On the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Enhanced Border and Interior Immigration Enforcement: Evidence from Deportees

Transcription

1 Preliminary Draft On the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Enhanced Border and Interior Immigration Enforcement: Evidence from Deportees Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes Professor of Economics Department of Economics San Diego State University San Diego, CA Susan Pozo Professor of Economics Department of Economics Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, MI April 3, 2013

2 I. Motivation, Objectives and Contributions With the onset of the past recession, we observed a heighted sense of animosity toward undocumented immigrants. The charged climate was due, perhaps, to the belief that undocumented immigration was out of control and raising competition for scarce jobs. Job market and fiscal pressures led, in turn, to the adoption of various measures intended to reduce the presence of unauthorized immigrants. Broadly speaking, enforcement was increased at both the border and interior points by federal and state-level governments. For instance, at the federal level, programs like Operation Streamline (OS) significantly raised the penalties for being apprehended while crossing the border. Before the implementation of OS, it was typically the case that first time unlawful border crossers, with no criminal history, were simply returned to Mexico. But OS changed that, making it mandatory that all unauthorized crossers be charged with a criminal act and imprisoned (Lydgate 2010). Simultaneously, state governments began implementing policies to deal with unauthorized migration. This began with the widespread adoption of employment verification systems, which was soon followed by the enactment of omnibus immigration bills authorizing state and local police to check the immigration status of individuals they had probable cause to arrest. 1 In some instances, these laws went even further, as in the case of Alabama, where the law required that public school officials check the immigration status of students. At the same time, reports of abuses against immigrants were on the rise (Diaz and Kuhner 2007, Fernandez 2011). Migrant rights violations ranged from verbal and physical abuse to 1 Arizona was the first state to pass immigration enforcement laws in April Five states quickly followed, enacting similar laws in 2011: AL HB56 in June 2011, GA HB87 in May 2011, IN SB590 in May 2011, SC S20 in June 2011 and UT s package (H116, H466, H469 and H497) in March In 2012, additional states have introduced alike omnibus enforcement bills: Kansas (H2576), Mississippi (H488 and S2090), Missouri (S590), Rhode Island (H7313) and West Virginia (S64). Bills in Mississippi and West Virginia have failed. For more information, visit: 1

3 failure to return personal belongings or inform migrants of their rights. These practices were documented and denounced by the United Nations, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteurs, the Mexican Human Rights Commission, and numerous NGOs (United Nations 2002, Organization of American States 2003). For instance, the Arizona humanitarian aid organization No More Deaths issued two reports: Crossing the Line and A Culture of Cruelty, in which they document more than 30,000 incidents of human rights abuses against undocumented immigrants in short-term detention between fall 2008 and spring 2011 (visit: Nearly 13,000 people were interviewed in the Mexican border towns of Naco, Nogales and Agua Prieta for the report. These events make us wonder about the intended and unintended consequences of immigration policies as captured by their effectiveness in curbing return migration and their role, if any, in the reported mistreatments of apprehended migrants. We address these two inquiries by, first, examining the effectiveness of increased border enforcement through the implementation of Operation Streamline (OS) in deterring repetitive illegal crossings, as well as on the mistreatment of some deportees during their detention and deportation. To this end, we use data on approximately 36,000 migrants apprehended while crossing the border from Second, we repeat the analysis focusing, instead, on the impact of increased interior immigration enforcement through the enactment of state-level Omnibus Immigration Bills (OIB). How effective are they in deterring repetitive illegal crossings? How do they impact the treatment received by deportees? We address these questions using data on approximately 24,000 illegal immigrants who successfully crossed the border, but were later detained usually at home, at work, on the street or elsewhere, from 2005 and onwards. 2

4 Gaining a better understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of increased immigration enforcement is important for various reasons. Current discussion at the national level is pointing to the possibility of comprehensive immigration reform that will include a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. It has been argued that a path to legalization may increase new illegal border crossings. Some legislators have, therefore, been insisting on stepped up immigration enforcement as quid pro quo for a bipartisan compromise on comprehensive immigration reform. But, what do we know about the effectiveness of devoting more resources at the border? Are there unintended consequences of pursuing more stringent enforcement? What are they? Policymakers will be interested in learning about the effectiveness of such measures; especially with regards to their effects on the self- reported remigration intentions of unauthorized immigrants. Additionally, what are some of the human/social costs other than the direct monetary ones of these measures? If comprehensive immigration reform fails, it is likely that states will continue to enact their own immigration enforcement legislation. In that case, understanding the effectiveness and unintended human costs of these measures will become particularly important. And even if comprehensive immigration reform succeeds, there might be important lessons to learn from the state-level experiments with immigration enforcement measures that may be extended nationwide. Are these measures achieving their goal? What are their unintended costs? Answers to these questions will allow policymakers to stand on firmer ground if asked to provide cost/benefit analyses of alternative immigration policies and will help spell out the intended and unintended consequences of record spending on border and interior immigration enforcement at the federal and state levels. 3

