2. The facts. b. children born, or legally adopted, after the specified date, whether inside or outside the host State. where:

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1 Both parties have brought evidence and a plea note into question. In the session, claimants 1. 2, 4 and 5 were present in person. Plaintiff 1 appeared also on behalf of Brexpats and claimant 5 also on behalf of CADS. Plaintiffs were assisted by mrs. Chr.A. Alberdingk Thijm, E.H. Janssen and S.C. van Velze. On the side of the State T. de Gans and H. van Eijken were present. On behalf of the Municipality appeared M. van Genugten. The defendants were jointly assisted by mrs. E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk and G.A. Dictus. 2. The facts 2.1. On 23 June 2016, a small majority of the British population voted in favor of the so-called Brexit referendum for withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (hereafter: EU). On 29 March 2017, the United Kingdom advised the European Council in accordance with Article 50 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter VEU) their intention to withdraw from the EU In accordance with Article 50 paragraph 2 VEU and Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter VWEU), on 19 June 2017 The European Council and the United Kingdom started negotiations on the United Kingdom's withdrawal agreement with the EU. No comprehensive agreement has yet been reached between the negotiating parties. On 8 December 2017, however, they presented a report and advised that the first phase of the negotiations has been concluded. From that report it appears that the negotiating parties have formulated a common starting point, inter alia, for the rights of British nationals residing in other EU states, under the condition that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" According to the progress report. at the moment the United Kingdom leaves the EU, the principle of reciprocity will govern the protection of rights of, on the one hand, British nationals who are currently residing in other EU states and, on the other hand, nationals of the other EU states currently in the United Kingdom. This protection must also extend to family members, as defined in Directive 2004/38/EG of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of free movement and residence in Member States for citizens of the Union and their family members (hereinafter: EU Citizenship directive). In section and 11 of the progress report the protection is described as follows: 12. Irrespective of their nationality, the following categories of family members who were not residing in the host State on the specified date will be entitled to join a Union citizen or UK national right holder after the specified date for the life time of the right holder, on the same conditions as under current Union law: a. all family members as referred to in Article 2 of Directive EC, provided they were related to the right holder on the specified date and they continue to be so related at the point they wish to join the right holder: and b. children born, or legally adopted, after the specified date, whether inside or outside the host State. where:

2 i. the child is born to. or legally adopted by, parents who are both protected by the Withdrawal Agreement or where one patent is protected by the Withdrawal Agreement and the other is a national of the host State; or ii. the child is born to. or legally adopted by. a patent who is protected by the Withdrawal Agreement and who has sole or joint custody of the child under the applicable family law of an EU27 Member State or the UK and without prejudging the normal operation of that law. in particular as regards the best interests of the child: 13. The UK and EU27 Member States will facilitate entry and residence of partners in a durable relationship (Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC) after the UK s withdrawal in accordance with national legislation if the partners did not reside in the host state on the specified date, the relationship existed and was durable on the specified date and continues to exist at the point they wish to join the right holder: 14. The right to be joined by family members not covered by paragraphs 12 and 13 after the specified date will be subject to national law (...). Finally, paragraph 15 states that frontier workers will also fall under the protective scope of the agreement Claimants 1 through 5 are nationals of the United Kingdom. They are all living in the Netherlands. Brexpats is a foundation founded on 13 September 2017 under Dutch law. According to an extract from the Trade Register, Brexpats has the object of looking after the interests of all citizens of the European Union with British nationality who are affected by the Brexit in their rights or interests. At the time of the creation of Brexpats and at the time of issuing the writ of summons Plaintiff 1, according to the extract from the Trade Register, was chairman, secretary and treasurer of its board, and the Advisory Council consisted of one person, namely B.R. Robinson. CADS is an Amsterdam network association of entrepreneurs with the aim to promote English-Dutch trade relations. The board of CADS exists of Plaintiff 5 and four others. CADS has about one hundred members. These are from the UK, other countries of the Commonwealth, and the Netherlands. 3. The dispute 3.1. Plaintiffs summarized the following requests: Primarily: I. In the case that EU citizenship is retained after Brexit:

