Case 2:16-cv SVW-MRW Document 17 Filed 08/05/16 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:294

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1 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: 0 BONNIE E. ESKENAZI (SBN 0) BEskenazi@GreenbergGlusker.com JONATHAN B. SOKOL (SBN 0) JSokol@GreenbergGlusker.com RICARDO P. CESTERO (SBN 0) RCestero@GreenbergGlusker.com TIMOTHY J. TOOHEY (SBN 0) TToohey@GreenbergGlusker.com & MACHTINGER LLP Telephone: 0..0 Fax: 0..0 Attorneys for Plaintiffs FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC LIMITED and HOPE ROAD MERCHANDISING, LLC FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC LIMITED, a Bahamian corporation, and HOPE ROAD MERCHANDISING, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, v /0. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Plaintiffs, JAMMIN JAVA CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, and DOES -0, Defendants. WESTERN DIVISION Case No. :-cv-00 SVW (MRWx) Assigned to Hon. Stephen V. Wilson AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JAMMIN JAVA S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [Declaration of Bonnie E. Eskenazi and Certificate of Interested Parties filed concurrently herewith] Action filed on August,.

2 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS i Page I. INTRODUCTION... II. FACTS... III. ARGUMENT... A. JJC Cannot Justify Emergency Ex Parte Relief... B. JJC Cannot Satisfy the Requirements for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction... C. If The Court Issues a TRO, It Should Impose a Substantial Bond to Protect Plaintiffs From Further Damages... IV. CONCLUSION...

3 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: 0 CASES TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii Page Caplan v. Felheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, F.d (d Cir. )... Caribbean Marine Services, Co. v. Baldridge, F.d ( th Cir. )... Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 0 of Alameda Cty., U.S., S. Ct., L. Ed. d ()... Griffith v. Department of Public Works, Cal.d ()... In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 0 B.R. (C.D. Cal. )... Nat l Rural Telecommunications Cooperative v. Diretv, Inc., F. Supp. d 00 (C.D. Cal. 0)... Perfect 0, Inc. v. Google, Inc., F.d (th Cir. )... Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., F.d (th Cir. )... Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Counsil, Inc., U.S., S.Ct. (0)... OTHER AUTHORITIES Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (b)... Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (c)...

4 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: I. INTRODUCTION Defendant and counterclaimant Jammin Java Corporation ( JJC ) seeks an ex parte temporary restraining order against Plaintiffs and counterdefendants Hope Road Music, Ltd. ( HR ) and Hope Road Merchandising, LLC ( HRM ). JJC allegedly seeks this temporary restraining order to prevent the irreparable harm of destroying JJC s business. However, what JJC actually seeks is an order of specific performance requiring HR to continue to perform under a trademark license agreement that was validly terminated by HR over a month ago. This, JJC cannot do. 0 To begin with, JJC fails to demonstrate any urgency which would justify trying to obtain a mandatory injunction on an ex parte basis. The facts underlying JJC s request have existed for over a month HR terminated its long-term license agreement with JJC more than a month ago and then HRM terminated the short term replacement license two weeks ago. JJC does not even try to explain what has supposedly happened in interim which could justify this emergency request. For this reason alone, the application should be denied. JJC s application also fails on the merits. It is indisputable that HR properly terminated its long term trademark license agreement with JJC. In fact, JJC admitted as much in a public filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ). Although HRM then entered into a short term license while the parties attempted to resolve their differences, JJC also breached that short term license. Accordingly, HRM properly terminated the short term license as well. JJC has offered no credible evidence to contradict these facts and cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. JJC also cannot demonstrate that it will suffer any irreparable harm. JJC claims that if an injunction is not issued requiring HR to perform a license that HR and HRM will be collectively referred to herein as Plaintiffs /0.

5 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: 0 has already been terminated, then JJC will not be able to fulfill its existing orders or conduct its business. But, HR has taken no actions to prevent JJC from fulfilling its existing orders. To the contrary, HR has informed JJC s creditors that they may continue doing business with JJC. Indeed, it is in HR s interest to allow JJC to fulfill orders and collect money so that JJC will have assets with which to satisfy the damages that it will owe plaintiffs for its breaches of contract. Finally, JJC improperly seeks an injunction to remedy an act that occurred weeks ago (Plaintiffs termination of the license agreements). It is well settled that an injunction can only be used to prevent harm caused by future acts, not past acts. In this way, injunctions are prospective, not retrospective. Yet, the injunction JJC seeks would require HR to reinstate an agreement previously terminated. This is not a proper use of injunctive relief. Accordingly, JJC has not justified its request for an emergency TRO. Should JJC wish to pursue a preliminary injunction, it should file a noticed motion and proceed in an orderly fashion. II. FACTS HR owns the valuable trademark rights in name and likeness of Bob Marley. Declaration of Bonnie E. Eskenazi ( Eskenazi Decl., -). HR licenses HRM to make merchandise based on those trademarks on a non-exclusive basis. Id. In August, HR entered into a license agreement with JJC which granted JJC the right to use the Marley trademarks in connection with coffee products (the Long Term License ). Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. B. Importantly, the Long Term License was limited only to coffee bean products and not brewed coffee, coffee houses or restaurants. Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. B, B, E. From early on in the relationship, JJC struggled to comply with its obligations under the Long Term License. Merely by way of example, JJC -0000/0.

