Organized Crime JANA ARSOVSKA

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1 Organized Crime JANA ARSOVSKA Many are familiar with the traditional Italian Mafia and its notorious players Al Capone ruling the Windy City in the 1920s and Lucky Luciano establishing the first US crime syndicate a decade later. With the advent of globalization following the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of other criminal organizations, including the Hong Kong Triads, the Russian Mafia, the Colombian cartels, and the Japanese Yakuza, have also established themselves around the world, taking control over criminal markets. Particularly after 1991, the advances in transportation and telecommunication, including the rise of the internet, became the major driving factors in promoting interdependence of economic and cultural activities. Some of these same factors that have improved the world s economy have also spurred the growth of transnational crime and have changed the nature and structure of traditional organized crime groups (Hill 2003; Galeotti 2005; Shelley 2006; Varese 2006; Albanese 2011). The spread of organized crime around the world has stimulated considerable national and international action. One of the difficulties in designing effective countermeasures, however, has been a lack of information on what organized crime actually is. Organized crime does not mean crime that is organized. Many crimes require a degree of organization, but are not labeled as organized crime. This definitional confusion has resulted in government investigators and scholars developing models of organized crime in order to define the phenomenon better. Organized crime, however, remains a source of controversy because of differences in the way persons and countries approach various aspects of the problem. Sensationalist reporting has also led to fantasy depictions of the Mafia, which have obscured serious research still further. The unconscious obsession with the Mafia, implying a formal organization with roots in foreign countries, has led to the application of this Italian term to criminal groups in countries as culturally diverse as Colombia, Japan, Russia, and Albania. Today, one of the main differences between the existing definitions of organized crime is the actual unit of analysis. Some definitions argue that organized crime is a process of committing crimes and try to grasp the essential aspects of the process whereby certain criminals carry out criminal activity, increasingly within a transnational context. Others focus on a list of specific crimes that should be considered organized crime; and some discuss a distinct type of criminal. Certain definitions are emotional, while others are political or legal. One early attempt to provide an official definition was made by the US Federal (Wickersham) Commission set up by President Herbert Hoover in The members of this Commission put together crimes of legitimate business, commercialized fraud, and racketeering under the heading organized crime. They laid blame on various actors in the United States, including the police, judges, and politicians. Their definition provided the basis for the depiction of organized crime as a business. Smith (1991: 137) explains: if businessmen and gangsters behave like each other, what is the sense of having two categories that, by definition, are not mutually exclusive? The Wickersham Commission also argued that one of the reasons why Americans do not abide by federal laws is that the laws are confusing; however, the findings were largely ignored by policy makers. Another early but very different US definition of organized crime is found in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Public Law ). According to the Act, [o]rganized crime means the unlawful activities of members of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such associations. This statute defines organized crime less in terms of unlaw- The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, First Edition. Edited by Jay S. Albanese John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: / wbeccj463

2 2 Organized Crime ful activities (the crime) than in terms of those who commit them (the type of offender). This definition did not focus on the potential involvement of politicians and law enforcement officials in organized crime, which made it more acceptable to policy makers. Some years later, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, as part of the Federal Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, made it a crime to infiltrate, participate in, or conduct the affairs of an enterprise in a manner similar to racketeering. An enterprise is defined as any association in fact comprised of two or more people. A racketeering act (RICO predicate) is defined as any serious federal felony, and as most state felonies. A second important statute in the United States is the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute, which is designed to counter the threat raised by large-scale drug trafficking organizations. The statute makes it illegal to engage in a continuing criminal enterprise. The term continuing criminal enterprise is given a statutory definition, which like the RICO statute is descriptive of the factual functioning of criminal organizations. The CCE statute, unlike the RICO statute, is restricted to drug trafficking organizations. These are some of the first US attempts to define organized crime. Today, there are more than 200 scholarly and institutional definitions of organized crime. Many confuse the term Mafia with organized crime. In Italy, the definition of Mafia-type crime is contained in Art. 416-bis of the Penal Code, which was introduced into the code in An association is Mafia type when its members systematically use intimidation and conditions of subjection deriving therefrom to commit crimes, to gain control over economic activities, and to acquire unlawful advantages. The Mafia is also considered a formal group with a hierarchical structure, from soldiers to bosses. Although Mafia-type crime has been defined by the Italian legislators in terms of the traditional behavior of the Sicilian Mafia, the result today is considered a general legal definition applicable to any criminal group that acts in a similar manner. Giovanni Falcone (quoted in Fijnaut and Paoli 2004: 51), however, pointed out that the Mafia is an over-defined concept that is used far too freely. Moreover, due to the cross-border character of modern-day organized crime groups, there has also been a need for international