The National Uprising of February 27th

Transcription

1 The National Uprising of February 27th In September, the Commander General of the Metropolitan Police (PM) announced his intention to decree a curfew for minors under 16 years of age, starting at 9:00 pm, the breaking of which would cause the arrest of both the minors and their representatives. In case this measure comes into effect, it would not only violate the right to free transit enshrined in the Constitution -which can only be suspended by the President s authority- but it would also create a regime of exception for minors, outside the scope of juvenile justice, ignoring the regulations concerning criminal responsibility, which is set at 18 years old. PROVEA considers that, in case these measures came into effect, they would constitute a dangerous precedent regarding the imposition of force, which would violate national and international legislation on Human Rights. 1

2 Causes and development of the uprising The events that took place during February 27th and 28th, 1989, started with a violent and massive protest against the excessive increase in transportation fees. It became a full-blown uprising, a phenomenon of massive protest, unprecedented in its national scope. Rioters broke into shops and supermarkets, finding their warehouses full of food basket staples which had been hoarded for weeks in preparation for the price release announced by the national government. The main characteristic of this first phase, the uprising itself, is that it was completely spontaneous, involving people from the slums, students and certain middle class sectors, who used this manifestation to express their dissatisfaction for economic and social policies advanced by various consecutive governments. The fact that the uprising was spontaneous, without any political direction, led to it devolving into lootings of small shops or medium-sized retailers which, although in a lesser scale, were also affected by the crisis. Spontaneity also sparked vandalism in poor sectors, which in a way, distorted the legitimacy of the protest. The second phase started with the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the establishment of the curfew, ordered by the government on Tuesday, February 27th (see Annex 5), when social conflict was getting out of hand. Press reports for those two days agree on a balance of 60 to 80 fatalities and over a thousand people wounded. From that moment onwards, the Armed Forces took control of the situation, preventing further lootings with their presence, and successfully imposing a relative order in daily life. Due to massive military presence on the streets -10,000 soldiers were deployed in the country s interior-, severe Human Rights violations started to take place. Fatalities climb to 276 according to official figures, to 379 according to Causa R legislators, and to a thousand according to student sources and foreign journalists. The third phase started on Monday, March 6th, when several sectors began to provide an organized solution to the situation. The Missing Persons Committee, the Committee for the Restitution of Constitutional Guarantees and the Central University s Comité de 2

3 Notables are created spontaneously and without much coordination or agreement. Human Rights institutions start to process complaints, to aid victims and relatives in judicial procedures and visiting detention centers. The positive aspect was the high amount of public complaints filed by relatives, torture victims and people whose homes were destroyed under gunfire. Once constitutional guarantees were reestablished, the government released all prisoners and even dismissed soldiers accused of military insurrection. The process of presenting complaints before tribunals and the Prosecutor s Office begins, regarding cases of Human Rights violations. Main repression patterns Deaths and executions. Most deaths during this period were caused by high caliber bullet wounds located from the waist up, occurring at night during the curfew. According to reports by victims relatives, the military tactic prevalent in popular areas of Caracas such as 23 de Enero, El Valle, Petare and Catia, was indiscriminate fire against apartments and houses, many of which were completely destroyed, in response to a few snipers. The official figure of 276 fatalities was reported by the then Prosecutor General, although that institution hadn t made an exhaustive investigation on the matter. Official secrecy, limitations imposed on the press and severe repression, prevented casualties to be appropriately measured and recorded. On the other hand, we re left to wonder if the final count has any relevance, considering the unacceptable death pattern, regardless of whether the pattern caused a thousand, ten or even only one victim. The Venezuelan Constitution doesn t allow the suspension of guarantees that protect the right to Life and yet, there s a persistent sensation that the suspension of some guarantees was taken by the various security forces as a licence to kill. A captain was recorded by a news outlet saying: Soldiers have been killed here and when that happens, we intensify our work [killing] isn t hard, because we re already indoctrinated, accustomed and psychologically prepared. 3

