(2017) LPELR-43469(SC)

Transcription

1 GALADIMA v. STATE CITATION: In the Supreme Court of Nigeria ON FRIDAY, 15TH DECEMBER, 2017 Suit No: SC.70/2013 Before Their Lordships: OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA Justice of the Supreme Court JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of the Supreme Court AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of the Supreme Court EJEMBI EKO Justice of the Supreme Court PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of the Supreme Court Between HARUNA ALHAJI GALADIMA - Appellant(s) And THE STATE - Respondent(s) RATIO DECIDENDI

2 1. APPEAL - GROUND(S) OF APPEAL: Effect of a ground of appeal from which no issue for determination is formulated "It is trite that by the rules of practice and procedure, in particular, of the appellate Courts, appeals are to be determined on the issues distilled from the competent grounds of appeal raised against the judgment being appealed. Therefore, any ground of appeal from which no issue has been formulated is deemed to have been abandoned and is liable to be discountenanced and struck out by the Court. Indeed, any such ground is lifeless and may not need a specific order to have it stuck out yet should still be struck out. See; Emespo J Continental Ltd Vs. Corona Shifah - Rtsgesellschaft & Ors (2006) 11 NWLR (pt.991) 365: (2006) 8-9 SCM 149; (2006) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 19; (2006) 26 NSC QR 1144; Bisiriyu Akinlagun & Ors Vs. Taiwo Oshoboja & Anor (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.993); (2006) 7 SCM 49, (2006) 5 SC (Pt.11) 105; Maobison Inter Link Ass Ltd vs UTC (Nig) Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 197; (2013) 72 SCM 112; (2013) 3-4 Sc (Pt.1) 109; (2013) 4 SCNJ 137." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. G-E) - read in context

3 2. APPEAL - INTERFERENCE WITH CONCURRENT FINDING(S) OF FACT(S): Attitude of the Supreme Court to interference with concurrent finding(s) of fact(s) of Lower Courts "When the appeal is predicated on the question of facts, concurrently found by the Courts below, the attitude of this Court is well settled. This Court will not interfere with those findings of facts except when appellant shows special or exceptional circumstances justifying the interference. Such special or exceptional circumstances include the showing either that there was miscarriage of justice; or a serious violation of some principles of substantive or procedural law; or that the findings of fact are perverse, in the sense that they do not at all flow from the totality of the evidence at the trial and or that the findings are unreasonable. See ENANG v. ADU (1981) SC 25 at 42; LOKOYI v. OLOJO (1983) 8 SC 61 at 73; OJOMU v. AJAO (1983) 9 SC 22 at 53; IBODO v. ENAROFIA (1980) 5-7 SC 42; AKAYEPE v. AKAYEPE (2009) 11 NWLR (pt. 1152) 217 SC. Notwithstanding this stance of this Court, this Court is still being perpetually inundated by appeals predicated solely on concurrent findings of facts by Courts below to this Court. The connivance of legal practitioners in this regard cannot be ruled out; particularly by those desperately wanting to make up their qualifying appearances in this Court to enable them apply for the award of the privilege of Senior Advocate of Nigeria. The sooner the balance between this privilege and the congestion in, or the work load of, this Court was struck the better for this Court and those seeking to be conferred the privilege. I say no more for now." Per EKO, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. C-D) - read in context

4 3. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE: Ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide "It is settled law that to succeed in a charge of culpable homicide the prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients of the offence: (a)that the death of a human being has actually taken place; (b) That the death has been caused by the accused; (c) That the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death or that the accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act. See; Tunde Adava & Anor Vs. The State (2006) 9 NWLR (pt.984) 152; (2006) 3 SCM 1, (2006) 2 SC (pt.11.) 136; Maikudi Aliyu vs. The State (2013) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 195. It must however be noted that all the above three ingredients of the offence must necessarily co-exist and none must be lacking. Where one is missing or not established, it means that the prosecution has simply failed to discharge the burden of proof that the law places on it in order to succeed with the charge." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. B-A) - read in context

5 4. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH: Ingredients the prosecution must prove to establish the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death "There is no doubt that the ingredients the law requires the prosecution to establish in order to prove an offence of murder is similar to that of a charge of culpable homicide punishable with death under the Penal Code. These ingredients are: (i) The death of the deceased; (ii) That the death resulted from the act of the accused; and (iii) That the accused knew that his act in question will result in the death or did not care whether the death of the deceased will result from his act. See; The State Vs. Musa Danjuma (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.506) 512; Durwode Vs. The State (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt.691) 467 at ; Ogbu & Anor Vs The State (2007) 4 SCM 169; Umaru Adamu Vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt.1416) 441; (2014) 8 SCM 1; (2014)4 & 5 SC 1. There is no doubt and it is beyond any argument that all the required ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death must co-exist and be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. See; Ubani vs. The State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851); Uguru Vs. The State (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. E-D) - read in context

