UNIT - IV PERSONAL LIBERTY

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1 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL RIGHT OF AN ACCUED UNIT - IV PERONAL LIBERTY Protections in respect of conviction of offences (Article-20) 1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (Prohibition against Ex post facto law) 2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (Prohibition against Double jeopardy) 3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Prohibition against self-incrimination) RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERONAL LIBERTY Protection of life and personal liberty (Article-21): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Procedure established by law: The expression procedure established by law means procedure laid down by statute or procedure prescribed by the law of the state. Accordingly, first, there must be a law justifying interference with the person's life and personal liberty, secondly; it must be a valid law; and thirdly, the procedure laid down by the law should have been followed. The executive in the absence of any procedure prescribed by the law sustaining the deprivation of personal liberty shall act in violation of Article- 21. Due process of law: The ambit of protection given by the American constitution in relation to personal liberty is wider than under the Indian law. The American constitution provides that a person cannot be deprived of his liberty 'without due process of law.' 1 In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, the upreme Court held that the procedure established by law should be just, fair and reasonable. 2 In unil Batra vs Delhi Admn., Krishna Iyer J. observed that our constitution has no due process clause but after decisions in Cooper and Maneka Gandhi cases the consequence is the same. 61

2 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL Relationship among (Articles-14, 19 and 21): By different leading cases like Maneka Gandhi and R.C. Cooper it has been established that a relationship among Articles-14, 19 and 21 particularly between Articles-14 and 21 exists and a requirement of reasonableness of law providing for deprivation of life or liberty has been upheld. It has been held in Kedar Nath ingh v/s tate of Bihar and Ranjit v/s tate of 4 Maharashtra that the test for the application of Article-19 is not whether a law is a penal law or not. Indeed, the test is whether the law penalizes an activity protected by Article-19. If it does, its validity shall have to be tested under Article-19. e.g., if theft or murder is penalized the penal law does not require to be tested under Article-19 but if anti-government speech and movement are penalized the law has to satisfy the requirements of Article-19 because speech and movement are the activities protected by that article. 5 New trends: In Francis Coralie v/s Union Territory of Delhi Bhagwati J. held that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing with fellow human beings." The magnitude and content of liberty would depend on the extent of the economic development of the country. 6 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v/s Union of India where the question of bondage and rehabilitation of some labourers was involved, the court held that it is the fundamental right of everyone in this country to live with human dignity and freedom from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article-21 derives its life and breath from the Directive Principles of tate Policy and particularly from Article-39 (e) and (f), Articles-41 and 42 and it must protect men and women, and children of the tender age against abuse, provide opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no state has the right to take any action, which will deprive a person from the enjoyment of these basic essentials. 7 In Consumer Education and Research Center v/s Union of India the upreme Court held that the right to health and medical aid in order to protect the health and vigour of a worker while in service or after retirement is a fundamental right under Article-21 read with Articles-39 (e), 41,43,48 (a). 8 In Unnikrishnan J.P. v/s tate of A.P the upreme Court while interpreting Article-21 held that right to education up till primary level is a fundamental right of every child till the age of fourteen years. There after his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the state. 9 In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (Pavement Dwellers Case) the upreme Court held that the world 'life' in Article-21 includes the right to livelihood. 10 In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, the upreme Court held that telephone-tapping is an invasion on right to privacy. 11 In R. Rajagopal v. tate of T.N., (Auto hanker Case) the upreme Court held that the right to privacy or the right to be let alone is guaranteed by Article-21. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education among other matters. No one can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. However, position may be different if he voluntarily puts into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. 62