4 It s true that the police and the army were kept at bay by snipers in some places, but the vast majority of deaths weren t caused by armed clashes. In a considerable amount of documented cases, deaths were caused by deliberate acts, as is the case of poet Crisanto MEDEROS, who was shot in his bed by a military commission, after they d forcefully entered his home on March 3rd. As they left the room, they cautioned his relatives: he was killed by rioters two days ago. His body was transported to the Technical Judicial Police s (PTJ) morgue, where it was eventually located by his family with a tag that said Unidentified. Not retrievable. The death certificate said that the poet had been shot for disobeying the curfew. Likewise, Yulimar REYES, literature student at the UCV, was shot in the throat, neck and chest with rubber bullets, on February 27th, when a PM officer attacked her in the commercial area of a building in Caracas; the student was merely ten meters away from the police officer, terrified by the weapon. Another student who tried to help her, was also wounded. The student couldn t be taken to a hospital immediately because police didn t allow it. Many fatalities were caused by the security bodies refusal to allow the wounded to be immediately taken to a healthcare facility, leaving them to bleed out on the street. Others were caused by shots that wounded people inside their homes, killing them instantly or seriously injuring them. People wounded in this manner couldn t be taken to a hospital despite the neighbors waving white handkerchiefs from their windows, begging the Armed Forces for help, which the authorities ignored. Other victims were ordered to run, to be later shot down, as was the case of Juan Alexander FRANCO (22), murdered by the PM, after being forced to run with a bullet in his leg. It s also the case of Eleazar MAVARES (18), arrested on March 3rd at 2:30pm. He was first shot by an PM officer who then ordered him to run, to which he refused due to the pain. Witnesses report to have heard a PM officer order one of his men: I m not going to carry the wounded. Kill him. Some members of security bodies took the suspension of guarantees as a chance to settle personal scores. That was, among others, the case of Boris BOLÍVAR, who had been threatened with death by a PM agent, weeks before the protests. Once 4

5 guarantees were suspended, a PM patrol car took Bolívar, and his body was found days later in the banks of the Guaire river, with a shot in the head. Several other bodies were found in the river, ten and even fifteen days after guarantees had been suspended. All of them had been reported as missing and had bullet wounds in their chest and head; other bodies showed signs of mistreatment and torture. In Maracay (Aragua state,) a group of students was dispersed by police officers firing from an ambulance, which resulted in the death of Juan Carlos CELIS PÉREZ. A Red Cross worker was arrested when trying to fulfill his humanitarian obligation in that same city. At least one wounded was forcefully taken by soldiers from the hospital in which he was being attended. These kinds of actions, coupled with the army s refusal to allow the wounded to receive attention, show a highly worrying trend, in which not even the minimum rules governing a state of internal or external warfare, were observed by the authorities who took the suspension of guarantees as a green light to act with impunity. Disappearances. The Missing Persons Committee, created by the parliamentarian caucus of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), received complaints about missing persons, starting with 70 cases which gradually dropped to 43 and finally, to three. It s concerning that many of those missing were found dead after being detained by security forces, although it s important to note that these disappearances aren t characterized by State repression practices denounced by other countries in the Continent. On Friday, March 3rd, 80 burials took place in the Southern General Cemetery, in Caracas; the normal average oscillates between 20 and 25 burials. However, mass graves aren t part of this count and cemetery authorities weren t accountable for what happened between 4:00 pm and 6:00 am of the following day, since Civil Defense took charge of the place during that period. On Monday, March 6th, 35 corpses were exhumed from a mass grave in La Peste Nueva sector in the general cemetery, with the intention of relieving the morgue of unclaimed bodies. The Missing Persons Committee submitted to the Prosecutor s Office a list of people declared missing, requesting the exhumation of bodies from the mass graves. The ministers questioned by the Congress s Interior Policy Committee denied the existence of mass graves. When asked by the press about the resources 5

6 available to families of missing and isolated persons, Pastor Heydra, head of the Central Office of Information, replied remember that guarantees are suspended. It s important to note that some disappearances were caused by the general confusion at the morgue and in health care centers; on the other hand, this confusion was worsened by the little cooperation authorities offered people who were trying to find their relatives. A typical example of official secrecy, coupled with a series of illegal actions, was the case of Antonio SARRAMEDA, shot in a foot while trying to aid another wounded. Sarrameda was taken to a hospital, and was later taken by soldiers who forced the doctors to hand him over. His mother looked for him in hospitals, morgues and detention centers for 10 days and she was told to desist more than once, since her son was probably dead. Sarrameda was later revealed to be among those detained in Fuerte Tiuna, wounded and accused of killing Mayor Acosta Carles. He was released later, however, with no formal charges filed against him. Arrests and illegal searches. Also due to the suspension of guarantees, the State s security forces, including the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM), which has no authority to collect intelligence on possible dissidents, carried out hundreds of illegal searches, arresting students and independent grassroots groups in poor areas, even Jesuit priests, while attempting to find information about their activities, intimidating them and blaming them for the riots before public opinion. Some of the detainees were tortured, a fact proven by the Committee created by President Carlos Andrés Pérez himself. Several students and community leaders were tried in military tribunals for the crime of military rebellion, a practice that had been criticized before by national and international Human Rights organizations. Some of the detainees were brought to Caracas from other parts of the country, having been arrested in other circumstances. Such is the case of brothers Ernesto and Arsenio FERNÁNDEZ, who were arrested in Barquisimeto (Lara state,) on August, 1988, accused of being members of Venceremos, an alleged guerrilla group; back 6

