled to be supplied with the copies of all material documents instead of having to rely upon his memory in regard to the contents of the documents. The failure of the detaining authority to supply the copies of such documents vitiates the detention order. For advancing the submission that the confirmation of detention order is bad, if illegible copies are supplied to the detenu, he relies on the Apex Court judgment in the case of BHUPINDER SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (1987) SCC (Cri) 328. In this regard, he has also relied upon the Division Bench s decision passed on in WP (HC) No.57/ He relies on the Division Bench judgment, dated passed in W.P. (HC) No.119/2011, wherein the detention order came to be quashed, as the detaining authority had not made available to the detenu the

11 11 documents on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction was recorded. 15. He has also referred to the Division Bench judgment dated passed in WP (HC) No.126/2002, wherein it is held that the non-supply of all the documents relied upon by the Government have come in the way of the detenu making effective representation, which vitiates the detention order. 16. He submits that the non-supply of all the Kannada translated version of the documents amounts to denial of right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making the representation against the detention order. He sought to draw support from the Apex Court s judgment in the case of HADIBANDHU DAS V. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, CUTTACK AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1969 SC He submits that the opinion of Advisory Board is binding only on the Government. The advisory opinion is never intended to be open to the challenge on merits before

12 12 any forum. Therefore, on the ground that the Advisory Board has opined against the detenu, his right to challenge the detention order cannot be taken away. In this regard, he relies on the Apex Court judgment in the case of AKSHOY KONAI V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL reported in 1973 SCC (Cri) Per contra Sri Manvendra Reddy, learned Government Advocate submits that the detenu is a habitual offender. He has been assaulting the people with deadly weapons, committing murders, kidnapping, committing dacoity, etc. He is involved in 9 such cases of different police stations of Gulbarga. He submits that the detenu is a rowdysheeter. 19. He submits that the detaining authority has furnished to the detenu the grounds of detention and the supporting documents in Kannada and English, which the detenu knows. He further states that detenu even knows both Kannada and English languages. He submits that the

13 13 detaining authority himself has said in his order dated (Annexure- C ) as follows: êÀÅ F DeÉÕAiÀÄ UÉÎ À ÀUÉ ( AzÀs ÀzÀ Áæ üpáj) ªÀÄ À«AiÀÄ ÀÄß À è À Ä EZÉÒ ÀlÖ è êÀÅ ªÀÄÄPÀÛªÁV CAvÀºÀ ªÀÄ À«AiÀÄ ÀÄß Ã«gÀĪÀ PÁgÁUÀȺÀzÀ C üãpààpàgà ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ À ÀUÉ À è À ºÀÄzÀÄ. 20. He submits that the detenu is also called upon to give his representation to the Advisory Board, if he so desires. The detenu has, neither to the detaining authority nor to the Advisory Board, given any representation. He submits that all the procedural requirements are complied with in the instant case. The impugned detention order is passed in the larger interest of public and with a view to maintain peace and tranquility. 21. He submits that the ground that the supporting documents were not legible is being taken for the first time. Such a ground was not even raised before the Advisory Board. He submits that it is absolutely fallacious that the detenu does not know English. As a matter of fact, the detenu studied in English medium at Linn Memorial English Medium

14 14 School, H.P.S. Jewargi Road, Gulbarga from 1 st standard to 7 th standard between 1989 and Thereafter, the detenu studied in English medium in Vijaya Vidyalaya, Gulbarga from 8 th standard to 10 th standard from 1996 to He has also produced the certificates issued by the said schools as Annexures-R7 and R The learned Government Advocate relies on the Apex Court judgment in the case of G. REDDEIAH vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH reported in (2012) 2 SCC 389 wherein the detention order was held to be valid, as the State arrived at a definite conclusion that the provisions of ordinary criminal law were not sufficient in the ordinary course to deal firmly because of his being a habitual offender and after satisfying itself as to all aspects passed an order of detention with a view to prevent him from indulging in such offences. While the position that the non-consideration of bail order amounts to non-application of mind is reiterated, it is also held that if the detaining authority is aware of the fact of granting the bail and passes the detention order after due

