STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Transcription

1 STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS BARBARA CONVERSE, Guardian and Conservator of CATHERINE CURTIS, a Legally Incapacitated Person, UNPUBLISHED March 3, 2011 Plaintiff-Appellant, v No Calhoun Circuit Court AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE LC No NO COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Before: BECKERING, P.J., and TALBOT and OWENS, JJ. PER CURIAM. Barbara Converse contests the grant of partial summary disposition in favor of Auto Club Group Insurance Company (ACIA) regarding her claims for payment of no-fault benefits. We affirm. We review a decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. 1 In making a decision under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we consider all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict it. 2 A movant is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 3 A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. 4 Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving 1 Hansen Family Trust v FGH Indus, LLC, 279 Mich App 468, 474; 760 NW2d 526 (2008). 2 Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 419; 684 NW2d 864 (2004). 3 Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). 4 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). -1-

2 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 5 are also reviewed de novo. 6 Questions of law and equitable estoppel issues Converse contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her negligence claim by having determined it was merely a contract claim clothed in negligence language. Converse asserts that the trial court s decision is directly contrary to pronouncements by our Supreme Court. 7 The gravamen of the cited Michigan Supreme Court decisions is that where negligence claims are pleaded as causes of action separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim, such negligence claims should not be summarily dismissed. 8 In other words, If the defendant has breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff apart from the contract of insurance, then there may be liability in tort. 9 The first step is to determine whether Converse s negligence claim amounts to an action on the [insurance] policy. If the claim is an action on the policy, a separate cause of action is not sustainable. 10 The complaint alleges the failure of ACIA to inform and disclose to Converse the benefits that were available to her under the insurance contract. A reading of the complaint reveals that Converse does not allege that ACIA breached a legal duty owed [to her] apart from the contract of insurance. 11 Because mere allegations of failure to discharge obligations under [an] insurance contract [is] not [] actionable in tort, 12 Converse s negligence claim was not a cause of action which existed separate and distinct from her breach of contract claim. 13 As Converse s negligence claim was on the policy, it was properly dismissed by the trial court. 14 Converse also argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her claim under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act ( MCPA) based on its determination that the no-fault act provides an exclusive remedy for causes of action arising in a motor vehicle accident context. 5 Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558, 568; 719 NW2d 73 (2006). 6 AFSCME Int l Union v Bank One, 267 Mich App 281, 283, 293; 705 NW2d 355 (2005). 7 Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass n, 481 Mich 399; 751 NW2d 443 (2008), amended 482 Mich 1201 (2008); Hearn v Rickenbacker, 428 Mich 32; 400 NW2d 90 (1987). 8 Id. at 35, 39-40; Cooper, 481 Mich at Hearn, 428 Mich at Id. at Id. at Cooper, 481 Mich at 410; Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, ; 295 NW2d 50 (1980). 13 Hearn, 428 Mich at Id. at

3 All of Converse s MCPA allegations involve violations of chapter 20 of the insurance code, which is comprised of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). 15 Specifically, MCL (3) provides that the MCPA does not apply to or create a cause of action for an unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive method, act, or practice that is made unlawful by chapter 20 of the insurance code of 1956, 1956 PA 218, MCL to This statutory language was added in an amendment effective March 28, Because the MCPA no longer applies to insurance companies, 17 any cause of action for claims accruing after March 28, 2001, clearly cannot be sustained. 18 With regard to claims accruing before March 28, 2001, private actions against an insurer were permitted pursuant to MCL of the MCPA arising out of misconduct made unlawful by chapter 20 of the insurance code. 19 But, [a]n action under this section shall not be brought more than 6 years after the occurrence of the method, act, or practice which is the subject of the action nor more than 1 year after the last payment in a transaction involving the method, act, or practice which is the subject of the action, whichever period of time ends at a later date. 20 The claims made by Converse stem from methods, practices and the alleged inadequate payment of benefits occurring from July 29, 1992, essentially up to the filing of her complaint on December 9, We note that the statutory wording does not provide an option regarding whether the six-year period or the one-year period may be used in determining the viability of a claim. Rather, the statutory language clearly dictates that we apply whichever period of time ends at a later date. This necessitates our restricting Converse s claims to those that were incurred no[] more than 1 year after the last payment in a transaction involving the method, act, or practice which is the subject of the action. Converse is contesting a series of practices that continued and resulted in payments as late as December Because we are constrained by the statute to consider the period of time that ends at a later date her claims are limited by the statutory language to those within one year immediately preceding December Commensurately, because any cause of action for claims accruing after March 28, 2001, cannot be sustained, the 15 MCL et seq. 16 MCL McLiechey v Bristol West Ins Co, 408 F Supp 2d 516, (WD Mich, 2006) (quotation marks omitted). 18 MCL Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, Inc (On Remand), 272 Mich App 142, ; 724 NW2d 498 (2006). 20 MCL (7). 21 MCL (7). -3-

