The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India

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1 120 doi: /j x The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India Patrick Kilby Coordinator, Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development Program, Australian National University, Australia This paper examines the role played by a network of 12 local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) the East Coast Development Forum (ECDF) in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami ( Asian tsunami ) of 26 December 2004, which devastated the east coast of India. It examines how the ECDF sought to meet the needs of affected people through a direct relief programme, a rehabilitation programme focused on the restoration of livelihoods, and through advocacy to press for changes to government programmes to make them inclusive and to ensure that they satisfy the priority needs of the people most affected. The paper concludes that it was the trust and capacity built up through past network activities of the fisher, dalit, and tribal communities that enabled the ECDF to launch an effective response to the tsunami. A lesson to emerge is that the use of similar existing networks could be employed in other disaster responses around the world. Keywords: India, networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), self-help groups, tsunami, women Introduction On 26 December 2004, the Asian tsunami hit the east coast of India and left a trail of destruction in its wake: 2,000 kilometres of the Indian coastline was submerged for a distance of up to two kilometres; 12,400 people were killed; 46,600 houses were lost or damaged in 559 villages; and 650,000 people were made homeless (Walls, 2005). In all, 3.2 million people were affected (Walls, 2005), of whom 2.7 million lost their livelihoods (Sugiyarto and Hagiwara, 2005). The most seriously affected (one-third of the total) were from the fishing sector, losing 88,000 boats and nearly a year s worth of production (Stobutzki and Hall, 2005). Within this sector, however, it was women, children, dalits, and tribal people the most vulnerable who arguably suffered the worst impacts, and were the most neglected in official responses (Walls, 2005; Choo, 2005; Krishnakumar, 2005). In addition to human losses, large swathes of land were rendered useless because of salt-water inundation, and fishing grounds were damaged. The response to the tsunami was swift and comprehensive, and local people, groups and networks were at the heart of it. At the local level, the response encompassed a combination of endeavours by governmental bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local community initiatives, with a relief programme providing food and shelter mainly for the first three months, followed by a major rehabilitation and reconstruction drive. The reconstruction initiative was supposed 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Overseas Development Institute, Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2 Patrick Kilby 121 to take three years to complete, involving the rebuilding of houses and the restoration of livelihoods. In addition, large Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank loans were secured for the restoration of public infrastructure, such as ports and roads. By the end of 2005, basic infrastructure had been largely restored to the fishing sector. However, despite the replacement of boats and nets, less than two months of fishing was possible in many places in 2005 due to a worse than normal monsoon in the last three months of the year. An important part of the overall response, therefore, has been the development of alternative livelihoods to supplement fishing in the most affected communities. This paper uses as a case study a network of 12 local NGOs the East Coast Development Forum (ECDF) whose response to the tsunami was integrated, providing immediate relief, restoring livelihoods, and advocating for improved and more responsive government services. The ECDF reached around 20 per cent of the affected population along the east coast of India. The paper explores why this network was suited to this type of relief and rehabilitation response, and whether at a policy level, the fostering and support of such networks is not only useful for advocacy, but also is important for direct relief and rehabilitation in times of disaster. The research for this paper was conducted one year after the tsunami (in December 2005 and