COMELEC used FAKE digital signatures in the automated elections

Transcription

1 COMELEC used FAKE digital signatures in the automated elections Statement of the Law The public office of Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a public trust Constitution, Article XI Accountability of Public Officers, Section 1. The constitutional provisions mandating the COMELEC to protect the sanctity of the ballot in implementing the election laws, read as follows: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot (emphasis supplied) 1987 Constitution, Article V Suffrage, Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall Constitution, Article IX Constitutional Commissions, C. The Commission on Elections, Section 2(2). Implementing the constitutional provision to protect the sanctity of the ballot, Congress enacted the Automated Election Law, as amended. Among the various safeguards established by the AES Law, the most important appears to be the digital signature. This is the one and only safeguard that the automated election laws tie directly to the validity of election results, canvassing of votes and proclamation of candidates. The pertinent provisions of the law read as follows: Republic Act No. 9369, Sec. 19 (2007). Section 18 of Republic Act No (1997) is hereby amended to read as follows: SEC. 22. Electronic Returns... The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate. (emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 9369, Sec. 20. Section 21 of Republic Act No is hereby amended to read as follows: SEC. 25. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers The certificates of canvass transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the 1

2 basis for the proclamation of a winning candidate. (emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 9369, Sec. 25. A new Section 30 (of Republic Act No. 8436) is hereby provided to read as follows: SEC. 30. Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results. - The manner of determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates shall conform with the provisions of Republic Act No as may be supplemented or modified by the provision of this Act, where applicable, by appropriate authentication and certification procedures for electronic signatures as provided in Republic Act No as well as the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant thereto. Implementing Electronic Commerce Act, Republic Act No (2000), in relation to the Automated Election Law, the Office of the President (OP) issued Executive Order No. 810 (2009) adopting a framework for a national certification scheme for digital signatures, issuing guidelines to implement the national certification scheme for digital signatures, and designating the root certification authority and the government certification authority. Executive Order No. 810 expressly mandated the National Computer Center (NCC) then under the Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT), as the SOLE government agency to operate as THE Government Certification Authority for ALL government transactions that involve the use of digital signatures. In other words, apart from the NCC, NO other Philippine government agency was authorized to operate the Government Certification Authority. Subsequently, the OP issued Executive Order No. 47 (2011) to transfer and integrate the NCC into the Information and Communications Technology Office (ICTO) under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). i Accordingly, the ICTO assumed the mandate to operate as the SOLE Government Certification Authority. Congress thereafter enacted Republic Act No (2015) that created the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and transferred and integrated the ICTO into the DICT. ii Accordingly, the DICT further assumed the mandate to operate as the SOLE Government Certification Authority. To stress the critical nature of the techno-legal requirement, digital signatures are intended to authenticate the identity of the sender (i.e. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers), and secure the integrity of the message (i.e. Election Returns and Certificates of Canvass) in the course of electronic transmission from the Vote Counting Machine (VCM) and the 2

3 city/municipality canvassing and consolidation servers. The VCM was previously known as PCOS (precinct count optical scan) machines. This electronic safeguard serves to protect the integrity of election results, against hacking by outsiders, or tampering by insiders (such as personnel of the COMELEC itself or its technology provider Smartmatic-TIM Corporation), and surreptitiously change the results. Notably, the Automated Election Law does NOT recognize the so-called machine digital signature. The digital signature mandated by law pertain to persons and NOT to machines, because ONLY persons can assume legal responsibility and incur criminal/civil/administrative liability, while machines being ONLY property CANNOT assume nor incur such responsibility or liability. The statutory laws, implementing rules and regulations and judicial rules of evidence define a digital signature as the SIGNATURE OF A PERSON. iii There is NO law or rule whatsoever that defines a digital signature as the signature of a property. To insist that the signature of a property is the functional equivalent of a signature of person will necessarily lead to absurd results. Thus, in case of widespread tampering of electronic election returns, the unidentifiable operators and manipulators of the Vote Counting Machines will escape liability, because it is only the machines that signed the tampered returns. Contrary to the widely publicized Fake News, the case of Capalla v. Comelec (2012) iv did NOT validate the so-called machine digital signature. Capalla was about the legality of the purchase of PCOS machines without public bidding, and the technical capability of said machines. v The arguments of parties and interpretations of individual Justices vi do not have any binding effect, UNLESS they relate to the issues for adjudication and are approved by a majority of the Court. Accordingly, the opinion and fallo (or final judgment) of the Court was limited ONLY to the legality of the purchase and technical capability of the machines. vii Statement of the Facts On 11 February 2016, COMELEC approved Resolution No providing for the delivery to, and use of electronic tokens that supposedly contain the private key of the key pair of a digital signature, viii by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) nationwide, to digitally sign the electronic election returns prior to electronic transmission. On 15 March 2016, COMELEC approved Resolution No providing General Instructions Governing the Consolidation / Canvass and Transmission of Votes, but curiously WITHOUT any instruction for the delivery to, and use of electronic tokens that contain the private key of the key 3

