Die Jovis 14 Februarii 1980

Transcription

1 Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JU/18/240 Die Jovis 14 Februarii 1980 Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was referred the Cause Woodar Investment Development Limited against Wimpey Construction UK Limited, That the Committee had heard Counsel as well on Monday the 19th as on Tuesday the 20th and Wednesday the 21st days of November last upon the Petition and Appeal of George Wimpey & Co., Limited of 27 Hammersmith Grove, London W6 7EN praying that the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 26th day of October 1978 might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the Case of Woodar Investment Development Limited lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause: It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 26th day of October 1978 complained of in the said Appeal be, and the same is hereby, Discharged: And it is further Declared, That the contract of the 21st of February 1973 was not repudiated by the notice of recission of the 24th of March 1974 served by the Appellants upon the Respondents: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondents do pay or cause to be paid to the said Appellants the Costs incurred by them in the Court of Appeal and also the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments if not agreed between the parties: And it is further Ordered, That the Appellants do pay to the Respondents the Costs incurred by them in the High Court of Justice: And it is also further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice to

2 do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment. Woodar Investment Development Limited (Respondents) v Wimpey Construction U.K. Limited (Appellants). HOUSE OF LORDS WOODAR INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED (RESPONDENTS) WIMPEY CONSTRUCTION U.K. LIMITED (APPELLANTS) v. Lord Wilberforce Lord Salmon Lord Russell of Killowen Lord Keith of Kinkel Lord Scarman Lord Wilberforce My Lords, The appellants ("Wimpey") are defendants in this action brought by the respondents ("Woodar") upon a contract of sale dated 21st February This contract related to 14 acres of land at Cobham, Surrey, near to the site later occupied by the Esher by-pass. There was the prospect of planning permission being granted for development. The purchase price was 850,000 and there was a special condition (Condition I) that upon completion the purchasers should pay 150,000 to a company called Transworld Trade Ltd. Completion was fixed for the earliest of three dates namely (i) two months from the granting of outline planning permission for the development of the property, (ii) 21st February 1980, (iii) such date as the purchaser should specify by not less than 14 days' notice in writing. The contract contained a special Condition E under which there was reserved to the purchasers power to rescind the contract in either of three events. The first related to failure to obtain outline planning permission, the second to the failure to obtain an easement giving access to the property, the third (E(a)(iii)) was in the following terms: "[if prior to the date of completion] "(iii) Any Authority having a statutory power of compulsory acquisition "shall have commenced to negotiate for the acquisition by agreement

3 "or shall have commenced the procedure required by law for the compulsory "acquisition of the property or any part thereof." On 20th March 1974 the appellants sent to the respondents a notice in writing purporting to rescind the contract under this provision. The notice stated that the ground relied on was that the Secretary of State for the Environment had commenced the procedure required by law for the compulsory acquisition of 2.3 acres of the property. It was in fact known to both parties at the date of the contract that certain steps had already been taken in relation to these 2.3 acres. In 1970 the Minister had given notice to the then owner of a draft compulsory purchase order, and this fact had been published in the local press. Notice had been given of the appointment of an Inspector to hold a public inquiry, and this was held. A compulsory purchase order was made on 8th November On these facts, the respondents contended that Special Condition E(a)(iii) could not be invoked by the appellants because the relevant procedure for compulsory purchase had started before the date of the contract, and so did not come within the words "shall have commenced". This contention was upheld by Fox J. at the trial and was not the subject of appeal, so that the appellants' claim to invoke the condition has failed. This gives rise to the first issue in this appeal: whether, by invoking Special Condition E(a)(iii), and in the circumstances, the appellants are to be taken as having repudiated the contract. The respondents so claim, and assert that they have accepted the repudiation and are entitled to sue the appellants for damage. My Lords, I have used the words "in the circumstances" to indicate, as I think both sides accept, that in considering whether there has been a repudiation by one party, it is necessary to look at his conduct as a whole. Does this indicate an intention to abandon and to refuse performance of the contract? In the present case, without taking the appellants conduct generally into account, the respondents' contention, that the appellants had repudiated, would be a difficult one. So far from repudiating the contract, the appellants were relying on it and invoking one of its provisions, to which both parties had given their consent. And unless the invocation of that provision were totally abusive, or lacking in good faith, (neither of which is contended for), the fact that it has proved to be wrong in law cannot turn it into a repudiation. At the lowest, the notice of rescission was a neutral document consistent either with an intention to preserve or with an intention to abandon the contract, and I will deal with it on this basis more favourable to the respondents. In order to decide which is correct the appellants' conduct has to be examined. One point can, in my opinion, be disposed of at once. The respondents, in March 1974 started proceedings against the appellants: this is one of the actions consolidated in the litigation before us. They claimed a declaration that the appellants' notice of rescission was not valid, and the appellants, by their defence, asserted the contrary and they counterclaimed for a declaration to that 2