6 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #: 0 repeatedly failed to provide HR with the required quarterly accounting of all sales of coffee products containing the Marley Trademarks. Eskenazi Decl.,. JJC also failed to provide HR with the required financial statements and disclosures regarding JJC s financial viability. Eskenazi, Decl., 0(b). JJC also failed to make its required royalty payments, ultimately resulting in a total liquidated amount due to HR of $,.0. Eskenazi, Decl., 0, Exh. C. Finally, in, the SEC filed charges against JJC for violations of securities laws and JJC entered into a consent judgment with the SEC. Eskenazi Decl., 0. As a result of all of these repeated material breaches of the license agreement, on June,, HR gave notice of these breaches, thereby giving JJC fifteen () days to cure. Eskenazi Decl, 0, Exh. D. JJC failed to cure any of these breaches. Eskenazi Decl., -. Accordingly, HR formally terminated the long term license agreement on June,. Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. F. Immediately after terminating the Long Term Agreement, HR offered JJC a short term license agreement to continue using Marley trademarks in connection with its coffee products. Eskenazi Decl.,. The purpose of the Short Term License was to give JJC time to try and cure its breaches and fix the problems with its business operations. Eskenazi Decl.,. On or about July,, HRM and JJC entered into a six month license agreement on substantially the same terms as the Long Term License (the Short Term License ). Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. H. The Short Term License acknowledged that the Long Term License had been terminated. Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. H. After the parties entered into the Short Term License, they attempted to negotiate a new long term license with sufficient assurances of JJC s ability to perform. Eskenazi Decl.,. During the negotiations, it became abundantly clear that JJC had no intention of changing its business operations or taking any steps to assure HRM and HR that it could and would perform properly under a new long -0000/0.

7 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:00 0 term agreement. Eskenazi Decl.,. For example, JJC refused or failed to provide certified statements, as required by the Long Term License and Short Term License, and failed to pay any portion of the Earned Royalties under the agreements. Eskenazi Decl.,. While the parties were negotiating a possible new long term license, plaintiffs discovered many new breaches of the Short Term License. Eskenazi Decl.,. For example, in mid-july, HR and HRM learned that JJC had purported to pledge the Short Term License as security for credit it sought a clear violation of the license agreements. Eskenazi Decl., (b), (c), Exh. I. This was after HR and HRM had previously complained that pledging the long term license was a breach of contract of that agreement. Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs discovered in or about July that JJC had entered into unauthorized sublicenses. Eskenazi Decl., (d). Plaintiffs also learned that JJC was unable to pay its current debts as they came due and/or to continue its current business activities, even in the short term. For example, plaintiffs learned that JJC was no longer filling all of the purchase orders from customers, putting the Marley Coffee brand in danger. Eskenazi Decl., (e). Plaintiffs also learned that JJC had ceased advertising, promoting and selling Marley Coffee in a manner commensurate with the promotion and sale of high quality merchandise. Eskenazi Decl., (f). In addition to the SEC violations and formal charges, which were themselves troubling, plaintiffs discovered of multiple instances in which management had acted in an misleading and unethical manner. Eskenazi Decl.,. Accordingly, on July,, HRM formally terminated the Short Term License. Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. J. Since the Short Term License was terminated, neither HR nor HRM have taken any action to prevent JJC from fulfilling existing orders for product or otherwise conducting its business. Eskenazi Decl.,. To the contrary, HR and HRM have offered assurances to one of JJC s largest customers that it will not take -0000/0.