5 II. Background Immigration enforcement has increased dramatically since the enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). A series of immigration enforcement operations along the U.S.-Mexico border (e.g. Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in 1994) resulted in an increasingly fortified border that shifted migration flows to more isolate and dangerous routes, raising migrant fatalities (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002). Yet, most apprehended migrants were released back to Mexico after signing a voluntary departure contract a policy that became known as catch and release, leading to the notion that the border was a revolving door (Kossoudji 1992). Voluntary returns were relatively inexpensive for the government and for the migrant, who avoided a long detention process and a formal removal order. A prolific literature exists examining the impact that federal immigration policies (e.g. increased enforcement) have on unauthorized immigration flows, recidivism and smuggling costs, to name a few outcomes. 2 Enforcement strategies changed substantially after 9/11. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instituted a consequence delivery system (CDS) intended to increase the cost of immigrating illegally to the United States. The new system ended the catch and release practices and provided Border Patrol agents with some latitude for choosing among a number of consequences for offenders. Examples of consequence enforcement actions included Expedited Removals and the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP). 3 A consequence enforcement action of 2 Examples of such studies using a variety of data sources including the Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF), the Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico (ENHRUM), the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) or aggregate series on border apprehensions are the works by Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011), Angelucci (2005), Bean et al. (1990), Bean, Edmonston, and Passel (1990), Bustamante (1990), Chavez et al. (1990), Cornelius (1989, 1990, 1998), Davila et al. (2002), Donato et al. (1992), Espenshade (1990, 1994), Gonzalez and Escobar (1990), Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999), Kossoudji (1992), Massey et al. (1990), Singer and Massey (1988), Orrenius (2001), Orrenius and Zavodny (2003), Ritcher et al. (2007), and White et al. (1990). 3 Expedited Removals are one example of consequence enforcement actions. They are reserved for individuals captured within 100 miles from the border and within two weeks from illegally entering the country, and effectively 4

6 particular interest to us is Operation Streamline (OS), introduced in 2005 in the Del Rio sector. OS implemented a Zero Tolerance Policy that implied that all illegal immigrants were subject to criminal prosecution. As shown in Table 1, OS progressively expanded to five more Border Patrol sectors, likely contributing to the 330 percent increase in the number of prosecutions for first time illegal entry (Lydgate 2010). In FY2011, a total of 164,639 people were referred to the U.S. Attorney s office for prosecution (Rosenblum 2012), significantly raising police, jail, criminal justice and legal costs. Overall, federal spending on immigration enforcement reached $18 billion in 2012, exceeding spending by all the other major federal law enforcement agencies combined (Meissner et al. 2013). Spending on immigration enforcement has increased beyond the federal level in the form of Omnibus Immigration Bills (OIB) enacted by state governments. Starting with Arizona s SB1070 in 2010, six more states enacted omnibus immigration legislation in 2011, including Alabama (HB56), Georgia (HB87), Indiana (SB590), South Carolina (S20) and Utah (H116, H466, H469 and H497). 4 Their laws address a variety of topics, including immigration enforcement by local and state police, verification for employment and public benefits, and in some instances, they go even further, requiring schools to verify students legal status. A growing number of researchers have turned to examining the impact that these statelevel polices are having on unauthorized immigration and on undocumented immigrants themselves. 5 For instance, Lofstrom, Bohn and Raphael (2011) explore how the enactment of the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), which mandated the use of an employment eliminate the need for a removal hearing before an immigration judge. They trigger a 5-year reentry bar on apprehended migrants. The Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), also known as Lateral Repatriation Program, transports undocumented immigrants to points east or west and far from where they were apprehended to make it difficult to reconnect with their coyotes. 4 See Table B in the appendix. 5 A comprehensive overview of state and local immigration policy-making in the United States can be found in Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States, edited by Varsanyi (2010). 5

