Plaintiff, ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED. Defendants.

Transcription

1 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document 366 Filed 12/10/18 Page 1 of 1 PagelD: 9457 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY TAMMY MARIE HAAS, Individually and on behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals, Case No (NLH-JS) -against- Plaintiff, ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BURLINGTON COUNTY, et al, Defendants. PLAINTIFF, TAMMY HAAS'S, NOTICE OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at the Final Fairness Hearing scheduled for January 16, 2019 at 11:00 a.m., counsel for Plaintiff, Tammy Marie Haas, will move to have the Court enter the proposed order submitted herewith that will grant their motion seeking the payment of: (1) $450, to Plaintiffs' Counsel for the payment of their attorneys' fees and (2) $4, as reimbursement of expenses. PLEASE F URTHER NOTE that Plaintiff will rely upon the Memorandum of Law, Declarations of Counsel and other related materials in support of this motion. PLEASE FURTHER NOTE that Defendants do not oppose this motion. Respectfully Submitted, BUDD LARNER, P.C. Attorneys for plai IekT. y Marie aas Dated: December 10, BY: DAVID J. NO A

2 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 1 of 17 PagelD: 9460 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY TAMMY MARIE HAAS, Individually and on behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals, Case No (NLH-JS) -against- Plaintiff, BURLINGTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants. PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SEEKING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES Of Counsel and on the Brief David J. Novack, Esq.

3 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 2 of 17 PagelD: 9461 FACTUAL BACKGROUND TABLE OF CONTENTS ARGUMENT 3 CONCLUSION 14 Cases: AT&T Com. Secs. Litig., 455 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2006). 4,8 Boone v. City of Phila.,668 F. Supp. 2d 693 (ED. Pa. 2009) 13 Briggs v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., No. 07-CV-5190, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEIS 66777, at *55 n.98 (RD. pa. July 31, 2009) 12 Careccio v. BMW of N. Am. LLC,Case No , 2010, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42063, at *22 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2010) 13 Charles v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,976 F.Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 1997) 5 Dewy v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,681 F.3d 170 (2012) 5 Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F.Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) 5 Gunter v. Redgewood Energy Corp.,223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) 5,8,10,12 Henderson v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46291, at *40-41 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2013) 3,5 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) 6 Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,148 F. 3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) 5 Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No , 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3270, at *89-90 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2010) 12 In re Cendant Corp. PREISDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001) 3,8 In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241 (2009) 8,11,12,13

4 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 3 of 17 PagelD: 9462 In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.,2004 WL at *48 (E.D. PA. June 2, 2004) In re Merck & Co. Vytorin ERISA Litig.,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *45 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) 7 In re Philips/Magnavoz TV Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67287, at *42 (D.N.J. May 14, 2012) 3 In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.,396 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) 8 In re Safety Components Sec. Litig., 166 E Supp. 2d 72, 96 (D.N.J. 2001) 9 McCoy v. Health Net, Inc.,569 F. Supp 2d 448 (D.N.J. 2008) 9 McGee v. Conn Tire N. Am., Inc.,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17199, at *50 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2009) 7 Milliron v. T-Mobile United States,423 Fed. Appx. 131, (3d Cir. 2011) 5 O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC 214 ER.D. 266 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 11 Philips/Magnavox TV Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67287, at *44 5 Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jeraey v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 297 F.3d 253, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) 6 Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) 4 Schering Plough/Merck Merger Litig.,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121, at *47 *52-54 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010) 6,7,13 Stalcup v. Schlage Lock Co., 505 F. Sup-. 2d 704 (D. Colo. 2007) 10 Welch & Forbes, Inc. Cendant Corp. 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001) 5 Federal Rules: Fed. R. Civ. P.23(h) 3 Rules: R.4:32-2(h) 3 R.4:

5 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 4 of 17 PagelD: 9463 FACTUAL BACKGROUND The putative class action complaint naming Tammy Haas as the putative class representative was filed on February 26, 2008 alleging that in July of 2006, Tammy Marie Haas had been subjected to an illegal strip search at the Burlington County Correctional Facility. At the time, Ms. Haas was represented by William Riback. The case lingered for nine years without any real progress. Written discovery was served four years after the complaint was filed. Four discovery depositions of defendants were taken. Motions for summary judgment were filed, withdrawn and filed again. In June, 2016, Ms. Haas discharged Mr. Riback as her attorney. Although Carl Poplar frequently characterized himself as counsel to Ms. Haas, he did not have a retainer agreement with her. She had never met him. Ms. Haas sought and retained Susan Chana Lask, Esq., to represent her because of Ms. Lask's experience and her successful handling of Florence v. Burlington County, the strip search case where her work led to this court's holding that Burlington was conducting unlawful strip searches. Ms. Lask, a New York attorney, initially worked with Jamie Goldman, Esq. on the matter. She subsequently reached out to David Novack, a shareholder at Budd Lamer P.C. to act as co-counsel in this class action. Prior to Lask and Novack (also referred to herein as "Counsel") entering the case, the matter had been in mediation for almost two years. There were only two sessions before John L. Hughes, U.S.M.J. reed., but there had been no offer of settlement. To move this case toward settlement, Lask and Novack urged U.S.M.J. Schneider to undertake the settlement discussions, over the objection of counsel for Burlington County and the reluctant agreement of counsel for Conrad Szczpaniak. After numerous conferences with the Magistrate Schneider, both in person and by telephone, a tentative settlement of the class action

6 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 5 of 17 PagelD: 9464 was reached. One term of the settlement agreement was that $900, would be allocated to counsel fees and $25, would be allocated to reimbursable expenses. After a settlement term sheet was negotiated, the parties engaged in further negotiations to create a memorandum of understanding and, ultimately, a binding settlement agreement. Thereafter, counsel for Haas and Szczpaniak jointly prepared a motion with supporting documents seeking, inter alia, class certification, preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, appointment of class representatives and appointment of class counsel and appointment of the class administrator. The court resolved this motion by order dated April 20, The class was certified, the settlement was granted preliminary approval, Ms. Haas was appointed as co-class representative and Mr. Novack was appointed as co-class counsel with the direction of the court to use Ms. Lask's experience as a consultant. Although Haas's Counsel worked to move this matter to a swift and fair settlement for the benefit of the class, they were met by opposition from Szczpaniak's counsel at every turn. One contentious aspect of this motion was the appointment of the class administrator. Ms. Haas's attorneys had identified Strategic Claims Services ("SCS") as a local administrator who presented a bid that was within the stipulated expense fund of $300, Counsel for Mr. Szczpaniak advocated the retention of A.B. Data, a national class administration company. The court ordered the retention of Strategic Claims Services. Thereafter, counsel worked with SCS to administer the class, file and serve notices to class members and to monitor the progress of class administration. SCS has filed a declaration in support of the final approval of the class settlement. Finally, counsel has worked on the motion for final approval of the class settlement. This motion is returnable before the court on January 16,

7 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 6 of 17 PagelD: 9465 As of this writing, additional work on the formal class list remains to be completed. There are approximately 490 putative class members whom the defendants dispute fall within the class definition. There are also approximately 70 individuals who claim to be class members but who have never been identified by Burlington County. By this motion, counsel for Ms. Haas seek a counsel fee award of $450,000.00, which is half of the stipulated counsel fee in the settlement agreement of $900, Counsel also seek an award of $4, in reimbursable expenses. This fund is separate and apart from any award to the class. Granting this counsel fee will not reduce the award to the class in any way. The defendants have consented to the $900, counsel fee award as well as the $25, award of reimbursable expenses. ARGUMENT Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in a class action settlement, "the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). "The awarding of fees is within the discretion of the Court, so long as the Court employs the proper legal standards, follows the proper procedures, and makes findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous." In re Philips/ Magnavox TV Lag., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67287, at *42 (D.N.J. May 14, 2012) (citing In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001). In the class action settlement context, the Court is "required to clearly articulate the reasons that support its fee determination." Henderson v. Volvo Cars of N Am., LLC U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46291, at *40-41 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2013) (citations omitted). The Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey are in accord with this procedure. R. 4:32-2(h) permits the award of fees to class counsel. An application under this rule should comply with R. 4:42-9. The law with regard to counsel fees in the State of New Jersey is 3