8 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 any action to interference with that customer s ability to continue doing business with JJC. Eskenazi Decl.,. Plaintiffs have not taken any actions to prevent JJC from fulfilling any existing customer orders. Eskenazi Decl.,. III. ARGUMENT A. JJC Cannot Justify Emergency Ex Parte Relief. A temporary restraining order is appropriate only where the moving party demonstrates that, absent the order, it will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage. Fed. R. Civ. P. (b) (emphasis added). See Caribbean Marine Services, Co. v. Baldridge, F.d, ( th Cir. ) (party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate immediate threatened harm. ). In order to justify emergency ex parte relief, the movant must demonstrate that this harm will occur before the opposing party can have an opportunity to respond. See e.g., In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 0 B.R., (C.D. Cal. ) (party filing ex parte application must show some genuine urgency such that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition. ). Moreover, ex parte temporary restraining orders should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 0 of Alameda Cty., U.S.,, S. Ct.,, L. Ed. d (). Here, JJC cannot meet these stringent requirements for three reasons. First, JJC does not seek to preserve the status quo. Presently, all licenses between JJC and plaintiffs regarding the use of Bob Marley trademarks have been terminated. Yet, JJC seeks a TRO to force HR to reinstate the Long Term License that has been terminated for nearly six weeks. See, JJC s Proposed Order. In this way, JJC is seeking a mandatory injunction forcing HR to perform under a -0000/0.

9 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 contract that it validly terminated pursuant to the express terms of the agreement. Such an order would not maintain the status quo, it would change it drastically. This alone demonstrates that JJC is not entitled to the relief it seeks. Second, JJC has inexplicably waited over a month before seeking this relief. HR validly terminated the long term license agreement on June,. JJC acknowledged nearly a month ago in a public filing with the SEC that HR had terminated the long term license with JJC on June, due to JJC s own breaches of the agreement. See, Eskenazi Decl.,, Exh. G. JJC offers no explanation of something that changed between June, and the filing of this application that created an urgency requiring ex parte relief. The truth is, nothing has changed the license agreement remains terminated. Given JJC s admissions and the length of time that has elapsed since the termination of the license agreement, this matter is hardly urgent. It was not until plaintiffs filed a breach of contract action in state court on August [Doc -] and sought a declaration that the agreements were in fact validly terminated that suddenly this TRO became urgent. It is not. In short, defendant has an adequate remedy at law and it is inappropriate for it to be seeking emergency relief for what it essentially claims is a breach of contract, especially when defendant has waited over a month to do so. Third, plaintiffs have done nothing to prevent JJC from fulfilling orders or conducting its business. In fact, plaintiffs informed JJC s largest revenue generating distributor that it may continue doing business with JJC. Eskenazi Decl.,. By doing so, plaintiffs have made clear that they have no present intention of disrupting JJC s operations. JJC can continue operating until its own incompetence shuts it down. Accordingly, there is no basis to believe that JJC needs the extraordinary relief it seeks simply to continue operating /0.

10 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page 0 of Page ID #:0 0 B. JJC Cannot Satisfy the Requirements for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. In addition to making a showing that justifies emergency ex parte relief, in order to prevail on this application, JJC must also establish the traditional requirements for a TRO or preliminary injunction, namely: () likelihood of success on the merits; () likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; () balance of equities tips in its favor; and () that injunctive relief is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Counsil, Inc., U.S.,, S.Ct., (0). JJC canont satisfy these elements.. JJC Has Not Shown Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of Legal Remedies JJC has not shown it will likely suffer irreparable harm without the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction. JJC claims that it will suffer irreparable harm without a TRO because it has been unable to fill existing purchase orders (totaling approximately $,000) or issue new purchase orders. Tran Decl., at - [Doc -]. JJC contends that without the ability to fill existing and future purchase orders, it cannot generate revenue and will die. Tran Decl., at -. However, JJC offers no evidence that Plaintiffs have done anything to prevent JJC from filling these orders. In fact, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not sought any preliminary injunctive relief in this action to preclude JJC from filling existing and future purchase orders. Plaintiffs have also not sought to interfere with JJC s ability to fill orders and do business with its distributors and retail customers. Eskenazi Decl.,. Not only have Plaintiffs done nothing to preclude JJC from continuing to generate revenue at the moment, Plaintiffs have told Mother Parkers one of JJC s largest revenue generating distributors that it has no objection to, and will not interfere with, Mother Parkers continued sale and distribution of Marley -0000/0.