3 i. that the State and the Municipality maintain, protect and guarantee the rights arising from EU citizenship of claimants 1 to 5, their husbands and children, and similarly all British citizens residing in the Netherlands: ii. that the State and the Municipality abstain from any measures that lead to the situation in which rights deriving from EU citizenship of claimants 1 to 5, their husbands and children and other British citizens residing in the Netherlands are violated, particularly that the State and the Municipality do not implement a withdrawal agreement or any other agreement where the aforementioned rights are not guaranteed: II. in case the United Kingdom's withdrawal causes UK citizens to lose their EU citizenship rights: i. to recommend that the State does not limit rights arising from the EU citizenship of claimants 1 to 5, their husbands and children and other British citizens resident in the Netherlands without individual scrutiny of the principle of proportionality: ii. in particular with regard to Plaintiff 2. to prohibit the State that plaintiff 2 must renounce her British nationality: iii. to order the Municipality to respect the individual test referred to in (i) and, in so far as they can, to ensure that happens. iii. to order the Municipality to urge the State to facilitate multiple nationality for anyone applying for Dutch nationality. Secondly: III. Order the State and the Municipality to take such measures as the Court considers just, in line with the aforementioned, in such a way that the rights of British citizens residing in the Netherlands are respected. protected and guaranteed: And in either case: IV. Order the defendants to pay the costs of the proceedings. The claimants assert that assessment of their claims focuses on clarification of Article 20 TFEU. They argue that preliminary questions should be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) The State of the Netherlands et al. defend the current position The statements of the parties will be referred to below insofar as relevant, and developed:

4 4. The admissibility of Brexpats and CADS 4.1. The State and the Municipality have argued that the Brexpats Foundation and the CADS Association should be declared inadmissible. This is based on the fact that Brexpats and CADS do not fulfill the conditions laid down in Section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code for instituting a collective action With regard to Brexpats, the State and the Municipality argue that the interests of persons for whom the claim is brought are insufficiently shown. They point out that Brexpats does not comply with the Claim Code (and not even its own articles of association) with the functions of chairman, secretary and treasurer in one person, viz. plaintiffs under 1 are the same. It is therefore insufficiently assured that Plaintiff 1 will not have their own interest prevail over the interests of the persons for whom Brexpats has instituted the claims The following is important in the assessment of this admissibility. If it is disputed that a foundation referred to in Section 3: 305a of the Netherlands Civil Code fulfills the condition that the interests of persons for whom the claim is made are sufficiently guaranteed. it should be assessed to what extent the people involved ultimately benefit from the collective action if the requisite order is given and to what extent orders may be trusted that the claimant organization has sufficient knowledge and skills to conduct the proceedings. In addition, according to parliamentary history, inter alia, every other work the organization has carried out to use for the interests of injured parties, or its members have been able to realize their own objectives, the number of injured parties that are members of the organization, and the extent to which injured parties support the same collective action. It can also be significant whether the claimant organization complies with the principles included in the Claim Code. In the case of an ad hoc foundation, it may be important whether it has been set up by existing organizations that have been successful in past actions. (Mvi, Parliamentary Papers No. 3, pp ) Regarding the above Brexpats fails the admissibility criteria. Assessing the independence of a foundation on the basis of article 3:305a, their claim must at least be extant or proven. It must be proven that it exists to defend the serious interests of those it represents. Although the Claim Code and the standards it contains in this respect is not decisive. it appears that the legislative history of Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code gives the legislator this (as a hint) to judgea certain weight. In the case of Brexpats, all management functions are united in one person including the Advisory Board. The condition advocated by the Claim Code is a balanced composition of the board. which in principle can become according to this code guaranteed by the appointment of three board members, insufficiently ensured. The State and the municipality has rightly argued the risk that Brexpats is founded for the sole or primary interests of Plaintiff 1. Even if the actual situation differs from that in the Trade register, it does not change the above. The State and the Gemeente can rely on publication in that register and on the person of Brexpats for the publication of its relevant data if necessary. In addition, neither is it shown that Brexpats has sufficient support among the group of stakeholders for whom it is arguing, namely