3 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL 12 In tate of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narain, the upreme Court held that the right to privacy is available even to a woman of easy virtue and no one can invade her privacy. 13 In Parmananda Katara v. Union of India, the upreme Court held that right to health and medical assistance is included in Article-21. It is the professional obligation of all doctors, whether government or private, to extend medical aid to the injured immediately to preserve life without waiting for legal formalities to be complied with by the police. Article-21 of the constitution casts the obligation on the state to preserve life. 14 In Gian Kaur v. tate of Punjab, a five judge constitution bench of the upreme Court has now overruled its decision in P. Rathinam's case and held that the right to life under Article-21 of the constitution does not include right to die or right to be killed. The right to die is inherently inconsistent with the right to life. The right to life preserves the life whereas right to die extinguishes the life. Life and death are two opposite extremes of the same life. 15 In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (hriram Food and Fertilizer Case) the upreme Court held that right to good environment is a fundamental right within the meaning of right to life. 16 In M.H. Hoskot v. tate of Maharashtra, the upreme Court held that right to free legal aid is an essential component of natural justice. Krishna Iyer, J., declared that to provide free legal aid is the duty of the state and not charity. If a prisoner is unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal including special leave to appeal for want of legal assistance there is implicit in the court under Article-142, read with Articles-21 and 39A of the constitution, the power to assign counsel to the prisoner provided he does not object to the lawyer named by the court. Equally it is implicit that the state which sets the law in motion must pay the lawyer an amount fixed by the court. 17 In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home ecretary, tate of Bihar, the upreme Court held that right to speedy trial is fundamental right with in the meaning of Article In Rudal hah v. tate of Bihar, the upreme Court held that the court has power to award monetary compensation in appropriate cases where there is violation of the constitutional right. 19 In Vishaka v. tate of Rajasthan, the upreme Court held that right to work with gender dignity is implicit in Article-21. The court issued exhaustive guidelines for prevention of sexual harassment of working women in places of their work until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. th Right to education a fundamental right (Article-21A): The Constitution (86 Amendment) Act, 2002 has added a new Article-21A after Article-21 and has made education for all children of the age of six to fourteen a fundamental right. PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND IT CONTITUTIONAL POLICIE Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases (Article-22) (1)No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. (2)Every detained person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest 63

4 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply- (a) (b) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. (4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub clause (b) of clause (7); or b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. (6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose. (7) Parliament may by law prescribe- 1) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4); 2)the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and 3)the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4). 20 In Bhim ingh v/s tate of J & K it was held that remand order obtained by the police from the magistrate without producing the arrested person before such Magistrate within 24 hours, is violative of Article-22 (2). 21 In tate of M.P v/s hobaram the respondents were arrested on a complaint of criminal trespass. The arrest was made under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the trial was held in the Nyaya 64

5 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL Panchayat functioning under the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act, which sentenced him. The court held that the section-63 of the aforesaid Act was ultra vires as it provided that no lawyer could plead a case before a Nyay Panchayat. This was violative of Article-22 (1) of the constitution. Hidayatullah J. pointed out that a person arrested and put on his defence against a criminal charge which may result in penalty is entitled to the right to defend himself with the aid of a counsel and any law that takes away this right offends against the constitution. Art. 22 clauses (4) to (7) relate to preventive detention. No authoritative definition of the term Prevention is used in contradistinction to the word punitive. The term preventive detention had its origin in the language used by the Law Lords in England while explaining the nature of detention under Regulation 14-B, Defence of Realm Act passed on the outbreak of the First World War. 22 According to Lord Finely in Rex v/s Holliday "It is not punitive but precautionary measure." The object of preventive detention is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved nor any charge formulated. The justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability of the impending commission of the prejudicial act and not criminal conviction. The law of preventive detention is authorized by our constitution makers as there may arise occasions in the life of the nation when the need to prevent citizens from acting in ways which unlawfully disrupt the basis of an established order may outweigh the claims of personal liberty. In our constitution the subject preventive detention is mentioned in the Union List as well as in the Concurrent List. Both the center and the states are free to have their own laws except that in the case of a conflict it is the central law that will prevail. The Union's ambit is larger than of the states as the Union can have a preventive detention law for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs and security of India. Certain safeguards are also provided in clauses (4) to (7) to mitigate their harshness by placing fetters on legislative power conferred on the legislature and to prevent misuse of the power by the executive. "If I was asked to name any particular Article in this constitution as the most important, an Article without which this constitution would be a nullity, I could not refer to any other Article except this... It is the very soul 23 of the constitution and the very heart of it," Dr. Ambedkar. It is true that a declaration of fundamental rights is meaningless unless there is an effective machinery for the enforcement of the rights. It is remedy which makes the right real. If there is no remedy there is no right at all. Due to this our constitution makers incorporated a long list of fundamental rights and also provided for an effective remedy for the enforcement of these rights under Article-32 of the constitution. Article-32 is in itself a fundamental right. Article-226 also empowers the High Courts to provide the same remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Article-32 (1) guarantees the right to move the upreme Court by "appropriate proceedings" for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part-III of the constitution. Clause (2) of Article-32 confers power on the upreme Court to issue appropriate directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warrant to and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III of the constitution. Under clause (3) of Article-32 the Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the upreme Court under clause (2). Clause (4) says that the right guaranteed by Article-32 shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for in the constitution. Article-32 provides for an expeditious and inexpensive remedy for the protection of fundamental rights from legislative and executive 24 interference. 65