4 pair of a digital signature ix, by the Board of Canvassers (BOC) nationwide to digitally sign the electronic certificates of canvass prior to electronic transmission. On 09 May 2016, COMELEC conducted national and local automated elections, purportedly using digital signatures as required by the Automated Election Law and pursuant to Comelec Resolution No , Sections 33(dd) & 43(a). More than a year after the 2016 automated elections, the Comelec Advisory Council, under the DICT being the successor-in-interest of the ICTO, in a letter reply dated 14 September 2017, answered the inquiry dated 14 August 2017 of TanDem, and confirmed that: Please be informed that based on the records of the Philippine National Public Key Infrastructure (PNPKI), we have not received a request from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the issuance of any certificate for digital signatures to be used for the 2016 NLE. Moreover, based on the records of the PNPKI and DICT, there has been no issuance of accreditation to the COMELEC and Smartmatic- TIM Corporation as Certification Authority, in connection with the conduct of the aforesaid elections. Notably, the negative confirmation of the Comelec Advisory Council (under the DICT) corroborates the admission made by the Executive Director of the COMELEC, Atty. Jose Tolentino, during the hearing on 23 March 2016 of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System (JCOCAES) that the COMELEC was unable to secure from the DOST the key pair digital signatures with the appropriate digital certificates. x Curiously, the COMELEC speaking through its Executive Director during the hearing, wanted the DOST to disclose to them the private keys to be issued individually to the BEI members. Naturally, the DOST rejected the request because that defeated the intended secrecy of the personal private key of the key pair of digital signatures. xi The oral statement of COMELEC Executive Director Tolentino made before the JCOCAES, reads in part as follows: MR. TOLENTINO. Just to clarify, sir, it is the DOST that does not want to divulge the private key. It s them that cannot comply. (emphasis supplied) The written statement of COMELEC Commissioner Lim submitted to the JCOCAES, reads in part as follows: (I)nsistence on utilizing personalized digital signatures is 4

5 short of folly. Having personalized digital signatures serves no purpose other than unnecessarily complicating the conduct of Elections. Worse, having personalized digital signatures increase the peril that members of the Board of Election Inspectors face in the service of our country. (emphasis supplied) Conclusion of Fact and Law In view of the foregoing, inevitable conclusion is that whatever form of digital signatures that COMELEC allegedly used during the 2016 automated elections, these were uncertified, unrecognized, unauthorized and therefore FAKE. The COMELEC betrayed public trust and culpably violated the constitutional mandate to protect the sanctity of the ballot by using FAKE uncertified digital signatures during the national and local automated elections of They grossly violating the mandatory provisions of the Automated Election Law that election returns transmitted electronically must be digitally signed in order to be considered as official election results and used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate. xii Notably, the 2016 elections is NOT the first time that COMELEC failed to use legally certified digital signatures. They committed the same gross violations in the past 2010 and 2013 elections. NCC Letter dated 18 May 2012 re 2010 elections. xiii Memorandum and Position Paper of Comelec Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim dated 14 January re 2010 and 2013 elections. xiv Implications of using FAKE digital signatures Considered as a critical electronic safeguard, the Automated Election Law expressly and mandatorily requires that election returns transmitted electronically MUST be digitally signed in order to be considered as official election results and used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate. xv By necessary implication, election returns transmitted electronically but NOT digitally signed CANNOT be considered as official election results and CANNOT be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate. The nullity of such election returns transmitted electronically but NOT digitally signed, is without prejudice to the criminal sanctions imposed on persons who utilize or cause to utilize without authorization, or otherwise transmit or cause to transmit electronically election returns that are NOT digitally signed. xvi 5