January 2006). The author visited the region, interviewed a number of ECDF members and reviewed reports and other literature on the tsunami. ECDF members were the focus of the research, and hence the author did not talk to community members, for instance, nor make a direct assessment of the impact or outcomes of the ECDF s relief and rehabilitation work. The interviews covered both the operations of the organisations engaged in the response to the tsunami and their network experiences before and after the event. The East Coast Development Forum At the heart of the ECDF is the East Coast Fishers Forum (ECFF), an advocacy network of 10 local NGOs that has been working for fisher s rights for more than a decade, and thus had extensive community links and members along the east coast of India (see PREM, 2003). As the tsunami hit the fishing community hardest, the ECFF was ideally placed to take a lead in coordinating a local-level response. In addition to fisher communities, though, many dalit and tribal communities living along the east coast were seriously affected by the tsunami, and were being either overlooked or actively discriminated against in much of the official response. The importance of including their interests in any comprehensive local response was quickly realised (Walls, 2005; Choo, 2005). Consequently, two NGO networks that focus on dalits and tribals, the Irulas Tribal Women s Welfare Society (ITTWS) and the Social Awareness Society for Youth (SASY) joined the 10 ECFF members in forming the ECDF (see Table 1) (SASY, 2005a, 2005b). The People s Rural Education Movement (PREM), an NGO from Orissa, was the common link within the diverse membership of the ECDF. While the tsunami did

3 122 The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India Table 1 Members of the ECDF NGO member Location Role Raja Kesavdas Foundation Swayam Sahaya Sangam Shanti Dan Pengal Munnetra Sangay Shanti Dan Uzhaikkum Pengal Nala Sangay Social Awareness Society for Youth (SASY) Irulas Tribal Women s Welfare Society (ITWWS) Kalaiselvi Karunalaya Social Welfare Society (KKSS) Society for Help Entire Lower and Rural People (HELP) Holistic Approach for People s Empowerment (HOPE) Action Group of Sustainable Development (SRAVANTI) Avalookunnu, Grandhasala and Vayanasala in Kerala Nagercoil and Kanyakumari districts, Tamil Nadu Odaivelly, Pondicherry Cuddalore and Villupuram districts Tamil Nadu Kanchipuram and Cuddalore districts, Tamil Nadu Pulicut district, Tamil Nadu Prakasham district, Andhra Pradesh Pondicherry East Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh Support for 184 self-help groups (SHGs) and 2,000 families Support for 8,000 families Support for 3,200 families Support for 800 (dalit) families Support for 1,600 (tribal) families Support for 1,000 families Support for 1,000 families Support for 600 families Support for 1,300 families JAGRITI Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh Support for 800 families Social Activities for Rural Development Society (SARDS) People s Rural Education Movement (PREM) Pralasam district, Andhra Pradesh Orissa Support for 1,100 families Overall coordination and support not directly affect its constituency, it had connections through its membership of the three networks (the ECFF, the SASY and the ITTWS). What is interesting is that the dalit and tribal networks were prepared to join with a fisher network, despite at times in the past having different and competing interests to those of fishing communities (ECDF, 2005a; ITTWS, 2005). Not only did PREM play a role in the existing networks, but also it had practical disaster management skills gained from its work in the super cyclone of 1999, which devastated parts of Orissa (see Das, 2005). Through its activities in 1999, PREM developed effective approaches to relief and accountability systems, which, with minimal adjustment, were applied to the tsunami relief effort of It was the strategic support offered by PREM, the strength of the local NGO networks, their strong links with local fisher communities, and a long record of trust and credibility, which enabled these NGOs to manage successfully the delivery of emergency relief and later rehabilitation programmes to affected communities. A group of some 10 staff (who themselves had been affected by the tsunami) moved from PREM s offices in Orissa to take up places with member NGOs located along the east coast, as well as running a small coordinating secretariat in Chennai that provided support to the ECDF members.