4 effect. The respondents now contend that if the original notice did not amount to a repudiation, the defence and counterclaim did. I regard this contention as hopeless. The appellants' pleading carried the matter no further: it simply rested the matter on the contract. It showed no intention to abandon the contract whatever the result of the action might be. If the action were to succeed (i.e. if the appellants lost) there was no indication that the appellants would not abide by the result and implement the contract. The facts indicative of the appellants' intention must now be summarised. It is clear in the first place that, subjectively, the appellants, in 1974, wanted to get out of the contract. Land prices had fallen, and they thought that if the contract were dissolved, they could probably acquire it at a much lower price. But subjective intention is not decisive: it supplied the motive for serving the notice of rescission: there remains the question whether, objectively regarded, their conduct showed an intention to abandon the contract. In early 1974, there was a possibility that some planning permission might be granted. If it were, and unless the purchasers could take valid objection to it, completion would (under the Conditions) have to follow in two months. Therefore, if a notice of rescission were to be given, it had to be served without delay, i.e. before the planning permission arrived. In this situation, the appellants' advisers arranged a meeting with a Mr. Cornwell, who was acting for the vendors, or as an intermediary with power to commit the vendors, to discuss the matter. This took place on 7 March 1974 and is recorded as a disclosed aide memoire dated the next day. This document was prepared by the appellants, and we have not the benefit of Mr. Cornwell's evidence upon it: he had died before the trial. But the rest of the correspondence is fully in line with it and I see no reason to doubt its general accuracy. After recording each side's statement of position, the document contained (inter alia) these passages: "He [Mr. Cornwell] stated that if we attempted to rescind the contract, "then he would take us to court and let the judge decide whether the contract "could be rescinded on the point we were making." This "point" was undoubtedly that relating to the compulsory purchase of the 2.5 acres. "I told him that our Legal Department would be serving the Notice to "Rescind the Contract within a short while this would ensure that the "company was fully protected and was prudent. He assured me that he "would accept it on that basis and not regard it as a hostile act." The notice was then served on 20 March On 22 March the respondents' solicitors wrote that they did not accept its validity. On 30 May 1974 Mr. Cornwell wrote a long letter to Sir Godfrey Mitchell, President of Wimpey. I refer to one passage: 3

5 "... within a few days of the original meeting, a notice of rescission was "served upon the vendor company by your organisation that the contract "was to be rescinded. Simultaneously with that notice or rescission, "proceedings were instituted and there the matter remains so far as the "legal situation is concerned and both parties, from the legal point of view, "must now await the decision of the court as to the validity of the claim "made by Messrs. George Wimpey & Co. Limited that they are entitled to "rescind this contract upon the grounds which they have so stated." On 4th June 1974 Mr. Cornwell wrote again: "All I need say now is that we will retire to our battle stations and it goes "without saying I am sure that you will abide by the result as I will." My Lords, I cannot find anything which carries the matter one inch beyond, on Wimpey's part, an expressed reliance on the contact (Condition E(a)(iii)), on Woodar's side to take the issue of the validity of the notice (nothing else) to the courts, and an assumption, not disputed by Wimpey, that both sides would abide by the decision of the court. This is quite insufficient to support the case for repudiation. There is only one other matter relied on. At the date of the contract (21st February 1973) there were arrangements made for a loan of 165,000 to be made to the respondents by the National Westminster Bank. The appellants guaranteed subject to three months' notice of termination the respondents' indebtedness to the Bank up to 165,000 and agreed with the Bank to meet interest and other charges. As between the appellants and the respondents it was agreed that the appellants should indemnify the respondents against all interest on the loan for seven years or until the contract should be "fulfilled or discharged". These arrangements did not form part of the contract of sale but were collateral to it. When the notice of rescission was served on 20th March 1974, it was accompanied by a covering letter, of the same date, referring to the loan arrangements. It stated: "The undertaking was limited to seven years from the date of exchange, "or until the contract was fulfilled or discharged. As the contract is now "discharged by the enclosed notice, [Woodar] will now be liable for the "charges incurred in respect of this loan." The appellants also gave three months' notice to the Bank terminating the guarantee. Again, in my opinion, this carried the matter no further. It simply drew the attention of Woodar to the consequences which would follow from rescission of the contract, nothing more. Woodar, in fact understood it as such, for they wrote to the Bank on 8th April 1974 stating that proceedings had been instituted against Wimpey for a declaration "which, if successful, "will reinstate the arrangements which you now give notice you intend to "bring to an end". My Lords, in my opinion, it follows, as a clear conclusion of fact, that the appellants manifested no intention to abandon, or to refuse future performance of or to repudiate the contract. And the issue being one of fact, citation of other decided cases on other facts is hardly necessary. I shall simply state that the proposition that a party who takes action relying simply on the terms of the contract, and not manifesting by his conduct an ulterior intention to