11 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 Coffee. Eskenazi Decl.,. To the extent JJC does fill the orders post-termination of the licenses, Plaintiffs will simply be entitled to money damages for JJC s breach of the license agreements and/or trademark infringement. Frankly, given that JJC already owes Plaintiffs hundreds of thousands of dollars for breach of the license agreements, it is in Plaintiffs best interest that JJC sell off its remaining inventory and account to Plaintiffs in damages. JJC s claim that it will suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and business reputation without the requested TRO is also meritless. Any such harm would be 0 self-inflicted. Plaintiffs are not seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction preventing JJC from filling existing or future product orders pending the resolution of this action. To the extent JJC voluntarily stops doing that, it is only harming itself. Self-inflicted harm does not qualify as irreparable harm. Caplan v. Felheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, F.d, (d Cir. ). Finally, JJC fundamentally misapprehends the nature of the injunctive relief remedy. Injunctions are designed to prevent future acts that will cause irreparable harm. Nat l Rural Telecommunications Cooperative v. Diretv, Inc., F. Supp. d 00, 0 (C.D. Cal. 0) ( Under California law, inunctions operate only with future effect. ). They are not used to remedy acts that have already occurred. Id.; Griffith v. Department of Public Works, Cal.d, () ( an injunction will not generally be issued to prohibit a completed act); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., F.d, (th Cir. ) (district court abused its discretion in enjoining an act that had already occurred), impliedly Although JJC makes vague references in its brief to attempts by Plaintiffs to enter into agreements directly with JJC s customers, JJC offers no evidence of any such actions by Plaintiffs. This is because this never happened. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have scrupulously avoided such interference. Eskenzai Decl.,. In fact, the evidence provided by JJC in their Notice of Errata attaches an August, which conclusively proves that Plaintiffs have no intention of preventing any of JJC s customers or distributors from ordering or shipping product. JJC Notice of Errata, Exh. F /0.

12 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 overruled on other grounds as stated in Perfect 0, Inc. v. Google, Inc., F.d (th Cir. ). Here, JJC s ex parte application is directed at reversing the terminations that have already occurred. This alone is a basis to deny JJC s application.. JJC Has not Shown a Likelihood of Success on the Merits It is indisputable that HR terminated the long term license agreement due to [JJC s] breach of certain terms of the Long-Term License Agreement, including, but not limited to, [its] failure to deliver quarterly statements in a timely manner, [its] failure to timely make licensing payments, [its] failure to deliver audited financial statements in a timely manner, and the Securities and Exchange Commission s complaint against [it] relating to an alleged pump and dump scheme regarding Jammin Java stock. See Jammin Java Corp Form -K, filed with the SEC on July,, Eskenazi Decl., Exh. G. JJC admitted in the same public filing that [s]ome of these breaches were due to cash flow issues and corporate governance matters. Id. Finally, JJC admitted in its public filing with the SEC that it owes HR $,, with accrued interest until paid in full, pursuant to the terms of the long term license agreement. Id. Paragraph of the Long Term License provided HR the right to terminate the agreement on multiple grounds, including without limitation: a. The failure of Licensee [JJ] to make any payment required to be made under this Agreement, which failure is not cured within ten (0) business days of Licensee s receipt of written notice from Licensor specifying the nature of such failure with particularity. Eskenazi Decl., Exh. B, (i). b. The breach by Licensee of any of its representations or warranties herein or the failure of Licensee to comply with any of the other terms of this Agreement or otherwise discharge its duties hereunder, and such breach or failure is not cured within fifteen () business days of Licensee s -0000/0.

13 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 receipt of written notice from Licensor specifying the nature of such breach or failure with particularity. Eskenazi Decl., Exh. B, (ii). c. Any negative or unlawful finding of Licensee s or Jammin Java s activities by the Securities & Exchange Commission or any similar government agency in any country, territory or possession. Eskenazi Decl., Exh. B, (v). It is undisputed that JJC violated the above provisions of the contract, and admitted as much in public filings with the SEC, thereby giving HR the lawful right to terminate the very agreement that JJC seeks a mandatory TRO or preliminary injunction to reinstate. Therefore, JJC has not, and cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits. In stark contrast to Plaintiffs clear evidence of breach by JJC and the resulting proper and valid termination of the license agreement, JJC s claims of breach by Plaintiffs have little connection to the actual terms of the license agreement. For example, JJC claims that Plaintiffs breached the Long Term License by entering into licenses to sell beverages and operate coffee houses. JJC Memo of P s & A s, p. -, Tran Decl., -. Yet, the evidence supposedly supporting this claim is utterly lacking JJC submits no correspondence or contracts, it simply offers vague and conclusory testimony of Ahn Tran. More to the point, the license agreements make abundantly clear that JJC had no right to operate coffee houses or sell brewed coffee beverages. See, Long Term License, Eskenazi Decl., Exh. B, B, C and E; Short Term License, Eskenzai Decl., Exh. H, B. Even if there were some basis to this claim (there is none), even JJC s own evidence demonstrates these matters were addressed years ago. Accordingly, JJC cannot prove that Plaitniffs breached the license agreements by entering into other Although not germane to the relief sought by this application, it is also indisputable that JJC breached the short term license agreement, thereby giving HRM the lawful right to terminate that agreement as well. Eskenazi Decl., /0. 0

