4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 1 of 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

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1 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 1 of 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION Robert Isgett, ) Civil Action No.: 4:14-cv-4810-RBH ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) Northstar Location Services, LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) ) This matter is before the Court upon Defendant s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. Having considered Plaintiff s complaint, Defendant s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff s response, and Defendant s reply, the Court denies Defendant s motion. 1 Background On December 19, 2014, Plaintiff Robert Isgett filed a complaint against Defendant Northstar Location Services, LLC, alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 2 (FDCPA), (2) violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 3 (TCPA), (3) treble damages under the TCPA, (4) negligent training and supervision, (5) reckless and wanton training and supervision, and (6) invasion of privacy. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4-8. The causes of action arise from Defendant s purported conduct in making unauthorized telephone calls to Plaintiff s home and cellular telephones to collect an alleged debt. Id. at Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.08, the district court may decide motions without a hearing. The Court believes the issues are thoroughly briefed and adequately presented in the materials before the Court U.S.C U.S.C. 227.

2 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 2 of 13 I. Facts Alleged in the Complaint Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of South Carolina, and Defendant is a New York corporation regularly engaged in the collection of debts. Complaint at 3-4. Beginning in April 2014, Defendant began placing telephone calls to Plaintiff s home and cellular telephones seeking to collect an alleged debt. Id. at 5. Defendant called Plaintiff from six different phone numbers and made several calls within a twenty-four hour period. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff asserts Defendant made the calls in violation of 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1) and with the intent to harass, coerce, or annoy him into paying an alleged debt. Id. at 5-7, 13. Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with the debt validation language required by 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a) until May 13, 2014, nearly a month after Defendant began calling Plaintiff. Id. at 8. Regarding the calls to his cell phone, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made a number of the calls by using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) as defined in 47 U.S.C. 227, that Defendant used an automated dialer to place calls from telephone number (678) , that he incurred charges for incoming calls to his cell phone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1), that he did not give his express consent for Defendant to call his cell phone using an ATDS pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A), that Defendant knew or should have known it was calling Plaintiff s cell phone without express consent, and that none of Defendant s calls were for emergency purposes as defined in 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(I). Id. at II. Plaintiff s Causes of Action Count one of Plaintiff s complaint alleges Defendant violated sections 1692c(a)(1), 1692d, and 1692g(a) of the FDCPA. Id. at Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, actual damages, and attorney s fees and costs. Id. at 20. Counts two and three allege the telephone calls placed by 2

3 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 3 of 13 Defendant constituted violations of the TCPA: count two asserts Defendant s calls were negligent violations, while count three asserts Defendant s calls were knowing and willful violations. Id. at Plaintiff seeks statutory and treble damages as provided under 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B) and (C). Id. at 23, 26. Counts four and five assert Defendant acted negligently, recklessly, and wantonly in failing to train and supervise its employees to prevent violations of the FDCPA, the TCPA, and South Carolina law. Id. at Count six alleges Defendant invaded Plaintiff s privacy by continually harassing him with telephone calls to collect an alleged debt. Id. at Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for counts four through six. See Complaint at 9. Standard of Review When deciding a motion to dismiss made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff s favor. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). A complaint must state a plausible claim for relief to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The Court will not dismiss the plaintiff s complaint so long as he provides adequate detail about his claims to show he has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits. Owens v. Baltimore City State s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2006)). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. Discussion 3

4 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 4 of 13 Defendant moves to dismiss counts two, three, four, five, and six of Plaintiff s complaint, arguing Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in each count. Motion to Dismiss at 1. I. Violation of the TCPA (Counts Two and Three) Defendant seeks dismissal of counts two and three by arguing Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendant used an ATDS to call Plaintiff s cell phone. Id. at 1-7. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to identify (1) the telephone number that Defendant allegedly called, (2) the number of times that Defendant allegedly called, (3) the times of day that Plaintiff received the alleged calls, (4) the content of the calls, (5) whether the voice on the alleged calls was robotic, and (6) whether the caller could respond to questions asked by Plaintiff. Id. at 6. Defendant contends Plaintiff s factual allegations are conclusory and do not provide details making it plausible that the alleged phone calls came from an ATDS. Id. at 5. The TCPA is a remedial statute that was passed to protect consumers from unwanted automated telephone calls. Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013). The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any [ATDS] or an artificial or prerecorded voice... to any telephone number assigned to a... cellular telephone service for which the called party is charged for the call. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The TCPA defines an ATDS as equipment that has the capacity to store telephone numbers and dial such numbers. 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1). The TCPA also prohibits any person from initiat[ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B). 4