definition of organized crime that could make cooperation among different countries easier. Consequently, from the mid-1970s, the United Nations gradually started to seek a universal definition of organized crime that would serve as a basis for law enforcement officials worldwide. Part of the problem for the international community, however, has been that there is no single behavioral paradigm that provides a constant frame of reference. Criminal organizations vary in size, scale, geographical scope, relationship with the power structures, internal organization and structures, operational methods, instruments that they use to avoid law enforcement and to pursue their criminal careers, and types of activity in which they are engaged. Some resemble multinational corporations and often have a similar managerial hierarchy (Louise 2006). Others maintain a flexible structure, which enables them to react quickly to law enforcement efforts or to new opportunities (Adamoli et al. 1998; Galeotti 2005; Arsovska 2011). In 1994, despite many challenges, the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime officially baptized the term transnational organized crime and discussed the potential of organized crime groups to expand beyond national borders. As early as 1997, the United Nations developed its Draft Framework Convention Against Organized Crime, which states that organized crime means group activities of three or more persons, with hierarchical links or personal relationships that enable their leaders to earn profits or to control territories or markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation, or corruption, in both furthering criminal activity and infiltrating the legitimate economy, in particular by the following means: illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and money-laundering; traffic in persons; counterfeiting currency; illicit traffic in or the theft of cultural objects; the theft of nuclear material; terrorist acts; illicit traffic in arms and explosive materials or devices; illicit traffic in or the theft of motor vehicles; and the corruption of public officials. Finally, in December 2000, in Palermo, Italy, the United Nations developed its first legally

3 Organized Crime 3 binding instrument in the field of crime: the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (also known as the Palermo Convention). This was a great achievement. By introducing the Palermo Convention, the United Nations tried to provide a universal definition of organized crime. After several days of negotiations among delegates from various countries, the Convention was ratified by more than 120 countries. The following agreement was reached (Article 2 of the Convention): (a) (b) (c) Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established pursuant to this Convention, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; Serious crime shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty; and Structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure. The UN Convention, in order to explain further the need for an international instrument, focused on the need to regulate the form of crime as global threat. Article 3(2) points out that the offence is transnational in nature if (a) it is committed in more than one state, (b) it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its perpetration, planning direction, or control takes place in another state, (c) it is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state, or (d) it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state. The UN definition was praised, in principle, for its wide applicability; however, it overlooked the arguments of the many scholars who claim that organized crime is mainly local and not transnational. Fijnaut and Paoli (2004: 39) argue that, even in typically transnational illegal trades, such as drug trafficking, transnationality usually refers exclusively to the transportation of commodities, communication between exporters and importers, and the eventual laundering of profits. Important activities, such as production, and processing, wholesale and retail distribution, and final consumption of illegal goods, take place locally. The UN definitions have been also criticized because they have allowed more powerful countries to externalize the problem of organized crime to less developed countries (Allum et al. 2010; Arsovska 2011). Another debatable issue is the UN definition of structured group. It is formulated in very broad terms, particularly compared with previous definitions, so as to include both groups with hierarchical or other structures, and non-hierarchical groups where the roles of the members of the groups need not be formally defined (Levi 2002: 884). Some have also questioned the durability condition. Levi (2002: 884) has noted that by these criteria a group of Chinese or East European origins, for example, which engages in skimming credit card details with a small and inexpensive piece of software, and re-encoding them on to plastic cards to be used in another country, qualifies as a transnational organized crime group. In 2001, the European Commission and Europol, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, tried to operationalize the UN definition to ensure more coherent action among European law enforcement agents. They developed a working definition, according to which 11 characteristics of criminal organizations are associated with the label of organized crime. The EU definition requires the presence of a minimum of six characteristics: four mandatory criteria and two optional, to be drawn from a list of criteria. The mandatory criteria are (1) collaboration among more than two people, (2) extending over a prolonged or indefinite period, (3) suspected of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty, and (4) the central goal of profit and/or power. The optional criteria are (5) specialized division of labor, (6) exercising measures of discipline and control, (7) employing violence or other means of intimidation, (8) employing commercial business-like structures, (9) participating in money laundering, (10) operational across