15 15 satisfaction in that regard, the detention order would be valid. He read out para 21 of the said decision, which is extracted hereinbelow: 21. The grounds of detention also show that the detaining authority, after scrutinising all the details including various orders of arrest and release, bail on various dates and noting that he is habitually indulging in trespass in forest area, illicit cutting, felling, smuggling and transporting of red sanders wood from the reserved forest owned by the State, arrived at a definite conclusion that the provisions of normal law were not sufficient in the ordinary course to deal firmly because of his habitual nature and after satisfying all aspects including the fact that the detenu was in jail from to and the factum of release from the jail in 4 criminal cases, passed an order of detention with a view to prevent him from further indulging in such offences. 23. He also relies on the Apex Court judgment in the case of SUBRAMANIAN vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 4 SCC 699 to advance the submission that if there is a compelling necessity to detain a person in order to prevent him from indulging in committing the crimes in future, which are prejudicial to the maintenance

16 16 of public order, the Court does not interfere with the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority except on exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Further, that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter is necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. He also relies on the Division Bench judgment, dated passed in W.P.(H.C.) No.20013/2014 wherein it is held that if there is consistency in the anti social activities of the detenu, there is no reason to quash the order of detention. 24. The submissions of learned counsel have received our thoughtful consideration. The following questions fall for our consideration: (i) Whether the impugned detention order is bad as the detenu is not informed of the right of representation to the Government?

17 17 (ii) Whether the non-supply of the Kannada version of all the documents supporting the detention order and some portion of the documents being allegedly illegible warrant the release of the detenu? (iii) Is the petitioner entitled to succeed on the ground of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority? (iv) Whether the detaining authority is in a position to show that there was compelling necessity to pass the impugned order? In Re.Question No.(i) 25. The right to make representation necessarily implies that the person detained must be informed of his right to make the representation to the authority that has made the order of detention at the time when he is served with the communication containing the grounds of detention so as to enable him to make such a representation and the failure to do so results in the denial of the right of person detained to make a representation.

18 The right to make the representation against the order of detention comprehend the right to make representation to the authority, who can grant relief and revoke the order of detention. If the detention order is passed by the State Government and not by the officer empowered by the Government, it is then that the detenu has to be necessarily afforded with an opportunity to give the representation only to the State Government and not to the concerned officer. 27. The Division Bench decisions in W.P.(HC).Nos. 50/2007 and 20/2014 do not come to the rescue of the detenu in this case. Because in the said writ petitions, an opportunity was given to the detenu only to submit a representation to the Advisory Board. In the instant case, the detaining authority has stated that the detenu can submit the representation to himself (detaining authority) and also to the Advisory Board. In the case of Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh (supra), there was delay in considering the detenu s

19 19 representation. The case of delay in this case is not involved, as the petitioner has not given any representation. 28. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the detaining authority himself has no power to revoke his order. In the General Clauses Act, 1899, the power of revokation is always available to the authority that has made the order of detention. There is no legal impediment for the detaining authority to consider the representation made by the detenu. 29. We cannot hold that even before the Government s approval of the order of the detaining authority, the detaining authority does not possess the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, There is nothing wrong in giving the right to make a representation to the detaining authority, so long as the order of detention is not approved by the State Government. In taking this view, we are fortified by the Hon ble Supreme Court s decision in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. SANTOSH SHANKAR ACHARYA reported in (2000) 7 SCC 463. What is of crucial importance is that the detenu has to be given an opportunity