6 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL Under Article-32(1) the upreme Court's power to enforce fundamental right is widest. There is no limitation in regard to the kind of proceedings envisaged in Article-32 (1) except that the proceeding must be "appropriate" and this requirement must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to 25 be taken, namely, enforcement of fundamental rights. In The Judges Transfer Case, the upreme Court held that it is not obligatory for the court to follow adversary system. The constitution-makers deliberately did not lay down any particular form of proceeding for enforcement of fundamental right nor did they stipulate that such proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or a strait-jacket formula because they knew that in a country like India where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation, any insistence on a right formula of proceeding for enforcement of fundamental right would become self-defeating. Right to constitutional remedies (Article-32) 1) The right to move the upreme Court, by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part, is guaranteed. 2) The upreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant to and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part. Concurrent Jurisdiction with High Courts: The upreme Court and the High Courts possess concurrent power to issue orders and writs in the matter of enforcement of fundamental rights and it is no condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction by the upreme Court that the petitioner must in the first instance, approach the High Court. Res-judicata: Petitions to the upreme Court under Article-32 are subject to the rule of res-judicata. If a question has been decided by the upreme Court between two parties, the same question cannot be reopened between the same parties under Article-32. Laches: (Unreasonable delay). The party aggrieved must move the court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily. There is no lower time limit and there is no upper time limit. The Limitation Act has no relevance either directly or indirectly to proceedings under Article-32. The right given under Article-32 is itself a fundamental right and the same cannot be curtailed except as provided by the constitution. Existence of alternative relief is no bar to the grant of remedy under Article-32 where a fundamental right has been infringed. Locus standi: (who can apply?) A petition could only be maintained by such a petitioner who himself has suffered that is a 'person injured'. But under the public interest litigation even a 'person aggrieved' who is a member of the public having sufficient interest, can maintain an action of judicial redressal. The right to move the upreme Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided by the constitution. It is only under Article-359 (suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by part III during emergency) that the constitution empowers the President to suspend enforcement of fundamental rights when a proclamation of emergency under Article- 352 is in operation. 66