6 5. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH: Ingredients that must be proved to establish the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death "The complaint of the appellant in the sole issue is that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. I agree with my learned brother in the lead judgment that the prosecution proved this charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. All that the law requires from the prosecution is to lead credible evidence to show and prove the following: 1. The death of the deceased. 2. That the death of the deceased was as a result of the act of the accused person; and 3. That the accused knew that his act will result in the death of the victim or that his act will cause or result in grievous bodily harm to the deceased. See Okereke V. The State (2016) LPELR (SC), Durwode V. The State (2000) 15 NWLR (pt. 691) 467, Asuquo V. The State (2016) LPELR (SC)." Per OKORO, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. B-F) - read in context

7 6. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - CRIMINAL LIABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY: Position of the law on a joint commission of crime and the liability or criminal responsibility of each person who participated in the joint act "The law on a joint commission of crime and the liability or criminal responsibility of each person who participated in the joint act is thus, as restated by this Court in GODWIN ALAO v. THE STATE (2015) LPELR (SC)- Where more than one persons are accused of a joint commission of a crime, it is enough that they all participated in the crime. What each of the participants did in furtherance of the commission of the crime is immaterial. The mere fact that (there exists) the common intention manifesting in the execution of the common object is enough to render each of the accused person in the group guilty of the offence. See NWANKWOALA v. STATE (2006) 14 NWLR (pt.1000) 663; IKEMSON v. STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 455; OYAKHIRE v. STATE (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 157." Per EKO, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. E-B) - read in context 7. EVIDENCE - PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: The requirement of the law as regard proof beyond reasonable doubt "However, the required proof beyond reasonable doubt which the prosecution is expected to show does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and the evidence adduced by the prosecution is strong enough against a man, as to leave only a remote probability in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence; "of course it is possible but not in the least probable," then the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See; Jimoh Michael Vs. The State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 361; (2008) 10 SCM 83; (2008) 34 NSCQR (Pt.11) 700." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. D-A) - read in context

8 8. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Duty of court where there are contradictions in the evidence of witness(es) "There is no doubt that where there are contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on a material fact and the said contradictions are not explained by the prosecution through any of its witnesses, it behoves the trial Court not to speculate on or profer the explanation for such contradictions and thereby pick and choose from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that which to believe. See; Boy Muka & Ors Vs. The State (1976) 9 & 10 SC 305; Christopher Arehia & Anor Vs. The State (1982) NSCC 85; (1982)4 SC 78." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. F-C) - read in context 9. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Position of the law as regards contradictions in evidence "Generally, the law is settled that where there are material contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused is entitled to be given the benefit of the doubt so created as a result of the inconsistencies. See; Onubogu Vs. The State (1974)9 SC.1; Nwabueze Vs. The State (1988)4 NWLR (Pt.86) 16."Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (P. 29, Paras. C-E) - read in context

9 10. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Nature of contradiction in evidence that would be fatal to the case of the prosecution "it is trite law that for inconsistency or contradiction in evidence to negatively affect its veracity, such inconsistency and contradiction must be materially significant as to affect negatively the overall case of the prosecution, otherwise such insignificant inconsistency or contradiction will be discountenanced by the Court. See; The State Vs. Azeez & Ors (2008) 8 SCM 175; (2008) 4 SC 188; Dibie & 2 Ors Vs. The State (2007) 7 SCM 101; (2007) 3 SC (Pt.1) 176; Stephen John & Anor Vs. The State (2011) 12 (Pt.2) SCM 238. In this case, I am unable to see any inconsistency or contradiction significantly material in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the material fact in issue required to establish the charge against the appellant. Indeed, this Court has laid it down in several cases that the contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses that will weigh on the mind of the Court must be such as are fundamental to the real question before the Court; the contradictions must be material and go to the root of the case to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court. See; Eze Ibeh Vs. The State (1997) 1 NWLR (pt.484) 632; (1997) LPELR 1389 (SC)." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. E-E) - read in context

10 11. EVIDENCE - CALLING OF WITNESS(ES): Whether the prosecution is required to call a specific number of witnesses "The defence has also challenged the prosecution for failure to call as witnesses a police officer and the spouse of the deceased. There is no doubt that the defence is not to determine how many witnesses the prosecution will call to testify in Court. The State is at liberty to call only one witness or as many as it desires as long as the testimony of a sole witness is sufficient to establish the ingredients to the charge. See; Bayo Adelumola Vs. The State (1988) NWLR (pt.73)683; (1988) LPELR 119 (SC)."Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. E-A) - read in context 12. EVIDENCE - PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: Meaning of proof beyond reasonable doubt "Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence, a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. See Miller V. Minister of Pensions (1947) 3 ALL ER 373, Nasiru V. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 307) 511; Fabian Nwaturuocha V. The State (2011) 6 NWLR (pt. 1242) 170." Per OKORO, J.S.C. (P. 34, Paras. A-B) - read in context