5 the British nationals who live in another EU country. Brexpats can therefore not be recognised in the Court. Admissability of CADS 4.5. With regard to CADS, the State and the Municipality state they are not satisfied with its foundations, in the sense that CADS has not sufficiently explained how it meets the conditions stated in article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code. The defendants also argue that CADS has not met the condition of article 3:305a paragraph 2 of the Dutch Civil Code that it must have endeavoured to advance its case by consultation. The defendants argue that CADS has not approached them to cooperate in a preliminary ruling reference to the CJEU This is rejected. CADS has with the documents submitted by it sufficiently made plausible that it complies with the provisions of Article 3: 305a of the Dutch Civil Code conditions. According to their website, CADS aims to promote business and cultural contacts between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, it has existed since 1972 and has therefore not been established for this procedure. It has a united membership and sufficient composition of the stakeholder group representatives for whom it has brought the present claims The fact that CADS has asked the State and the Municipality to support its desire for preliminary questions to be asked to the CJEU does not require that the condition referred to in 4.5 is met. CADS takes the position that the questions to be asked are necessary for the assessment of its aims. Partly considering the essentially transboundary nature of the present dispute and the (legal) attitude of the State and the Municipality in which it lies has decided that they do not see any legal grounds or grounds for protecting the claimants against the (threatened) violation of their rights, consultation in these circumstances is pointless CADS can therefore be admitted as a co-plaintiff. 5. The assessment 5.1 Claimants apply three bases for their claims, namely i) the doctrine of acquired rights, (ii) EC citizenship under Article 20 TFEU and (iii) Article 8 ECHR. 5.2 The State and the Municipality have argued that the requests form an undesirable interference with the Brexit negotiation process, and that the claimants have set up a fictional dispute to present to the HvJEU. These defenses will now be dealt with. Political Question? 5.3. The first defense refers to the doctrine of the political question and relates to the division of tasks between the appointed judiciary and elected politicians. This doctrine is decisive for answering the question whether the dispute submitted for judgement lies within the competence of the court, or to another state power; whether there are sufficiently clear

6 and objective criteria to judge the dispute in court, or whether another competent state power must become involved in what is a political decision In general, it is unusual that a dispute arises that is not suitable for review by the court. The mere fact that a procedure is surrounded with political sensitivities is insufficient More specifically, this is also the case in Dutch government. There exists between the legislators, the executive, and the judiciary, a careful balance of power that is less capable of a strict division of competencies. The mutual relationship of the trias politica in the Netherlands (to a certain extent) can be typified as a cooperative model, respecting everyone's specific responsibility. Inherent to the task of the civil court is to provide legal protection at individual level against other state powers. This is not necessarily different in cases that have a political dimension The present dispute concerns the question whether UK citizens residing in the Netherlands derive their fundamental rights from the UK's membership of the EU. Rights that are lost due to the UK leaving the EU. In this case, the question focuses on their fundamental rights to reside, live and work in EU Member States and to travel freely between the countries of the EU. Plaintiffs 1 to 5, and the stakeholders whom CADS represents, have made use of their fundamental rights to live and work in another Member State. They have specifically explained their fear that Brexit will compromise those rights and freedoms, and that they are already suffering damage from the uncertainty about their future legal position. This (threat of) damage has arisen because in the progress report mentioned in 2.2 and 2.3 the Brexit negotiators assume that existing rights and freedoms of Britons living in other EU countries will lapse if the negotiating parties do not agree them As a result, damage has already occurred for the claimants (including CADS interested parties). They must take into account in their life and business planning their status after the Brexit: if the negotiating parties do not agree otherwise, there is a real threat that as 'thirdcountry nationals' they can be given notice to leave the territory without individual assessment. In view of the seriousness of this threat, they must already make a decision about a possible change of nationality. That may have consequences for the preservation of their British nationality, and thus for the possibility to visit their mother country and maintain contact with family members there. In addition, there are considerable costs associated with obtaining Dutch nationality. Furthermore, decisions have to be made with regard to the legal position of cohabiting partners in The Netherlands where one is a British citizen and the other has the nationality of a third country. Furthermore, parents who are the same British nationality but have children born in the Netherlands are faced with difficult choices (per 5.24). Yet another claimant is uncertain about the possibility to continue his profession because it requires unhindered travel throughout the EU Plaintiffs seek protection from the court against these threats, partly according to them already present, and violation of their fundamental rights. Providing such protection is preeminently a judicial task. It is the essence of a democratic constitutional state that, on an individual level, members of social or political minorities deserve legal protection against the will of the majority.