4 Patrick Kilby 123 At the administrative level, each of the 12 member NGOs was responsible for their existing constituency, made up of small self help groups (SHGs) 1 that they had supported for some years via small savings and microfinance programmes, as well as advocating for fisher rights. The relief programme utilised a common set of procedures introduced by PREM, which involved distributing a standard package of supplies to the members of the SHGs. Likewise, the rehabilitation programme used quite a simple model to provide cash support to existing SHGs under long established systems. These approaches reduced the administrative load, avoided duplication and enabled the adoption of a decentralised approach. Beyond the use of common procedures and forms particular to the relief phase, the ECDF also employed a decentralised structure and operating style: instead of a single leader, the leadership rotated among the members, who took it in turn to organise meetings and set agendas, among other things. The network members came together every three months usually at the state level where the NGOs could share their ideas more easily because of a common language. Arguably, it was the informal systems based on trust, confidence and credibility that enabled the ECDF to access the affected communities to determine what was required and how to proceed. These informal systems were complemented by more formal accountability and distribution systems for the work itself. What makes this case interesting, and possibly a model for other work on disasters, is that NGOs generally tend to be poor at networking this is true at the local level as much as at the international level. This is due to competition among them concerning both values and resources. As values based organisations, NGOs have a particular worldview or weltanschauung, and will try to promote it even when they are part of a network; and likewise, there will also be competition for resources (Kilby, 2006; Lissner, 1977). This competition can quite easily have an adverse effect on the cooperation required for effective operations (Ewig, 1999; Benson, Twigg and Meyers, 2001; Nelson, 1997; Benzi, 2006). Most networks only form when donors mandate them to do so either officially or de facto through the provision of resources (Abelson, 2003). It is rare, therefore, for networks to emerge organically in response to a particular event, the exception being in the area of advocacy, where network approaches are necessary to gain influence this was the case for a number of NGOs working on fisher issues along the east coast of India in the mid-1990s. The key characteristics of NGO advocacy networks are trust, ability to cooperate, loyalty, reciprocity (particularly if they have been working together for some time), and a certain style of leadership (Hudson, 2001; Liebler and Ferri, 2004). Successful NGO networks have a leadership style that can be characterised as leading from the outside in cognisant of the external environment, mobilising energy, offering trust and coaxing members outside their comfort zone (Liebler and Ferri, 2004, p. 25). Some of these features can be found in the ECDF to varying degrees, and were adapted to the emergency response. The main change made within the ECDF was the adoption of common systems and procedures, while maintaining the existing decentralised flexible response framework.

5 124 The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India All ECDF members had been active in development and had worked together in advocacy campaigns for at least 10 years, with around one-half active in the area for more than 20 years. ECFF members had worked together on issues that were common among themselves and their constituencies and therefore had developed the necessary trust and leadership for the network to function well. The ITWWS and the SASY were mainly advocacy organisations and engaged in the relief and rehabilitation effort to support their constituencies. Even though they had not been part of the fisher network, their experience of advocacy and fighting for rights was similar. Consequently, they understood the culture of networking and by all accounts fitted in relatively easily (Prakarama, 2005). However, because the ITWWS and the SASY had less operational experience, they received additional support from other networks members, for instance, help in organising and managing the SHGs. They also had PREM staff seconded to them to assist with these endeavours. Overall, though, around 80 per cent of the support went to pre existing SHGs and hence the risk of poor or non performance within the relief and rehabilitation programme was low (see Table 1). The ECDF response to the tsunami For the first two to three days after the tsunami, local communities were entirely responsible for the response, helping each other out, rescuing those in need, and offering temporary shelter, food and water, among other things, to the victims. Next came governmental and non governmental agencies. Subsequent to this, government programmes were put in place with a variety of objectives, including rescuing people and establishing camps for displaced persons. However, it is the critical role of local communities in the first few hours of a disaster that is often overlooked in many accounts of disaster responses. Furthermore, it is local communities links with governmental agencies