7 verification system for all employers, reduced the share of Hispanic non-citizens a group more likely to be unauthorized residing and working in the state of Arizona. Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2011) examine the timing and effectiveness of SB1070 in reducing the share of likely unauthorized immigrants in the state, while Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun and Martinez-Donate (2012) assess how the enactment of E-Verify mandates has impacted the migration experience, trajectory and future plans of unauthorized immigrants. They find no evidence of a statistically significant association between E-Verify mandates and the difficulties reported by unauthorized immigrants in accessing a variety of services, including social or government services, finding legal assistance or obtaining health care services. However, the enactment of these mandates infuses deportation fear and reduces inter-state mobility among voluntary returnees during their last migration spell, helping curb deportees intent to return to the United States in the near future. Consequence enforcement actions and state-level measures are costly in a variety of respects (Immigration Policy Center 2011). They increase police, jail, criminal justice and legal costs. Likewise, they impose costs on state agencies, which require additional personnel and time to carry out checks, as well as schools (possibly losing federal and state funding as enrollments drop); not to mention broader economic costs due to loss of business, decreases in consumer spending and reductions in tax revenues. In addition, there are other nonmonetary costs that have received increased attention, as is the case with reports of mistreatment ranging from physical and verbal abuse to failure to return personal belongings. These practices have been documented by the United Nations, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteurs, the Mexican Human Rights Commission, and numerous NGOs (United Nations 6

8 2002, Organization of American States 2003). More importantly, they have been on the rise (Diaz and Kuhner 2007, Fernandez 2011). Despite all of the costs, we still know very little about the effectiveness of these immigration enforcement policies. For instance, while Cañas et al. (2012) explore OS s impact on the aggregate number of apprehensions across the Mexico-U.S. border, we still do not know how and if the policy is deterring recidivism. Furthermore, to this date, no studies have looked at one potential and very important unintended consequence of increased enforcement, as is the case with the objectionable treatment that some undocumented immigrants may be receiving when being apprehended and deported to Mexico. We propose shedding some light on these issues with an analysis of the intended as captured by deterred re-entry plans and unintended consequences as measured by reported mistreatments and life risks of two immigration enforcement measures: (1) Operation Streamline a measure of increased federal spending on immigration enforcement along the border, and (2) Omnibus Immigration Laws state-level initiatives on interior immigration enforcement. III. Data To address the aforementioned questions, we use the Encuesta Sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF) which stands for Survey on Migration to the Northern Mexican Border. The EMIF is a migration survey conducted by COLEF for the Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social and the Consejo Nacional de Población along the United States- Mexico border (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social 1998). The EMIF surveys contain a module that is highly representative of the overall population of unauthorized Mexican immigrants apprehended in the United States and returned to Mexico. The survey has been 7

9 carried out annually in Mexico at the centers where deportees from the United States are delivered by the immigration authorities. 6 We use data from the waves, which contain detailed information on the demographic and migration history of approximately 60,000 deportees. As displayed in Table 1, the vast majority (83 percent) of deportees in our sample are male and, on average, 29 years old. About 9 percent of them speak an indigenous language and 15 percent speak English. Most of them have either a secondary education (45 percent) or a primary education (35 percent). More than half (56 percent) of them indicate being married, fifty-three percent are household heads and, on average, their families consist of 5 members. Table 1 also informs on deportees migration history, as well as on some of the characteristics surrounding their last migration spell to the United States. Because the vast majority of immigrants have never crossed before (true for approximately 74 percent of deportee), their average number of previous trips is This is also the case for deportations. About 81 percent of deportees have never been deported before; therefore, their average number of deportations is also less than one (0.30). An average of 76 percent of deportees crossed without documents and 59 percent used a coyote to cross to the United States. The average duration of their last migration spell is about a year and a half, although there is ample variability in this statistic, with the median duration being just 2 days. Of special interest to us is the information on the timing and place of apprehension both of which are needed to identify whether apprehension took place at a particular Border Patrol sector or state with one of the immigration enforcement measures being examined in place. Specifically, the timing is given by the month and year of the interview, which occurs 6 While some deportees were returned to the interior of Mexico through the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), the vast majority of undocumented immigrants were returned to locations along the border that laid east or west from where they were apprehended through the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP). In fact, the MIRP has been suspended due to cost considerations. 8