5 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 5 of 13 As a threshold matter, the Court notes Defendant s arguments appear to relate only to Plaintiff s allegations concerning the calls to his cell phone, not the calls to his home phone. See Motion to Dismiss at 1-7. This narrowed focus is likely due to the fact that Plaintiff confines the allegations concerning the use of an ATDS to calls made to his cell phone. Complaint at 9. Defendant frames its arguments under section 227(b)(1)(A), not under section 227(b)(1)(B). See Motion to Dismiss at 3, 5. Whereas subsection (b)(1)(a)(iii) prohibits the use of an [ATDS] or an artificial or prerecorded voice to call a cellular telephone, subsection (b)(1)(b) does not refer to an ATDS and confines its prohibition to the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice to call a residential telephone line. See generally Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 745 (2012) (distinguishing the practice prohibited in section 227(b)(1)(A) from the practice prohibited in section 227(b)(1)(B)). In other words, subsection (b)(1)(a) concerns cell phones while subsection (b)(1)(b) concerns home phones. Compare 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), with 227(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, the Court confines its analysis to the allegations concerning Defendant s calls to Plaintiff s cell phone, conduct alleged to have violated section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Court finds Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendant used an ATDS to call Plaintiff s cell phone. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ( A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. ). Plaintiff alleges, A number of calls placed to the Plaintiff s cellular telephone by Defendant were made through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C Complaint at 9. Accepting this short and plain statement as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under the TCPA. See Hashw v. Dep t Stores Nat. Bank, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (D. Minn. 2013) (addressing the 5

6 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 6 of 13 same issue and finding that when the plaintiff pleaded that an ATDS was used to make the calls to his cellular phone, nothing more [wa]s required to state a claim for relief under the TCPA ); see also Ott v. Mortgage Investors Corp. of Ohio, F. Supp. 3d, 2014 WL , at *8 (D. Or. 2014) (recognizing a plaintiff states an adequate TCPA claim if he alleges the defendant frequently made calls to [the p]laintiff s cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing system (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, Plaintiff pleads sufficient additional facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendant used an ATDS when calling his cell phone. Plaintiff alleges Defendant made several phone calls within a twenty-four hour period, used six different telephone numbers, placed calls from telephone number (678) using an automated dialer, and made the calls to collect an alleged debt. Complaint at 5-6, 9. These allegations lend further credence to the inference that Defendant used an ATDS to generate calls to Plaintiff s cell phone. 4 The Court therefore denies Defendant s motion to dismiss regarding Plaintiff s claims under the TCPA. II. State Law Claims (Counts Four, Five, and Six) A. Counts Four and Five: Negligent and Reckless Training and Supervision Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to state claims for negligent and reckless training and supervision because Plaintiff does not allege (1) that Defendant owed him a duty or (2) that Defendant breached any standard of care by allegedly directing its employees to call Plaintiff to collect a debt. 4 The Court also rejects Defendant s argument that Plaintiff s claims under the TCPA must be dismissed because his complaint did not specify the telephone number that Defendant allegedly called. Motion to Dismiss at 6. See Margulis v. Generation Life Ins. Co., F. Supp. 3d,, 2015 WL , at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2015) (recognizing [t]he majority of district courts do not require [a TCPA plaintiff to give the telephone number that allegedly received the defendant s automated call] at the pleading stage in order to provide adequate notice to a TCPA defendant (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ott, F. Supp. 3d,, 2014 WL , at *8 (denying the defendants motion to dismiss the plaintiffs TCPA claim based on the plaintiffs failure to plead the cellular telephone number that the defendants allegedly called). 6

