Immigration. Our individual rights are (in general) much more secure and better protected

Transcription

1 Immigration Some Stylized Facts People in the developed world (e.g., the global North ) are (in general) much better off than people who live in less-developed nation-states. Our individual rights are (in general) much more secure and better protected We are wealthier; we have relatively greater opportunities for economic and intellectual development We have access to (relatively) much better statesupplied benefits and services 1

2 in short, we are comparatively well-off; others are much worse off. Assume that there is a general moral duty, if/to the extant that we can, to help people who are less well-off. Wealthy states do help less-wealthy states through humanitarian aid. (Whether they do enough is another question, one that we will get to later.) A seemingly straightforward and effective way to make people better off would be to allow them to migrate to states that are better off. Yet, for many, this is at least problematic in that it conflicts with a widely-accepted right of nation states to control their borders and, specifically, to control immigration. This apparent conflict is a site for moral argument(s) 2

3 Some Questions Do wealthy states have an obligation to adopt a (relatively) open immigration policy? If not, what explains their right to embrace a (relatively) closed immigration policy? If a state has the right to implement a closed policy, how does this affect its obligations to alleviate worldwide poverty and oppression? Even if a wealthy country is not obligated to adopt an open policy, is it still obligated to allow political refugees and/or stateless persons who seek citizenship? What criteria of selection are morally justified in determining who may or may not immigrate to a country? 3

4 Empirical Issues Economic: What impact (some specified level of) immigration have on job competition, wages, etc.? E.g., employers may benefit from lower wages; consumers may benefit from lowers prices (e.g., for food); existing host country workers may be harmed by lower wages/increased completion. Distribution of Benefits: Impact on benefits and services provided to citizens (e.g., health care, education, welfare). Will increased burdens on these programs undermine public support for them? Culture: In some nations/nation-states, members may have an interest (possibly a very strong interest) in preserving a distinctive public culture. Will immigration have negative effects on traditions, language, etc.? Will immigrants effectively assimilate? Security: States have an obligation to protect their citizens from crime, terrorism, etc. (Hobbes: the fundamental justification for the state.) Will restricting immigration be effective in doing so (or will would-be terrorists simply find other ways in)? 4

5 Political Stability: Immigrants may bring with them political commitments/beliefs that are incompatible with (or outright opposed to) liberal democratic political culture (e.g., /w/r/t freedom of expression, gender equality, separation of church and state, etc.). Do liberal democratic values require tolerating the intolerant (Carens)? Will immigrants from non-liberal societies reliably come to adopt liberal democratic values? Or will immigration from non-liberal societies eventually threaten the political stability of a liberal democratic state? Some Political Position (Moral) Cosmopolitanism: Fundamentally, ultimately all human beings belong (or can belong) to a single political community. Implication: (Relatively, possibly radically) open borders, since we all share an obligation (to fellow members of the world community) to help those in need and/or those who are oppressed: Our fellow citizens (i.e., within our state) count no more and no less than others. N.B.: Can be justified on consequentialist or Kantian grounds 5

6 Egalitarian Cosmopolitanism (Carens): 1) All individuals should be free to pursue their own projects so long as these projects do not interfere with the rights of others. 2) All individuals enjoy rights to equality of opportunity, regardless of class, sex, race, etc. 3) Economic, social and political inequalities (intrinsically) ought to be minimized. Implication: Freedom of movement is a fundamental right; immigration policies that would limit that right require special justification Libertarian Cosmopolitanism (< Locke, Vallentyne): All individuals fully own themselves and, because of this, have moral powers to acquire property rights in other things. Limiting immigration a) unjustifiably limits one s ability to invite others onto one s property and b) unjustifiably limits one s ability to acquire property rights (e.g., in things located across borders) Implication: Freedom of movement is required to exercise our fundamental rights. 6

7 Anticosmopolitanism (Macedo, Wellman): States may/do have a moral obligation to help the world s poor and oppressed (e.g., through humanitarian aid), but this does not extend to opening borders. Other moral considerations (e.g., distributive justice or a right to freedom of association) outweigh or override the presumed obligation to open borders as a way of helping others. Macedo: Open Borders vs. Social Justice Stephen Macedo (Princeton): States have special obligations to their citizens, specifically duties of distributive justice (maintaining institutions of taxation, social benefits, education with a view to achieving a just society). These special obligations (e.g., to our least well-off fellow citizens) generally outweigh obligations to noncitizens 7

