RENDERED: October 17, 1997; 2:00 p.m. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED NO. 97-CA-0560-MR

Transcription

1 RENDERED: October 17, 1997; 2:00 p.m. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED NO. 97-CA-0560-MR HUBERT L. SMITH APPELLANT APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE ACTION NO. 96-CI-0393 JACK LEWIS, WALT CHAPLEAU, JAMES STEPHENS, KATHY BINGHAM, BRIAN SEWELL, and LANCE ORTHAL APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING * * * * * * * * * * * * BEFORE: GUDGEL, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, JUDGES. KNOPF, JUDGE. Hubert L. Smith, acting pro se, appeals a February 3, 1997, order of the Oldham Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the appellees, effectively dismissing appellant's civil action for breach of contract. We affirm. In 1990, Smith was an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR) at LaGrange, Kentucky. He was serving a life sentence for murder and twenty (20) years for rape. In January 1990, Smith enrolled in a correspondence course to receive training in computer technology. After completing the initial course in July 1993, Smith requested authorization to participate in an advanced correspondence course in computer programming. As

2 a part of the course, the appellant also sought the required permission to use a computer that he built, along with various software programs and educational materials. In his request dated July 14, 1993, Smith indicated that he needed the education to obtain employment when released from prison and that he was physically disabled. The request was approved by Walt Chapleau, the KSR warden, Jim Stephens, the deputy warden for operations, and Margaret Moore, the corrections school administrator. In August 1995, Smith was reclassified and transferred to the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (EKCC) in West Liberty, Kentucky. On August 8, 1995, Smith internally appealed his reclassification, but the appeal was rejected. Due to the transfer, Smith was unable to continue and complete his advanced vocational training correspondence course. On August 9, 1996, Smith filed a civil complaint against Jack Lewis, commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, Walt Chapleau, James Stephens, and several members of the classification committee who recommended Smith's transfer to EKCC. He alleged the appellees breached an implied contract by transferring him from KSR to EKCC. Smith maintained that the approval for the correspondence course created an implied contractual agreement that led him to believe he would be permitted to complete the computer vocational training program. Smith alleged that he was damaged because his Social Security disability benefits were terminated because of his inability to continue the vocational training and he effectively lost the -2-

3 amount of the tuition and the related costs of the course. Smith sought punitive and compensatory damages of $500,000.00, and a jury trial. After conducting pretrial discovery consisting of request for admissions, interrogatories, and request for production of documents, Smith moved for summary judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56. Appellees also filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 3, 1997, the circuit court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied Smith's motion. The circuit court held that there was no contract between the parties. It also held that the appellant had no liberty interest in remaining at KSR. This appeal followed. Smith contends a contract was created to allow him to complete his vocational training by approval of the prison authorities to his request to participate in the computer correspondence course. On the second page of the July 1993 request memorandum entitled "Correspondence Course Agreement," Smith agreed to three (3) stated guidelines: 1) the course would be controlled by a designated vocational school instructor; 2) all materials and equipment would be removed if appellant abused "the privilege of being allowed to receive this course"; and 3) no materials or equipment would be removed from vocational school premises, except for written materials. The warden and other relevant prison officials signed the two-page request memorandum approving the request to take the advanced computer -3-

4 correspondence course. Smith argues that by signing this alleged "agreement," the prison officials entered into an implied contract. He also alleges that the appellees knew he needed to be enrolled in a certified vocational training program in order to continue receiving Social Security disability benefits. In effect, he argues that appellees breached the contract by preventing him from completing the correspondence course through the transfer to EKCC, where he was not allowed to complete the course. As an initial matter, the standard by which we review a dismissal based on summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Palmer v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1994); CR A party is not entitled to summary judgment unless it is shown with clarity that there is no room for controversy, and it appears impossible for the other party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (1991); Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992). In addition, the record must be considered by the circuit court in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480; Palmer, 882 S.W.2d at 120. The operative facts in this case are not in controversy, and only legal issues remain. -4-