7 5.9. Against this background the decay or preservation of such rights is now included in a political negotiation process (see 2.2 and 2.3). That is no good reason not to judge the claims brought by the plaintiffs. The defence case is rejected. Fictional dispute? The second defense is that this is a hypothetical or fictional dispute. It is only an attempt to obtain citation to the CJEU. This translation fails on the grounds mentioned above in There is no question of a hypothetical or fictional dispute. The claimants have made sufficiently plausible that there is a real, or partially real, threat. In part, an attack on their fundamental rights and freedoms at individual level has already occurred. Already in 4.7, in the (procedural) stance of the State and the Municipality, the government has determined that they do not see a legal basis or reason to protect claimants against the alleged (threatened) violation of their rights We now turn to an assessment of the claims and their basis. This basis exists at the heart of the rights and freedoms that plaintiffs derive from their EU citizenship as referred to in Article 20 TFEU. In the present dispute, the right to free movement, and the right to live and work freely in other Member States of the EU. These rights and liberties come from article 20, paragraph 1 VWEU to all citizens of the EU, that is to say, anyone who has the nationality of a Member State, as is currently the case with the United Kingdom. Claimants have also practiced those rights and freedoms in the past The consequences of terminating interstate treaties are included and generally governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (Irb 1985/79, hereinafter also the Vienna Convention on Treaties). This Convention contains provisions for the realisation. explanation. compliance with, and termination of treaties. If a treaty is terminated, the legal consequences arising follow from article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Treaties. The parties are then released from the obligation to continue the implementation of the treaty, but the cancellation does not affect any existing right. obligation or legal position of the parties (implemented before the termination) The Vienna Convention on Treaties refers to the legal consequences of treaties between states. The VEU and the VWEU are different in that they not only confer rights and obligations between states in the EU, but also rights and obligations for citizens of the Union. Unlike other bilateral and multilateral treaties, the VEU and the VWEU have an established autonomous legal life, separate from national legal systems, and for the benefit of the Member States the EU have limited their sovereignty (HvJEG 5 februari 1963, C- 26/62, Jur. 1963, p. 3. ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 (Van Gend & Loos)). So the Vienna treaty does not answer the question of the legal effects of cancellation of the VEU and the VWEU. This is consistent with the fact that the VEU has its own regulation for the procedure to be followed in case a Member State wishes to leave the EU. From the above it follows that the legal position of citizens and the UK in other EU Member States must be answered from their Article 20 VWEU rights and freedoms after the UK leaves the EU. The question must be answered on the basis of EU law itself.