4 4 Organized Crime national borders, and/or (11) exerting influence over legitimate social institutions (polity, government, justice, economy). The EU definition has also been criticized because of its vagueness. The optional criteria are too easy to satisfy: major profitable crimes always entail money laundering; degree of specialization always exists to some extent between participants; and the criterion of durability/continuity is vague. The EU definition includes anything from a major Italian syndicate to three menacing burglars with a window cleaning business who have divided among themselves the criminal tasks (Levi 2002: 882). Also, traditionally the notion of violence has been at the heart of organized crime, and now, in the EU definition, it is only an optional criterion. Overall, having a universal definition of organized crime is seen as a great step toward a more effective fight against transnational organized crime. Unfortunately, however, there are always those who want the legislation to cover a wide set of circumstances to avoid major criminals getting away with it and those who want the law to be tightly drawn to avoid criminalizing groups who are only a modest threat. Today, many of those who favor the broader UN definition still remain captivated by the notion of organized crime as a unique, hierarchically structured, criminal entity that poses an existential threat to civil society. The early and allegedly outdated American definitions, designed to describe something rather specific, foreign, and mysterious, still fascinate many readers, scholars, and practitioners. More important than just a formal definition is in fact the actual understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. There are many ways to conceptualize organized crime, and each definition mentioned previously is rooted in a specific behavioral paradigm. For over five decades, scholars and government experts have debated how to best comprehend the actions of organized and criminal persons and the symbiotic relationships they have with upperworld figures. These debates have centered on three major paradigms used to comprehend organized crime. A classification proposed by Albanese (1994) names these approaches the hierarchical/ alien conspiracy model, the patron client model, and the enterprise model of organized crime. The hierarchical/alien conspiracy paradigm proposes that organized crime is best understood as a viable organization, often originating from foreign countries a reflection of the institutional approaches that dominated sociology and business departments during the 1960s, as well as major government hearings on organized crime such as those held by the Kefauver and McClellan Committees. In fact, it was not until 1963 that any evidence was produced to support the view that organized crime operated as a hierarchical formal structure. In the 1960s, the testimony of the first insider in organized crime (Kefauver 1950s and McClellan 1960s Crime Investigating Committees), Joseph Valachi, became the basis for the hierarchical model of organized crime. Valachi described the organizational structure of Cosa Nostra (known at the time as the Mafia ) as consisting of the bosses of the individual families, underbosses, caporegimes, which are lieutenants, and soldiers. Territory and criminal enterprises were divided among families of men of Italian descent. Hence, this model came to be characterized as a governmental-like structure, where illegal activities are conducted with the approval of superiors (Cressey 1969). Various authors have termed this the bureaucratic model, national conspiracy, or corporate/organizational model of organized crime. In 1967, the President s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice confirmed the conspiratorial nature of organized crime by arguing that it is a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments. At that time, the hierarchical conspiracy model of organized crime was also given a degree of academic legitimacy. Cressey (1969) produced a task force report, which was later turned into a book, Theft of the Nation. Cressey claimed that organized crime in the United States was mainly comprised of a nationwide alliance of 24 tightly knit criminal Mafia families. These families were hierarchically structured and comprised a well-defined criminal organization. No longer was organized crime an outcome of contradictory laws as described by the Wickersham Commission; rather, it was a conspiracy

5 Organized Crime 5 of outsiders who were intent on undermining the country s moral policies and operated within a hierarchically structured organization. Mario Puzo s The Godfather (1969) had also its part in shaping the mystifying image of the Mafia as a criminal conspiracy. By the mid-1980s, it was clear that Italian Americans were no longer the dominant party in the US criminal underworld. The new emerging crime groups included Cuban, Colombian, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Mexican, Russian, Canadian, Irish, and Jamaican gangs. The alien conspiracy and hierarchical/organizational models were then applied to other criminal organizations, which started reading like an inventory of ethnic minorities. However, despite the general popularity of Cressey s model amongst law enforcement officials and common people, the model did not manage to convince many other criminologists, who suggested a different picture of organized crime. The second paradigm of organized crime rejects the formality of the institutional approach in favor of one based on exchange relationships between those with power and those who need access to power. This paradigm, originating during the 1970s, is a reflection of scholarship in the fields of anthropology and, to a lesser extent, political science that emphasizes the patron client relationship. Albini (1971) and Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972), as well as other researchers, were unable to find any connection between the criminal groups they studied and a well-structured hierarchy. According to their studies, almost all of the investigated groups appeared to be friendships based on cultural, ethnic, and economic ties. This paradigm excluded any corporate dimension. Albini (1971) also claimed that organized crime consisted of networks of patrons and clients, rather than rational hierarchies. In such networks, the criminal entrepreneurs exchange information with their clients in order to maximize profits. Largely due to the group approach to organized crime and the alien and cultural paradigms, the study of organized crime has become greatly shaped by ethnicity. If one follows these behavioral models, it seems that, whenever the subject of organized crime comes under analysis, it will unquestionably be predicated by an ethnic modifier (for example, Italian, Albanian, or Chinese organized crime). In the criminological literature, this phenomenon has led to what criminologist Jay Albanese (2011) calls