10 immediately after deportation. Additionally, the EMIF contains information on the place where they were apprehended. Approximately 58 percent of the sample was apprehended while crossing the border. Because deportees also indicated the city through which they were crossing into the United States, we are able to identify the Border Patrol sector in which they were captured and, therefore, whether or not it was a Border Patrol sector participating, at that point in time, in OS. 7 Approximately 34 percent of deportees were captured along the border in a Border Patrol sector with OS in place. Alternatively, deportees may indicate being apprehended at work, at home, on the street or elsewhere after having successfully crossed the border. Forty-two percent of deportees were apprehended after having successfully crossed the border twenty-six percent on the street, four percent at home, four percent at work and the remaining 7 percent elsewhere. In those instances, we use information on the U.S. state where they report residing while in the United States to identify whether the state had an omnibus immigration law in place at the time of apprehension. 8 About 12 percent of deportees captured after having successfully crossed the border were apprehended in a state with an OIB in place. In addition to the time and place of apprehension, we are particularly interested on the information regarding the two outcomes object of analysis. The EMIF asks deportees about their intentions to return to the United States. 9 Deportees are asked: Do you intend to cross into the United States within the next 7 days? If they answer no, they are asked: Do you intend to return some day to the U.S. to work or to look for work? The responses to these questions are used to construct dummy variables identifying the likelihood of a repetitive illegal crossing in the 7 Dates on the implementation of Operation Streamline across the various Border Patrol sectors are obtained from Lydgate (2010). Please refer to Appendix Table A. 8 Dates on the enactment of omnibus immigration laws were obtained from the National Conference of State Legislators (NCLS) website. See Appendix Table B. 9 Repetitive illegal crossings have traditionally accounted for the largest component of overall apprehensions (Cornelius 1998, Spener 2001, Sherry 2004). 9

11 short- and long-run. According to the figures in Table 1, an overwhelming 70 percent of deportees declare intending to cross again illegally in the next week and 87 percent in a more distant future. As shown in Table 2, these percentages have dropped over time, especially for immediate returns. The latter might be a byproduct of the increasingly common practice, by the Border Patrol, of returning migrants to Mexico through ports of entry at a greater distance from those where they were captured, making it much more difficult for migrants to access their networks and significantly raising their migration costs. 10 By 2012, only 25 percent of deportees indicated their intent to return in the following week, even though 73 percent of deportees continued to indicate that they would attempt a new crossing in the more distant future. Since 2005, the EMIF has also been questioning deportees about the treatment received during their apprehension and detention process. Specifically, respondents are asked whether they were subject to physical aggression by the authorities, such as being pushed or hit; whether they were subject to verbal aggression (yelled at or insulted); and whether their belongings were confiscated. They are also asked whether they were informed of their right to speak with the Mexican Consulate. It is worth looking not only at the percentage of migrants reporting being mistreated in the various ways (shown in Table 1), but also at how those percentages have changed, if at all, over time (Table 2). In some instances, the share of immigrants reporting being mistreated has not changed much over the years, as in the case of the shares of deportees that report being physically abused during the apprehension process. The share reporting such is fairly stable, at 4 percent, though creeping up a bit from time to time. In contrast, the reported confiscation of personal items rose from 2 percent in 2005 to 15 percent by Likewise, the separation of family members during the deportation process jumped. Among those reporting 10 See, for example: 10

12 crossing with family, an average of 17 percent reported being separated from family members in 2005, while 70 percent did in This might be a byproduct of the increasing number of apprehensions in the interior as opposed to the border. Lastly, there is evidence of wide spread failure to inform migrants of their rights and, in particular, of their right to contact their Consulate. Up to three-quarters of deportees indicate being victims of this practice up to However, this violation seems to have been addressed, likely through training, given that the share of deportees reporting being victims of such a practice dropped to 32 percent by Table 1 and Table 2 also report on whether deportees risked their life to cross yet another proxy of the human costs of increased enforcement. In 2005, approximately 29 percent of deportees indicated that they did, whereas in 2012, only 14 percent claimed to have risked their life to cross. Perhaps, increased enforcement has induced selection in terms of which migrants attempt the crossing. This selection may, in turn, be driving the reduced share reporting risking their lives. Tables 3A and 3B provide some preliminary descriptive evidence of OS and OIB on the intended and unintended consequences object of analysis. Specifically, Table 3A compares the effectiveness of OS in deterring deportees from crossing again pre- vs. post-december 2005 (when OS was first implemented) in treated vs. control Border Patrol sectors (that is, Border Patrol sectors with OS as opposed to other Border Patrol sectors without OS). A simple difference-in-difference estimate reveals that OS is associated with a higher intent to return to the United States within the next 7 days following apprehension. Similarly, OS appears to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of reporting being uninformed about the right to contact the Mexican Consulate of 5 percentage points. Yet, OS seems to significantly lower the willingness to return to the United States in the more distant future, as well as the likelihood of 11