11 13. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Nature of contradiction in evidence that will vitiate a trial "It is settled that Witness testimonies can only be said to be contradictory when they give inconsistent accounts of same event, and for such contradictions to vitiate a decision, they must be so material that they cast doubt on the case presented as a whole. Thus, it is only a contradiction in respect of a material fact that would make a Court doubt the evidence, and what is material will depend on the facts of the particular case - see Eke V. State (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1235) 589, Kalu V. State (1988) 4 NWLR (pt. 90) 503, and Ikemson V. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 110) 455 at 474/5, where this Court per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, aptly stated as follows- I think it is right to postulate that material evidence, is such evidene, which on account of its logical nexus with the issue tends to influence decisively the establishment of the fact in issue For instance, the evidence which of the Appellants shot PW1 or PW2 or which leg PW2 was shot is not material to the issue of fact that PW1 or PW2 was shot. That PW1 or PW2 was shot at is material to the crime with which Appellants have been charged. Similarly, the sequence of pointing a gun at PW1 and PW2 and blocking of the road on a Motor Cycle. The fact was that there was credible evidence that the gun was pointed at them and the road was blocked by persons on a Motor Cycle. Thus, none of the contradictions alleged - - is material to affect the establishment of the fact that the offence of robbery with arms was committed, and that Appellants have been identified as those who committed the offence. The alleged contradictions are not material to the facts in issue, no explanation seems to me to be required." Per AUGIE, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. A-D) - read in context

12 14. EVIDENCE - FACT(S) IN ISSUE: What is fact in issue "Facts in issue, as defined in Section 258 of the Evidence Act 2011: Includes any fact from which either by itself or in connection with other facts the existence, nonexistence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows. A particular fact can only be said to be in issue when its assertion by a Party is denied by the other and it becomes a fact in dispute. So, an issue is said to be joined on a particular fact making its proof necessary when its assertion is disputed by the opposing partysee Mohammed & Anor V. State (2007) 11 NWLR (pt 1045) 303." Per AUGIE, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. D-A) - read in context 15. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Effect of contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witness "The appellant's counsel had strenuously called in aid the cases: ONUBOGU v. THE STATE (1974) 9 SC 1; BOY MUKA & ORS v. THE STATE (1976) 9-10 SC 305 at 325; CHRISTOPHER AREHIA & ANOR v. THE STATE (1982)NSCC 85, (1982) 4 SC 78; IBEH v. THE STATE (1997) 1 NWLR pt. (484) 632 at 661, on the effect of when prosecution witnesses contradict one another. It is true that when prosecution contradict one another on material facts, the Court cannot pick and choose which of them to believe or disbelieve. In such a situation, there has been a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt."per EKO, J.S.C. (P. 43, Paras. A-C) - read in context

13 16. EVIDENCE - CALLING OF EVIDENCE: Whether in a criminal trial, a host of witnesses is required by the prosecution to achieve a proof beyond reasonable doubt "Appellant's counsel had also submitted that the failure of the prosecution to tender the extra-judicial statement of the appellant was fatal to their case. The duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt does not include their also proving his innocence or defence, by putting into their case the evidence that contradicts their case. See PAUL AMEH v. STATE (1978) 6-7 SC 27. The prosecution does not have the obligation to put forward two versions of one incident. See ONUBOGU v. THE STATE (supra); BOY MUKA v. THE STATE (supra); ALFRED ONYEMENA v. THE STATE (1974) ALL NLR 522.?Once the prosecution can prove their allegation beyond reasonable doubt with the witnesses they have screened and selected, they would have discharged the burden of proof cast on them by law. They owe neither the Court nor the accused the duty to call a host of witnesses, or a particular witness. I accordingly do not agree with the appellant's counsel that the failure to call one sergeant Sani was fatal to the prosecution's case. Clearly, repetition of a piece of evidence goes to surplusage. Though surplusage may be to emphasise a point; it is, however, not necessary for proof beyond reasonable doubt." Per EKO, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. B- A) - read in context

14 17. EVIDENCE - CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: Whether minor contradiction in the evidence of witnesses can be fatal to a case "It is not any and every minor discrepancy or inaccuracy in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that amount to contradiction, especially where the witnesses are in substance saying the same thing. It is only material contradiction that is important. See The State vs Azeez & Ors 4 SC 188: Dibie & 2 Ors vs The State (2007) 3 SC (Pt. 1) 176."Per GALINJE, J.S.C. (P. 49, Paras. C-D) - read in context 18. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: Essence of a preliminary objection; when it should be taken by the court "Generally, the rules of this Court allow a respondent to rely on a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal. The purpose of the objection is to bring the appeal to an end after being discovered to be incompetent and or fundamentally deceptive. In either case, it will be unnecessary to continue with the appeal once an objection is raised, without disposing of same. In other words, the Court is expected to deal with and dispose of a preliminary objection once raised by a respondent before taking any further step in the appeal. See; General Electric Company Vs. Harry Ayoade Akande & Ors (2010) 12 (Pt.2) SCM 96; Lamidi Rabiu Vs. Tola Adebajo (2012) 6 SCNM 201; Udenwa & 1 Ors Vs Uzodinma & 1 Ors (2012) 12 (Pt.2) 472 at 483." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp. 3-4, Paras. G-D) - read in context