and NGOs that seem to be a strong indicator of successful recovery, as this case will demonstrate. In the Indian response to the tsunami, NGOs tended to fill gaps not covered by government programmes. They met short-to-medium-term demands for food and shelter, and later became involved in longer-term rehabilitation, particularly of livelihoods, as well as assuming a watchdog role to ensure respect for people s rights, and equal treatment for all groups in governmental and non governmental programmes. Finally, they proposed rehabilitation approaches geared towards sustainability and reducing the risk of catastrophic consequences of natural disasters in the future. Below is an examination of the ECDF response at all three stages (relief, rehabilitation and advocacy), and a reflection on the role of networks in disaster relief and rehabilitation work. The relief phase The first step taken was to construct an overview of the situation of partners and the possible role they could play. PREM took the lead on this, contacting ECFF

6 Patrick Kilby 125 members and other actors, and proposing a coordinated network response. Within a few days, dalit and tribal interests were included in the overview and the ECDF was formed. 2 After in principle donor support was obtained from Oxfam Australia in January 2005, ECDF members immediately carried out a survey, to identify the worst hit villages and where the network could be most beneficial. In early February 2005, ECDF members and representatives of the affected communities drew up a relief map. PREM then offered training to ECDF members staff on how to manage the operation, including in the use of the systems that it had in place for the tsunami response, such as ration books, purchase orders, quotation pro forma and SHG records. Local purchase committees were created before relief got under way in mid-february, providing families with enough food for three months. 3 The ECDF reached 50,000 beneficiaries during this phase. The ECDF s relief work was relatively free from controversy. This was attributed to three features of the programme: the presence of village organisations (through the SHGs) throughout the process; the local knowledge of network members; and the experience and systems offered by PREM (Parakrama, 2005). Parakrama noted in his report on this phase that quiet yet consistent long-term engagement through partners has led to greater trust and respect from communities (Parakrama, 2005, p. 10). Finally, it can be argued that the role of the networks themselves, including the high level of trust, the leadership style, and the well developed culture of mutuality that is inherent in networks, was key to effective coordination, beneficiary selection, and overall management of what was seen as a very successful programme (Hudson, 2001; Liebler and Ferri, 2004). Rehabilitation The rehabilitation phase started in April At that time, the ECDF took the decision to focus on livelihoods, particularly those of women, and to make relatively small loans of Rs 10,000 (approximately USD 250) to affected families through established women s SHGs, rather than engaging in large scale infrastructure rehabilitation, such as of fishing boats and housing. The process comprised the following steps: a SHG receives funds in the form of a grant; loans are made to members; members then repay money into the particular SHG s account; and the SHG loans the money again within the group. In this way, the fund revolved internally, the outcomes multiplied, and the capital base of the SHG increased. Another advantage is that this approach is very flexible, giving the family concerned a large say in the use of funds, and allowing the community to keep control through SHG members. The other members of the SHG, together with NGO staff, were responsible for monitoring the use of funds and offering advice to women where necessary. Two other reasons for the adoption of the approach are that, first, there was a serious gender disparity in the official response (Choo, 2005; Krishnakumar, 2005): women were left out of official livelihood programmes, which mainly concentrated on restoring the infrastructure of the fishing industry itself, rather than recognising the diverse roles played by all family members. Overall, government provided little

7 126 The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India support for women s livelihoods, which included petty trading, fish marketing and simple fish processing. In addition, dalit and tribal women suffered discrimination not only by virtue of their gender and but also because of their caste (Choo, 2005). Second, this straightforward approach to rehabilitation suited network-oriented relief management. Working with existing SHGs did not require technical expertise, and more importantly, it was sufficiently simple to streamline administration so that payments were made directly to the SHGs from the ECDF secretariat, rather than through the NGOs. Instead, the NGOs provided non-financial institutional and other support to the SHGs to help them make it work. This approach reduced the impact on NGOs in terms of financial accountability (they did not handle funds), and meant that they did not have to scale up to manage large levels of funding however, some scaling up was required for monitoring purposes. In most cases, extra technical assistance was not necessary, as women