14 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 licenses and certainly cannot demonstrate that any such breaches give JJC any right to injunctive relief. Similarly, JJC claims that HR failed to indemnify and defend JJC from lawsuits brought by Shane Whittle. Yet, JJC offers no evidence that the Long Term License requires HR to indemnify it from those lawsuits (it does not). Moreover, JJC offers no evidence that it gave prompt written notice to HR of the supposed indemnity claim (again, it did not). See, Eskenazi Decl., Exh. B, (c). Accordingly, JJC cannot possibly prove that Plaintiffs breached any indemnity obligation under the Long Term License. The evidence clearly shows that JJC repeatedly breached both the Long Term License and the Short Term License and Plaintiffs fully complied with the terms of those licenses. Accordingly, JJC cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.. JJC Has Not Shown A Balance of the Equities in Its Favor. As discussed above, JJC does not seek to preserve the status quo. Presently, all licenses between JJC and plaintiffs regarding the use of Bob Marley trademarks have been terminated. Yet, JJC seeks a TRO to force plaintiffs to continue to perform under the Long Term License that has been terminated for nearly six weeks. In this way, JJC is seeking a mandatory injunction forcing HR to reinstate a contract that it validly terminated pursuant to the express terms of the agreement. Such an order would not maintain the status quo, it would change it drastically and would impose an extraordinary burden on Plaintiffs. In effect, the TRO JJC seeks would require Plaintiffs to continue doing business with a company that does not honor the contract, cannot and will not pay the required royalties, and has been found repeatedly to violate federal law. On the other hand, Plaintiffs have done nothing since the termination of the Long Term License to preclude JJC from filling customer orders to generate revenue. Plaintiffs are not preventing JJC from fulfilling orders, nor are Plaintiffs -0000/0.

15 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 interfering with JJC s relationships with its customers and suppliers. This evidence demonstrates that JJC is presently suffering no direct harm, whereas issuance of this injunction would immediately and irreparably harm Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of denying injunctive relief.. JJC Has Also Not Shown that Injunctive Relief Is In the Public Interest. JJC has plainly not established this element. No public interest would be served by granting a mandatory injunction reinstating a license agreement that was validly terminated for good cause six weeks ago. This is especially true given that JJC has already informed all of its shareholders, as well as prospective investors, that the Long Term License was terminated as a direct result of JJC s own breaches of contract. JJC -K, Eskenazi, Decl., Exh. G. Surely, there can be no public interest in now allowing JJC to reinstate the very license that it admittedly breached. C. If The Court Issues a TRO, It Should Impose a Substantial Bond to Protect Plaintiffs From Further Damages. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (c), the Court may issue a TRO only if JJC gives sufficient security to protect Plaintiffs from the harm that will occur as a result of being improperly restrained. Given the nature of the injunction JJC seeks, these damages will be substantial. The evidence demonstrates that JJC has already proven an inability to pay Plaintiffs for the use of their valuable trademark rights. To the extent the Court were to order Plaintiffs to continue allowing JJC to use those rights, Plaintiffs will continue to suffer substantial damage in the form of lost royalty income. JJC already owes Plaintiffs nearly $00,000. That amount will continue to grow as JJC continues to operate and use Plaintiffs intellectual property. More importantly, however, is the potential for long-term harm to the Marley brand of having to be associated with a disreputable and incompetent licensee. JJC -0000/0.

16 Case :-cv-00-svw-mrw Document Filed 0/0/ Page of Page ID #:0 0 has already stopped advertising the Marley Coffee brand in a way that is beneficial to the marks. Eskenazi Decl., (f). Given the disarray at JJC, one can only imagine the problems with quality control that are likely to arise if Plaintiffs are forced to continue doing business with JJC. The harm to the Marley brand could become irreparable if Plaintiffs are forced to stay in business with JJC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask that if the Court is willing to consider issuance of a TRO, it set the amount of security at no less than $ million. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny JJC s application in its entirety. JJC has offered no urgency which would justify issuance of an ex parte TRO, nor has it offered any justification for setting a preliminary injunction hearing on an expedited basis. JJC seeks an injunction to remedy acts that occurred weeks ago and is unable to demonstrate any new present threat to its business. There is no reason why this case cannot proceed in the normal course without the need for temporary injunctive relief. DATED: August, -0000/0. GREENBERG GLUSKER FIELDS CLAMAN By: /s/ Ricardo P. Cestero RICARDO P. CESTERO (SBN 0) Attorneys for Plaintiff FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC LIMITED and HOPE ROAD MERCHANDISING, LLC