15 19. WORDS AND PHRASES - "HOMICIDE" "CULPABLE HOMICIDE": Meaning of "homicide" and "culpable homicide" "Generally, homicide means the killing of one person by another. In other words, it is the act of purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causing the death of another human being. However, culpable homicide means a wrongful act that results in a person's death but does not amount to murder. See, Umaru Adamu Vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (pt.1415) 441; (2014) 8 SCM 1; (2014) 4 & 5 SC 1; (2014) All FWLR (Pt.733) 1938." Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp , Paras. F-B) - read in context

16 OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.(Delivering the Leading Judgment):This is an appeal against the judgment of the Kaduna division of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 8th day of February, Coram: Dalhatu Adamu, Habeeb A. Abiru, Ita G. Mbaba, JJCA. The appellant and two others were arraigned before the Jigawa State High Court, Kazaure Judicial Division, Coram: Tahir, J. for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death, contrary to Section 221(b) and Section 246 of the Penal Code Law. The three persons were: (i) Sambo Alhaji Galadima (ii) Haruna Alhaji Galadima (iii) Shabe Alhaji Galadima The three accused persons were charged with the following count: Count 1 That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996 at Kadagawa village of Babura Local Government Authority of Jigawa State within Jigawa Judicial Division you had formed a common intention to commit culpable homicide by doing an illegal act to wit by attacking and beating one Safiya Nomau with knowledge that death could be the probable consequence of your act and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 (b) of the Penal 1

17 Code and Section 79 of the same law. The prosecution called five witnesses in order to prove its case, while the three accused persons testified in their defence respectively, but did not call any other witness. Upon conclusion of the testimonies, both the counsel prosecuting and the defence counsel addressed the Court. In its considered judgment, the trial Court found the three accused persons guilty of the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death as charged and each was accordingly sentenced to death as required by the appropriate law. The three convicts appealed to the Court below on eight (8) Grounds of Appeal. They also filed a joint brief of argument and urged the Court below to allow their appeal, set aside their conviction and sentence. The appeal was found to lack merits and was accordingly dismissed by the Court below in its unanimous decision. Further aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court below led the instant appellant who was the 2nd accused/appellant to appeal to this Court. The appellant had filed an amended Notice of Appeal on 8/7/2015. He raised eieht (8) grounds in his amended notice of

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19 appeal. Briefs of argument were filed and exchanged by parties. The appeal finally came up for hearing on 28/9/2017. Learned counsel for the appellant, Tajudeen Oladoja Esq referred to the amended brief of argument he settled for the appellant, which was deemed properly filed and served on 18th June, He adopted and relied on same to urge the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Court below. Earlier, Mr. Suleh Umar Esq, of counsel for the respondent had referred to the respondent's brief of argument he settled and filed on 2nd July, 2013 but later deemed properly filed and served on 28th September, 2017 before the Court proceeded to hear the appeal. Learned counsel also drew the attention of the Court to the respondent's Preliminary Objection he has to the appeal which is argued in the brief. The said preliminary objection is argued on pages 5 to 17 of the respondent's brief of argument where he finally urged the Court to strike out the appeal. He however later argued the appeal on its merit and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal for being unmeritorious. Generally, the rules of this Court allow a 3

20 respondent to rely on a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal. The purpose of the objection is to bring the appeal to an end after being discovered to be incompetent and or fundamentally deceptive. In either case, it will be unnecessary to continue with the appeal once an objection is raised, without disposing of same. In other words, the Court is expected to deal with and dispose of a preliminary objection once raised by a respondent before taking any further step in the appeal. See; General Electric Company Vs. Harry Ayoade Akande & Ors (2010) 12 (Pt.2) SCM 96; Lamidi Rabiu Vs. Tola Adebajo (2012) 6 SCNM 201; Udenwa & 1 Ors Vs Uzodinma & 1 Ors (2012) 12 (Pt.2) 472 at 483. I have carefully considered the said preliminary objection raised to what the respondent called "sub issues" raised by the appellant. The objection is found to be devoid of merit and cannot be sustained. It is accordingly disallowed and overruled. Now to the appeal on merit. The appellant in his amended brief of argument distilled the following sole issue for determination. "Whether in view of the evidence adduced at the trial Court, the Court of 4