the ethnicity trap. The ethnicity trap is sprung when organized crime is described in terms of the nature of the groups that engage in it, as opposed to the nature of the organized crime activity itself, and how and why various groups specialize in certain activities (or fail to specialize). Albanese (2011: 5) argues that the use of ethnicity often comes close to racial and ethnic stereotyping, and that Italian is no more a descriptor of organized crime in New York than is African American in describing armed robberies or Caucasian in describing embezzlement. The third contemporary paradigm, on which most current national and international definitions of organized crime are based, deemphasizes the actors engaged in organized crime and focuses on the business of organized crime. This enterprise paradigm reflects the influence of the field of economics on the study of organized crime. In the 1980s judicial investigations in Italy started to provide proof of the existence of well-structured Mafia groups. This resulted in a shift of scholars attention toward entrepreneurial features of Mafia actors. The Mafia was conceptualized as an enterprise and its economic activities became the focus of academic analysis (Smith 1978, 1991; Reuter 1983). According to this view, organized crime groups form and thrive in the same way as legitimate businesses do: they respond to the demands of suppliers, customers, regulators, and competitors. The illegal enterprise models argue that the economic concerns are the primary cause of criminal behavior: organized crime is the product of market forces rather than of hierarchical and ethnic relations. Some scholars equate organized crime with legal businesses (Smith 1978). In Europe, the illegal enterprise approach started acquiring a dominant position from the late 1970s onward. Diego Gambetta (1993) depicted the Mafia as an industry that produces, promotes, and sells private protection. The criticism of the business model is that in a simplistic way it reduces contemporary Mafia groups to business

6 6 Organized Crime enterprises, thus denying them any other goal but profit. This paradigm does not necessarily falsify the other two paradigms of organized crime. Some academics have been applying an integrative approach to the study of the phenomenon. Paoli (2003), in her research on the Italian Mafia, does not deny the underlying ideas behind the illegal enterprise paradigm. She does, however, assign a great importance to the cultural and political dimensions of organized crime when trying to explain the actions of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian Ndrangheta. In her view, it would be reductive to consider these groups as economic enterprises or as industries of private protection. Southern Italian Mafia organizations have traditionally employed the strength of Mafia bonds to pursue a plurality of goals and to carry out different functions. Current literature also argues that a social network approach transcends existing criminological paradigms such as organizational, patron client, and enterprise models in that it emphasizes a supposition held by each paradigm that human relationships form the basis for organized criminal activity (Kleemans and van de Bunt 1999; McIllwain 1999). After conducting research on the development of organized crime in New York City, criminologist Alan Block (1978) concluded that organized crime should be viewed as a social system. The social system of organized crime refers to the notion that organized crime is a phenomenon recognizable by reciprocal services performed by professional criminals, politicians, and clients. Organized crime is thus understood to lie in the relationships binding members of the underworld to upperworld figures. Some scholars favoring a social network approach argue that the least common denominator of organized crime is human relationships engaged in the process of social networking for the provision of illicit goods and services as well as the protection, regulation, and extortion of those engaged in the provision or consumption of these goods and services (McIllwain 1999). In addition to the paradigms of organized crime there are many other academic debates that deserve additional attention. Globalization, for example, has affected the study of organized crime and mobility of organized crime groups has become a widely debated topic. There are a few competing views on the ability of organized crime to take advantage of globalization. The first claims that criminal groups take advantage of globalization by forging international alliances and creating colonies around the world. The increased movement of people has led to expansion of organized crime groups; thus today the turnover of the global criminal economy is estimated at around one trillion dollars (Galeotti 2005). Manuel Castells argues that a new phenomenon, global crime, has now emerged. Criminal groups, ranging from the Sicilian Mafia to the Colombian cartels, have come together in a global, diversified network (Castells 2000: 167). Today, the Russian Mafia is active in at least 26 foreign countries. Albanian organized crime groups dominate specific criminal markets on five continents, and the Calabrian Ndrangheta is present in 20 countries (Paoli 2003; Varese 2006, 2011; Arsovska 2011). Organized crime can migrate easily (Williams 2001), and, just as multinational corporations establish branches around the world to take advantage of attractive labor markets, so do illicit businesses (Shelley 2006). As globalization progresses, criminal groups will increasingly seek to enter attractive markets abroad, putting into action a rational strategy to expand. According to this view, the introduction of the Schengen Agreement within the European Union has promoted transnational crime because it permits individuals, including criminals, to travel within the EU without border checks. Scholars favoring this global view also argue that contemporary forms of organized crime lack strict hierarchies and are decentralized and inherently dispersed. The lack of gravity centers makes it harder for law enforcement agencies to disband such groups (Castells 2000; Williams 2001). Specialization and subcontracting are also claimed to be common features of international criminal cooperation (Shelley 1999, 2006; Galeotti 2005). For example, ethnic Albanian organized crime groups in Belgium are specializing in the transport sector and are often subcontracted by groups such as the Chinese Triads to transport people, drugs, and even guns from Belgium to the UK.