4 trial court properly dismissed Converse s MCPA claim. 22 This Court will affirm where the trial court came to the right result even if for the wrong reason. 23 Converse next contends that the trial court improperly weighed evidence, made credibility determinations, and failed to view the evidence in a light most favorable to her when it dismissed her fraud and silent fraud claims, finding a lack of justifiable reliance. Our Supreme Court set forth the elements of fraud in an insurance context as requiring: (1) that the insurer made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that when the representation was made, the insurer knew that it was false, or the insurer made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that the insurer made the statement with the intention that it would be acted upon by the insureds; (5) that the insureds acted in reliance upon the statement; and (6) that the insureds consequently suffered injury. 24 To establish fraud or silent fraud, a [p]laintiff must... show that any reliance on defendant s representations was reasonable. 25 There can be no fraud where a person has the means to determine that a representation is not true. 26 The trial court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Converse reasonably relied on ACIA s alleged representations. 27 The record demonstrates that Converse complained about ACIA on three separate occasions to the insurance commission, and was put on notice by the commission to seek out a lawyer. Converse also acknowledged having contact with attorneys throughout the years to assist her with various matters relating the services to be provided to her daughter. The alleged representations by ACIA S agents did not involve information that was primarily or exclusively within ACIA s control, but concerned what benefits were available to her under the no-fault act. 28 Because Converse consulted with attorneys, complained to the insurance commission, negotiated directly with the insurer, had access to information and, thus, had available to her the means to ascertain the accuracy or truth of ACIA s statements, she was unable to demonstrate that she reasonably relied on ACIA s representations. 29 In addition, because the alleged representations occurred during the claims handling and negotiation process, the reliance element is not established because during these processes the parties are in an obvious adversarial position and generally 22 MCL (3); MCL (7). 23 Fisher v Blankenship, 286 Mich App 54, 70; 777 NW2d 469 (2009) (citation omitted). 24 Cooper, 481 Mich at Foreman v Foreman, 266 Mich App 132, ; 701 NW2d 167 (2005). 26 Nieves v Bell Indus, Inc, 204 Mich App 459, 464; 517 NW2d 235 (1994). 27 Coblentz, 475 Mich at Nieves, 204 Mich App at Coblentz, 475 Mich at

5 deal with each other at arm s length. 30 Converse s claims of fraud and silent fraud were, therefore, properly dismissed by the trial court. Converse next contends that the trial court erred by applying the one-year-back rule to her breach of contract claim rather than allowing a jury to decide the issues of fraud and equitable estoppel. Because we find that the fraud claims were properly dismissed, that aspect of her appellate argument on this issue is without merit. Addressing her argument regarding equitable estoppel, we note that Converse has not indicated in her appellate brief the law she is relying on or how an equitable estoppel defense is available in this case. An appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claims, nor may [the] appellant give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation to supporting authority. 31 An appellant s failure to properly address the merits of [her] assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue. 32 Despite this failure we note that, because the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires justifiable reliance, which has not been demonstrated, this claim is also without merit. 33 Converse also asserts that the trial court s decision to apply the one-year-back rule to her breach of contract claim should be reversed because of a recent decision by the Michigan Supreme Court. 34 The statutory provision in the cited case on which Converse relies provides that the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run. 35 Specifically, in discussing the interplay between the no-fault act and the disability savings provision, our Supreme Court stated: MCL (1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In nofault cases, for example, MCL (1) must be read together with MCL (1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to bring the action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits.... On the basis of its language, MCL 30 Cooper, 481 Mich at Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003) (citations omitted); see also MCR 7.212(C)(7). 32 Id. 33 AFSCME Int l Union, 267 Mich App at Regents of Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010). 35 MCL (1). -5-