6 abandon it, is not to be treated as repudiating it is supported by James Shaffer Ltd. v. Findley Durham & Brodie [1953] 1 W.L.R. 106 and Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. v. Universal News Services Ltd. [1964] 2 Q.B In contrast to these is the case in this House of Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Molena Alpha Inc. which fell on the other side of the line. Of that I said: "The two cases relied upon by the owners [i.e. the James Shaffer Case "and the Sweet & Maxwell Case]... would only be relevant here if "the owners' action had been confined to asserting their own view, 4 "possibly erroneous, as to the effect of the contract. They went, in fact, "far beyond this when they threatened a breach of the contract with serious "consequences." The case of Spettabile Consorzio Veneziano di Armamento e Navigazione v. Northumberland Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (1919) 121 L.T though in some factual respects distinguishable from the present, is nevertheless, in my opinion, clear support for the appellants. In my opinion therefore the appellants are entitled to succeed on the repudiation issue, and I would only add that it would be a regrettable development of the law of contract to hold that a party who bona fide relies upon an express stipulation in a contract in order to rescind or terminate a contract should, by that fact alone, be treated as having repudiated his contractual obligations if he turns out to be mistaken as to his rights. Repudiation is a drastic conclusion which should only be held to arise in clear cases of a refusal, in a matter going to the root of the contract, to perform contractual obligations. To uphold the respondents' contentions in this case would represent an undesirable extension of the doctrine. The second issue in this appeal is one of damages. Both courts below have allowed Woodar to recover substantial damages in respect of Condition I under which 150,000 was payable by Wimpey to Transworld Trade Ltd. on completion. On the view which I take of the repudiation issue, this question does not require decision, but in view of the unsatisfactory state in which the law would be if the Court of Appeal's decision were to stand I must add three observations: 1. The majority of the Court of Appeal followed, in the case of Goff L.J. with expressed reluctance, its previous decision in Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R I am not prepared to dissent from the actual decision in that case. It may be supported either as a broad decision on the measure of damages (per James L.J.) or possibly as an example of a type of contractexamples of which are persons contracting for family holidays, ordering meals in restaurants for a party, hiring a taxi for a group calling for special treatment. As I suggested in New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. [1975] A.C. 154, 167, there are many situations of daily life which do not fit neatly into conceptual analysis, but which require some flexibility in the law of contract. Jackson's case may well be one.

7 I cannot however agree with the basis on which the learned Master of the Rolls put his decision in that case. The extract on which he relied from the judgment of Lush L.J. in Lloyd's v. Harper (1880) 16 Ch. D. 290, 321 was part of a passage in which the Lord Justice was stating as an "established rule "of law" than an agent (sc. an insurance broker) may sue on a contract made by him on behalf of the principle (sc. the assured) of the contract gives him such a right, and is no authority for the proposition required in Jackson's case, still less for the proposition, required here, that if Woodar made a contract for a sum of money to be paid to Transworld Woodar can, without showing it has itself suffered loss or that Woodar was agent or trustee for Transworld, sue for damages for non-payment of that sum. That would certainly not be an established rule of law, nor was it quoted as such authority by Lord Pearce in Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C Assuming that Jackson's case was correctly decided (as above), it does not carry the present case, where the factual situation is quite different. I respectfully think therefore that the Court of Appeal need not, and should not have followed it. 3. Whether in a situation such as the present viz. where it is not shown that Woodar was agent or trustee for Transworld, or that Woodar itself sustained any loss, Woodar can recover any damages at all, or any but nominal damages, against Wimpey, and on what principle, is, in my opinion, a question of great doubt and difficulty no doubt open in this House but one on which I prefer to reserve my opinion. I would allow the appeal. Lord Salmon My Lords, This case raises a point of law of considerable importance in relation to the repudiation of contracts. Between July 1969 and February 1973 prolonged negotiations took place between Mr. Ronald Cornwell and the appellants (Wimpey) for the purchase by Wimpey of acres of freehold land known as Mizen's Nurseries at Cobham. In January 1973 Wimpey learnt from Mr. Cornwell that the Vendors were to be the respondents (Woodar). By February 1973 the purchase price had been agreed at lm. In that month Mr. Cornwell proposed that part of the purchase price should be paid to him as European Agent for the Transworld Trade Ltd. (Transworld), and a few days later it was agreed that that part of the purchase price should amount to 150,000 and be paid to Transworld direct. It was also arranged that the contract should provide for a loan of 165,000, secured by a charge on the land (the subject matter of the contract) to be made to Woodar by Wimpey through their bank and that Wimpey should be 5

8 responsible for servicing the loan. Wimpey were, however, advised that the loan should be treated separately from the contract, otherwise the contract might be void as constituting a clog on the equity of redemption under the charge. Accordingly, on the 21st February 1973 Wimpey's bank lent Woodar 165,000 and Woodar executed a legal charge on the land in respect of the loan. Wimpey gave a written undertaking to the bank to meet all interest and other charges in respect of the loan until 21st February 1980 "or until the "contract should he fulfilled or discharged". (The underlining is mine.) The facts which I have related are all taken out of Wimpey's printed Case. The written contract for the purchase of the land by Wimpey from Woodar was also executed on the 21st February It specified the purchase price as 850,000 and laid down at the end of the contract in Article I that upon the completion of the purchase of the whole or any part of this land, Wimpey should pay Transworld 150,000. I will now turn to the material clauses in the contract. Clause E(a) so far as relevant reads: "This Contract shall be absolutely binding on both parties... for a "period of seven years from the date hereof but there shall be reserved "to the Purchaser only the power to rescind this contract if prior to the "date of completion:... "(iii) any Authority having a statutory power of compulsory acquisition "shall have commenced to negotiate for the acquisition by agreement "or shall have commenced the procedure required by law for the "compulsory acquisition of the property or any part thereof." This clause, quite obviously, refers only to any such negotiation or procedure commenced after the execution of the contract and prior to completion but not to any negotiation or procedure which had commenced and of which both parties were well aware before they executed the contract. Clause E(c), so far as relevant, reads: "The power to rescind reserved to the Purchaser by subclause (a)... "shall be exerciseable by the service of a notice in writing to that effect "upon the Vendor... and the Purchaser's liability under... this Contract "shall from the date of service of such notice cease." Clause E(g) provides that completion shall take place on the earliest of the three dates it mentions, namely, (i) two months after the date on which outline planning permission for the development of the property is granted; (ii) 21st February 1980; (iii) such date as the Purchaser shall specify but not by less than 14 days' written notice. 6