7 Organized Crime 7 The opposing view maintains that organized crime groups are localized and stationary. Diego Gambetta writes that not only did the [Sicilian] mafia grow mainly in Western Sicily, but, with the exception of Catania, it has remained there to this very day. This is a difficult industry to export because it is heavily dependent on the local environment (Reuter 1985; Gambetta 1993). Varese (2011) in his study on Mafia migration has shown that the Solntsevskaya Russian Mafia did not move its protection racket to Italy. Its core business remained highly dependent on the territory of origin. Similarly, Yiu Kong Chu argues that Hong Kong Triads are localized and they are not international illegal entrepreneurs whose wealth and connections may enable them to emigrate to Western countries (Chu 2000). Research has also shown that the Yakuza s foreign travel has been mainly recreational or focused on investing in real estate (Hill 2003). Many scholars argue that the difficulty faced by the Mafia in expanding its business reflects the high cost of monitoring agents that such transplants entail, as well as the difficulties of building a reputation and collecting information in the new territory. Secrecy and illegality make it harder for criminal groups to build the systems of supervision that exist in legitimate firms (Hobbs 1998; Varese 2006, 2011). Finally, a third and more critical approach is that organized crime has been unjustly linked to vulnerable ethnic minority groups for the benefit of powerful organizations. Scholars supporting this approach argue that the threat is not real and the sinister entity is socially constructed. Chambliss (1998) argues that the US government and the FBI set about improving the image of the police by externalizing the problem of organized crime. Success in downplaying the involvement of domestic police, judges, and politicians in racketeering made way for the alien conspiracy description of organized crime: organized crime groups come from foreign countries to take advantage of the American people. Smith (1991) asked how better to explain failure (and to prepare the ground for increased budget) than to argue that, dedicated though it might be, the Bureau was pressed to overcome an alien, organized, conspiratorial method that had forced its way on an innocent public. Critical criminologists also argue that the success of this mainstream paradigm of organized crime depends on the ability to isolate organized crime from other structures. One way this is achieved is by presenting it as a sinister entity that is able to cross national borders. This disposition to externalize organized crime is related to the widespread tendency of defining it as culturally homogeneous. This also implies that the cause of organized crime can be found in the lower classes or in the communities at the fringe of the host nation. On a global level, the tendency to blame a lower class for organized crime can be seen by the popular image of transnational organized crime originating in the third world. The critical view argues that this perception of organized crime has its own biases; it allows powerful actors/countries to offer their services to third world countries, and thus impose their own normative order in these allegedly criminogenic regions (Allum et al. 2010). For example, the embryonic conditions of the economic and political institutions in the Balkan countries enabled the European Union to emerge in the world arena as an institution that promotes normative order. During the past two decades, governments have been investing billions of dollars in trying to fight organized crime. The process of globalization, however, has outpaced the ability of governments to develop comprehensive, effective, and politically acceptable responses to the flow of immigrants as well as to the threat posed by transnational organized crime groups. In fact, law enforcement operations against organized crime have only intermittently been devised as part of a systematic organized crime reduction strategy. The focus has been on (a) arrest and conviction of offenders and (b) interdiction of shipments of illegal and tax-unpaid legal commodities and persons (Levi and Maguire 2004). More deeply rooted attempts to reduce organized crime opportunities have been restricted to particular activity sectors, notably illegal drug precursors, payment card fraud, vehicle finance fraud, and the money laundering of crime proceeds. Finally, the arguments connecting crime to culture have been shaping immigration policies and law enforcement responses as well, resulting in attacks on specific groups control over specific areas. Xenophobic feelings