21 Appeal was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the charge of culpable homicide punishable with death was proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by laws" (Grounds 1, 2 and 3). In arguing this sole issue learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that the burden of proving that any person has committed a crime or a wrongful act rests with the person who asserts it and that this is more often than not, the prosecution. He submitted that in discharging the burden, all the essential ingredients of the crime alleged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He relied on Section 135 (i) of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel contended that the burden never shifts, and that if on the whole of the evidence the Court is left in a state of doubt, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the onus of proof which the law lays upon it and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. He however conceded that the required proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to the hilt and thus not synonymous with proof beyond all iota of doubt. He submitted that if the evidence is so 5

22 strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, "of course it is possible, but not in the least probable," the case will be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He relied on Uzoka Vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt.1177) 118; Jua Vs State (2010) 4NWLR (Pt.1184;Ike Vs. State (2010) NWLR (P1.1186) 41; Garba Vs. State (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt.1266). He submitted further that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person rests throughout, on the prosecution. Learned counsel contended that there is a plethora of authorities and it is settled beyond controversy that in a charge of murder, which is the same as a charge of culpable homicide punishable with death pursuant to Section 221 of the Penal Code, the essential ingredients that must be proved by the prosecution in order to secure conviction are: (i) That the deceased died; (ii) That the death of the deceased resulted from the act of the accused, and (iii) That the accused caused the death of the deceased intentionally or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable 6

23 consequence. He relied on a number of cases including; The State Vs. Danjuma (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.506) 512; Sule Vs. State (2009) 19 NWLR (P1.1169) 33. He concluded that the prosecution must meet the above ingredients through credible evidence which may be direct or circumstantial. And that whether this evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel further contended that the above ingredients are expected to co-exist, but where one of them is either absent or tainted with some doubt then the charge is said not to have been proved. He relied on Obudu Vs. The State (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 198) 4333; Ogba Vs. State (1992) NWLR (Pt.222) 164. Learned counsel referred to Section 221 (b) of the Penal Code pursuant to which the appellant was charged. He referred to the testimony of PW1-PW6 and contended that the prosecution cannot be safely said to have proved the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that there are glaring contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the 7

24 prosecution which has, to a large extent, cast reasonable doubt upon the guilt of the appellant who ought to have been given the benefit of the doubt. He submitted further that the sum total of the evidence led by the prosecution merely showed that the appellant probably committed the offence, thus the requisite standard of proof was not attained to justify his conviction and sentence. Learned counsel conceded that on the strength of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, there was no dispute that Safiya Nomau is dead. He therefore submitted that the first ingredient of the offence was proved. However, on the second ingredient of the offence, that is, whether it was the appellant that caused the death of the deceased, learned counsel submitted that while the testimony of PW2 and PW4 were contradictory in nature, the testimonies of PW3 and PW5 did not link the appellant to the commission of the offence. Learned counsel contended that the two star witnesses for the prosecution; PW2 and PW4, Garba Adamu and Hardo sule respectively contradicted themselves materially in describing the involvement of the appellant in the alleged crime. He 8

25 referred to the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses - (PW2 and PW4). He also referred to the testimony of PW3 under both Examination in-chief and Cross examination and submitted that with regard to the materiality of the contradiction in the testimonies of PW2 and PW4 which touches and concerns the identity of the appellant and his presence at the scene of the crime in one hand and the failure of the trial Judge to make any findings in his judgment, this is a case that should warrant the intervention of this Court in setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant as affirmed by the Court below. Still on the testimonies of PW2 and PW4, learned counsel contended that their testimonies must be considered with extreme caution. According to him, the vital issue is whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies as a whole were sufficient to cast doubt on the general story that the appellant took part in the killing of the deceased. He contended that conversely, it is the appellant that must be believed that he did not kill the deceased. He submitted that where there are such contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence before a 9

26 criminal Court, such as to cast reasonable doubt upon the guilt of the accused person, such accused person should be given the benefit of the doubt and should not be convicted on the basis of such unreliable evidence. He relied on Onubogu V. State (1974) 9 SC1. He submitted further that if the learned trial Judge had considered the contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses with relevant laws, the trial Court would have entertained doubt as to whether death of the deceased was caused by the act of the appellant and would have resolved the doubt in favour of the appellant. Learned counsel referred to the testimony of PW5 on who investigated the case. He conceded that even though there is no obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses and that what matters really is not the number of witnesses called but rather the quality of the evidence from the witnesses called. He contended that the prosecution failed to call one Sergeant Sani who was said to have investigated the case. Also not called was the husband of the deceased - Nomau Tela. Learned counsel contended that failure of the prosecution to call both the police officer 10