9 Returning to paragraph E(a)(iii) of the contract, it is common ground that Wimpey and Woodar both knew, well before the contract between them was executed, (1) that in 1970 the Minister of the Environment had given notice of a draft compulsory purchase order in respect of 2.3 acres of the acres covered by the contract, (2) that this fact had been published in the local press, and (3) that notice had also been given of the appointment of an inspector to hold a public inquiry which he had duly held. Indeed, there is a provision in the contract under clause G which, so far as relevant, reads: "It is hereby agreed that the Vendor shall not require the Purchaser to "include in the Transfer to the Purchaser any part... of the land hereby "agreed to be sold which shall be required by the Surrey County Council "... or any Statutory Authority... and the purchase price shall be abated "at the rate of 70,000 per acre... for any part... of the land hereby "agreed to be sold which shall not be included in the Transfer to the "Purchaser". It is to be observed that if the land is priced in the contract at 70,000 an acre, the acres sold under the contract would, in fact, be priced at about lm. By March of 1974 there had been a very alarming slump in the value of land. It is quite clear from one of Wimpey's internal memoranda, written at the beginning of that month, that Wimpey had no intention of honouring their contract by paying the agreed price of 70,000 an acre for the land: that they intended to repudiate the contract but would gladly enter into a new contract with Woodar to buy the land at 48,000 an acre, on otherwise the same terms as those of the existing contract. The relevant part of the memorandum reads as follows: "Revised broadsheets have been prepared taking account of the reduced "selling price of houses and increased building costs and these indicate "that currently to show 20% profit we can offer 48,000 per acre, to show "15% profit 53,000 per acre. "The indications are that this piece of land could obtain outline planning "permission within the next 4 months, in which case we as a company "would be obliged to perform in accordance with the obligations of our "contract to purchase subject to the various conditions. "We propose arranging a meeting with Mr. Cornwell to discuss formally "with him: "(a) Our intention to rescind the contract so that he is obliged to "pay the interest on the loan thereafter from that date. "(b) To make him a proposal that we are prepared to proceed with "the purchase of the land at the reduced figure of 48,000 per "developable acre subject, of course, to the same terms and "conditions." On 20th March 1974 a notice was sent to Woodar by Wimpey in the following terms:

10 "Pursuant to Clause E(c) of a Contract dated the twenty-first day of "February 1973 and made between Woodar Investment Development "Limited of the one part and George Wimpey & Co., Limited of the "other part the said George Wimpey & Co., Limited hereby rescinds the "said Contract on the ground that within the meaning of Clause E(a)(iii) "of the said Contract the Secretary of State for the Environment has "commenced the procedure required by law for the compulsory acquisition "of part of the property (a Compulsory Purchase Order relating to the "land edged red on the plan annexed hereto having been made)," I am afraid that I am entirely unable to agree with the proposition that this notice of rescission was a neutral averment consistent either with the intention to preserve or with an intention to abandon the contract. To my mind it was served with the clearly expressed intention of bringing the contract to an end. This notice was accompanied by a letter of the same date, the last paragraph of which reads as follows: 7 "When Contracts for the sale and purchase of the above land were "exchanged, an undertaking was given by the Company indemnifying "Woodar Investment Development Limited against all interest charges "payable to the National Westminster Bank Limited as a result of a loan "by them to you of a sum of 165, The undertaking was limited "to seven years from the date of exchange or until the Contract was "fulfilled or discharged. As the Contract is now discharged by the enclosed "Notice, Woodar Investment Development Limited will now be liable "for the charges incurred in respect of this loan." (The underlining is mine.) My Lords, it was conceded in this House on behalf of Wimpey that they had no right to rescind, discharge or repudiate the contract. In my respectful opinion, Wimpey had made it crystal clear by their notice and letter of 20th March that they purported to bring their liability under the contract to an end by rescinding and discharging it; and that they had no intention of paying the contract price for the land in question. If this does not go to the root of the contract and evince an unequivocal intention no longer to be bound by it, and therefore amounts to a repudiation of the contract, I confess that I cannot imagine what would. In the court of first instance, Wimpey sought to justify their notice and letter of 20th March 1974 on the ground that prior to the execution of the contract of 21st February 1973, steps had been taken for the compulsory acquisition of 2.3 acres out of the acres the subject matter of the contract. I have already described these steps and I shall not repeat them. It is common ground that all these steps were well known both to Wimpey and to Woodar at the time they were taken. The point was nevertheless argued on behalf of Wimpey before the trial judge that because of these steps having been taken when they were, Wimpey were entitled under Clause E(a)(iii) of the contract to rescind the contract and refuse to perform it. The learned trial judge made short work of that point and decided that it was untenable. The point was so obviously bad that it was wisely decided by counsel on behalf of Wimpey