7 then, they were released when proven innocent, although they were warned that they would be arrested again in case any more riots occurred in the future. In Caracas, the detention centers were the DIM, the headquarters of the National Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP) and Fuerte Tiuna. Around 200 students were detained in the DISIP s cells during the first days, and then were transported to Fuerte Tiuna. It s worth noting that, while government spokespersons indicated during the first riots that many of those responsible for lootings were foreigners, only 56 cases of foreigners were handed over to the Directorate of Identification and Immigration (DIEX) to study their situation. Besides arrests, hundreds of homes, community or cultural work facilities were illegally searched. Equipment, flyers, personal documents and money were stolen. Roland Dennis BOULTON, who was arrested and reported that his workplace was illegally searched, filed a formal complaint before the Prosecutor s Office. Initial investigations produced no results, since there was no record that any search warrant had been issued. Arrests and searches started the very first day of the uprising, many of them were carried out during the curfew and in many cases, detainees were taken to detention facilities in unidentified vehicles. All of these actions were denounced through the media by public figures and were considered socio-political persecution. Tortures. Several complaints of torture were processed by the Presidential Committee, created to analyze the situation of arrested students, and were revealed to the public by media outlets. Chapter 2.3 presents a detailed analysis on these complaints. 7

8 Disregard for the law and judicial helplessness The application of justice during the suspension of guarantees met with several obstacles. The suspension of constitutional guarantees created a climate of confusion and anarchy, in which security forces felt authorized to act illegally, while citizens were ignorant of the authorities power restrictions, and didn t think they had the right to demand an end to these excesses. According to PROVEA, the ultimate responsibility falls on the Executive Branch s authorities, who decreed the suspension of guarantees, without taking adequate measures to inform security forces about the limits of their restrictions, and let citizens know about the reach of these measures and the available resources to protect their essential rights. Official response to complaints Independent investigations. Starting in March, the President appointed a Presidential Committee to investigate the situation of arrested students during events of February 27th and 28th, 1989, led by criminologist Elio Gomez Grillo. The Committee interviewed students held in the Directorate of Military Intelligence and Fuerte Tiuna. They also interviewed high ranking officers of civilian and military security forces. The report was delivered to the President, but its results were never disclosed to the public. Off the record, it was revealed that the Committee reported detailed information on tortures and abuses committed against students held in the DIM, and the Committee s members certified that, in fact, they observed dark stains on the skin, presumably caused by electric shocks. The Committee also recommended performing forensic examinations on the victims. However, PROVEA later reported that some students who tried to request tomographies and other medical examinations, couldn t do it due to the lack of cooperation from Prosecutor s Office authorities and medical examiners, in a behaviour that clearly violates their ethical obligations. On the other hand, the Congress Interior Policy Committee (CPI), started an investigation on March about February s events, their causes and consequences 8