8 5.14. Article 20 TFEU gives EU citizens the right to free movement and residence in other Member States. The construction of this provision implies a link between citizenship of a Member State and EU citizenship. Consequently, EU citizenship is additional to the associated rights and freedoms reserved to nationals and member states of the EU. In this light, it can be argued that as a downside, the loss of status of citizen of an EU Member State leads to loss of EU citizenship. The conclusion follows; however, not without further consideration. Acquired rights The CJEU has repeatedly ruled on the doctrine of acquired rights. The case law can be summarized as follows: In principle, acquired rights cannot be withdrawn by later decisions. This follows, in particular, from the general principles of law underlying EU law, such as legal certainty and the starting positions. If, however, at the time of the award of these rights the necessary legal basis was objectively lacking, the corrupt rights can (even retroactively) be revoked. (ECJ 12 July C-3-7 / 56. Judgment : ECJ 22 March C-42 and 49/59, p.103.p.10: ECJ 26 April C-376, 02, 2005, pp , page 32) In the foregoing, it is noted that the CJEU has been restrained in the question of whether an acquired right can be revoked by a previous decision. Rights holders cannot always rely on the fact that a particular situation will not be subject to change and that they already have an acquired inalienable right. The answer to the question, in each case (briefly) of rights that EU citizens actually possess, derive from their claims, what they actually have done, and how each judge considers these citizens with regard to (the survival of) their rights. The degree of foreseeability of the infringement plays a major role. The less likely it is that the right will be infringed, the more necessary it is to protect the rights of the individual in his claim against a greater weight relating to the general interest, even if that infringes such a right. Even assuming that the infringement is justified. the recognition of that in such cases only extends to future actions. (For all this see CJEU 19 July 2012, C-522 / l0, ECLI: EU: C: 20l2: 475 (Albert Reichel): ECJ 5 October 1994, C and 362/93. mr p ECJ 27 September C-230/78, Jur. 1979, p ) In abstracto, the possibility expressly provided for in Article 50 VEU for a Member State to withdraw from the EU does seem to have appeared so unlikely that it initially appeared this possibility would never be ordered; that nationals of an EU Member State - and therefore also of the UK - must take into account the possibility that a Member State would leave the EU. In concrete terms, the plaintiffs during the past years had to increasingly take account of the realization of that - initially unlikely - possibility, already announced years ago by the then Prime Minister Cameron that a referendum on EU membership of the UK would be held in However, the above does not automatically mean that plaintiffs could also foresee that this could lead to the loss of, among other things, their right to live and work in other EU member states. Before the UK expressed its wish, no other Member State had made use of the possibility of withdrawing from the EU under Article 50 TEU. Only when this wish was made known, at least after the outcome of the referendum had become known, could

9 the claimants take into account the possibility that their rights and freedoms as nationals of an EU Member State as referred to in Article 20 TFEU, as a result of that exit, would be lost. That moment is only a short time ago. In these circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that the rights and freedoms that UK citizens living in another EU country derived from Article 20 TFEU should be regarded as acquired rights in the sense referred to above in 5.15 and Broad interpretation of EU citizenship and rights deriving therefrom The CJEU has broadly interpreted both EU citizenship and the resulting rights. While Article 20 TFEU states that citizenship of the Union comes alongside national citizenship, the CJEU has ruled that citizenship of the Union should be the primary status of nationals of the EU Member States and that, on that basis, subject to explicit legal exceptions, are entitled to equal treatment in law. (See ECJ 20 September 2001, C-184/99, ECLI: EU: C: 2001: 458 (Grzelczyk), ECJ 11 July 2002, C-224/98, ECLI: EU: C: 2002: 432 (D'Hoop ), CJEU 22 December 2010, C-208/09, ECLI: EU: C: 2010: 806 (Wittgenstein), CJEU 12 May 2011, C-391/09, ECLI: EU: C: 2011: 291 (Runevič Vardyn and Wardyn)) Once lawfully acquired, EU citizenship is an independent source of rights and obligations that cannot be simply reduced or affected by national government action (see AG Maduro's conclusion of 30 September 2009 in case C-135/08 (Rottman), under 23 and the recent judgment of the CJEU 14 November 2017, C-165/16, ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 862 (Toufik Lounes)). In the former procedure, the CJEU considered, with regard