6 (1), supersedes all limitations in MCL (1), including the oneyear-back rule s limitation on the period of recovery. 36 We find that Converse s reliance on this ruling is mistaken, as the circumstances in this case do not fall within the purview of this statute. In general, the purpose of statutes tolling the period of limitations for persons to whom a legal disability is attributed is to allow protected classes of persons an opportunity to be made whole once their disabilities have been removed.... [t]he purpose of a savings or tolling statute for persons under a disability is to protect the legal rights of those who are unable to assert their own rights and to mitigate the difficulties of preparing and maintaining a civil suit while the plaintiff is under a disability. 37 In other words, MCL (1), as a savings provision, is designed to prevent[] the abrogation of the claims of infants and the incompetent. 38 We note that it is unnecessary to apply the savings provision to Converse s claims as the limitations period has not expired. As recognized by our Supreme Court, MCL (1) does not create its own independent cause of action. 39 Rather, it must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. 40 The relevant portion of the no-fault act to be read in conjunction with the savings provision, states: An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor s loss has been incurred. 36 Regents of Univ of Mich, 487 Mich at Klida v Braman, 278 Mich App 60, 71; 748 NW2d 244 (2008) (citations omitted). 38 Id. at 72 (citation omitted). 39 Regents of Univ of Mich, 487 Mich at Id. -6-

7 However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. 41 In this instance, ACIA has been paying benefits to Converse over a number of years on behalf of Curtis. It is undisputed that ACIA made payments to Converse as late as December 2005, when this action was initiated. According to the no-fault act s language permitting an action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense... has been incurred the limitations period has not run and, therefore, there is no need to apply the savings provision. The savings provision language specifically provides for one year after the disability is removed to bring the action although the period of limitations has run, reinforcing that its function is to operate as an exception to applicable statutes of limitation. 42 Simply put, because the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, there is no reason to utilize the savings provision. Because a claim for benefits accruing more than one-year before the commencement of this action cannot be sustained, 43 the trial court correctly applied the one-year back rule to the breach of contract claim. 44 Affirmed. /s/ Michael J. Talbot /s/ Donald S. Owens 41 MCL (1) (emphasis added). 42 MCL (1); Hatcher v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 269 Mich App 596, 604; 712 NW2d 744 (2005). 43 See e.g. Vega v Lakeland Hosp at Niles and St. Joseph, Inc, 479 Mich 243, 248; 736 NW2d 561 (2007); Honig v Liddy, 199 Mich App 1, 4; 500 NW2d 745 (1993). 44 MCL (1). -7-

8 STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS BARBARA CONVERSE, Guardian and Conservator of CATHERINE CURTIS, a Legally Incapacitated Person, UNPUBLISHED March 3, 2011 Plaintiff-Appellant, v No Calhoun Circuit Court AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE LC No NO COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Before: BECKERING, P.J., and TALBOT and OWENS JJ. BECKERING, P.J. (concurring in part in result only and dissenting in part). I concur in result only with respect to the majority s conclusion that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition of plaintiff s fraud and negligence claims. I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority s conclusion that defendants were entitled to partial summary disposition of plaintiff s breach of contract claim under the one-year back rule set forth in MCL (1). I also disagree that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL et seq. I would reverse the trial court s orders as to these claims accordingly. I. APPLICATION OF THE ONE-YEAR BACK RULE In her breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached its obligation, under the policy of insurance and the no-fault act, MCL , to pay all personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits owed to or on behalf of plaintiff. The trial court held that plaintiff was limited, by the one-year back rule set forth in MCL (1), to recovery of any unpaid benefits accruing on or after December 9, In upholding the trial court s decision, the majority essentially holds that, because plaintiff s complaint was timely filed under the no-fault act, Curtis is not entitled to the legal protections afforded to her by MCL (1) as a person disabled by insanity as a result of the accident, and therefore, that the one-year back rule set forth in MCL (1) applies to limit her ability to recover no-fault benefits she claims are owed to her. I respectfully disagree. MCL (1) provides in relevant part: -1-