9 regarding Human Rights. The CPI s report was unanimously approved and made public in July. The report was the result of meetings with the Governors of the Federal District and Miranda state, as well as with the ministers of Defense, Justice and Interior. The report includes a narrative summarizing the meetings with the three ministers. Of particular interest: The three ministers agreed on quoting the balance of 276 fatalities as the official figure. Although the CPI didn t openly support this figure, neither did they refute it in their report, because lawmakers from different parties couldn t agree on accepting certain statistics provided by some deputies. So far, it s been impossible for PROVEA to obtain a copy of the official list of deaths because, according to information we were offered off the record, that list is top secret and won t be made public. The Justice minister said he had no information about the existence of mass graves, even though it was widely reported by the press. He said that, in case there were any, they were the responsibility of Civil Defense, a body attached to the Interior ministry. However, the Interior minister also denied the graves existence, although he admitted that 87 people had been buried without identification or informing their families. Despite official denial of the graves existence, PROVEA has received a series of witness accounts and complaints from relatives of the deceased, who couldn t retrieve the body and were informed that it was buried in a mass grave. The questioned ministers denied the allegations of tortured detainees, remarking that the medical team who examined some of them in the presence of authorities from the Prosecutor s Office didn t find any medically verifiable sign that such tortures occurred. This contradicts the report issued by the Presidential Committee created to investigate the situation of the detainees. In a witness account received by PROVEA, the person interviewed was shocked to hear a Prosecutor s Office authority say to the detainees You should thank God that you re in prison, because there are many dead on the street. The CPI report also includes cases of detainees that were unconstitutionally isolated and strongly criticizes the Prosecutor s Office s reiterative and almost traditional disregard for one of its main purposes as an 9

10 institution, which is to defend citizen rights. It s important to note, however, that even though the CPI itself was aware of the Prosecutor s Office s severe negligence, some of their conclusions, as well as the statements of the questioned ministers, are based on information issued by members of that institution. Regarding alleged disappearances, the Interior minister said that many of those reported missing might have been buried without identification and others were people whose disappearances were reported by their relatives prior to February 27th. As for the CPI, they spoke about a list of missing persons submitted by the Missing Persons Committee, saying that the list offered no way for the CPI to determine the identity of these individuals and called for relatives to offer precise information about them. Months later, the head of the CPI publicly promised to continue investigating for the whereabouts of the individuals whose disappearance was ratified before the Committee. So far, there s no information about the CPI s progress in this regard. The Defense minister dismissed allegations that his office had been ordering illegal searches, which is contradicted by complaints of people affected by this practice. Illegal searches were widely reported by media outlets, but it wasn t a surprise, since inviolability of the home was one of the guarantees suspended. The Defense and Interior ministers admitted that security forces committed excesses, but indicated that those were individual decisions, not orders. Without establishing responsibility, the CPI report says that security forces committed severe excesses (...) meaning that they caused innocent victims. Despite statements about individual excesses, a sizable part of the procedures had been started or known by Military Justice. PROVEA believes that the files of the complaints for alleged Human Rights violations should be made available for the ordinary criminal jurisdiction. This issue is stressed later on. 10

11 The Defense minister denied that the riots could ve been motivated or stimulated by subversive elements or by the interference of foreign governments. PROVEA agrees with this and, in that regard, it s strange that students and community leaders were illegally arrested and blamed for the riots. The ministers agreed in pointing out that most excesses were caused by lack of information about the meaning and reach of the suspension of guarantees, among the people as well as security bodies. In this regard, the CPI recommends the creation of a law to regulate states of emergency. PROVEA thinks that such a law would be redundant since the Constitution and a series of national laws and international agreements in which Venezuela participates, already have a number of clauses that regulate states of emergency and suspension of guarantees. Many of these clauses were not respected during the recent suspension of guarantees. Therefore, it s a matter of fully enforcing what s established in the current regulation, since creating additional legislation on the issue wouldn t necessarily ensure compliance. PROVEA recommends that the emphasis must be in instructing people and security forces on current regulation and demanding Congress, as well as the institutions in charge of dealing justice, to fulfill their obligations to control everything regarding suspension of guarantees, which we hope won t be necessary in the future. In their recommendations, the CPI requests the National Institute of Housing (INAVI) to perform a technical evaluation of the damage caused in houses affected by firearms. So far, there s no information about the work advanced by the INAVI, in contrast with the speed with which several private and public organizations approached the problem of shops affected by lootings. In the last paragraph of their report, the Committee promises before the Chamber and the people, to permanently continue gathering any information or complaint related to the riots. 11