7 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 7 of 13 Motion to Dismiss at 8. Defendant also asserts Plaintiff does not allege any factual basis for his allegation that Defendant knew or should have known of its employees phone calls made in violation of the TCPA. Id. To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant owed him a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, and the plaintiff suffered a loss caused by the breach. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 246, 711 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2011). Negligence is the failure to exercise due care. Solanki v. Wal-Mart Store No. 2806, 410 S.C. 229, 237, 763 S.E.2d 615, 619 (Ct. App. 2014). Due care means the degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances. Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 287, 709 S.E.2d 607, 612 (2011). It is well settled that negligence may be so gross as to amount to recklessness, and when it does, it ceases to be mere negligence and assumes very much the nature of willfulness. Id. at , 709 S.E.2d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the term wanton is synonymous with reckless ). Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly; it is a conscious failure to exercise due care. Id. at 287, 709 S.E.2d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the common law ordinarily imposes no duty to act, an affirmative legal duty may arise from statute. Rayfield v. S. Carolina Dep t of Corr., 297 S.C. 95, 100, 374 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ct. App. 1988). To establish a defendant owes him a duty of care arising from a statute, a plaintiff must show (1) the purpose of the statute is to protect him from the kind of harm he has suffered; and (2) he belongs to the class of people that the statute is intended to protect. Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 306 S.C. 51, 53, 410 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1991). If a plaintiff makes these two showings, he has proven the first element of a negligence claim, i.e., that the defendant owes him a duty of care. Id. 7

8 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 8 of 13 Once a duty has been established, it is the further function of the court to determine and formulate the standard of conduct to which the duty requires the defendant to conform. Doe ex rel. Doe, 393 S.C. at 247, 711 S.E.2d at 912. The standard of care in a given case may be established and defined by the common law, statutes, administrative regulations, industry standards, or a defendant s own policies and guidelines. Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 140, 638 S.E.2d 650, 659 (2006). Regarding his claims for negligent and reckless training and supervision, Plaintiff cites James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 377 S.C. 628, 631, 661 S.E.2d 329, 330 (2008), and Land v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. CA 8: TMC, 2014 WL , at *5-6 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2014). 5 Plaintiff s Response to Defendant s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 at James and Land both cite Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, , 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1992), a case in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the tort of negligent supervision for an employee acting outside the scope of his employment. 309 S.C. at 116, 420 S.E.2d at 496 ( Under certain 5 Plaintiff asserts, Neither of these cases speaks to requiring an allegation of any duty whatsoever. Plaintiff s Response to Defendant s Motion to Dismiss at 11. Contrary to Plaintiff s assertion, the Court notes claims for negligent and reckless training and supervision sound in negligence and require allegations of the four basic elements of negligence: duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages. The Court s position is consistent with a recent district court opinion analyzing claims for negligent supervision and training. See Stalvey v. Am. Bank Holdings, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-714, 2013 WL , at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2013) ( turn[ing] to [the] [p]laintiff s negligent training and supervision claims, citing the basic elements of negligence, and specifying a duty of care [is] an essential element of [the plaintiff s] negligence based claims ). Furthermore, South Carolina state courts considering similar causes of action have addressed such claims within the framework of ordinary negligence law. See Rickborn v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 291, 300, 302, 468 S.E.2d 292, (1996) (considering a negligent supervision claim, citing the elements of ordinary negligence (including the duty of care ), and stating [a]n employer owes a duty of care to a third party when the possible harm resulting to the third party by the employee could have been reasonably anticipated by the employer ); Trask v. Beaufort Cnty., 392 S.C. 560, 566, 709 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2011) (considering claims for negligence and negligent supervision and training and citing the basic elements of negligence); Charleston, S.C. Registry for Golf & Tourism, Inc. v. Young Clement Rivers & Tisdale, LLP, 359 S.C. 635, n.2, 598 S.E.2d 717, n.2 (Ct. App. 2004) (evaluating a claim for negligent supervision, specifying [t]he disposition of this claim depends upon whether [the defendant] owed a duty to [the plaintff], recognizing [a]n employer may have a legal duty to use due care in supervising an employee as a result of a contractual relationship with the employee, and noting [t]his duty sounds in tort, not in contract (emphasis added)). Thus, Plaintiff must allege the existence of a duty owed by Defendant to state claims for negligent and reckless supervision and training. As explained in more detail above, Plaintiff s complaint sufficiently pleads the element of duty statutory duties under the FDCPA and TCPA for his claims. 8