adopted familiar livelihoods, such as fish vending and other petty trading. Some did diversify, though, and took up loans to fatten and rear goats, for example. In other cases, women used the loan to repay moneylenders; once they were free from debt, they could engage in an enterprise. In the ECDF programme, around three-quarters of the resources went to existing SHGs with extensive experience of these types of funds, and one-quarter to new groups with less experience, which were provided with training and other support. In all, 170 villages and more than 18,000 families were reached through 850 SHGs (ECDF, 2005a). Advocacy Advocacy was regarded as an integral part of the response, as government either conducted the majority of relief work or was responsible for the policy framework within which relief efforts occurred. Advocacy concentrated at first on issues directly affecting the relief and rehabilitation drive, but then broadened to the related matters of fisher livelihoods, dalit and tribal rights, and coastal protection to minimise the impact of future disasters. Underlying the approach of the ECDF s advocacy work was the principle that relief and rehabilitation programmes should be seen as preserving and respecting rights rather than as privileges. The primary focus of initial advocacy was on ensuring that the community and government officials had full access to information on the impact of and the response to the disaster as well as on addressing discrimination questions as they arose. In the first instance, the ECDF and community representatives met with state and federal ministers and others to report on the findings of their survey of deaths and other losses, and identified people who were not included on government lists, such as dalits and tribals, and sought to ensure that they received proper compensation (Krishnakumar, 2005). The ECDF also made information available to the community on the government and NGO packages that were available so that all those in need had access to relief, thereby limiting the extent to which vested interests could direct the relief packages to their own constituencies. The ECDF was also able to

8 Patrick Kilby 127 mediate between the government and fisher and dalit/tribal communities on discrimination issues, as it represented and enjoyed credibility among all three. For example, when some huts belonging to dalits were washed away, the government said that it did not have to pay compensation or replace them since the huts were unauthorised and within 200 metres of the shore. The ECDF argued that the location of a hut should not be used to deny dalits their right to shelter. After some representations to government officials, many dalit households were allocated land within the 500-metre limit on which to rebuild their huts (ECDF, 2005a). Prior to the start of the rehabilitation phase of the tsunami response (on 9 April 2005), the ECDF consulted with government on key issues concerning tsunami relief and rehabilitation, including the establishment of land rehabilitation committees, on which there must be mandated positions for dalits and tribals, in all affected villages. The ECDF also called for the provision of counselling to survivors, vigorous enforcement of the principle of non discrimination across the board, and stronger cooperation from international NGOs. As part of a mid term review of the overall rehabilitation endeavour, the ECDF organised a two-day programme (in August 2005) which included tsunami-affected people and representatives of 45 NGOs that looked at progress to date and identified future needs. Following this workshop, a delegation of 11 community members went to New Delhi to lobby for a stronger federal response. As a result, there was a marked increased in union government support for tsunami recovery programmes. The ECDF also successfully lobbied the Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Pondicherry governments to expand their programmes to include marginalised groups in their tsunami work, and the ECDF was involved in the national public hearing on discrimination against Dalits in tsunami relief and rehabilitation operations, held in Chennai (30 August 2005) and Cochin (30 November 2005). The ECDF also saw the access to government that it gained through its disaster work as an opportunity to advocate more broadly for the strengthening of coastal environmental regulations and industrial development, among other things. Finally, it sought official and donor support for the planting of mangroves, screw pine, casuarinas and other shelter trees along the coastal belt to ameliorate the impact of storm surges and tsunamis, for instance, as well as for the restoration of the prawn fishery (see Danielson, 2005). Conclusion That the ECDF s response to the tsunami along the east coast of India was successful was due to its experience of other disasters in that part of India and the ability of local NGOs to come together to address a local crisis. This example offers important lessons for NGO cooperation and networking in disaster situations, both in India and in the region more broadly. While NGOs (particularly local entities) are generally poor at networking as part of development or disaster work, the trust and cooperation built up though joint advocacy initiatives may well provide the foundation for better cooperative work by NGOs in future disasters.