5 The gravamen of Smith's complaint rests on the existence of an implied contract. There are two (2) types of implied contracts: 1) implied in fact and 2) implied by law. The characteristics of these types of contracts were described in Perkins v. Daugherty, Ky. App., 722 S.W.2d 907 (1987), as follows: A contract implied in fact is a true contract, shown by evidence of facts and circumstances from which a meeting of minds concerning the mutual promises may be reasonably deduced. Thompson v. Hunter's Ex'r, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 266 (1954). A contract implied by law allows for recovery quantum meruit for another's unjust enrichment. It is not based upon a contract but a legal fiction invented to permit recovery where the law of natural justice says there should be a recovery as if promises were made. The courts supply the fiction of the promise to permit the recovery. Furthermore, recovery quantum meruit may be had irrespective of the intentions of the parties, and sometimes even in violation of them. Fayette Tobacco Warehouse Company v. Lexington Tobacco Board of Trade, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 640 (1957); Kellum v. Browning's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459 (1929). Id. at 908; SEG Employees Credit Union v. Scott, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 402, 405 (1977). In the case sub judice, Smith has failed to demonstrate the factual elements for creation of an implied contract. This situation actually involves two (2) separate aspects -- completion of the correspondence course and Smith's transfer to another prison. A contract implied in fact differs from an express contract only in the mode of proof required in that it is inferred from the circumstances, the conduct, the acts and relations of the parties. Victor's Ex'r v. Monson, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 175, (1955); King v. Ohio Valley Terminix Co., 309 Ky. 35, 214 S.W.2d 993, 996 (1948). To establish a contract implied in fact, the evidence must disclose an actual agreement -5-

6 or meeting of the minds although not specifically expressed, which is implied or presumed from the acts or circumstances, which according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, shows a mutual intent to contract. Rider v. Combs, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 749, 749 (1953). Prison officials have discretion in the management of prisons and the placement of prisoners. See, e.g., KRS An inmate has no constitutional right to a specific educational or vocational program in prison or in not being transferred to another institution where the programs are less comprehensive. See, Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150, 163 S. Ct. 796, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1983); Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989) (involving classification and work release); Termunde v. Cook, 684 F. Supp. 255, 259 (D. Utah 1988); Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372, 377 (E.D. Ky. 1995). In fact, it is well settled that an inmate has no constitutional right to rehabilitation. See, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981); Archer, 877 F. Supp. at 377; Buffington v. O'Leary, 748 F. Supp. 633, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Similarly, an inmate has no constitutional right to be housed in a particular institution, and an inmate may be transferred for any reason, or no reason at all. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed.2d 451 (1976); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d

7 (6th Cir. 1986). In Mahoney v. Carter, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 575 (1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Kentucky Department of Corrections policies and procedures did not create a liberty interest giving an inmate a right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a particular prison facility. Smith has failed to present sufficient evidence to infer a contract between the parties involving completion of the correspondence course. As a prison inmate, Smith needed authorization to even enroll in a vocational program or correspondence course. The request documents represent the formal procedure for this initial authorization. The documents do not contain any reference to completion of the course. The relationship of the parties places extensive control and discretion in the prison authorities over Smith's activities. Smith has no inherent right to participate in a particular vocational program. Given the facts and circumstances, as well as the relationship of the parties, we cannot infer an intent by prison authorities to guarantee Smith that he could complete the correspondence course. Smith has not shown sufficient evidence of a meeting of the minds. Similarly, Smith has not demonstrated an implied contract in fact concerning his transfer to EKCC. The various prison institutions necessarily offer different vocational and rehabilitation programs. Smith's reclassification and prison transfer was based on the need to provide additional beds for new -7-

8 inmates who were to receive treatment in the Sex Offender Treatment Program, which was offered only at KSR. The prison official's approval of the correspondence course clearly cannot be considered to have restricted their discretion in transferring Smith to another prison institution. Moreover, the officials at KSR did not have authority to guarantee Smith could participate in the correspondence course at another prison facility. Again, the facts militate against recognizing any implied contract in fact that Smith would not be transferred, and thereby be unable to complete the correspondence course. The relationship of the parties and the circumstances of the approval suggest that no binding commitment was intended. In addition, Smith cannot prevail based on an impliedin-law contract. In order to establish a claim for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that a benefit was conferred upon the nonclaimant at his expense, the resulting appreciation of a benefit on the nonclaimant, and the inequitable retention of the benefit by the nonclaimant. Tractor and Farm Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp (W.D. Ky. 1995). The doctrine of unjust enrichment is based on equity designed to provide restitution to prevent one person from keeping benefits conferred by another. See Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ky. Supp., 769 S.W.2d 64, 67 (1989). Clearly, Smith conferred no benefit on appellees justifying restitution or the recognition of a contract based on quantum meruit. As a result, Smith has failed to establish a right to -8-

9 relief based on an implied contract, and appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Oldham Circuit Court. ALL CONCUR. -9-

10 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: No brief for appellees Hubert L. Smith, Pro Se West Liberty, KY -10-