9 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 9 of 13 circumstances, an employer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control an employee acting outside the scope of his employment. ). An employer in that situation may be liable for negligent supervision if its employee intentionally harms the plaintiff when the employee (1) is upon the employer s premises or is using the employer s chattel; (2) the employer knows or has reason to know it has the ability to control the employee; and (3) the employer knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity to exercise control. Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, 407 S.C. 128, 139, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2014) (citing Degenhart). First, the Court rejects Defendant s argument that Plaintiff has failed to plead Defendant owed him a duty of care. See Motion to Dismiss at 8. In counts four and five of his complaint, Plaintiff adopts the allegations from count one (the FDCPA claim) and counts two and three (the TCPA claims). Complaint at 27, 32. He grounds the claims in counts four and five upon the premise that Defendant owed him statutory duties of care under the FDCPA and the TCPA. Id. at 27, 29, 32, 34. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Defendant knew or should have known that its employees conduct violated the FDCPA and the TCPA. Id. at 29, 34. Plaintiff s assertions indicate that the FDCPA is designed to preclude abusive practices in the collection of consumer debts, that the TCPA is designed to prevent automated telephone calls made without the recipient s consent, and that he belongs to the broad class of citizens the two federal statutes are designed to protect. See Whitlaw, 306 S.C. at 53, 410 S.E.2d at 252; Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 100, 374 S.E.2d at 913. Accepting these assertions as true, the Court finds Plaintiff s complaint includes plausible factual statements supporting a reasonable inference that Defendant owed Plaintiff statutory duties of due care arising under the FDCPA and the TCPA. Second, the Court rejects Defendant s argument that Plaintiff has failed to plead Defendant breached any standard of care. See Motion to Dismiss at 8. Plaintiff s complaint indicates the FDCPA 9

10 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 10 of 13 and the TCPA federal laws under which Plaintiff alleges Defendant owed him statutory duties establish the standards of care relevant to his claims for negligent and reckless training and supervision. Complaint at 29, 34. See Madison, 371 S.C. at 140, 638 S.E.2d at 659 (stating a statute that creates an affirmative legal duty may also establish and define the standard of care). Any inquiry regarding whether Defendant conformed with these standards of care is an evidentiary question inappropriate for resolution at the dismissal stage. Finally, the Court rejects Defendant s argument that Plaintiff pleads no factual basis for his allegation that Defendant knew or should have known of its employees phone calls made in violation of the TCPA. See Motion to Dismiss at 8. Plaintiff alleges in counts four and five that Defendant knew or should have known of their inadequate training and supervision, Complaint at 28 and 33, and that Defendant Northstar knew or should have known that the conduct of its employees, agents, and/or assigns was improper and was in violation of the FDCPA, the TCPA, and South Carolina law. Id. at 29, 34. These two short and plain statements are sufficient allegations of two key elements concerning the employer s knowledge or reason to have knowledge necessary to maintain causes of action for negligent and reckless training and supervision. See Doe, 407 S.C. at 139, 754 S.E.2d at 500 (listing two of the three elements necessary to maintain a cause of action for negligent supervision: (2) the employer knows or has reason to know he has the ability to control the employee; and (3) the employer knows or has reason to know of the necessity and opportunity to exercise such control ). The Court therefore denies Defendant s motion to dismiss counts four and five of Plaintiff s complaint. B. Count Six: Invasion of Privacy Defendant seeks dismissal of count six, the invasion of privacy claim, by arguing Plaintiff does 10