27 - Sergeant Sani who was alleged to have investigated the case and the deceased's husband was fatal to the prosecution's case. He further contended that the failure of the prosecution to tender the extra-judicial statement of the appellant was also fatal to its case. He referred to the testimony of PW1- Ezekiel Sale on the statement obtained from the 1st accused person after the case was transferred from Babura to their office on 16/6/96. Learned counsel urged the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the appellant and allow the appeal. He further urged the Court to set aside the judgment of the Court below which had earlier affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial Court. And in its place order the discharge and acquittal of the appellant. In responding to the appellant's argument of the appeal, learned counsel for the respondent referred to his brief of argument filed on 02/07/2013 but deemed properly filed and served on 28/9/2017, the day this appeal was argued. The respondent adopted the sole issue distilled by the appellant and predicated his argument on same. Learned counsel conceded that the burden of 11

28 proving the commission of an offence is squarely saddled on the prosecution by virtue of Section 138 (2) of the 1990 Evidence Act, (now Section 135 (2) of the 2011 Evidence Act). He contended that by the above provisions of the Evidence Act, the law requires that the proof of any criminal allegation must be proof beyond reasonable doubt. He relied on Moses Vs. State (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt.992) 458 at 482. He submitted that in the instant case, the prosecution had proved the ingredients of culpable homicide punishable with death against the appellant and his co-convicts, beyond reasonable doubt. He also gave the three ingredients the prosecution is required to establish to prove its charge of culpable homicide punishable with death. Learned counsel referred to the concession given by the appellant on the first ingredient of the fact that the deceased had died and therefore did not require any proof again, as there was no dispute on it. Learned counsel referred to the sub issues raised by the appellant on alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; alleged inconsistency; failure to call particular witnesses by the prosecution; 12

29 failure to tender extra judicial statement of the appellant by the prosecution at the trial and failure to subject Exhibit 2 (a hoe) to forensic analysis. He submitted that there was no contradiction whatsoever in the testimonies of PW2 and PW4. He reproduced the alleged testimonies of the said prosecution witnesses. He contended that from the testimonies of the said witnesses there was no contradictions. Learned counsel contended that before it can be said that two witnesses contradict each other on a piece of evidence, it must be shown that they were together and they perceived the fact in issue from the same angle. He relied on Esangbedo Vs. State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57 at 58. He contended further that both PW2 and PW4 did not observe the particular fact in issue from the same circumstance and or at the same time. He submitted that there was no contradiction in the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses to warrant the setting aside of the judgment of the Court below which affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial Court. Learned counsel referred to the submission of the learned appellant's counsel on the failure 13

30 of the prosecution to call on one Sgt Sani and the deceased husband as witnesses, he contended that the onus placed on the prosecution by the law can be discharged with a single witness, if through the said witness all the ingredients of the offence could be established. He submitted that the prosecution is not under any duty to call a particular witness, in so far as it can prove its case beyond reasonable doubt through some other witness or witnesses. He relied on ljiofor Vs. State (2001) 3 MJSC 61 at He urged the Court to discountenance the argument of the appellant's counsel with regard to the failure of the prosecution to call one Sergeant Sani and Nomau Tela. He submitted that the five witnesses called by the prosecution proved the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death against the appellant. Learned counsel referred to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on failure of the prosecution to tender the extra judicial statement of the appellant, relying on Section 167 (d), formerly Section 149 (d) of the Evidence Act, He referred to the four conditions that must be satisfied before the presumption under that 14

31 law could be achieved or arrived at. He relied on Tewogbade Vs. Akande (1958) NMLR 404. Learned Counsel contended that there is no evidence which shows that the appellant gave his statement to the Police. Nothing on record to show that the appellant in particular made statement other than in the words of PW1 who stated as follows: "l did the same with all accused persons" He contended further that the above statement of the police is vague, to say the least, and no Court of law will rely on it as evidence showing that there is an extra judicial statement of the appellant in existence somewhere. Learned counsel contended that assuming but without conceding that the Court will consider the above vague statement of the Police to conclude that there is in existence a confessional statement made by the appellant, then he asked, "how could, not producing the confessional statement of the appellant be unfavourable to the prosecution?" He relied on Ebeinwe Vs The State (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 402 on relying on Section 149 (d) of the Evidence Act, He submitted that the particular provision of the Evidence Act is not applicable to this 15

32 case, as failure to produce the statement, if at all there was one in existence, did not affect the case of the prosecution in any material form. He urged the Court to hold that the prosecution succeeded in proving the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He urged the Court to resolve the sole issue formulated for determination of the appeal against the appellant but in favour of the respondent, and dismiss the appeal and accordingly affirm the decision of the Court below which had earlier affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial Court for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death. As I stated earlier, the appeal was predicated on a Notice of Appeal duly amended and filed on 8/7/2015 but deemed properly filed and served on 15/6/2015. The appellant had raised in the said amended Notice of appeal eight (8) grounds of appeal. But in his amended brief of argument, he formulated a sole issue for the determination of the appeal from only three Grounds of appeal viz: grounds 1,2, and 3 of the amended notice of appeal. It is trite that by the rules of practice 16