6 By using FAKE uncertified digital signatures during the national and local elections of 2016, the COMELEC exposed the automated election system to hacking and tampering by unidentifiable perpetrators, and grossly violated the sanctity of the ballot. Under these premises, in the interest of transparency and truth, and for the sake clean, honest and credible elections being the cornerstone of a democratic society, this writer supports the call of civil society, particularly by the Tanggulang Demokrasya (TanDem), Inc.), xvii for the immediate conduct of a digital forensic examination of the system (software) and platform (hardware) of the automated election network of the COMELEC, by the Anti-Cyber Crime Group (ACG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), with representatives of independent IT groups as observers. Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato General Counsel Tanggulang Demokrasya (TanDem), Inc. 08 April Makati City, Philippines i ii iii Exec. Order No. 47, Sec. 3 reads as follows: SECTION 3. Transfer of the NCC and the TELOF to DOST. The NCC and the TELOF are hereby transferred to DOST and will form part of the internal structure of the ICTO. Rep. Act No , Sec. 15, reads in part as follows: SECTION 15. Transfer of Agencies and Personnel. (a) The following agencies are hereby abolished, and their powers and functions, applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property, and personnel transferred to the Department: (1) Information and Communications Technology Office (ICTO); (2) National Computer Center (NCC) Rep. Act No (known as the Electronic Commerce Act), Section 5. Definition of Terms- For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows: (e) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic from, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. (emphasis supplied) Id, Section 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures.- An electronic signature on the electronic document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if the signature is an electronic signature and proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document, existed under which- (a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said party's access to the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature; (b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document was generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including any relevant agreement; (c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in or order to proceed further with the transaction to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and (d) The other party is authorized and enable to verify the electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same. (emphasis supplied) Id, Section 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures-In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that, (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and 6

7 (b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically designed electronic document knows or has noticed of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances. (emphasis supplied) IRR of the Electronic Commerce Act, Section 6. Definition of Terms. - For the purposes of the Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows: (g) Electronic signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. (emphasis supplied) Id, Section 13. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. An electronic signature relating to an electronic document or electronic data message shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if the signature: (a) is an electronic signature as defined in Section 6(g) of these Rules; and (b) is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document or electronic data message, existed under which: (i) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said party s access to the electronic document or electronic data message necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature; (ii) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document or electronic data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including any relevant agreement; (iii) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order to proceed further with the transaction, to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and, (iv) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same. (emphasis supplied) The parties may agree to adopt supplementary or alternative procedures provided that the requirements of paragraph (b) are complied with. For purposes of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (b), the factors referred to in ANNEX 2 may be taken into account. Id, Section 14. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. - In any proceeding involving an electronic signature, the proof of the electronic signature shall give rise to the rebuttable presumption that: (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and (b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic data message or electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic data message or electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances. (emphasis supplied) A.M. No SC, Rules on Electronic Evidence, Rule 2, Section 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows: (j) Electronic signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures. (emphasis supplied) iv v Capalla v. Comelec, G.R. No , 13 June Id, which reads in part as follows: Simply stated, petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions for the purchase of the subject PCOS machines as well as the Extension Agreement and the Deed of Sale covering said goods mainly on three grounds: (1) the option period provided for in the AES contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM had already lapsed and, thus, could no longer be extended, such extension being prohibited by the contract; (2) the extension of the option period and the exercise of the option without competitive public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and, (3) despite the palpable infirmities and defects of the PCOS machines, the Comelec purchased the same in contravention of the standards laid down in RA vi Id, which reads in part as follows: 7