7 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL 26 Curative petition : In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, a five judge constitution bench of the upreme Court has unanimously held that in order to rectify gross miscarriage of justice in its final judgement which cannot be challenged again the court will allow curative petition by the victim of miscarriage of justice to seek a second review of the final order of the court. Writ of habeas corpus: The writ of habeas corpus is an effective measure of immediate release from unlawful detention, whether in prison or private custody. The writ is an order calling upon the person by whom a person is alleged to be kept in confinement to bring such person before that court and to let the court know on what ground the person is confined. If there is no legal justification for the detention, the person is ordered to be released. An application for habeas corpus can be made by the person in confinement or by any other person on his behalf. A person who is not produced within 24 hours (excluding the time spent in journey) of his arrest before a magistrate, will be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus. Writ of mandamus: Mandamus is a command and a judicial remedy from a superior court to any government, court, corporation or public authority to do or forbear from doing some specific act which that body is obliged under law to do or refrain from doing as the case may be and which is in the nature of a public duty in certain cases of a statutory duty. No one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when he is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or abstain from doing it. The writ of mandamus cannot be issued for enforcing obligations arising out of a contract. No mandamus will lie where the duty is of a discretionary nature. A mandamus would lie against a company constituted by a statute. Writ of prohibition: A writ of prohibition commands the court or tribunal to refrain from doing something which it is about to do. The writ lies both for excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction. When an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior court or tribunal. Writ of quo-warranto: The object of this writ is to prevent a person who has wrongfully usurped a public office from continuing in that office. The writ calls upon the holder of the office to show to the court under what authority he holds the office. Before filing a petition for quo-warranto he must satisfy the court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority. This writ will not lie in respect of an office of a private nature. A petition for the writ challenging the legality of an appointment to an office of a public nature is maintainable at the instance of any private person, though he is not personally aggrieved or interested. Writ of certiorari: The writ of certiorari is an order of the superior court issued to inferior courts, tribunals or authorities to transmit to it the record of proceedings pending with them for security and if necessary for quashing the same. The object of this writ is to secure that the jurisdiction of an inferior court, or tribunal is properly exercised and it does not usurp the jurisdiction, which it does not possess. The first necessary condition for issue of the writ is that there should be a tribunal or officer having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights and having a duty to act judicially. econd condition is that the tribunal or officer must have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the legal authority. When a decision of an inferior tribunal is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record it is liable to be quashed by certiorari. Error means error of law. Public interest litigation: Where a person or class of persons to whom legal injury is caused by reason of violation of fundamental rights, is unable to approach the court for judicial redressal on account of any social or economic disability or due to socially or economically disadvantageous position, any member of 67

8 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL the public acting bona-fide can move the court for relief under Articles-32 and Article-226. The upreme Court has taken cognizance of letters from individuals complaining the infringement of the fundamental rights and has treated such petitions as writ petitions. The reason for this development is that it has been realized that rights of the poor, ignorant, socially and economically disadvantaged persons are sought to be vindicated through a court action and the courts allow public men or concerned voluntary associations to agitate such matters before the courts. It has been realized that if this is not permitted, rights of the poor will remain un-redressed as such persons are least equipped to bring their grievances before the courts and such a situation is unwarranted in a welfare state and destructive for the rule of law. 27 In A.B..K. angh (Rly.) v. Union of India, Krishna Iyer J. declared that access to justice through class actions, public interest litigation and representative proceedings is the present constitutional jurisprudence. 28 In Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, Bhagwati J. (as he then was) laid down principles and norms which should be followed in determining whether a child should be allowed to be adopted by foreign parents. With the object of ensuring the welfare of the child the court directed the government and various agencies dealing with the matter to follow these principles in such cases as it is their constitutional obligation under Articles-15 (3) and 39 (c) and (f) to ensure the welfare of the child. 29 In Munna v. tate of U.P a public interest litigation was filed in the upreme Court on the basis of a news report about sexual exploitation of children by hardened criminals in Kanpur jail. The court directed the District Judge, Kanpur to visit the jail and report. The report of the District Judge confirmed the offence of sodomy being committed on the children. The court directed the release of the children from jail and their shifting to children's home. 30 In Gaurav Jain v. Union of India the upreme Court rejected the demand for providing separate schools and hostels for children of prostitutes as it was not in the interest of such children. The application under Article-32 was made through public interest litigation asking for direction to the government for making such provisions for children of prostitutes. 31 In National Federation of Blind v. U.P.C., the upreme Court has held that the visually handicapped (blind and partially blind) are eligible to compete and write civil services examination in the categories of group 'A' and 'B' post which are suitable for the handicapped in Braille cript or with the help of a scribe. 32 In Delhi Judicial ervice Association v. tate of Gujarat, the upreme Court on a public interest litigation sent five police officers including an I.P.. to jail as they were found guilty of committing criminal contempt of the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad in Kheda district of Gujarat by harassing and handcuffing him. 33 In Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India, a public interest litigation was filed under Article-32 to expose the pathetic plight of domestic servants who were subjected to indecent sexual assault. In this case the upreme Court issued guidelines for the protection, rehabilitation and compensation for domestic working women subjected to such an abuse. 34 In Common Cause v. Union of India, the petitioner through a public interest litigation highlighted the serious deficiencies and shortcomings in the matter of collection, of storage and supply of blood through various blood centres operating in the country and prayed that an appropriate writ, order or direction be issue by the court directing the Union and tate Governments and the Union Territories to ensure that positive steps in a time bound programme be taken for removing the malpractices, malfunctioning and 68