13 other mistreatments. Also of interest is the fact that OS seems to be associated with a large drop (31 percentage points) in the incidence of reporting risking one s life to cross. Similarly, Table 3B examines the impact that OIB might have on the various intended and unintended consequences being examined. As with OS, OIB appears to raise the likelihood of planning a new crossing into the United States in the next week by 15 percentage points and also raises the likelihood of being separated from family members during the deportation process by 33 percentage points. However, OIB is generally associated with a lower likelihood of planning to cross into the United States in the more distant future, and with a reduced likelihood of enduring mistreatments covered by the survey (except in the case of family separations). Overall, then, at a purely descriptive level, it is unclear what the intended and unintended impacts of OS and OIB might be. While they seem to deter recidivists in the long-run and even contribute to reduce the likelihood of various types of mistreatments, they both seem to enhance the intent to return in the immediate short-run and, depending on the policy in question, increase the incidence of misinformation about the right to consul (OS) or family separations (OIB). Therefore, we next turn to a more thorough regression-based analysis. IV. Methodology Our first objective is to learn about the effectiveness of increased border enforcement as captured by the recent implementation of Operation Streamline (OS) in deterring deported migrants from attempting to return to the United States and in receiving questionable treatment during the deportation process. To accomplish this, we utilize individual level data on deportees apprehended while crossing the border between 2005 and As noted earlier, the data contain information that allow for the identification of the Border Patrol sector through which migrants crossed, allowing us to know whether or not OS was in place. Specifically, we 12

14 compare changes in the reported intent to return to the United States by deportees, as well as the circumstances surrounding the apprehension process, in treated vs. control Border Patrol sectors pre -vs. post- implementation of OS as follows: (1) Y # (# ist 0 1OSst 2 Sec t 3 Sec t * OSst ) X ist s t st ist, ist ~ N 0,1 where: i=1,, n individuals, s=sector, and t=(month, year). Y ist equals 1 if the ith deported migrant, who last migrated in time t and was apprehended in Border Patrol sector s, indicates: (a) planning on returning to the United States, 11 or (b) experiencing questionable treatment during the apprehension and detention process. 12 OS st is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the migrant was apprehended in a Border Patrol sector with OS in place. For example, OS st equals 1 if the migrant was apprehended in a treated Border Patrol sector, such as Tucson after January It is equal to 0 if the migrant was apprehended in the Tucson Border Patrol sector before January 2008, or if s/he was apprehended in a Border Patrol sector that never implemented OS, such as San Diego. We are primarily interested in which captures how OS may be impacting the treatment of deportees and their return intentions. To account for the possibility that the impact of OS increases (or decreases) as more Border Patrol sectors under OS are added, we incorporate a variable accounting for the number of Border Patrol sectors implementing OS (#Sec t ) at the time of apprehension and interact it with the policy dummy (i.e. OS st ). It is conceivable, for example, that as the number of Border Patrol sectors implementing OS rises, the deterrence effect rises (that is, the willingness to return to the United States drops or α 3 <0) due to a tighter squeeze on undocumented crossings. Similarly, 11 We estimate separate models for the intent to return within the next seven days and intent to return in the more distant future. 12 Separate equations are estimated using responses to questions concerning being physically abused, verbally abused, having possessions confiscated, separated from family, right to counsel, and risking life. 13