8 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 7 of 17 PagelD: 9466 set forth in Rendine v. Panter, 141 N.J. 292, 316 (1995). While the court addresses the distinction between the calculation of "reasonable attorney's fees" under state and federal law, for purposes of this application, the standards are the same. In the final analysis, an attorney's fee must be reasonable under the standards set forth in the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct. R.P.C. 1.5(a). Pursuant to that rule and the settlement agreement, Ms. Haas's counsel now apply for a total fee award of $450, and a total reimbursable expense award of $ Burlington County has agreed not to oppose Class Counsels' attorneys' fees and costs request in the aggregate amount of up to $900, and $25,000.00, respectively. These requests are reasonable considering the work performed and the results achieved. The settlement agreement is the product of strenuous and efficient efforts by counsel through difficult phases of the negotiations. In addition, these fees, costs, and incentive awards will be paid separately from - and in addition to - the benefits made available to the Settlement Class. For the reasons that follow, these requests should be granted. A. The Fee Request Should be Evaluated Under the Lodestar Method. In class action settlements, "[a]ttorneys' fees are typically assessed through the percentage-of-recovery method or through the lodestar method." In re AT&T Corn. Secs. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006). In Rendine, the court stated that the lodestar, the number of hours multiplied by the hourly rate, should be established first. Rendine, supra at Under the lodestar method, the court "determines an attorney's lodestar by multiplying the number of hours he or she reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services given the geographical 4

9 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 8 of 17 PagelD: 9467 area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the lawyer." Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Coip., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). In undertaking this approach, the Court is "is not required to engage in this analysis with mathematical precision or 'bean counting' [and] may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys" without "scrutinize[ing] every billing record." Henderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46291, at * The lodestar method "has appeal where... the nature of the settlement evades the precise evaluation needed for the percentage of recovery method." Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 590 (D.N.J. 2010) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (2012). The percentage-of-recovery methodology, on the other hand, "is favored in common fund cases," and is calculated by applying "a certain percentage to the settlement fund." Milliron v. T-Mobile United Stales, 423 Fed. Appx (3d Cir. 2011). It is "designed to allow courts to award fees from the fund 'in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure." Welch & Forbes, Inc. v. Cendant Corp. (In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig.), 243 F.3d 722, 732 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions), 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998). Which one of these two methodologies to use "will rest within the district court's sound discretion." Charles v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 976 F. Supp. 321, 324 (D.N.J. 1997). While either methodology will confirm the reasonableness of the fee requested here, Ms. Haas's counsel respectfully submit that the Court should use the lodestar method in this case since the fee will be paid from a separate fund and not a common fund pursuant to the settlement agreement. See In re: Philips/Magnavox TV Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67287, at *44 (determining fees based on the lodestar method); Dewey, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 593 ("[I]f the 5

10 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 9 of 17 PagelD: 9468 settlement's value is certain, the Court can use the percentage-of-recovery method to calculate attorneys' fees, but if the value is too uncertain, then the Court must use the lodestar method.") See also In re ScheringPlough/Merck Merger Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121, at *47, *52-54 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010) (noting that the existence of complexities in valuing a settlement supports use of the lodestar method). B. Counsels' Lodestar Figure is Reasonable. The lodestar method involves two initial steps. The first step is to determine the appropriate hourly rate, based on the attorneys' usual billing rate and the "prevailing market rates" in the relevant community. See In re: ScheringPlough/Merck Merger Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121, at *54(citations omitted). The second step is to assess whether the billable time was reasonably expended. Id. "Time expended is considered 'reasonable' if the work performed was 'useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to secure the final result obtained from the litigation.' Id. at * The lodestar figure is "presumptively reasonable" where it arises from a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours. Planned Parenthood of cent. New Jersey v. Attorney General of the State of New.Jersey, 297 F.3d 253, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). In this matter, the fees for the class attorneys were negotiated between the parties as a separate aspect of the settlement agreement. This provides further support for approval of Counsel's request. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)("Ideally, of course, [class] litigants will settle the amount of a fee."). The final step in the lodestar analysis, discussed infra, is to determine whether to increase or decrease the lodestar amount by applying a lodestar multiple. In re Schering- 6

11 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 10 of 17 PagelD: 9469 Plough/Merck Merger Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121, at *55. Counsel for Ms. Haas are not seeking an enhancement of the lodestar amount. The five attorneys who worked on the matter on behalf of Ms. Haas and the class are: NAME HOURLY RATE Susan Chana Lask $ David J. Novack $ Terence W. Camp $ Sonya Longo $ Jamie Goldman $ The hourly rates of Ms. Haas's counsel that were used to calculate the lodestar values are entirely consistent with hourly rates routinely approved by this Court in complex class action litigation. See In re Merck & Co. Vytorin ERISA Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 12344, at *45 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) (approving rates between $250 and $835 per hour); McGee V. Conn Tire N. Am., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17199, at *50(D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2009) (approving hourly rates of $495 and $600); In re Schering-Plough/Merck Merger Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *57("an overall hourly lodestar non-weighted average ranging from $ to $ is not unreasonable in light of similar rates charged in the market and in light of the usual billing rates documented in counsel's declarations to the Court "). The time reported by counsel to date does not include any of the billable time for the work that will be performed by Ms. Haas's counsel after December 10, 2018, including argument of the motion for final approval and other relief and the future work that will be associated with claims and settlement administration. 7