20 20 to give the representation, which has been done in the present case. The detenu cannot find fault with the detaining authority on the ground that the detenu is given the opportunity to give the representation only to the detaining authority and not to the Government. Besides, it is also not shown to us that such a ground was ever raised before the Advisory Board. Considering all these aspects of the matter, we answer question No.(i) against the detenu. In Re.Question No.(ii): 30. The statement made on behalf of the detenu that he does not know English is unbelievable. Annexures-R7 and R8 produced by the Government show that he studied in English medium at Linn Memorial English Medium School, Gulbarga from I standard to VII standard between Thereafter the detenu studied in English medium in Vijaya Vidyalaya Composite Pre-University College, Gulbarga from VIII standard to X standard between Merely because the Kannada translated version of certain documents is not given, it cannot be said that it has

21 21 deprived the detenu of the opportunity of making effective representation. It is profitable to refer to what the Apex Court has held in paragraph No.4 of its judgment in the case of M.KUDUBDEEN v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2010) 15 SCC A perusal of the said document (front portion) shows that the material particulars therein are the name of the passenger, flight number, numbers of the packages, checked baggage, hand baggage, total value of the dutiable goods being imported and signature. All these particulars have been filled in that document. The name, flight number and number of packages have been mentioned in the document in question. Against the value of the goods tick mark has been made. The document has been signed by the detenu. In the face of the above details given by the detenu in the aforesaid declaration, the contention that the translation thereof has not been supplied particularly keeping in view that the reverse is in the Tamil language, is without any substance. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that non-supply of the English (sic Tamil) translation of the document has resulted in depriving the petitioner from making an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The first contention is therefore rejected.

22 The communication, dated (Annexure-D) containing the grounds of detention itself states that the detenu speaks Kannada, Hindi, Telegu and English language and that he knows reading and writing in Kannada and English. 33. In the Kannada version the detenu is unambiguously called upon to submit the representation through the Superintendent of Police where the detenu is lodged. In the English version an inadvertent surplasage that the detenu has to submit the representation to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Bangalore, has therefore caused no prejudice to the detenu. 34. In the case of PRAKASH CHANDRA MEHTA v. COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA AND OTHERS reported in 1985 (Supp) SCC 144, which case fell for consideration under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Hon ble Supreme Court has this to say:

23 The principle is well-settled. But in this case it has to be borne in mind that the grounds were given on June 25, 1984 following the search and seizure of gold biscuits from his room in the hotel in his presence and in the background of the mercy petition as we have indicated and he was in constant touch with his daughter and sons and there is no evidence that these people did not know Hindi or English. Indeed they knew English as well as Hindi. It is difficult to accept the position that in the peculiar facts of this case, the grounds were not communicated in the sense the grounds of detention were not conveyed to the detenu Venilal. Whether grounds were communicated or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 35. Further, on the ground of one or two words being not as legible as they should have been, the impugned order cannot be quashed. On the communication, dated containing the grounds of detention, the detenu has endorsed that the contents of the said communication are read over to him in Kannada and that he has understood the same. Thus, the second question is liable to be answered in the negative and accordingly it is answered.

24 24 In Re.Question No.(iii): 36. The detaining authority has also briefly discussed about nine criminal cases in which the detenu is involved. He has also referred to the cases in which the enquiry is going on and the cases in which he is an under-trial. The detaining authority has also referred to the cases in which he is acquitted. On the slender ground of there being small inaccuracies or discrepancies while making the references to the criminal cases, the impugned order cannot be quashed. The small inaccuracies would not impair the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. In the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra), the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that the detention order is not vitiated on the ground of nonapplication of mind, if subjective satisfaction is arrived at on the basis of other independent and objective factors enumerated in the grounds. 37. The detaining authority has clearly stated that the detenu, on the enlargement of the bail, would threaten the witnesses and manage them to become hostile to prosecution.