15 as the number of sectors under OS increases, it is possible that Border Patrol agents behavior concerning the treatment of immigrants changes. The vector X includes individual level characteristics traditionally incorporated when modeling migration experiences and decisions, such as gender, race, age, indigenous language, English proficiency, educational attainment, marital status, household head status, and family size. Migration-related characteristics, such as the number of times they have crossed before, the number of times they have been deported, the duration of their last migration spell or whether they last crossed with a coyote are also included. We include a series of Border Patrol sector fixed-effects, time fixed-effects and Border Patrol sector-time trends in equation (1) in order to help capture regional and macroeconomic factors affecting our outcomes. For instance, Border Patrol sector fixed-effects can help capture time invariant geographic characteristics, such as a political environment hostile to immigration a characteristic that could potentially be related to the likelihood of reporting mistreatment. Border Patrol sector fixed effects can also capture the presence of networks in specific crossing points a trait that can lower migration costs and increase intent of returning to the United States. Time fixed-effects may address economy-wide shocks that could impact the likelihood of mistreatment by affecting investments in police training, or the probability of indicating a desire to return to the United States in the future given the economic climate. Lastly, a key identification assumption in the difference-in-difference (DD) analysis described above is the presence of similar pre-treatment trends in treated and control Border Patrol sectors/states of apprehension. This assumption is violated if differences between the latter are driving the enactment of the policy. To address that possibility, it is important to control for the variation over time within each Border Patrol sector or apprehension state by including Border Patrol 14

16 sector- or state of apprehension-time trends in our most complete model specification. Border Patrol sector-time trends may capture time-varying factors at the sector-level potentially driving our outcomes, such as an increasing presence of undocumented immigrants in that sector an element that could alter the attitudes and antagonism toward this population. Alternatively, sector-time trends might capture changing economic conditions at the Border Patrol sector level, such as the development of migrant businesses a phenomenon that might lure deportees to the United States. Our second aim is to learn about: (a) the effectiveness of state-level initiatives (as captured by the enactment of OIB) in immigration enforcement in deterring repetitive illegal crossings, and (b) their impact on the treatment received by deportees when apprehended and detained. We utilize individual level data on deportees apprehended at work, at home, on the street or elsewhere after having successfully crossed the border from 2005 through The data contain information on the timing of the apprehension and the state where the migrant resided, allowing us to identify whether an omnibus immigration law was in place. Our benchmark model is thus given by: (2) Yist 0 1OIBst 2 # States t 3 (# States t * OIBst ) X ist s t st ist, ist ~ N 0,1 where: i=1,, n individuals, s=state and t=(month, year). The dependent variable, constructed as a dummy variable, captures the migrant s self-reported intent to return to the United States in the foreseeable future, or whether s/he reported mistreatment during the apprehension and detention process. OIB st equals 1 if the migrant was apprehended in a state with an omnibus immigration bill in place, such as SB1070 in AZ, after April 2010; otherwise, it is set equal to 0. As in the case of OS, we account for spillover effects that could result from the increase in the 15

17 number of states with OIBs by incorporating the variable #States t and the interaction term (#States t *OIB st ). The remaining regressors include whether deportees were apprehended at work, at home or on the street. In addition, we include the same demographic and migration related characteristics as in equation (1). We are interested in learning about β 1 which will inform about the impact that the passage of state-level immigration enforcement statutes have had on deportees expressed intent to return to the United States and on their reported treatment during the apprehension and detention process. Equations (1) and (2) are both estimated as linear probability models (LPMs). Although, in some instances, LPMs can yield predicted probabilities that fall outside the unit circle, they impose fewer restrictions on the distribution of the error term and facilitate convergence (Wooldridge 2008). V. Findings The results from estimating equations (1) and (2) for the intended and unintended outcomes object of analysis are reported in Tables 4 through 11. The first two tables display the estimated immediate and long-run deterrence impact of OS and OIB on deportees. The remaining tables zero in on the unintended consequences of increased enforcement as captured by the likelihood of reporting different types of mistreatment (physical abuse, verbal abuse, confiscation of personal belongings, separation from family members during the deportation process, being uninformed about the right to contact the Mexican consulate) or by the likelihood of risking one s life during the crossing. In all tables, the first 3 columns report the impact of OS, and the rest of the columns inform on the impact of OIB. In all tables, we also display three alternative model specifications. Specification (1) includes all the demographic and migration- 16