8 Moreover, as to the digital signature which appears to be the major concern of petitioners, it has been clarified during the oral arguments that the PCOS machines are capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions It is a machine ID, in other words? No, let me explain it this way, Your Honor. The best example I can give, Your Honor, is Okay, let us define first what a digital signature means. The Rules of Court, Your Honor, defines digital signature as the first one it is electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public Cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer s public key can accurately determine: (i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer s public key; and (ii) whether the initial electronic document has been altered after the transformation was made. Therefore, digital signature requires private key and public key Yes, Your Honor How was that private key generated? Again, Your Honor, as I said Did the BEI Chairman know what that private key is? Your Honor, allow me to explain, Your Honor. The names, Your Honor, or the private keys are were assigned to the BEIs Your Honor. In the same way, Your Honor, in the office my code name, Your Honor, or assigned to me is 00 xxx You mean to say the private key is embedded in the machine? No, Your Honor, it is embedded in the ibutton and they are given a x x x Yes, in the machine the ibutton is in the machine. No, Your Honor. Where is it? It is a gadget, Your Honors, that is used it is a separate gadget, your Honor xxx This is a sample of an ibutton, your Honor, and in fact we said that we are prepared to demonstrate, Your Honor, and to show to this Court vii Id, which reads in part as follows: Moreover, as to the digital signature which appears to be the major concern of petitioners, it has been clarified during the oral arguments that the PCOS machines are capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions 8

9 As the Comelec is confronted with time and budget constraints, and in view of the Comelec s mandate to ensure free, honest, and credible elections, the acceptance of the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option, and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the more prudent choices available to the Comelec for a successful 2013 automated elections. The alleged defects in the subject goods have been determined and may be corrected as in fact fixes and enhancements had been undertaken by Smartmatic-TIM. Petitioners could not even give a plausible alternative to ensure the conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections, in the event that the Court nullifies the Deed of Sale. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 24, 2012 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED. viii ix Comelec Resolution No , Sec. 8, Other Envelopes A18-A. Comelec Resolution No , Sec. 10. See Id, Sec. 11(IV)(E) Transmission of Results. x JCOCAES Transcript of 23 March 2016, Pages 1-5, , which reads in part as follows: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). So this is where the clash is, right? The definition ng digital MR. CHONG. The provision of the law in Republic Act 9369, Section 30, it says here, For the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates referring to the digital signature, it must go through the appropriate authentication and certification procedures for electronic signatures as provided in Republic Act 8792, that is the E-Commerce Law. Now the question is, does this digital signature they are telling us is compliant with Republic Act 8792? I may turn over the microphone to Dr. Nelson Celis, Your Honor. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). Let s ask the Comelec to answer. I think this issue has been sufficiently discussed before. So Director Tolentino, ano MR. TOLENTINO. Sir, we tried asking the DOST, I think it was asking if they could generate the digital certificates for us and I think we have a bit of a problem there because there are requirements for the issuance of a digital certificate which we cannot comply with because, for example, sir, ano siya parang there is a data that has to be divulged and the DOST said, No, we cannot issue that. It should be, kumbaga secret or nobody should know about it, otherwise it could be copied or something. So THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). Did the stakeholders hear the explanation? And if you want to question it, then maybe you know what to do. MR. CELIS. Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). Kasi we cannot engage in endless debate. The Comelec has made a decision based on their understanding. If we disagree Pero for the record na lang, Dr. Celis, what is the interpretation of at least your group or yourself? MR. CELIS. Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Chairman, remember in the past hearings we had, we had Usec Casambre, we had Director Dennis Villorente, and they said that they can simplify the digital signing using their digital signing facility. What was mentioned by Director Tolentino, he mentioned about iyong intricacies in providing the information for the board of canvassers and the board of election inspectors with regard to the digital signatures. But I do remember Director Dennis Villorente said that it can be simplified. It can be simplified. So as mentioned by Director Tolentino, they were not able to comply with the authentication of that digital signature as he just mentioned. MR. TOLENTINO. Just to clarify, sir, it is the DOST that does not want to divulge the private key. It s them that cannot comply. 9