11 not to be worth taking in the Court of Appeal. It was however accepted by Woodar that on the 20th March 1974, Wimpey honestly believed in the point which they later abandoned. I do not understand how Wimpey's honest belief in a bad point of law can in any way avail them. In Federal Commerce Ltd. v. Molena Alpha Inc. [1978] 3 W.L.R. 309, at p. 342, Lord Denning M.R. said: "I have yet to learn that a party who breaks a contract can excuse himself "by saying that he did it on the advice of his lawyers: or that he was under "an honest misapprehension. Nor can he excuse himself on those grounds "from the consequences of a repudiation". I gratefully adopt that passage which seems to me to be particularly apt in the present case. It certainly was never questioned in your Lordships' House when the appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Federal Commerce case [1978] 3 W.L.R. 991 was dismissed. In Freeth v. Burr (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 208, Lord Coleridge said at p. 213: "... where the question is whether the one party is set free by the action "of the other, the real matter for consideration is whether the acts or "conduct of the one do or do not amount to an intimation of an intention "to abandon and altogether to refuse performance of the contract." In Mersey Steel and Iron Co. Ltd. v. Naylor, Benzon and Co. (L.R. 9 App. Cas. p. 434) Lord Selborne L.C., after approving of what Lord Coleridge said in Freeth v. Burr, supra, went on to say at p. 439: 8 "... you must examine what the conduct is, so as to see whether it "amounts to a renunciation, to an absolute refusal to perform the contract, "such as would amount to a rescission if he had the power to rescind, and "whether the other party may accept it as a reason for not performing "his part." In the Spettabile case (1919) 121 L.T. 628, Atkin L.J. said at p. 634: "A repudiation has been defined in different terms by Lord Selborne "as an absolute refusal to perform a contract; by Lord Esher as a total "refusal to perform it; by Bowen L.J. in Johnston v. Milling 16 Q.B.D. "p. 460 as a declaration of an intention not to carry out a contract when "the time arrives, and by Lord Haldane in Bradley v. H. Newsom Sons "& Co. Ltd. [1919] A.C. 16 as an intention to treat the obligation as "altogether at an end. They all come to the same thing, and they all "amount, at any rate to this, that it must be shown that the party to the "contract made quite plain his own intention not to perform the contract." In the Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. case [1942] A.C. 356 at pp. 378, 379, Lord Wright said: "There is, however, a form of repudiation where the party who repudiates "does not deny that a contract was intended between the parties, but "claims that it is not binding because of the failure of some condition or "the infringement of some duty fundamental to the enforceability of the "contract, it being expressly provided by the contract that the failure of "condition or the breach of duty should invalidate the contract...

12 "But perhaps the commonest application of the word 'repudiation' is to "what is often called the anticipatory breach of a contract where the "party by words or conduct evinces an intention no longer to be bound "and the other party accepts the repudiation and rescinds the contract. "In such a case, if the repudiation is wrongful and the rescission is rightful, "the contract is ended by the rescission but only as far as concerns future "performance. It remains alive for the awarding of damages... for the "breach which constitutes the repudiation." In my opinion, the repudiation in the present case exactly fits the repudiation which Lord Wright explains in the passages which I have just cited. I do not recall that any of these definitions of a repudiation of a contract have ever until now, been questioned. The fact that a party to a contract mistakenly believes that he has the right to refuse to perform it cannot avail him. Nor is there any authority for the proposition that if a party to a contract totally refuses to perform it, this refusal is any the less a repudiation of the contract because he honestly but mistakenly believes that he is entitled by a condition of the contract to refuse to perform it. It would indeed be unfortunate if the law were otherwise. A mistake in the construction of a contractual condition, even such a glaringly obvious mistake as the present can apparently easily be made especially perhaps when the market price has fallen far below the contract price. It is acknowledged in this case that the mistake was an honest one. If, however, a case arose in which a mistake of this kind was alleged to be an honest mistake, but not acknowledged to be so, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to prove the contrary. James Shaffer Ltd. v. Findlay Durham and Brodie [1953] 1 W.L.R. 106 and Sweet and Maxwell Ltd. v. Universal News Services Ltd. [1964] 2 Q.B. 699 were strongly relied upon on behalf of Wimpey. Those two cases were very different from each other and even more different from the present case; in my opinion they certainly lend no more support to Wimpey than they did to the appellants in the Federal Commerce case [1978] 3 W.L.R Indeed, if anything, they are of some help to Woodar. In the former case, Singleton L.J. said at p. 121: "... is it possible to say that the defendants... showed "an intention to abandon and altogether to refuse the performance of the "contract?... I think not." Morris L.J. said at p. 124: "I have no doubt 9 "that [the defendants] wanted to go on with the contract." In the latter case, Harman L.J. said at p. 729, "... repudiation really is not in the picture "here at all, because if the defendants were not wholly justified in the attitude "they took up [on the construction of the agreement] the plaintiffs were not "wholly justified in their attitude either, and they could only treat the "defendants' refusal to comply with their demands as repudiation if their "demands were wholly right. Therefore... repudiation does not really arise: "but as it was the ground of the judgment of the judge below, I think I ought