8 Why? (After all, borders are as morally arbitrary as accidents of birth the sort of thing that a liberal theory of justice typically seeks to minimize) It is as members or co-participants in self-governing political communities that we have special obligations to our fellow members (278, emphasis added) The range of those with whom we (should) seek to establish principles of justice is limited to those with whom we share a system of binding laws (278, < Rawls). If open immigration threatens to undermine states duties of distributive justice toward it own citizens, then such polices should be rejected. Macedo: Approaches to The Immigration Problem 1. Try to limit legal migration; stop illegal immigration 2. Decrease demand for migrant workers 3. Accept and regularize the flow of migrant labour 8

9 Carens: Migration and Morality According to Joseph Carens (Toronto), liberal egalitarians value: Human freedom: Our freedom to pursue our own projects, insofar as doing so does not interfere with others freedom to do the same. Equality of opportunity: Access to social opportunities should be determined by your talents and capacities not limited by class, race, etc. So far as possible, minimizing actual economic, social, and political inequalities. Freedom of Movement Freedom of movement (FoM) is closely connected to all of these liberal egalitarian values since: FoM is itself an important freedom. FoM is essential for equality of opportunity. FoM would/does contribute to a reduction in actual political, social and economic inequalities. 9

10 It is widely accepted that internal FoM is a defining feature of a liberal state. And in fact, in virtually all liberal states, people enjoy nearly unfettered subnational FoM (e.g., if you are an SK resident, you are free to move to On). Carens: if you take seriously the freedom and equality of all individuals and you treat sub-national freedom of movement as a moral imperative, then you should treat FoM across national borders similarly. Some Objections The backlash argument: Opening borders could damage the sense of community needed for a healthy liberal democratic society. Does this justify more restrictive immigration policies? Carens: no in principle; perhaps in practice. Exclusionists who argue for such policies are either arguing on grounds that are intrinsically unjust (e.g., racism) or simply denying the legitimate claims of potential immigrants. But if exclusionists can effectively threaten disruption, we may in practice have to offer concessions. 10

11 The brain drain hypothesis: Immigrants to wealthy states will often be the best and brightest in their home state; even among the poor it is typically most ambitious and energetic who choose to emigrate. This may impede development in poor states and worsen global inequality. Carens: This is sort of argument that gives U a bad name (290). Even if the argument is correct, restrictions are morally impermissible (cf. regional inequalities within states) Wellman: Immigration and Freedom of Association Christopher Heath Wellman (Washington U.) offers one main argument: Like individual people, legitimate nation-states have the right to freedom of association. The right to freedom of association includes the right to not associate. Therefore, every legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants. 11

12 Freedom of Association (FoA) Individuals: Have a right to marry who you wish (or no one); have a right to choose their religious affiliation (or none). Of course this right is limited: You have no right marry someone against his/her will; a congregation may not accept you. Groups: A club (or other association) has the right to choose who to include (or not include) as a member Wellman: If we accept a right to FoA in the individual and group cases, this implies that states have a similar right and so may rightly exclude potential immigrants on that basis. Note that, for Wellman, this is an essentially deontological claim: It may or not be the case that restrictive immigration policies will lead to bad consequences (or injustice, or infringement of a prima facie right to FoM). For Wellman, FoA is a right that simply overrides all of these considerations. (Cf., again, marriage, religion) 12

13 Fine: FoA Is Not the Answer Sarah Fine (KCL) responds directly to Wellman s argument. According to Fine, that argument depends on two debatable claims 1. The state has a right to freedom of association, which is a component of its right to self-determination. 2. The state's freedom of association includes a right to exclude would-be immigrants. Internal Objections Objection from harm to others: Wellman would agree that a right to self-determination is limited to cases where exercising the right does not harm others. Yet closing borders would/could harm others. Objection from the distinctiveness of the state: The collective of a nation's citizens constitutes neither an intimate (e.g., marriage) nor an expressive (e.g., religion) association. 13

14 Absence of a justification for the state s territorial rights: Wellman's argument only applies to membership in the political community, but there is a difference between membership in a community and permission to enter territory. 14