9 if the person first entitled to... bring an action under this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the action accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise to... bring the action although the period of limitations has run. [Emphasis added.] It is undisputed that, as a consequence of the severe head injury she sustained in the May 11, 1987, motor vehicle accident underlying her no-fault claims, Curtis meets the definition of insanity set forth in MCL (2). MCL (3) provides that the insanity must exist at the time the claim accrues to permit tolling of the limitations period on that basis. The nofault act provides that [p]ersonal protection insurance benefits payable for accidental bodily injury accrue, not when the injury occurs but as the allowable expenses, work loss or survivors loss is incurred. MCL (4); see also, Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476, ; 673 NW2d 739 (2003). Therefore, Curtis s claim for PIP benefits accrued at the time she incurred allowable expenses necessitated by the injuries she suffered as a result of the accident. Because it is undisputed that Curtis has been in a persistent vegetative state since the accident, her claim for PIP benefits for allowable expenses, necessarily accrued after the point at which she became insane under MCL (2). Further, where, as here, a person is rendered insane by the wrong committed against them, he or she is under a disability with regard to the prosecuting of legal actions arising from that wrong. Emery v Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co, 372 Mich 663, ; 127 NW2d 826 (1964). Consequently, Curtis s claims for no-fault benefits fall within the savings provision set forth in MCL (1). There is no basis in law or fact for concluding otherwise. Under MCL (1), Curtis, or her representative, has until one-year after her disability has been removed, through death or otherwise, to bring an action for PIP benefits. See, Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289, 345; 791 NW2d 897 (2010) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting) quoting Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass n, 476 Mich 55, 73; 718 NW2d 784 (MARKMAN, J., concurring); Sallee v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 190 Mich App 305, 307; 475 NW2d 828 (1991); DeVito v Blenc, 47 Mich App 524, 529; 209 NW2d 728 (1973). Until means up to the time that or when,... onward to or till. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001), p Plainly, then, Curtis has any time from the time of the wrong up to or onward to one year after the disability is removed to file her claims. There is no assertion here that plaintiff s claims were not timely filed. In Univ of Mich Regents, 487 Mich at 298, our Supreme Court held that: MCL (1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL (1) must be read together with MCL (1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to bring the action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits... for accidental bodily injury.... On the basis of its language, MCL (1) supersedes all limitations in MCL (1), including the one-year-back rule s limitation on the period of recovery. [Emphasis added.] -2-

10 And, the action and claim preserved by MCL (1) include the right to collect damages. Id. at 299. Accordingly, claims for PIP benefits brought by claimants afforded the protection of the tolling provision set forth in MCL (1), are not subject to the one-year back limitation set forth in MCL (1). Id. at 302. Rather, as to these plaintiffs, the oneyear back rule is superseded by the protections afforded by MCL (1). Id. at 298. Stated differently, the provisions of MCL (1) preserving a plaintiff s right to bring an action also preserve the plaintiff s right to recover damages incurred more than one year before suit is filed. Id. at 302. Therefore, Curtis s claim for breach of contract seeking to recover PIP benefits simply is not subject to the one-year back rule set forth in MCL (1). This is true regardless of whether application of MCL (1) is required to render the filing of plaintiff s claim timely, because MCL (1) also independently protects Curtis s right to collect damages arising from her claims, free from the restriction of the one-year back rule set forth in MCL (1). Univ of Mich Regents, 487 Mich at The majority holds that whenever a no-fault claim on behalf of a disabled person protected by MCL (1) is filed within the limitations period set by MCL (1), MCL (1) does not apply to protect the disabled person s right to collect damages. This reading of the interplay between MCL (1) and MCL (1) eviscerates our Supreme Court s holding in Univ of Mich Regents. Further, it produces the incongruous result that a claim brought on behalf of a disabled person that is timely filed under the no-fault act is subject to the one-year back rule limiting the recovery of damages, while the same claim filed well after the limitations period in the no-fault act has expired, but within the time afforded for the filing of such claim by MCL (1), is not subject to the one-year back rule. In this way, the majority applies MCL (1) to abrogate the claims of infants and the incompetent, Kilda v Braman, 278 Mich App 60, 71-72; 748 NW2d 244 (2008), in contravention of the purposes of MCL (1) and the case law interpreting and applying it. This result is untenable. Id. at 74. As this Court explained in Kilda, the purpose of MCL (1) is to prevent the abrogation of the legal rights of persons who are legally incapable of enforcing them. Id. at 71, And, as our Supreme Court plainly explained in Univ of Mich Regents, 489 Mich at 299, MCL (1) preserves not only a disabled plaintiff s right to bring an action or claim, but also preserves the disabled plaintiff s right to recover the resulting damages incurred, regardless whether they were incurred more than one year before suit is filed. Id. at 299, 302. Under Univ of Mich Regents, the one-year back rule simply does not apply to limit Curtis s recovery of no-fault benefits, whenever they are filed and so long as they are timely filed. Id. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court s grant of partial summary disposition of plaintiff s breach of contract claim on the basis of application of the one-year back rule. II. PLAINTIFF S MCPA CLAIMS Plaintiff asserts claims under the MCPA arising from alleged deceptive practices by defendant occurring from July 29, 1992, to the filing of her complaint on December 9, MCL (7) of the MCPA provides in pertinent part: An action under this section shall not be brought more than 6 years after the occurrence of the method, act, or practice which is the subject of the action nor more than 1 year after the last payment in a transaction involving the method, act, -3-