9 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL inadequacies of blood banks all over the country. On the basis of the reports of various committees and the committee constituted by the court, the upreme Court directed that a National Council of Blood Transfusion with its ecretariat at Delhi and tate Councils be established as registered societies duly registered under the ocieties Registration Act. 35 In Rudal hah v. tate of Bihar, the court awarded Rs.30,000 as compensation to the petitioner who had to remain in jail for 14 years because of the irresponsible conduct of the state authorities. 36 In Peoples Union for Democratic rights v. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters, one of the labourers was taken to the police station for doing some work, when he demanded wages he was severely beaten and as a result of which he died. It was held that the state was liable to pay compensation of Rs.75,000 to the family of the deceased. IMPORTANT QUETION Q.1. Q.2. Q.3. Q.4. Q.5. Q.6. Q.7. Q.8. Q.9. What is writ? From which judicial system of the world the feature of writ has come in Indian constitution. What do you understand by the writ of habeas corpus? tate the constitutional protection relating to the life and personal liberty. Discuss the doctrine of double jeopardy as provided under Indian constitution. When and in which cases is the writ of certiorari is issued? What is the extent of the writ jurisdiction of upreme Court of India? Can the remedy provided under Article-32 be said to be a fundamental right in itself? Can ordinary rights be enforced under Article-32? Can an amendment to the constitution change the right under Article-32? Q.10. What is the literal meaning of the term habeas corpus? Q.11 Who can apply for the writ to habeas corpus? Q.12. Can the writ jurisdiction of the upreme Court under Article-32 extend to the authorities out side the territory of India? Q.13. Will a petition under Article-32 be maintainable on a matter disposed of by the High Court on merits under Article-226? Q.14. What remedy is open to a party aggrieved by an order of the High Court on merits under Article-226? Q.15. Is there any exception to the rule of res judicata in the matter of writs? 69

10 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL Q.16. Can the upreme Court under Article-32 issue writ of habeas corpus when the High Court has already refused the same? Q.17. Does the limitation law apply to the writ petitions under Article-32? Q.18. Will the availability of alternative relief bar the grant of remedy under Article-32? Q.19. Who can apply for the writs under Article-32? Q.20. When can the rights guaranteed under Article-32 be suspended? Q.21. Can you move the upreme Court under Article-32 to challenge the validity of a state law? Q.22. Does the constitution demand the tate to provide free and compulsory education? Q.23. Wheatear enemy alien is entitled to the safeguards under Article-22 (1) and (2)? Q.24. Whether a law authorising the arrest of a person, but which does not provide for informing the ground of arrest valid? Q.25. Is there any difference between the term personal liberty under Article-21 and freedom of movement under Article-19(1) (d)? Q.26. What are the arguments to recognise the right to privacy as a fundamental right? Q.27. Q.28. Q.29. Q.30. Reference: Discuss the requirement of locus standi for various kinds of writs. Distinguish between writ of certiorari and writ of prohibition. Under what contexts writ of quo warranto will be issued? What are the conditions precedent for issuing the writ of certiorari under Article-32? 1. AIR 1978 se AIR 1978 se AIR 1962 se AIR 1963 se AIR 1981 se AIR 1984 se (1995) 3 see (1993) 1 see 645, AIR 1986 se 180; (1985) 3 see AIR 1997 se (1994) 6 see

11 trictly for Internal Circulation - KCL 12. AIR 1991 se AIR 1989 se (1996) 2 see (1986) 2 see AIR 1978 se. 17. AIR 1979 se (1983) 4 see AIR 1997 se AIR 1986 se C CAD. Vol. VII at CAD (Constituent Assembly Debates) Vol. VII at P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 C AIR 2002 C AIR 1981 C (1984) 2 CC (1982) 1 CC AIR 1990 C (1993) 2 CC (1991) 4 CC (1995) 1 CC (1996) 1 CC (1983) 4 CC (1989) 4 CC