25 25 The detaining authority has also stated that the detenu s anti-social activities are going on unabated and that even on getting the bail, the detenu has not been mending his ways. Besides, the bail/discharge/acquittal by a criminal court is no bar to the preventive detention. 38. The perusal of the communication, dated Annexure-C) shows that the detaining authority was conscious of all the relevant aspects of the matter and passed the detention order in order to prevent the detenu from committing the prejudicial activities in future. Besides, it is not even the case of the petitioner that the ground of nonapplication of mind was ever raised before the Advisory Board. The impugned order and the communication containing the ground for detention are reflective of the application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. Thus the third ground also fails the petitioner. In Re.Question No.(iv): 39. As held by the Apex Court in the case of M.Kudubdeen (supra), the sufficiency of material in arriving at subjective satisfaction cannot be gone into in exercise of

26 26 writ jurisdiction. It is not a case of absence of materials altogether. It cannot be held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority about the compelling necessity stands vitiated. In the present case, it is not possible to accept the contention that there was no material before the detaining authority to arrive at a conclusion that there was compelling necessity to detain the person in question, only because he was in custody as a remand prisoner. 40. In the case of Rekha (supra), the detention was on the ground of selling the expired drugs after tampering with labels and printing fresh labels showing them as non-expired drugs. Whenever an order of preventive detention is challenged, the first and foremost question to be examined is whether the ordinary law of land is sufficient to deal with the situation. If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order is illegal. The Hon ble Supreme Court, on holding that the relevant provisions of the IPC and the Drugs and Cosmetic Act were sufficient to deal with the situation, made the order for the release of the detenu in the said case. The

27 27 facts of the said reported case and those of this case are entirely different. 41. We do not find any infirmity either in the reasoning of the detaining authority or in the procedure followed by it. We are satisfied that the detenu was afforded with adequate opportunities at every stage and that there is no violation of any procedural safeguards. We fully agree with the reasoning of the detaining authority, as approved by the Government. 42. The perusal of the statement of objects and reasons of the Goondas Act reveals that it was enacted as the activities of certain anti-social elements like bootleggers, drug offenders, gamglers, goondas, immoral traffic offenders and slum grabbers have been causing the feeling of insecurity and alarm amongst the public. 43. In the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra), the Apex Court has expressed the considered view that the Court s approach should be pragmatic and not highly technical. Strict adherence to the procedure sacrificing greater social interest is not justified. The protection of society

28 28 may claim higher priority under certain circumstances. While quoting the ardent exponent of individual liberties, Thomas Jefferson, the Apex Court has said in paragraph No.83 in its decision in Prakash Chandra Mehta s case (supra), as follows: 83. As has been set out by Thomas Jefferson To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means [Thomas Jefferson, Writings (Washington Ed.), V and The Constitution Between Friends by Louis Fisher 47]. By the aforesaid approach both justice and power can be brought together and whatever is just may be powerful and whatever may be powerful may be just. 44. The detenu cannot ask this Court to consider the question as to whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority can be justified by the application of objective tests. The detenu can challenge the detention order on the ground of malafides or on the ground of absence of materials or if the grounds of detention are vague or irrelevant. It is only in this incidental manner that the question of satisfaction may

29 29 become justiciable. Otherwise, the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction cannot be challenged before the courts. In taking this view, we are fortified by the Apex Court s judgment in the case of PUSHKAR MUKHERJEE AND OTHERS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL reported in AIR 1970 SC 852. We cannot be called upon to undertake an investigation into sufficiency of the materials on the basis of which the detention order is passed. 45. The Writ Court would neither act as a court of appeal in a petition filed challenging the validity of the detention order nor it would put itself in the position of the detaining authority for satisfying itself of the adequacy of the materials. The power to issue a detention order depends on how the detaining authority processes, perceives and evaluates the threat to the maintenance of public order. Its satisfaction is purely subjective and excludes the judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention. 46. In the instant case, we find that the grounds of detention have nexus with the purpose for which the

30 30 detention is made. The conjoint reading of the detention order and the communication containing the grounds of detention reveals that the detention order is legal and is in conformity with the provisions of Goondas Act. 47. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian (supra), it is not open to the Court to interfere in the matter when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant. 48. Thus, the consideration of question No.(iv) also yields the conclusion that the impugned detention order is invulnerable. 49. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE Msr/Swk/MD