18 related characteristics included in Table 1. Specification (2) adds time (year, month) fixedeffects, as well as Border Patrol sector or state of apprehension fixed-effects depending on whether we are examining the impact of OS or OIB, respectively. Finally, specification (3) includes Border Patrol sector-time trends or state of apprehension-time trends. As noted earlier in the methodology, an important check on any difference-in-difference strategy is to control for any pre-existing and differential trends in treatment versus control Border Patrol sectors (state of apprehension). The inclusion of Border Patrol sector (state of apprehension) time trends controls for the existence of these differential trends. A) Intended and Unintended Consequences of Operation Streamline Does OS deter repeated undocumented crossings by deportees? Does it impact the more immediate or more distant future migration plans? The estimates in the first 3 columns of Tables 4 and 5 address these questions by estimating equation (1). For simplicity, we discuss only the main regressors object of study namely the federal and state-level policies being examined. We further zero-in on the final specification, it being the most complete. While the implementation of OS by a particular Border Patrol sector does not significantly change deportees return intentions in the immediate or distant future, OS appears to impact deportees future return intentions via an indirect spillover effect. Specifically, the adherence of an additional Border Patrol sector to OS lowers deportees long-run return intentions by seven-tenths of a percentage point. While this impact is statistically different from zero, it is rather modest given that, on average, eighty-seven percent of deportees indicate their intent to cross in the further future. As such, OS seems to have only a modest impact on recidivism. Does OS impose any significant costs in terms of mistreatment of deportees? According to the estimates from the most complete specification (column 3) in Tables 6 through 11, OS 17

19 does not seem to have altered deportees reported likelihood of reporting having endured physical abuse, verbal abuse, confiscation of personal property, separation from family or being uninformed about the right to contact the Mexican Consulate. In fact, deportees likelihood of being uninformed about the right to consul appears to have decreased by 11 percentage points (14 percent) as the number of Border Patrol sectors implementing OS rises. 13 However, the growing implementation of OS appears to impose some costs. First, with each additional Border Patrol sector implementing OS, the likelihood of having one property confiscated rises by about 1 percentage point. More importantly, OS has significantly raised human costs. According to the figures in Table 11, deportees become 2 percentage points more likely to report having risked their lives while crossing with each additional Border Patrol Sector joining OS. As such, the implementation of OS in six Border Patrol Sectors effectively raises deportees likelihood of risking their lives by 12 percentage points. This is true whether they crossed through a Border Patrol sector implementing OS or not and, overall, corroborates news reports of this human cost to increased border enforcement. It is interesting that such an effect is not evident in the descriptive statistics, emphasizing the importance of accounting for other migrant characteristics, Border Patrol and time fixed effects and, in particular, Border Patrol specific time trends. B) Intended and Unintended Consequences of Omnibus Immigration Bills Tables 4 through 10 also inform on the intended and unintended consequences of increased immigration enforcement at the state level as captured by the enactment of OIB. As we do with OS, we display the results from estimating three different specifications that progressively add controls to the regressions. One difference with regards to the previous model 13 In that case: (0.005*0.34) = or -11 percentage points. Both coefficients are jointly significant at the 5 percent level, i.e. F (2, 2) =65.02, Prob>F=

20 specifications is that these equations include information on where the apprehension took place once the migrant had successfully crossed the border, i.e. whether at home, at work or on the street. Apprehension elsewhere is used as the reference category. Are OIBs deterring undocumented immigrants from planning repetitive illegal crossings? According to the results in Table 4 and Table 5, they are; both in the short-run and in the longrun. OIBs curb deportees immediate re-entry intentions by 6.4 percentage points (9 percent). 14 Although to a smaller extent, OIBs also seemingly reduce deportees re-entry intentions in the further future by about 3 percentage points, 15 from 87 percent to 84 percent among deportees in our sample. Are OIBs related to the incidence of mistreatment among deportees? The figures in Tables 6 through 10 address this question. If we do not take into account spillover effects, OIBs lower the incidence of physical abuse with respect to deportees by 4.6 percentage points. Similarly, OIBs appear to reduce the likelihood that deportees report being subject to verbal abuse by 11 percentage points. However, the incidence of both types of mistreatment increases with each additional state implementing an OIB. At the conclusion of 2011, a total of six states had OIBs. If one more state were to enact an OIB, the likelihood of physical abuse would increase by roughly 1 percentage point. A similar result is observed for the likelihood of enduring verbal abuse. What might explain these patterns? Perhaps, the growing number of states adopting OIBs is a reflection of a growing anti-immigrant sentiment that may manifest itself in a higher incidence of mistreatment. 14 This results from: (-0.033*0.66) = , where 0.66 is the average number of states with an omnibus immigration bill in our sample (see Table 1). Both coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent level, i.e. F (2, 44) =7.46, Prob>F= In this case: (-0.009*0.66) = or -3 percentage points. Both coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent level, i.e. F (2, 44) =7.82, Prob>F=