12 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 11 of 17 PagelD: 9470 C. The Gunter Factors Confirm the Reasonableness of the Fee Request. In addition to determining the method of calculating the fee award, the court is obliged to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct in New Jersey, under R.P.C. 1.5(a). In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 283 (3d Cir. 2001). In Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., the Third Circuit provided a series of non-exhaustive factors for district courts to consider in this regard: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases. Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1.1. In addition to these factors, the Third Circuit has listed three other factors that may be relevant: "(1) the value of benefits accruing to class members attributable to the efforts of class counsel as opposed to the efforts of other groups, such as government agencies conducting investigations; (2) the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent fee agreement at the time counsel was retained; and (3) any 'innovative' terms of settlement." In re AT&T Corp. Secs. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2006). These factors "need not be applied in a formulaic way... and in certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest." In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241 (2009). The district courts are to engage in "robust assessments of the fee award reasonableness factors when evaluating a fee request." Id. (quoting In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2005). Each of the Gunter factors support the fee request here. 8

13 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 12 of 17 PagelD: The Site of the Fund Created and the Number of Persons Benefitted. The settlement agreement in this case makes available substantial relief to approximately 15,000 individuals who were strip searched by the defendants. While this number remains in some dispute, the defendants conceded that there were 10,000 individuals who were undisputed members of the class. All of the Settlement Class Members are entitled to a m aximum benefit of $ which is consistent with awards in similar cases. The settlement agreement guarantees this compensation by its terms. Based upon the current class participation, all class members will receive the maximum amount. 2. The Presence or Absence of Substantial Objections by Members of the Class. The deadline by which class members may object to the terms of the settlement agreement, including the request for attorneys' fees - was September 15,2018. There have not been any written objections submitted by class members to the counsel fee provision of the settlement agreement. 3. The Skill and Efficiency of the Attorneys Involved. The "single clearest factor reflecting the quality of class counsels' services to the class are the results obtained." In re Safety Components Sec. Litig., 166 E Supp. 2d 72,96 (D.N.J. 2001). Related factors include "'the quality of the result achieved, the difficulties faced, the speed and efficiency of the recovery, the standing, experience and expertise of the counsel, the skill and professionalism with which counsel prosecuted the case and the performance and quality of opposing counsel." McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 448, 476 (D.N.J. 2008) The goal of this Gunter factor is to ensure "that competent counsel continue to 9

14 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 13 of 17 PagelD: 9472 undertake risky, complex and novel litigation" for the benefit of large numbers of class members who might otherwise lack reasonable access tojustice." Gunter, supra at 198. The result obtained in this case is, in large measure, due to the efforts which Ms. Haas's counsel expended with respect to procuring a settlement for the benefit of the class. Ms. Haas's Counsel achieved significant benefits for the Settlement Class Members, which is a testament to the abilities of her counsel. For instance, w here Mr. Sczcpaniak's counsel participated in two years of mediation without securing a settlement offer, Ms. Haas's counsel entered this case with a strategy to settle and achieved a settlement over the course of several months of intense negotiations. Another example is Ms. Lask successfully kept Ms. Haas in the case when her former counsel who also represented Szczpaniak filed motions to remove Haas from this case to the detriment of a significant portion of the class members whom Ms. Haas represents. They are now part of the settlement due to the efforts of Haas's counsel. 4. The Complexity and Duration of the Litigation. Although not particularly complex when compared to other class actions, this class action litigation lasted almost eleven years. Several courts have recognized that "any class action presents complex and difficult legal and logistical issues which require substantial expertise and resources." Stalcup v. Schlage Lock Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (D. Colo. 2007). See also, McCoy, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 477. The amount of compensation sought by the Class Counsel is reasonable when assessed in light of these factors. 10