to the withdrawal of the nationality of a citizen of an EU Member State, that an assessment of the principle of proportionality should take place. Whether the proportionality test must always be carried out individually or can also take place in abstracto, as the basis for a statutory regulation, is the subject of a Dutch question currently pending before the CJEU (ABRvS 19 April 2017, ECLI: NL: RVS : 2017: 1098) It is admitted that the cited case law of the CJEU relates to national measures that brought the loss of nationality of a Member State and thereby EU citizenship. Thus, that case-law does not automatically apply to the present case, in which a Member State intends to leave the EU, as a result of which all citizens of that Member State, including those who voted against that intention, are threatened with losing the status of EU citizen. Nevertheless, it is arguable that that case-law, and the principles on which it is based, applies in the same way to the present question, or at least influences the answer to that question. Protection of the minority against the majority The notification referred to in 2.1 above and the negotiations mentioned in 2.2 have taken place as a result of the wish of the majority of those who participated in the Brexit referendum referred to in 2.1. That is in itself entirely in accordance with the way in which a democratic constitutional state functions. But as considered in 5.8 above, the essence of a democratic constitutional state is that the rights and interests of minorities are protected as much as possible. The same applies to the functioning of the EU as a whole which forms a democratic community of (member) states governed by the rule of law.

10 Solidarity between EU citizens and between them and the Member States In view of the case law mentioned above in 5.19, the EU citizenship acquired through the operation of Article 20 TFEU - a new, transnational form of citizenship - aims to unite the (citizens of the) EU Member States and increase their mutual solidarity. Taking into account what has been considered above in 5.21, it can then be argued that this solidarity means that (the citizens of) other EU Member States cannot leave the claimants who, against their will are threatened with losing fundamental rights and freedoms that are derived from that EU, should not be left out in the cold. Complications in the case of young children who are EU citizens In the above it should be borne in mind that the status of EU citizen not only affects the fundamental rights of the relevant EU citizens, but is also important in some circumstances for the right of residence of third-country nationals, provided that is a dependency relationship between the EU citizen and the third-country national and the nongranting of a right of residence to the third-country national would effectively lead to the EU citizen not enjoying effective enjoyment of the rights conferred on him by Article 20 paragraph 2 of the TFEU. According to the CJEU, in any event, that is the case if a thirdcountry national - as in the opinion of the UK after Brexit, if the negotiating parties do not agree otherwise - is denied the right to reside in the Member State in which are his/her young children who are EU citizens. The consequence of a refusal to grant a right of residence to a third-country national would then actually lead to the obligation that EU minor citizens would also be forced to leave the EU (CJEU 8 March 2011, C-34/09, ECLI). : EU: C: 2011: 124 (Ruiz Zambrano) and CJEU 10 May 2017, C-133/15, ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 354 (Chavez-Vilchez)). In addition, it should be noted that, where the dependency relationship does not force the acceptance of a derived right of residence, it can not be claimed on the basis of the importance that the unity of the family must be preserved as much as possible, the CJEU has repeatedly ruled (see CJEU 15 November 2011, C-256/11, ECLI: EU: C: 2011: 734 (Dereci), CJEU 6 December 2012, C-356 and 357/11, ECLI: EU: C: 2012: 776 (O ea) and CJEU May 8, 2013, C-87/12, ECLI: EU: C: 2013: 291 (Ymeraga)). Result What has been considered above in entails that there is reason to doubt the correctness of the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU that the loss of the status of citizen of an EU Member State leads to loss of EU citizenship as well (see for this in 5.14). The answer to the question which explanation is the right one is essential for the assessment of these claims. Questions referred 1. Does the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU automatically lead to the loss of the EU citizenship of British nationals and thus to the elimination of the rights and freedoms deriving from EU citizenship, if and in so far as the negotiations between the European Council and the United Kingdom are not otherwise agreed? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, should conditions or restrictions be imposed on the maintenance of the rights and freedoms to be derived from EU citizenship?