8 8 Organized Crime might, however, exacerbate racial stereotypes, which in turn may lead to an increased focus on certain ethnic groups, and therefore to ineffective anti-organized crime strategies. The study of organized crime needs more in-depth analysis, because solutions only have meaning if one has a firm grip of the problems being addressed and of why these problems matter. SEE ALSO: Cressey, Donald; Transnational Gangs; Transnational Organized Crime; United Nations Crime Conventions; United Nations Role in International Criminal Justice. References Adamoli, S., Di Nicola, A., Savona, E. U., & Zoffi, P. (1998) Organized Crime Around the World.Helsinki: HEUNI European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Albanese, J. (1994) Models of organised crime. In R. J. Kelly, K. Chin, & R. Schatzberg (eds.), Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States. New York: Greenwood, pp Albanese, J. (2011) Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption and Opportunity. New York: Oxford University Press. Albini, J. L. (1971) The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: Irvington. Allum, F., Longo, F., Irrera, D., & Kostakos, P. (2010) Defining and Defying Organized Crime: Discourse, Perceptions and Reality. New York: Routledge. Arsovska, J. (2011) Conceptualizing and studying organized crime in a global context: Possible? Indispensible? Superfluous? In C. J. Smith, R. Barberet, & S. Zhang (eds.), Handbook of International Criminology. New York: Routledge, pp Block, A. (1978) History and the study of organized crime. Urban Life 6, Castells, M. (2000) End of Millennium, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Chambliss, W. (1998) Power, Politics and Crime. Boulder, CO: Westview. Chu, Y. K. (2000) The Triads as Business. London: Routledge. Cressey, D. R. (1969) Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America. New York: Harper & Row. Fijnaut, C., & Paoli, L. (eds.) (2004) Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond. Dordrecht,The Netherlands: Springer. Galeotti, M. (ed.) (2005) Global Crime Today. The Changing Face of Organised Crime. London: Routledge. Gambetta D. (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. London: Harvard University Press. Hill, B. E. (2003) The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law and the State. London: Oxford University Press. Hobbs, D. (1998) Going down the glocal: The local context of organised crime. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 37, Ianni, F. A. J., & Reuss-Ianni, E. (1972) A Family Business. New York: Sage. Kleemans, E., & van de Bunt, H. (1999) The social embeddedness of organized crime. Transnational Organized Crime 5(2), Levi, M. (2002) The organization of serious crimes. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp Levi, M., & Maguire, M. (2004) Reducing and preventing organised crime: An evidence-based critique. Crime, Law and Social Change 41, Louise, S. (2006) The globalization of crime and terrorism. ejournal USA February, McIllwain, S. J. (1999) Organized crime: A social network approach. Crime, Law and Social Change 32, Paoli, L. (2003) Mafia Brotherhoods. Organized Crime: Italian Style. New York: Oxford University Press. President s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, DC: US Government. Puzo, M. (1969)The Godfather. New York: Putnam. Reuter, P. (1983) Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. London: MIT Press. Reuter, P. (1985) The Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis. New York: US National Institute of Justice. Shelley, L. (1999) Identifying, counting and categorizing transnational criminal organizations. Transnational Organized Crime 5, Shelley, L. (2006) The globalization of crime and terrorism. ejournal USA Smith, D. C. (1978) Organized crime and entrepreneurship. International Journal of Criminology and Penology 6, Smith, D. C. (1991) Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an official definition for organized crime. Crime, Law and Social Change 16, Varese, F. (2006) How mafias migrate: the case of the Ndrangheta in Northern Italy. Law and Society Review 40(2),

9 Organized Crime 9 Varese, F. (2011) How mafias take advantage of globalization. The Russian mafia in Italy. British Journal of Criminology 51(2), Williams, P. (2001) Transnational criminal networks. In J. Arquilla & F. D. Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, pp Arlacchi, P. (1986) Mafia Businesses: The Mafia and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. Finckenauer, J. O., & Waring, E. J. (1998) Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture and Crime. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Further Readings Allum, F., & Gilmour, S. (eds.) (2012) Handbook on Transnational Organized Crime. New York: Routledge.