15 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 14 of 17 PagelD: The Risk of Nonpayment. Ms. Haas's counsel brought this litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. Without a successful settlement, there would have been no counsel fee paid. The risk of non-recovery was sufficiently substantial to justify the instant fee request. See O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC, 214 ER.D. 266, 309 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Any contingency fee includes a risk of non- payment. That is why class counsel will be paid a percentage that is several times greater than an hourly fee in this case."). Indeed, in In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., this Court observed that "Courts recognize the risk of non-payment as a major factor in considering an award of attorney fees." No (CCC) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46496, at *135(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (citations omitted). In this case, Burlington County moved for summary judgment which motion was denied. Had the matter proceeded to trial, even if plaintiffs were successful, Burlington County would have had a right to appeal which, if granted, might have eliminated any possible recovery and any possible legal fee. 6. The Amount of Time Devoted to the Case by Class Counsel. In terms of the sheer amount of genuine labor involved on the part of the Plaintiffs, there were over 1,900 hours of contingent work performed by Ms. Haas's Counsel in litigating this matter. These hours equate to over $990,000 in fees. This work involved coming up to speed on 8 years of litigation, participating in motion practice, engaging in settlement negotiations with the court and counsel for Burlington County, negotiating the settlement agreement, preparing the motion for class certification, preliminary approval of the settlement and appointment of class representatives and class counsel, working with the class administrator and 1 1

16 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 15 of 17 PagelD: 9474 finally, preparing the motion for final approval.. The time and effort devoted by Ms. Haas's counsel to this matter more than adequately supports her counsel's request for attorneys' fees and reimbursable expenses. 7. The Awards in Similar Cases. A review of similar cases demonstrates that the fee request here is reasonable and appropriate. Numerous strip search class actions have been settled in New Jersey. Counsel fees have generally been in the range of the fees allowed by the Settlement Agreement in this matter. Accordingly, this and the other Gunter factors strongly support granting the requested fee. D. The Requested Fees Are Reasonable Under a Cross-Check. The Third Circuit has recommended that district courts perform a "crosscheck" of a fee award. Briggs v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group. Inc.. No. 07-CV- 5190, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66777, at *55, n.98 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2009). See also, In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig WL at *48(E.D. PA. June 2, 2004) ("While the Court adopts the percentage of recovery method, the Court will also subject petitioners' proposed fee to a cross-check using the lodestar method"). The purpose of doing a lodestar cross-check is "to insure that plaintiffs' lawyers are not receiving an excessive fee at their clients' expense." Gunter. 223 F.3d at 199. Under the "cross-check" method, the Court multiplies the hourly rates by the applicable hours to calculate the lodestar amount. The lodestar multiplier is then obtained by dividing the proposed fee award by the lodestar amount. In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig F.3d at 280. See also, Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3270, at *89-.90(D.N.J. Jan. 15,2010) ("The lodestar multiplier is calculated by dividing the attorneys' fees that Class Counsel seeks by Class Counsel's associated lodestar."). 12

17 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 16 of 17 PagelD: 9475 In this case, the lodestar "cross-check" confirms the reasonableness of the fee sought. M s. Haas's counsel are reporting their lodestar using a method by which hours expended by each attorney are multiplied by the attorney's hourly rate. Based on these figures, the requested fee amount o f $ 450, is 45% of Plaintiffs' counsel's actual lodestar of $992, Courts routinely find in class action cases that a multiplier of one to four of counsel's lodestar is fair and reasonable. See Boone v. City of Phila., 668 F. Supp. 2d 693,714 (E.D. Pa, 2009). In this case, the multiplier is less than I. E. The Reimbursable Expenses of Ms. Haas's Counsel Should be Approved. There is little question that "[c]ounsel for a class action is entitled to reimbursement of expenses that were adequately documented and reasonably and appropriately incurred in the prosecution of the class action." Careccio v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, Case No , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42063, at *22(D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2010) in accord, In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46496, at * (recognizing the same principle, and approving an expense request of $394,192.76). In this case, Ms. Haas's counsel have incurred $4, in properly documented expenses for the common benefit of Class Members. The requested expenses will be paid from the total $25, which is a separate fund under the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs' counsel advanced these necessary out-ofpocket costs without assurance that they would ever be repaid. The court should find that the requested amount is reasonable and that it should be approved. See, e.g., In re Schering- PloughlMerck Merger Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121, at *58(approving expenses that were "adequately documented and reasonably and appropriately incurred in the prosecution of the case."). 13

18 Case 1:08-cv NLH-JS Document Filed 12/10/18 Page 17 of 17 PagelD: 9476 CONCLUSION It is respectfully requested, for the reasons set forth above, that attorney's fees in the amount of $450, and reimbursable expenses in the amount of $4, be granted to counsel for Tammy Haas. BUDD LARNER, P.C. Attorneys or Plaintiff Tam arie Haas Dated: December 10, BY: DAVID J. NOVA 14