33 and procedure, in particular, of the appellate Courts, appeals are to be determined on the issues distilled from the competent grounds of appeal raised against the judgment being appealed. Therefore, any ground of appeal from which no issue has been formulated is deemed to have been abandoned and is liable to be discountenanced and struck out by the Court. Indeed, any such ground is lifeless and may not need a specific order to have it stuck out yet should still be struck out. See; Emespo J Continental Ltd Vs. Corona Shifah - Rtsgesellschaft & Ors (2006) 11 NWLR (pt.991) 365: (2006) 8-9 SCM 149; (2006) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 19; (2006) 26 NSC QR 1144; Bisiriyu Akinlagun & Ors Vs. Taiwo Oshoboja & Anor (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.993); (2006) 7 SCM 49, (2006) 5 SC (Pt.11) 105; Maobison Inter Link Ass Ltd vs UTC (Nig) Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 197; (2013) 72 SCM 112; (2013) 3-4 Sc (Pt.1) 109; (2013) 4 SCNJ 137. In this appeal, no issue has been formulated from grounds 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 of the Amended Notice of Appeal. Meaning that those grounds are deemed abandoned. Accordingly, the said grounds 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 are struck out. Now to the sole issue distilled 17

34 for the determination of the appeal. It reads thus: "Whether in view of the evidence adduced at the trial Court, the Court of Appeal was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the charge of culpable homicide punishable with death was proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by laws" As shown earlier, the appellant along with two others were charged with, tried, convicted and sentenced for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death, pursuant to Section 221 (b) of the Penal Code. The said law provides as follows: S.221 "Except in the circumstances mentioned in Section 222, culpable homicide punishable with death shall be punishable with death... (b) If the doer of the act knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable not only a likely consequence of the act or of any bodily injury which the act was intended to cause." Generally, homicide means the killing of one person by another. In other words, it is the act of purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or 18

35 negligently causing the death of another human being. However, culpable homicide means a wrongful act that results in a person's death but does not amount to murder. See, Umaru Adamu Vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (pt.1415) 441; (2014) 8 SCM 1; (2014) 4 & 5 SC 1; (2014) All FWLR (Pt.733) It is settled law that to succeed in a charge of culpable homicide the prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients of the offence: (a)that the death of a human being has actually taken place; (b) That the death has been caused by the accused; (c) That the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death or that the accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act. See; Tunde Adava & Anor Vs. The State (2006) 9 NWLR (pt.984) 152; (2006) 3 SCM 1, (2006) 2 SC (pt.11.) 136; Maikudi Aliyu vs. The State (2013) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 195. It must however be noted that all the above three ingredients of the offence must necessarily co-exist and none must be lacking. Where one is missing or not established, it means that the prosecution has simply failed to discharge the burden of proof that the law 19

36 places on it in order to succeed with the charge. In this appeal, the appellant has conceded that there is no dispute that there is clear evidence that the prosecution indeed established that the death of a human being, that is; one Safiya Nomau had occurred or taken place. What is actually being contested is the involvement of the appellant in the death of the deceased and whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause death or that he knew that death would be the probable consequence of his alleged act. In order to establish the other two ingredients, the prosecution called five (5) witnesses consisting of three (3) civilians and two (2) policemen. PW1 - one Ezekiel Saleh PC. No of State Criminal Investigation Department, Dutse and PW5 - Sergeant Adamu Ibraim of Babura, in Jigawa State. The two policemen testified before the trial Judge as to what each of them saw and did in their respective official capacity. While the three civilians, PW2, PW3 and PW4 also testified on what each of them saw and did on the matter. PW2 was one Abdullahi Dabo. He was a farmer and cattle rearer. 20

37 He lived at Kagadawa. He testified, inter alia, as follows: "On 1st of June, 1996 I was at home Kagadawa on Saturday. I know Alhaji Galadima, the father to the accused persons and Safiya Nomau, the deceased, were having civil case before an Area Court at Babura and Ringim. The land in dispute was neither given to Galadima nor to the deceased, Safiya. On Friday night the deceased reported to her Ward head that since she was not given the land, she would go and erect a hut on the land in dispute. She also notified the village head of her intention. The Galadima family also planned that if they see the deceased on the land in dispute, they would kill her. I was near the farm in dispute when I saw Safiya the deceased on her way to the farm. On reaching (to) the farm I also saw Haru (Appellant) then I saw Sambo and Shabe Hassan - (1st & 3rd Accused). They killed the woman with sticks and a hoe, they cut her on the head. I then ran away to the village head of Magarya and reported to him. Haru (the appellant) beat the deceased first two times with a stick; Sambo also used the stick in the beating. I saw Hassan come with a spear but I was frightened, 21