10 THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). Well, anyway MR. TOLENTINO. Why don t you just ask the DOST kung may doubt. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PIMENTEL). Basta, Comelec, you have explained to us what you will do. Okay. Your actions will be measured against Section 30 by stakeholders. Should they not believe that Section 30 has been complied with, they know what to do. Okay. So (Emphasis supplied) xi Id, Page 145. Memo on Digital Signatures and a Public Key Infrastructure System (dated 04 February 2014), Page 12, by Comelec Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, attached to Comelec Letter dated 01 June 2016 by Atty. Ronaldo R. Gutierrez. xii 1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1, & Art. V, Sec. 2; Rep. Act No. 9369, Sec. 19, amending Rep. Act No. 8436, Sec. 18. Comelec Reso. No , Secs. 33(dd) & 43(a). xiii National Computer Center Letter dated 18 May 2012 addressed to DZR, which reads in part as follows: Please be informed that based on NCC records, we have not received a request from the Commission on Elections for the issuance of any certificate for digital signatures. Likewise, we have not issued any certificate for digital signatures, in connection with the conduct of 10 May 2010 national and local elections. Moreover, based on NCC records, we have not issued an accreditation to the Commission on Elections and Smartmatic-TIM Corporation as Certification Authority, in connection with the conduct of 10 May 2010 national and local elections. xiv Memorandum and Position Paper of Comelec Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim which in Page 10 reads in part as follows: The voting machines used during the 2010 and 2013 NLE s have provisions for personalized digital signatures as explained during the 04 December 2014 Joint Congressional Oversight Committee Hearing; although, a number of operational issues impede and effectively preclude the Commission from utilizing this feature. xv Rep. Act No. 9369, Sec. 19. Section 18 of Republic Act No is hereby amended to read as follows: SEC. 22. Electronic Returns... "The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate." (emphasis supplied) xvi Rep. Act No. 9369, Sec. 28. Section 29 of Republic Act No is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. 35. Prohibited Acts and Penalties. - The following shall be penalized as provided in this Act, whether or not said acts affect the electoral process or results: "(a) Utilizing without authorization, tampering with, damaging, destroying or stealing: "(1) Official ballots, election returns, and certificates of canvass of votes used in the system; and "(2) Electronic devices or their components, peripherals or supplies used in the AES such as counting machine, memory pack/diskette, memory pack receiver and computer set; "(b) Interfering with, impeding, absconding for purpose of gain, preventing the installation or use of computer counting devices and the processing, storage, generation and transmission of election results, data or information; "(c) Gaining or causing access to using, altering, destroying or disclosing any computer data, program, system software, network, or any computer-related devices, facilities, hardware or equipment, whether classified or declassified; "(d) Refusal of the citizens' arm to present for perusal its copy of election return to the board of canvassers; "(e) Presentation by the citizens' arm of tampered or spurious election returns; "(f) Refusal or failure to provide the dominant majority and dominant minority parties or the citizens'' arm their copy of election returns; and "(g) The failure to post the voters' list within the specified time, duration and in the designated location shall constitute an election offense on the part the election officer concerned." "Any person convicted for violation of this Act, except those convicted of the crime of electoral sabotage, shall be penalized with imprisonment of eight years and one day to twelve (12) years without possibility of parole, and perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Moreover, the offender shall be perpetually disqualified to hold any non-elective public office." 10

11 xvii LET THE PEOPLE S VOICE PREVAIL! PROTECT THE PEOPLE S WILL! The people s vote is sacred. The free results of the elections is the collective voice of the people. As such it is every citizen s duty to protect it and let it prevail. We, members of the Tanggulang Demokrasya, believe that a clean, honest and credible elections is the cornerstone of a democratic society. We view with grave concern the blatant attempt by those mandated to conduct the 2016 elections to tamper with the computerized system that may affect the true results of the elections. We denounce the widely publicized unauthorized uploading of a computer script (instructions) to the transparency server in the course of the quick count, as publicly admitted by both the Comelec and Smartmatic. Accordingly, we call for the immediate conduct of a digital forensic examination of the system (software) and platform (hardware) of the automated election network by the anti-cyber crime group of the Philippine National Police, with representatives of independent IT groups as observers. We demand that Comelec address this call right now in the interest of transparency and truth of the 2016 elections. Let the true voice of the people prevail! Comelec must protect, not thwart, the people s will. Makati City, Philippines. 17 May Tanggulang Demokrasya (TanDem), Inc. Evelyn L. Kilayko, Chairman Elena San Agustin, Trustee Rosita K. Imperial, Trustee Teresita D. Baltazar, President Pilar L. Calderon, Trustee Ma. Salome A. Mable, Trustee Demosthenes B. Donato, General Counsel 11