13 "to say something about it.... there was not that absolute refusal to go on "which is necessary... to arrive at a conclusion that an agreement... has "been entirely repudiated". Pearson L.J. said much the same. The present case is, however, quite different from the James Shaffer case and the Sweet and Maxwell case because Wimpey made it very plain by their notice and letter of 20th March 1974 that they had no intention to go on with the contract and buy the land at the contract price. The case of Spettabile Consorzio Veneziano di Armomenta e Navigazione v. Northumberland Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. [1919] 121 L.T. 628 was also strongly relied upon on behalf of Wimpey. The facts of that case were very strange and clearly distinguishable from the present. Goff L.J. made a long and masterly analysis of that case with which I agree and gratefully adopt. I do not consider that that case is, in reality, of any help to Wimpey. I cannot accept that the majority of the Court of Appeal concentrated too much attention on Wimpey's rescission notice of 20th March 1974 and not enough upon its surrounding circumstances. In any event, it seems to me that those surrounding circumstances supported Woodar's case rather than Wimpey's. I think that it is obvious from the surrounding circumstances that Wimpey had made up their mind at the beginning of March 1974 (and never changed it) that, in no circumstances would they comply with their contractual obligation to buy the land in question at the price of 70,000 per acre. This is made clear by the language of their memorandum which I have already cited and which appears to have been written a day or two before Wimpey's aide memoire of 8th March 1974 upon which Wimpey rely. I do not understand how that document can be evidence against Woodar, even if Mr. Cornwell were still alive. Nor do I think that even if the document were admissible in evidence it could be accepted as being accurate in every detail. Looking at the document as a whole, however, it seems to support Woodar's case rather than Wimpey's. It indicates (1) that Wimpey made plain to Mr. Cornwell what was recorded in the memorandum which I have cited; (2) that Mr. Cornwell was anxious to effect a compromise and suggested that "the money could be paid "to him over a period of up to say five years, or that the price could be lowered "or a combination of both"; (3) that Wimpey replied "the mere extension of "five years would not be attractive to us, but that if the land value was vastly "reduced we would still like to remain with the deal"; (4) that Mr. Cornwell then said "that he would go away and consider the lowest price that he could "afford to sell it to us and that below that price he would fight us through the "Courts." (The underlining is mine.) On 22nd March 1974, two days after the notice of rescission was served by Wimpey, Woodar's solicitor wrote that they did not accept its validity. By a writ of summons endorsed with a statement of claim served on 29th March 1974 Woodar, amongst other things, claimed against Wimpey a declaration that their notice of 20th March 1974 did not rescind the contract. It may well be that Woodar considered that once they commenced legal proceedings, Wimpey would throw in their hand. If so, they were mistaken, for Wimpey served a defence and counterclaim on 18th May 1974 alleging that the notice

14 of rescission of 20th March 1974 was valid and counterclaimed a declaration that the contract had been rescinded by that notice. Mr. Cornwell, who seems to have done all the negotiations on behalf of Woodar, was obviously anxious if possible to settle rather than embark on lengthy and expensive litigation. He was no doubt disappointed when Wimpey made it clear by their defence and counterclaim that they intended to fight. He probably, I think, wrote his lengthy letter of 30th May 1974 in one last effort to effect a settlement. Wimpey have sought to make much of this letter which in my view helps Woodar rather than Wimpey. It seems to make it very plain that Mr. Cornwell had consulted counsel on the notice of rescission and had been advised that it constituted a wrongful repudiation of the contract. I cite one brief passage from it. "... unless some compromise is reached "and quickly, then I shall feel obliged to sell immediately in the best possible "circumstances with a certain knowledge, so far as counsel's advice is con- "cerned, that we have a complete redress against" (Wimpey). Of course there was nothing to stop the parties waiting and doing nothing until the litigation constituted by the first action was over as Mr. Cornwell said earlier in his letter. But there was nothing to prevent Woodar from selling immediately and bringing another action claiming damages, once they had accepted the repudiation to which I have already referred. At the time when Mr. Cornwell's letter of 4th June 1974 was written, upon which my noble and learned friend Lord Scarman places considerable reliance, Woodar had not accepted the repudiation: and a repudiation, however wrongful is nugatory until accepted by the other contracting party. The result of the first action must have been in Woodar's favour. They could have waited until completion was due under the contract, which could not have been later than 21st February Wimpey might then perhaps have completed the contract or they might have failed to complete it, in which event they would have had no defence to an action for specific performance or damages. There was, however, nothing to compel Woodar to confine themselves to the first action. They had a free choice to do so or to accept the wrongful repudiation which would enable Woodar to bring the second action claiming damages for an anticipatory breach of the contract. I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce that Wimpey's counterclaim in the first action did not amount to a repudiation of the contract. For the reasons I have given, however, their repudiation of the contract had, in my view, been effected by the notice of rescission dated 20th March 1974 and supported by the letter of the same date. Although I cannot agree with Buckley L.J. that the contract was not wrongfully repudiated, I do agree with his view that if Wimpey's notice of the 20th March 1974 did constitute a wrongful repudiation of the contract of 21st February 1973, the proceedings launched by Woodar against Wimpey on the 29th March 1974 could not preclude them from accepting that repudiation and bringing another action against Wimpey claiming damages for an anticipatory breach of contract. And this is what Woodar did. On 10th July 10