21 Additionally, OIBs are associated with a 17 percentage point higher likelihood of being separated from family members during the deportation process. 16 As with the likelihood of being verbally abused, the likelihood of this event rises with the number of states adopting these policies, possibly hinting at the anti-immigrant sentiment noted earlier. Yet, for this type of perpetration, the spillover effect is negatively signed; thus indicating that this violation loses prevalence as the number of states implementing OIBs rises. Finally, in some instances, the implementation of an OIB appears to have helped lowered the incidence of some types of mistreatments. For instance, on average, OIBs seem to have helped lowered the likelihood of being misinformed about the right to contact the Mexican consulate by 13 percentage points both directly as well as indirectly through their spillover effects. Perhaps, as OIBs become more prevalent and receive growing public attention, certain groups may publicize migrants right to consul. Alternatively, the Mexican government might be responding to public outcries about mishandling of detainees as the number of deportees has swelled in recent years, trying to increase migrant awareness of their rights through information campaigns in border cities and through its direct involvement in Mexican deportation cases. To conclude, it is also worth noting how the incidence of mistreatment varies where apprehension took place. For instance, with the exception of being uninformed about the right to consul, all other migrant rights violations are more likely to take place when apprehensions occurred at work (than elsewhere the reference category). Similarly, various types of mistreatment including physical abuse, separation from family members and misinformation about the right to contact the Mexican consulate, appear more prevalent during at home apprehensions. It may be that apprehensions at work and at home are less likely to be in the 16 Basically: (-0.027*0.66) = or 17 percentage points. Both coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent level, i.e. F (2, 44)=72.81, Prob>F=

22 public eye, allowing for the escalation of a confrontation or for negligence during the detention procedure. In contrast, apprehensions taking place on the street only seem to endure a higher likelihood of being uninformed about the right to consul, but not a higher exposure to the remaining mishandlings object of analysis. VI. Summary and Conclusions In this study, we examine some of the intended and unintended consequences of increased border and interior immigration enforcement as captured by Operation Streamline (OS) and Omnibus Immigration Bills (OIB) enacted at the state level. We first assess the effectiveness of federal and state-level initiatives in curtailing deportees intent to return to the United States in the immediate and further future an aim or intended consequence of these policies. Subsequently, we explore some unintended consequences of these policies namely how they have impacted the treatment received by deportees during their detention. In the case of OS, we also look at how the policy may have induced migrants to risk their lives with the hope of making it to the other side. Overall, we find that these policies curtail deportees intent to return to the United States in the further future, although by rather small amounts. The larger impact occurs in the immediate short-run via OIBs, which curb deportees return intentions by 6 percentage points (9 percent). OS impact, in that regard, is null. However, in some regards, the scorecard of OS with regards to migrants rights violations during the apprehension and deportation process looks better than it does for OIBs. OS does not seem to raise the incidence of mistreatments, even though deportees are more likely to report risking their lives to cross as the number of Border Patrol sectors implementing OS rises. In contrast, although the implementation of an OIB appears to be accompanied by a reduced 21

23 incidence of physical and verbal abuse among deportees, such an impact reverses as the number of states adopting OIBs rises. Perhaps, the growing number of OIBs is just an expression of an evolving anti-immigrant sentiment that manifests itself in a higher rate of physical and verbal mistreatment during the apprehension and detention process a herd effect. This is an area worthy of further research. Additionally, OIBs have raised the incidence of family separations during the detention and deportation process a concern often expressed in the news. However, OIBs appear to have reduced the incidence of migrant misinformation about the right to contact the Mexican Consulate perhaps increased awareness by police officers of the importance of letting detainees know about their right to consul might have contributed to that outcome. In sum, the results reveal that, while partially effective at reducing the intention to commit recidivism by deportees, recent immigration enforcement policies at the federal and state-level have substantially raised some human costs endured by migrants. Such costs involve a substantial increase in the proportion of deportees who claim risking their lives to cross, and an increased likelihood of being separated from family members during the deportation process. A full accounting of these human costs, alongside the limited effectiveness of some of these policies in curbing recidivism, should be taken into consideration when evaluating these policies. Also of interest is the finding that the effect of these policies varies as their prevalence spreads through Border Patrol sectors and states, raising important questions about their ultimate impact if implemented throughout the country. 22

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28 Figure 1 Border Patrol Zone 27