11 or practice which is the subject of the action, whichever period of time ends at a later date. The majority correctly concludes that plaintiff s MCPA claim was timely filed. However, it then reads into the limitations period a one-year back rule akin to that provided by MCL (1). Clearly, though, MCL (7) contains no such limitation on damages. By its plain language, MCL (7) affords plaintiff one year after the last payment in a transaction involving the method, act, or practice which is the subject of the action in which to file her action for damages arising from the entire period in which the insurer utilized the deceptive method, act or practice. Unlike MCL , 1 MCL does not contain any temporal limit, beyond the confines of the limitations period itself, on the recovery of damages. MCL (2) provides that a person who suffers a loss as a result of a violation of this act may bring an action to recover actual damages or $250.00, whichever is greater, together with reasonable attorney fees. Thus, so long as a plaintiff s action is timely filed under MCL (7), that plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages suffered as a result of the violative conduct. The MCPA contains no provision akin to the no-fault act s one-year back rule. And, as previously discussed, the no fault act s one-year back rule, set forth in MCL , does not apply in this case. Univ of Mich Regents, 487 Mich at 302. Therefore, the majority s conclusion that plaintiff is barred from recovering for claims arising before December 9, 2004, is in error. 2 The majority correctly notes that plaintiff may not bring a claim under the MCPA arising from alleged deceptive insurance practices occurring after March 28, MCL (3). 3 However, plaintiff s claims for conduct arising before March 28, 2001, remain viable to the extent that they were timely filed. Smith v Global Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 467; 597 NW2d 28 (1999); Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, 272 Mich App 145, 149; 724 NW2d 498 (2006). By the plain language of MCL (3) and MCL (2) and (7), plaintiff can assert claims under the MCPA seeking to recover her actual damages resulting from methods, practices or acts 1 MCL (1) specifically provides that, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. 2 That this is so is further emphasized by the fact that MCL (7) permits a plaintiff to file suit within 6 years after the occurrence of complained-of method, act, or practice or within 1 year after the last payment in a transaction involving the complained-of method, act, or practice, whichever period of time ends at a later date. The majority s interpretation and application of this provision would graft a one-year back rule into MCL (7) in all cases in which there is a payment to or from a plaintiff resulting from the complained-of method, act or practice. There is no basis in the language employed in MCL (7) for such an interpretation. 3 MCL (3) was added as an amendment, effective March 28, 2001, and provides: This act does not apply to create a cause of action for an unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive method, act, or practice that is made unlawful by chapter 20 of the insurance code of 1956 [], MCL to

12 violative of the MCPA based on conduct by defendant occurring from December 5, 1999, (six years prior to the filing of the complaint) to March 28, 2001, (the effective date of MCL (3)). The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff may not challenge the propriety of defendant s actions denying her no-fault benefits under the MCPA. Plainly, that conclusion is legally erroneous. Smith, 460 Mich at 467 ( private actions are permitted against an insurer pursuant to 11 of the MCPA... ); Grant, 272 Mich App at 149 ( plaintiff was permitted to raise an MCPA claim [arising from the denial of no-fault benefits] under Smith... ). Further, the majority s alternative basis for upholding the trial court s grant of summary disposition of plaintiff s MCPA claim is contrary to the plain language of MCL (2) and (7) and our Supreme Court s holding in Univ of Mich Regents, 487 Mich at 302. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court s order dismissing plaintiff s MCPA claim in its entirety pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). I would hold that plaintiff stated a claim on which relief can be granted under the MCPA arising from alleged deceptive conduct by defendant occurring between December 9, 1999, and March 28, /s/ Jane M. Beckering -5-