15 1974, through their solicitors, they accepted the wrongful repudiation of 20th March 1974 and then launched their action for damages for an anticipatory breach of contract. The two actions were consolidated and duly tried by Fox J. who found that Wimpey had wrongfully repudiated the contract of the 21st February 1973 and gave judgment in favour of Woodar for, in all, 462,000 damages. The Court of Appeal by a majority affirmed Fox J.'s decision on liability but reduced the damages to 272,943. My Lords, for the reasons I have stated, I would dismiss the appeal on the issue of liability. Since, as I understand, the majority of your Lordships are for allowing the appeal on liability, the interesting question in relation to damages in respect of the claim for 150,000 does not now arise. I do, however, agree with what my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce has said about the finding of the majority of the Court of Appeal (Goff L.J. with reluctance) on this topic. I would add that, in my opinion, the law as it stands at present in relation to damages of this kind is most unsatisfactory; and I can only hope that your Lordships' House will soon have an opportunity of reconsidering it unless in the meantime it is altered by statute. Lord Russell of Killowen My Lords, 11 The contention advanced by the purchaser ("Wimpey") was that it was entitled to rescind the contract by notice of rescission under special condition E(a)(iii) of the contract, because the relevant authority had "commenced the "procedure" required by law for compulsory acquisition not earlier than the making of the compulsory purchase order on 8th November 1973, subsequent to the contract. Fox J. held that this was incorrect; and that even if it were a correct construction of the contract there should be rectification to make it clear that steps taken by authority in that connection prior to the contract constituted commencement of the relevant procedure and were not intended to afford a ground for rescission under the special condition. From that holding there was and is no appeal. Consequently there was no justification in law for the notice of rescission, and the first question in this appeal is whether the notice of rescission was capable of being accepted by Woodar as a renunciation or repudiation of the contract by Wimpey. An affirmative answer to that question was assumed, or not disputed, before Fox J., and was given by the majority in the Court of Appeal (Buckley L.J. dissenting). The difference of opinion on this point in the Court of Appeal and in your Lordships' House turns upon a question which can be shortly stated. If a party to a contract has a power thereunder totally to rescind and renounce all liability to perform any part of its obligations under a contract, and in terms purports absolutely so to rescind and renounce on grounds that in law

16 are not justified, can there ever be circumstances which enable the rescinder to dispute the renunciatory and repudiatory quality of his action? My Lords, in my opinion the answer to that question is in the negative. I do not of course dispute that a mistaken concept of the rights of a party under the contract, and action (or inaction) on the basis of that mistaken concept, need not constitute such a renunciation of the contract as to be capable of being accepted as repudiation of the contract. Nor do I dispute that repudiation is a serious matter not lightly to be found. Nor do I dispute that in most cases repudiation or non-repudiation falls to be decided having regard to all the circumstances of a case. But I deny that a clear case of the purported exercise of a power of rescission, a total renunciation of all future obligation to perform any part of the contract, such as now concerns your Lordships, can by any circumstances be watered down or deprived of its repudiatory quality. I further assert that it is fallacious to deny that totally renunciatory and repudiatory quality on the ground that because the action is purportedly taken under a clause in the contract it is somehow affirming rather than repudiating the contract. The notice of rescission given in this case by Wimpey was wholly unequivocal, in effect saying that Wimpey would not in any circumstances fulfil the contract: and that flat statement is not to be regarded as otherwise than renunciatory of the contract because Wimpey genuinely thought that it was entitled in law to take that attitude. It is of course true that in previous discussion with Mr. Cornwell (for Woodar) it was indicated that Wimpey's right to rescind on the ground suggested would be challenged by Woodar in proceedings. But I see no ground in that for watering down the absolute nature (or colour) of the notice of rescission as being somehow conditional upon the rectitude in law of Wimpey's stance. Indeed I do not accept a view that the notice of rescission could have been (a) expressed to be conditional upon its justification in law but (b) then operative to terminate all liability of Wimpey under the contract, as it was manifestly intended to be because it was feared that shortly a planning permission would be forthcoming (though it did not) which would trap Wimpey irrevocably into an unprofitable bargain. I can, my Lords, envisage a situation in which a party in the position of Woodar might state unequivocally in advance that if Wimpey were to serve the notice which it did serve, Woodar would not, when it was shown in proceedings that the notice was unjustified, treat it as repudiatory. But that would achieve a position in which Woodar would be debarred from asserting repudiation, rather than constitute a circumstance qualifying the fundamental renunciatory character of the purported exercise by Wimpey of the power. But it cannot be said that such a position was achieved by anything said by Cornwell in this case. I am, my Lords, not led to a contrary view by the circumstances of the Spettabile case at first instance. There the view was taken that if originally a communication would have indicated a repudiatory attitude, subsequent approach to the court by the "repudiator" for a decision upon the rights of 12