9 128 The strength of networks: the local NGO response to the tsunami in India At the root of the ECDF s success is the fact that its institutional form emerged out of three existing networks, and hence its 12 members could draw on a strong tradition of collaboration to promote issues affecting fishing and other communities along the east coast. Its links and advocacy experience facilitated the launch of an effective response, characterised by: a prompt emergency relief programme, lasting more than three months, to supply food and to meet other immediate needs; a strong watchdog role, to ensure that all communities were treated fairly and their needs addressed; a rehabilitation programme that aimed to rehabilitate the livelihoods of the women of fisher communities, utilising the capacity of existing SHG networks; and an advocacy strategy to protect the natural resource base (rehabilitating the coastal fishing industry) and to mitigate the effects of future natural disasters on these fragile coastal communities (ECDF, 2005b). By the end 2005, the ECDF programme had reached around 20 per cent of the total population affected by the tsunami; the rehabilitation programme, by concentrating on women s livelihoods, had filled an important gap left open by other relief initiatives; and the advocacy campaign had resulted in a marked increase in national government support and some state government support. The tsunami afforded a number of networks the opportunity to recognise that they do not necessarily have competing interests. Rather, many of their interests are complementary, for example, the lives of farmers and service providers from the most marginalised communities along the coastal belt are inextricably connected to those of members of the fisher community. The key lesson that emerges is that the characteristics of NGO advocacy networks can be applied to disaster situations. The ECDF drew on elements of three successful advocacy networks, namely: a shared leadership approach, encouraging people to be innovative and flexible; a decentralised approach to the work; and the incorporation of common systems into this decentralised approach. In other disaster areas it may possible to identify and build on existing locally based advocacy networks so that any response is more effective in reaching the local affected communities, as they have the trust and experience to be able to work together in these high-pressure environments. Correspondence patrick.kilby@anu.edu.au. Endnotes 1 SHGs are autonomous groups of between 10 and 20 women that meet every two weeks to a month to discuss social issues, to pool savings, and to take decisions on the use of the latter as well as bank funds they have leveraged to provide credit to members (see DeW, 2000). Each SHG

10 Patrick Kilby 129 generally has its own bank account and over time can become independent of the facilitating organisation, and in some cases, groups of SHGs form their own federations, for example, to maximise advantages of scale in their dealings with government, banks and other donors. In the early 2000s, governments, at the national and state level, became very active in implementing and funding SHG programmes, with the Indian Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram, boasting in his 2004 budget speech that one million SHGs were operating across India (Chidambaram, 2004). 2 The ECDF was quickly registered as a trust and obtained the necessary prior approval from the union government in Delhi to receive foreign funds and to set up a small secretariat in Chennai. So began the relief programme. 3 The standard relief package generally provided comprised 100 kilogrammes of rice, five kilogrammes of dhal, gramme packets of biscuits, and 1,100 grammes of spices. An additional package of 28 kitchen utensils was supplied to those whose house had been lost or seriously damaged (ECDF, 2005). References Abelson, A. (2003) NGO Networks: strength in numbers? Unpublished paper. Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Washington, DC. Benson, C., J. Twigg and M. Meyers (2001) NGO Initiatives in Risk Reduction: an Overview. Disasters. 25(3). pp Benzi, R. (2006) NGOs in conflict prevention: experiences from the water sector in Ethiopia. Development in Practice. 16(2). pp Chidambaram, P. (2004) Budget Speech of P. Chidambaram, Minister of Finance, July 8, 2004, Part A. (accessed 6 October 2005). Choo, P.S. (2005) Women in the December 26 Tsunami: how they have coped; how can we help. NAGA World fish Center Newsletter. 28(1). pp Danielson, F. et al. (2005) The Asian Tsunami: a protective role for coastal vegetation. Science. 310(5748). p Das, B.P. (2005) Socio-Economic Devastation of Orissa Coast, India: Caused by Unprecedented Sea Level Rise during October 1999 Super Cyclone. Paper presented at the World Water and Environmental Resources Congress, May, Anchorage, AK. DeW (Tamilnadu Corporation for Development of Women Ltd.) (2000) Mahalir Thittam: Working Manual. DeW, Chennai. ECDF (East Coast Development Forum) (2005a) Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation Initiative Progress Report, Jan May. ECDF, Chennai. ECDF (2005b) Disaster Preparedness and Community-based Coastal Resource Management: A Project Proposal. ECDF, Chennai. Ewig, C. (1999) The strength and limits of NGO women s movement model: shaping Nicaragua s democratic institutions. Latin American Research Review. 34(3). pp Hudson, A. (2001) NGOs and transnational advocacy networks: from legitimacy to political responsibility. Global Networks. 1(4). pp ITWWS (Irulas Tribal Women s Welfare Society) (2005) Intervention of ITWWS in Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation. Report. July. ITWWS, Chennai. Kilby, P. (2006) Accountability for empowerment: dilemmas facing non governmental organizations. World Development. 34(6). pp Krishnakumar, A. (2005) In Chennai, women s vulnerability exposed by tsunami. Unpublished report. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC.

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