11 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 11 of 13 not allege facts showing a substantial and unreasonable intrusion by Defendant. Motion to Dismiss at 10. Defendant contends, Plaintiff has not alleged the number of calls that were made or the period of time over which they were made. Id. Defendant asserts that because it is a creditor permitted to take reasonable efforts to collect a debt, Plaintiff cannot show Defendant demonstrated a blatant and shocking disregard for his privacy rights. Id. South Carolina recognizes three separate and distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy: 1) wrongful appropriation of personality; 2) wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and 3) wrongful intrusion into private affairs. Sloan v. S.C. Dep t of Pub. Safety, 355 S.C. 321, , 586 S.E.2d 108, 110 (2003). Plaintiff alleges the third type of invasion of privacy claim, wrongful intrusion into private affairs; thus, he must show (1) an intrusion, which may consist of prying, besetting or other similar conduct; (2) into that which is private (that is, those aspects of [the] plaintiff[ ]s self, home, family which one normally expects to be free from exposure to the others); (3) that the intrusion was substantial and unreasonable; and (4) that the defendant[ ]s conduct was intentional. Craig v. Andrew Aaron & Associates, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 208, 213 (D.S.C. 1996) (citing Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164, 171, 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (Ct. App. 1989)). Whether the conduct is substantial and unreasonable is, in the first instance, a question of law for the court. Snakenberg, 299 S.C. at 172, 383 S.E.2d at 6. A plaintiff who brings an action for wrongful intrusion into private affairs must show a blatant and shocking disregard of his rights, and serious mental or physical injury or humiliation to himself resulting therefrom. O Shea v. Lesser, 308 S.C. 10, 17-18, 416 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1992). The Court finds Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts showing a substantial and unreasonable intrusion by Defendant. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant made relentless telephone calls 11

12 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 12 of 13 to his home and cell phones with the intent to harass, annoy, or coerce him into paying an alleged debt. 6 Complaint at 5, 7. Defendant placed its calls from six different numbers and made several calls to Plaintiff within a twenty-four hour period. Complaint at 5-6. Defendant used an ATDS to generate the calls to Plaintiff s cell phone without his consent. Id. at The complaint also alleges Defendant s repeated calls and systematic campaign of harassment constituted a blatant and shocking disregard for Plaintiff s rights. Complaint at 41. Furthermore, Plaintiff s invasion of privacy claim incorporates his allegations that Defendant violated the FDCPA, a law that Congress passed to prevent [a]busive debt collection practices [that] contribute to... invasions of individual privacy. 15 U.S.C. 1692(a) (emphasis added) (containing the congressional findings for the passage of the FDCPA). Accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds they support a reasonable inference that Defendant s conduct was sufficiently substantial and unreasonable so as to support a plausible claim for wrongful intrusion into private affairs. Although, as Defendant argues, Plaintiff has not specified the exact number of calls or the precise time period during which they occurred, the number and time period are not necessary to notify Defendant of its alleged conduct constituting an intrusion upon Plaintiff s privacy. See Motion to Dismiss at 10. This information may be produced during discovery; at the pleading stage, it is unlikely Plaintiff has access to such particulars. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated a claim for invasion of privacy and denies Defendant s motion to dismiss count six of Plaintiff s complaint. 6 Although Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s invasion of privacy claim by asserting creditors are permitted to take reasonable efforts to collect a debt, Motion to Dismiss at 10, Plaintiff neither admits nor denies he owed a debt to Defendant. Plaintiff refers to the debt as an alleged debt. Complaint at 5-8. The Court also points out the two cases that Defendant cites in support of its argument, Craig v. Andrew Aaron & Associates, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 208 (D.S.C. 1996) and Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1967), both involved motions for summary judgment on claims for invasion of privacy. The district courts in those cases had before them evidence (namely, depositions) showing the existence of a debt owed, and only after considering such evidence did the courts grant summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs invasion of privacy claims. See Craig, 947 F. Supp. at ; Harrison, 264 F. Supp. at

13 4:14-cv RBH Date Filed 07/02/15 Entry Number 13 Page 13 of 13 Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendant s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 9] is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Florence, SC July 2, 2015 s/ R. Bryan Harwell R. Bryan Harwell United States District Judge 13