17 the case should be taken as withdrawal of the original repudiation. That is not this case. The resort to the court was not by Wimpey, and Wimpey never withdrew its notice of rescission to abide the outcome of the litigation. It was suggested that the proceedings by Woodar for a declaration and/or rectification somehow constituted an election not to accept the rescission as a repudiation, so that Woodar's later purported acceptance of it as such was ineffective. In common with, I believe, all your Lordships I cannot accept that. Woodar was obliged to take the steps that it did in order to establish that the notice was unjustified in law and therefore an unjustified repudiation. Accordingly in my opinion Wimpey wrongfully repudiated the contract by its notice of rescission, and Woodar accepted that repudiation so as to entitle it to damages for total breach. In arriving at my conclusion I do not rely upon the reference to interest payments in the covering letter enclosing the rescission notice: nor upon the defence or counterclaim of Wimpey. These seem to me to add nothing to the repudiatory nature of the notice itself. In conclusion upon this point I cannot agree that, if my opinion were correct, it would be an unfortunate step in the law. If a party takes such a bold step he risks disaster. If he plunges in without first testing the temperature by a construction summons asking whether the rescission remedy is available to him he runs the risk of catching a severe cold. There is no question on this appeal as to quantum of damage save under the heading of damages for breach of special condition I, under which Wimpey agreed on completion of the sale to pay 150,000 to Transworld, a Hong Kong company. Transworld was in some way connected with Mr. Cornwell, who died before action. No evidence connects Transworld with Woodar, the party to the contract. No evidence suggests that Woodar could suffer any damage from a failure by Wimpey to pay 150,000 to Transworld. It is clear on the authority of Beswick v. Beswick that Woodar on completion could have secured an order for specific performance of the agreement to pay 150,000 to Transworld, which the latter could have enforced. That would not have been an order for payment to Woodar, nor (contrary to the form of order below) to Woodar for the use and benefit of Transworld. There was no suggestion of trust or agency of Woodar for Transworld. If it were necessary to decide the point, which in the light of the views of the majority of your Lordships on the first point it is not, I would have concluded that no more than nominal damages had been established by Woodar as a consequence of the refusal by Wimpey to pay Transworld in the light of the law of England as it now stands. I would not have thought that the reasoning of Oliver J. in Radford v. De Froberville [1977] 1 W.L.R supported Woodar's case for substantial damages. Nor do I think that on this point the Court of Appeal was correct in thinking it was constrained by Jackson v. Horizon Holidays [1975] 1 W.L.R to award substantial damages. I do not criticize the outcome of that case: the plaintiff had bought and paid for a high class family holiday: he did not get it, and therefore he was entitled to substantial damages for the failure to supply him with one. It is to be observed that the order of the Court of Appeal as drawn up did not suggest that any part of the damages awarded to him

18 were "for the use and benefit of" any member of his family. It was a special case quite different from the instant case on the Transworld point. I would not, my Lords, wish to leave the Jackson case without adverting with respectful disapproval to the reliance there placed by Lord Denning, M.R. not for the first time on an extract taken from the judgment of Lush L.J. in Lloyd's v. Harper L.R. 16 Ch. D That case was plainly a case in which a trustee or agent was enforcing the rights of a beneficiary or principal, there being therefore a fiduciary relationship. Lord Denning at p in Jackson's case said this: "The case comes within the principle stated by Lush L.J. in Lloyd's v. "Harper [at p. 321] 'I consider it to be an established rule of law that " 'where a contract is made with A for the benefit of B, A can sue on the " 'contract for the benefit of B and recover all that B could have recovered " 'if the contract had been made with B himself ". Lord Denning continued: "It has been suggested that Lush L.J. was thinking "of a contract in which A was trustee for B. But I do not think so. He was a "common lawyer speaking of common law". I have already indicated that in all the other judgments the matter proceeded upon a fiduciary relationship between A and B: and Lush LJ. in the same passage makes it plain that he does also; for he says: "It is true that the person [B] who employed him [the broker A] has a "right, if he pleases, to take action himself and sue upon the contract "made by the broker for him, for he [B] is a principal party to the "contract". To ignore that passage is to divorce the passage quoted by Lord Denning from the fiduciary context in which it was uttered, the context of principal and agent, a field with which it may be assumed Lush L.J. was familiar. I venture to suggest that the brief quotation should not be used again as support for a proposition which Lush L.J. cannot have intended to advance. In summary therefore, in disagreement with the majority of your Lordships, I would have dismissed this appeal on repudiation. Had I been correct I would, as at present advised, have allowed the appeal on the Transworld point, and awarded only nominal damages on that point to Woodar, and not substantial damages to be paid to Woodar "for the use and benefit of" Transworld, a form of order which I cannot see was justified. 13 Lord Keith of Kinkel My Lords, In deciding the issue of repudiation which arises in this appeal, the guiding principle is that enunciated by Lord Coleridge in Freeth v. Burr (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 208 at p. 213: "In cases of this sort, where the question is whether the one party is set "free by the action of the other, the real matter for consideration is whether "the acts or conduct of the one do or do not amount to an intimation