12 Judicial investigations. The PTJ s Homicide Division had started to collect information regarding reports of casualties occurred from February 27th onwards. However, on March 3rd, the DIM notified the PTJ that all files had to be handed over to the military jurisdiction. In view of the DIM s demands, Judge 43 of the First Instance Criminal Court, said that jurisdiction conflicts may be processed between tribunals; in this case, between military and ordinary criminal tribunals, and there s no need to present them before an auxiliary institution like the PTJ. The Judge remarked that as long as the conflict of jurisdiction was not presented in these terms, criminal tribunals would still have access to the cases. On the other hand, a Prosecutor s Office authority said that, in view that all complaints regarding the riots occurred while the state of emergency was in effect, military judges requested access to a series of files that were under the jurisdiction of criminal courts. Differing from this interpretation, PROVEA requested information about the judicial foundation for that claim; so far that information is yet to be provided. PROVEA s perspective regarding the aforementioned claim is based on these premises: Article 39(b) of the Framework Law of Security and Defense (LOSD) isn t applicable, since the presidential decree didn t declare a state of emergency, but suspension of guarantees. In Venezuelan Emergency Law, these concepts are distinct and independent. Article 123(3) of the Military Justice Code isn t applicable, since the events in question didn t take place within military facilities. Additionally, if the statements of the then Defense minister before the CPI are considered valid, the abuses and excesses committed weren t officially ordered, but produced by individual initiatives. Only Article 6 of the same Code, which establishes that no one can be militarily tried for any crimes but those set forth in this Code, nor punished for military misdemeanor but in compliance with the Regulation of Disciplinary Punishment, except for cases established in Article 123, 3rd paragraph, is applicable. As we can see, this paragraph is excluded in the cases that we re studying. 12

13 As this report is created, 230 cases related to February s riots are being reviewed by military tribunals. Other cases (about 40,) are being processed by ordinary criminal justice. As a positive note, PROVEA highlights that military justice authorities have begun to rescind jurisdiction over a number of files which are now being handed over to ordinary criminal tribunals, particularly in cases in which those involved belong to police or civilian security bodies. We reiterate, however, that PROVEA believes that ordinary criminal justice should know about all the cases related to February s riots, where violation of essential rights is suspected. Few decisions have been reached, seven months after these events, all of them issued by ordinary justice: Arrest warrant against a PM agent who fired his weapon indiscriminately, severely wounding Osquelis CAMPOS, causing her to completely lose sight of both eyes. Arrest warrant against a PM officer, for the homicide of Yulimar REYES. Arrest warrant against state police officers in Maracay (Aragua state,) for the death of student Juan Carlos CELIS PÉREZ, killed by gunshots fired from within an ambulance. Investigations were opened for other two officers who were inside the vehicle. Although PROVEA considers these measures to be positive, it expresses its concerns for the extreme tardiness with which these cases are being processed. Upon concluding this report, it was revealed that Criminal Judge 43, who was aware of the request to exhume bodies buried in mass graves, declined any authority in the case, handing it over to military tribunals. PROVEA believes that this is an extremely serious decision, since exhuming these mass graves is imprescindible to know the truth, to locate people who are still missing and satisfy the legitimate request of relatives who have expressed their wishes to bury their loved ones according to their beliefs. The handout of this case to military tribunals could mean additional delays in 13

14 the process. At the last minute, it was revealed that the Prosecutor s Office was working to avoid the handing over of this file to military tribunals, but it s unknown whether they were successful. PROVEA wants to certify the receptiveness found among high-ranking Prosecutor s Office authorities, once Dr. Ramón Escovar Salóm was appointed to lead the institution. The relatives of the victims of February s riots met with the Prosecutor General and several Prosecutor s Office Directors in two occasions, to find mechanisms to hasten the process. As a result of these meetings, a committee formed by Prosecutor s Office authorities, relatives of the victims and representatives of Human Rights organizations was created. This mixed committee has had some progress, although not with the expected speed, in a series of cases known to ordinary criminal tribunals. The military jurisdiction has had much less progress and some relatives have expressed their dissatisfaction with the attitude of Prosecutor s Office authorities and military justice officials whom the relatives think are trying to delay or confuse the investigations. Finally, PROVEA wishes to emphasize that it knows about a series of complaints filed by victims and relatives of victims of February s riots, who have been intimidated, harassed or followed, presumably to make them desist in their attempts to obtain justice. As an example, we present the case of Margarita de MEDEROS, mother of Crisanto MEDEROS, whose case has already been mentioned. In mid-september, Mrs. Mederos s home was searched by men who identified themselves as PTJ agents and presented a judicial warrant, which caused Mrs. Mederos and her grandchildren a great deal of distress, as they remembered Crisanto s death. Since there was no reason for this search, Mrs. Mederos filed a complaint before the Prosecutor s Office. Initial investigations indicate that the men weren t PTJ agents, and there was no proof that any tribunals issued the search warrant for the Mederos family s residence, which would support claims about intimidation. Other harassment complaints have been filed by several students arrested by the DIM. 14