38 I therefore ran away to report the incidence (sic). The husband of the deceased, named Nomau was also chased and beaten to unconsciousness. He was together with his wife, that when he saw her dead he tried to run away. The village head, the District Head and one Dabo came to the scene of the crime. When the accused persons were asked by the village Head, they said they have killed or committed the offence. The deceased and her husband Nomau were conveyed to Babura general hospital. Nomau was admitted for 21 days and Safiya, the deceased was buried at the farm in dispute." (Brackets supplied) Under cross examination, the witness maintained that the appellant beat the deceased both on her shoulders and on the head. PW4 was one Hardo Saleh. He testified, inter alia, under examination-in-chief as follows: "I know the accused persons. We live in the same village. They are my subjects. The deceased on Saturday the 1st of June, 1996 came to me and asked me to assist her erect a hut on her land. I was on my way to the farm to assist her as she requested. Before I reach the farm, I saw the accused except Haru (the appellant) going towards the 22

39 place where the deceased woman wanted to erect a hut. I then heard them saying kill her, kill her. I therefore retreated backward and watched. When they started beating the woman I hid myself, I heard someone, her neighbor saying shame, shame on yourselves all of you beating a woman or killing a woman... They went away and some people and I carried the deceased under the three... The deceased was taken to Babura and brought back for burial. We buried her" Under cross examination by the defence counsel, the witness confirmed his testimony in chief, but went further, in responding to questions, that the deceased never quarreled with the accused persons when the land civil suit was going on. And that the village head gave the deceased permission to erect the hut on the said land in dispute. Upon consideration of the entire testimony of the prosecution and the defence, the trial Judge was satisfied that the prosecution discharged the burden to establish the other two ingredients of the offence charged. In his considered judgment that went on appeal to the Court below, the Judge found on record, inter alia, that the evidence before the 23

40 Court revealed or showed that the three accused persons were at the scene of the crime and that there was a fight which resulted in the death of the deceased. The trial Judge also found that there was no doubt that the fight or the attack on the woman was intended. He further opined as follows: "In my view in this case, the accused persons had the intention to cause death or to cause such injury that would result in death. It is hardly incredible that blows struck by 3 able bodied men of the stature of the accused persons in this case, with sticks and hoe on a woman (the deceased) could not cause her death or cause bodily injuries... From the totality of the evidence before the Court, I must say that I have no doubt in my mind that the accused persons did know that death would be the probable consequence of their acts. This is because, both PW2 and PW4 saw them attacked the deceased and exhibit 2 was found at the scene of the crime." The trial Court opined that he believed the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses but was not in the least impressed by the defence as witnesses. The Court finally held that the prosecution had proved its 24

41 case beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons had the intention to cause death of the deceased or that they know or have reasons to know that death would be the probable and not a likely consequences of their acts. They were found guilty, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Upon an appeal to the Court below, the Court found that there is strong evidence of two persons on record, who testified to what they witnessed when the deceased was killed, the weapons used, being sticks and a hoe, and how she was killed. PW2 was recorded under cross examination on page 14 of the record as saying: "Haru (the Apellant) beat the deceased on the shoulder and the head... Then Shabe (3rd accused) went with a hoe (Magirbi) and cut her on the head... Sambo (1st Accused) beat the deceased on the head with a stick" PW3 (Village Head) who was invited to the scene testified, inter alia, as follows: "I found the deceased... dead covered with Sana mat. There were cuts on both husband and wife's bodies. There was a cut on her head, there were many on the shoulders and her back." The Court below rightly found that the testimonies of all 25

42 the Prosecution witnesses showed that the deceased died on the spot after the attack, while her husband was injured and beaten to unconsciousness. All the issues raised in the appeal were resolved against the appellants and the appeal was found and adjudged to be liable to dismissal and was accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the appellants by the trial Court was affirmed by the Court below. That decision of the Court below led to the instant appeal by the appellant who raised the sole issue earlier alluded to as - whether in view of the evidence adduced at the trial Court, the Court of Appeal was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the charge of culpable homicide punishable with death was proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by laws. There is no doubt that the ingredients the law requires the prosecution to establish in order to prove an offence of murder is similar to that of a charge of culpable homicide punishable with death under the Penal Code. These ingredients are: (i) The death of the deceased; (ii) That the death resulted from the act of the accused; and 26

43 (iii) That the accused knew that his act in question will result in the death or did not care whether the death of the deceased will result from his act. See; The State Vs. Musa Danjuma (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.506) 512; Durwode Vs. The State (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt.691) 467 at ; Ogbu & Anor Vs The State (2007) 4 SCM 169; Umaru Adamu Vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt.1416) 441; (2014) 8 SCM 1; (2014)4 & 5 SC 1. There is no doubt and it is beyond any argument that all the required ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death must co-exist and be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. See; Ubani vs. The State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851); Uguru Vs. The State (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90. However, the required proof beyond reasonable doubt which the prosecution is expected to show does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and the evidence adduced by the prosecution is strong enough against a man, as to leave only a remote probability in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence; "of course it is possible but not in the least probable," then the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See; Jimoh 27